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Abstract 
 This thesis examines the expansion of the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) under the 
St. Laurent government with the concept of the Big Air Force that emerged from the defence re-
armament programme announced on 5 February 1951.  During this critical Cold War period, the 
RCAF became Canada’s first line of defence, making an essential contribution to the collective 
defence of Western Europe through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.  Concurrently, the 
RCAF underwent tremendous expansion in Canada contributing to North American defence, 
along with significant increases in its training, maritime and transport capabilities.  The RCAF 
developed into the largest military service with the biggest portion of the defence budget.  The 
notion of “airmindedness” that permeated all aspects of Canadian society enabled the 
development and implementation of the Big Air Force concept.  Underlying the Big Air Force 
concept were two conflicting visions of air power, derived from leading theorists of the 1920s.  
The first was an independent role for aviation, “Douhet with nukes,” a Cold War reference to the 
ideas of Italian General Giulio Douhet.  The second approach was American General William 
Mitchell’s “anything that flies” construct that embraced missions under the control of the army 
and navy and support to other agencies in such undertakings as air transport.  By the late 1950s, 
the Big Air Force could not be sustained, thus marking its decline under the Diefenbaker and 
Pearson governments that was complete by the late 1960s.  Despite some modernization in the 
late 1970s, successive governments adhered to the notion of a “minimalist air force” after 1969 
until the end of the Cold War.  This thesis considers the expansion and decline of the air force 
from the perspective of three inter-related thematic pillars – politics and economics, military 
strategy and technology.  The predominance of air power represented the Canadian “way of war” 
during this time, and this legacy still resonates today with the ongoing debate regarding the F-35 
aircraft for the RCAF’s Next Generation Fighter Capability programme. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and Literature Review 
 
Canadian experience during the Second World War ensured that air power would be an 
essential part of Canadian defence in the post-1945 period, and it was during the years of the 
Louis St. Laurent government from 1948 to 1957 that the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) 
reached the apex of its development.1 The emphasis placed on the RCAF by the St. Laurent 
government ensured its dominance among the Canadian armed forces for a generation. 
Air power became the “Canadian way of war” during the St. Laurent years, or at least the 
“Canadian way of deterrence.” For a short time, the RCAF was one of the top half-dozen air 
forces in the world.2  Wartime ‘post-hostilities’ planning that carried into the early post-war years 
was for a small, but balanced and independent air force.3  This approach was dashed with the 
outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 that necessitated a rapid expansion of the RCAF to meet the 
demands of collective defence both in North America and Western Europe.  The development as 
a balanced force gave way to specialized alliance roles resulting in the build up of a large fighter 
force. The RCAF was able to achieve both quality and quantity, but in the longer term was 
unable to sustain this level of effort. The seeds of its eventual decline were planted in its very 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 A taxonomy for identifying a tiered methodology for categorizing air forces in terms of quality and functionality is 
also missing.  See Colonel James Cottingham, Commanding Officer, Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre, 
“An Air Force Taxonomy,” Powerpoint presentation at the Aerospace Power Forum 2005, “The Demand-Resource 
Dilemma: The Experiences of 2nd and 3rd Tier Air Forces,” Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of 
Manitoba, Winnipeg, MB, 22-23 November 2005. 
2 According to the Canadian Forces Chief Historian Stephen J. Harris, the RCAF could be rated as a Tier 1 air force 
until 1958, and thereafter Tier 2+ throughout the Cold War, Aerospace Power Forum 2005. 
3 See Alexander Babcock, The Making of the Cold War Air Force: Planning and Professionalism in the Postwar 
Royal Canadian Air Force, 1944-1950. Unpublished PhD Thesis, Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, 2009. 
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expansion, a decline that became pronounced during the Diefenbaker and Pearson governments 
of 1957-68.   
The term “air power” has been used since the early beginnings of manned powered flight, 
but there has not been a universally accepted definition of the term. The term “airpower” has 
been used and abused by both proponents and opponents of air warfare represented by such 
works as Alexander P. de Seversky, Air Power: Key to Survival (1950) and Marshall Andrews, 
Disaster Through Air Power (1950).4  The starting point for this project, therefore, was the 
definition used by the RCAF during the 1950s, which mirrored that of the RAF: “Air power 
means the use of the air to enforce the national will.”5  In the course of the research I have 
further defined air power as “the application of air force resources to meet Canadian national and 
international defence and collective security commitments.”  This refinement owes much to 
Stefan Possony’s “elements of air power” described in his seminal study, Strategic Air Power 
(1949) discussed later in this chapter.6 
This thesis will examine the development of air power in Canada during the St. Laurent 
years from 1948 to 1957 with an emphasis on the RCAF’s expansion after the outbreak of the 
Korean War in 1950, a period that has been referred to as the “golden years of the RCAF.”7 The 
notion of a “golden age” in Canadian defence and diplomacy is a recurring issue in the 
historiography.8  However, a closer examination of the RCAF’s supposed Golden Age in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See Alexander P. de Seversky, Air Power: Key to Survival, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1950, and Marshall 
Andrews, Disaster Through Air Power, New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc, 1950. 
5 Air Ministry.  Royal Air Force Manual – Operations, AP 1300, January 1950, p. 19. 
6 Stefan T. Possony, Strategic Air Power: The Pattern of Dynamic Security, Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 
1949. 
7 See Larry Milberry, Sixty Years: The RCAF and CF Air Command 1924-1984, Toronto: CANAV Books, 1984, p. 
258 and James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada – Volume 4: Growing Up Allied, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1980, p.38. 
8 See Andrew Cohen, While Canada Slept: How We Lost Our Place in the World, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart 
Ltd, 2003, Marc Milner, Canada’s Navy: The First Century (2nd Edition), Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
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early stages of this project raised fundamental questions about the accuracy of this label.  It soon 
became evident that the Golden Age of the RCAF needed to be explored in a broader context, as 
existing studies are quite narrowly focused.  In fact, many of the difficulties and significant 
cutbacks that the air force endured during the Diefenbaker and Pearson governments from 1957 
to 1968 and later were manifestations of lapses and shortcomings during the St. Laurent years.  
The massive expansion of the Golden Age in the early 1950s was a scramble in response to 
dramatic changes in the international security environment.  The first part of this thesis shows 
how the rapid changes in military strategy and technology during the early 1950s resulted in 
political and economic commitments to a large air force that were reactive and crisis-driven 
rather than broadly considered and forward looking.  It is true that the RCAF achieved pre-
eminence among the forces in terms of manpower, equipment, and budgetary priorities, as 
emphasized in the existing literature on the Golden Age of the service.  However, the present 
study will demonstrate that the over-riding commitment to air power for the country’s defence 
was transitory.  A severe weakness for the RCAF as an institution was a failure to appreciate the 
impact of continuing rapid changes in technology, the strategic environment, and Canadian 
politics.  These changes in fact challenged the purposes of the Golden Age air force and the 
ability and willingness of the country to sustain such a large service even before the end of the 
St. Laurent administration in 1957.  
The research question that began this study was why Canada developed a large air force, 
in particular for what purposes.  Central concerns all through the project were the question “does 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2010, and Peter Kasurak, A National Force: The Evolution of Canada’s Army, 1950-2000, Vancouver, UBC Press, 
2013. 
 4 
size matter” and the issue of quality versus quantity for military effectiveness.9 The intellectual 
challenge that arose during the research was the increasingly evident need to place the Golden 
Age of the RCAF as popularly presented during the St. Laurent years in context by addressing 
subsequent developments, principally the challenges – manifested most concretely in the erosion 
of budgets -- of the Diefenbaker and Pearson years, 1957-1968.  What began as an exploration of 
the unheralded expansion of the period 1950-1957 became a study of the rise and fall of what I 
have referred to as the “Big Air Force concept.” The latter term includes the vision of the 
RCAF’s leadership, and also the government’s airmindedness in facilitating the realization of 
that vision.  The St. Laurent government’s commitment saw the RCAF emerge as the “senior” 
military service, with the biggest budget, the biggest slice of military manpower, and a leading 
place in the development of the nation’s aviation industry.  Of the three services, the RCAF 
alone achieved most of its desired “wish list” for expansion.10  
At the heart of the “Big Air Force concept” was the RCAF leadership’s commitment to 
“independent” air power, that is, an almost complete priority for roles independent of the other 
armed services.  Indeed, the air staff engaged in continuous and sometime acrimonious 
opposition to the development of aviation arms of the army and navy to meet those services’ 
specialized needs on the premise that only the air force should operate aircraft.  Confidence in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Both Canada and Australia have made the claim that each nation’s air force, the RAAF and RCAF, was “the fourth 
largest air force in the world” at the end of the Second World War.  Raw numbers and different dates do not tell the 
entire story.  See “World’s Fourth Largest Air Force?” Pathfinder, Royal Australian Air Force Air Power 
Development Centre Bulletin, Issue 119, September 2009. 
10 In the case of the RCN, it never realized its goal of a second aircraft carrier, whilst the Canadian Army did not 
expand to a corps or even a complete division. For the Canadian Army, see DHH 73/1223, Series 1, Box 13, File 
265, Consideration of MRC 5/2 and Canadian Proposals to Close the Gap, 10 September 1951, and Sean M. 
Maloney, An Identifiable Cult: The Evolution of Combat Development in the Canadian Army 1946-1965, 
Directorate Land Strategic Concepts Report 9905, Kingston, ON: Department of National Defence, 1999. In the case 
of the RCN, see Michael Whitby, “Fouled Deck: The Pursuit of an Augmented Aircraft Carrier Capability for the 
Royal Canadian Navy, Part 1, 1945-56,” The Canadian Air Force Journal, Vol. 3, No. 3 Summer 2010, and “Fouled 
Deck: The Pursuit of an Augmented Aircraft Carrier Capability for the Royal Canadian Navy, Part 2, 1956-64,” The 
Canadian Air Force Journal, Vol. 3, No. 4, Fall 2010. 
	  
 5 
the primacy of “independent” air power for national defence also bred confidence that the 
circumstances that had brought such large and rapid expansion of the air force in 1950-1957 
would not change, or at least not significantly.     
   The expansion and then decline of the air force will be examined from the perspective 
of three inter-related thematic pillars.  First is the political dimension, particularly Canadian 
civil-military relations and the economics of defence budgeting.  Second is the evolution of 
military strategy as part of Canada’s defence alliances and bi-lateral arrangements within the 
context of the Cold War.  Third, expansion and decline needs to be examined in relation to the 
rapidly changing military technology during this period, including its impact on the political and 
military strategy, especially in response to the Soviet Union’s acquisition of nuclear weapons and 
delivery systems. As well, the implications for air power of the Korean War need to be 
considered.  The build up during and after that war had a long-term impact on the future 
development of the RCAF; much of this impact resulted in negative consequences for its 
institutional well-being.  The governments lead by John Diefenbaker and Lester Pearson 
inherited the results of decisions made during the St. Laurent government regarding the RCAF.  
The response by the Diefenbaker and Pearson governments to RCAF force development 
requirements and plans will be addressed in detail. 
 This thesis is a study of a military institution during a critical period in the Cold War 
from the perspective of the RCAF staff, whose key ideas were embodied in what is termed here 
the Big Air Force concept.  The main narrative traces the fate of the Big Air Force concept – 
from substantial realization in 1950-1957 to gradual and then accelerated erosion -- in the 
context of Canadian government policies. From this larger perspective, the narrative shows how 
the airmindedness of Canadian leaders waned in the face of ongoing international developments 
 6 
and changing relations within the Western alliance, even as the air force leadership remain 
wedded to the ideas that had driven the remarkable expansion of 1950-1957.   Thus the thesis is a 
study of an organization, summoned to extraordinary and successful expansion by unheralded 
international crises in the late 1940s and early 1950s then failing to react to changing 
circumstances on the international stage and in Canadian politics.   
Politics, Technology, and Strategy 
   “Airmindedness,” the conviction that aviation was a key to the future of nations and 
mankind that first emerged in the First World War, became still more important after the Second 
World War among political leaders and the public alike, and was essential to the successful 
promotion of Canadian air power. Jonathan Vance, in High Flight: Aviation and the Canadian 
Imagination, provides an insightful analysis of airmindedness in the Canadian context.11 He 
defined the concept in the years following the First World War as “an enthusiasm for flying, a 
belief in the future of aviation and excitement of what the airplane could do for Canada.”12 With 
rearmament in the late 1930s, the Mackenzie King government gave priority to the 
modernization of the RCAF rather than the Canadian Army.  Despite the existence of defence 
plans that called for the dispatch of army expeditionary forces, Prime Minister Mackenzie King 
viewed the RCAF as the nation’s first line of defence.  On the outbreak of war in September 
1939, the government succumbed to popular demands and those of English Canadian ministers 
to dispatch an army expeditionary force to the United Kingdom, but gave top priority to air force 
expansion through the launching of the vast British Commonwealth Air Training Plan (BCATP), 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Jonathan Vance, High Flight: Aviation and the Canadian Imagination, Toronto: Penguin Books, 2002. 
12 Ibid. p.108.  For an American perspective, see Steve Call, Selling Air Power: Military Aviation and American 
Popular Culture after World War II, College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2009.  A British post-war 
perspective is provided by James Hamilton-Patterson, Empire of the Clouds: When Britain`s Aircraft Ruled the 
World, London: Faber and Faber Limited, 2010. 
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which included the development of training facilities across the country and kick started the 
exponential growth of aircraft production.  Over 70,000 RCAF aircrew were recruited and 
trained through the BCATP and they formed over twenty percent of the aircrew strength in the 
British Commonwealth’s main air force combat commands, especially the RAF’s Bomber 
Command.  This tremendous growth in airmindedness during the Second World War had a great 
impact in the post-war period. 
 Policies during the St. Laurent years represented a renewal of Liberal government 
programmes enacted by Mackenzie King starting in 1935, more fully developed with the 
apprehension of war in 1938-39 and realized on a grand scale during the Second World War.  
The salient features of the King government’s initiatives were:  promotion of military aviation as 
a spur to the growth of civil aviation for national development, particularly through stimulus for 
large-scale aircraft manufacturing and such infrastructure as airfields, re-armament of the RCAF 
as the front line for both home defence and overseas expeditionary forces, and ambitious air 
training programmes in which civilian and military facilities would be mutually supporting. .   
This airmindedness – the embrace of aviation as a key to the nation’s future – was 
uncharacteristic for the exceedingly cautious King.  Certainly the lead role for the air force 
seemed little more than fantasy in 1935.  The RCAF, meagre in size and largely committed to 
support of civilian aviation, was administered as a branch of the Army, and scarcely existed as a 
military organization.  It achieved organizational autonomy from the Army and the status of a 
full-fledged military service only towards the end of 1938.13  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 See James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, Volume 1 – From the Great War to the Great Depression, Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1964, Chapter 5, pp. 185-223 and Chapter 7, pp. 287-302, and James Eayrs, In Defence 
of Canada, Volume 2 – Appeasement and Rearmament, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965, pp. 91-114.  
See also W.A.B. Douglas, The Creation of a National Air Force, The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air 
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Yet aviation, and the air force in particular, seemed convincingly to meet Canada’s 
political and economic circumstances in the face of Depression, international crisis, and then 
world war.  Transportation had always been the key to development of Canada’s vast territory, 
and aviation was clearly the successor to the railway revolution of the 19th century on which the 
new federation had been built.  The large role Canada played during the First World War in 
supplying and training air crew for the British air services had provided the basis for the growth 
of civil aviation in the 1920s, and demonstrated that air forces, in sharp contrast to the Army and 
the Navy, directly spurred the development of essential civilian services and infrastructure.  
These broad considerations provided the context for the particular political usefulness of the air 
force: to avoid the necessity for conscription to sustain an overseas land force as had been 
necessary in 1917-18.  The Liberal Party had achieved political dominance after the First World 
War by pledging never to impose conscription, and thus securing a bedrock of support in French 
Canada, the focus of the most vehement opposition to conscription.  Air forces at once demanded 
very few front line personnel compared to land forces, but required massive training and 
industrial facilities. Provision of those essential services would keep many men and women 
safely removed from combat.14    
 St. Laurent’s experiences as Mackenzie King’s Quebec lieutenant during the 
conscription crises of the Second World War, and then, in 1946-48, as the secretary of state for 
external affairs provided him with acute insights into the art of the possible for Canadian post-
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war defence policy, in which air power figured prominently.  In his capacity as the Minister of 
National Defence (MND) from 1947 to 1954, Brooke Claxton, was a strong advocate for air 
power as Canada’s first line of defence.  The emphasis on the RCAF’s pre-eminent role in 
Canadian defence continued during the tenure of Ralph Campney as the MND, in the period 
1954-57.  Similarly, C.D. Howe’s wartime experience as the minister of munitions and supply, 
and then as the minister of defence production in the St. Laurent cabinet provided another source 
of support for the Big Air Force concept.  From the benches of Her Majesty’s Official 
Opposition, the Progressive Conservative defence critic, Major General (Retired) Georges 
Pearkes, was a keen advocate of air power, and would remain so while MND (1957-59) in the 
Diefenbaker government.  Within the RCAF, successive chiefs of the air staff (CAS), Air 
Marshal Wilf Curtis (1947-53), a veteran of the First World War Royal Naval Air Service and an 
architect of the BCATP, and Air Marshal Roy Slemon (1953-57), who had served since the early 
days of the RCAF in 1920s and occupied senior staff positions in the bombing offensive against 
Germany during the Second World War, provided the necessary leadership for the service to 
gain its pre-eminence.    
However, there were opposing views to large-scale air force expansion, most noticeably, 
but unsurprisingly, amongst senior officers of the Canadian Army, such as Lieutenant General 
Guy Simonds, chief of the general staff, 1951-55 and Major General W.H.S. Macklin, adjutant 
general, 1949-54.  As the Canadian Army’s “personnel manager” during the tremendous 
expansion during the Cold War to meet forward defence requirements in Korea and Northwest 
Europe, Macklin witnessed first hand how the Big Air Force concept progressed at the expense 
of the Army.  After his retirement in 1954, he was alarmed at the considerable defence resources 
that were expended for North American “Maginot Line” style air defences.  This opposition was 
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to manifest itself both within National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) and also in the form of 
more public debate, particularly after Simonds’ retirement in 1955.15  In addition, there was 
internal RCAF opposition to the development of the service as a nuclear equipped “alliance” air 
force in the early 1960s, a programme that did not appear to be focused on future challenges.16  
Defence economics was a key factor in policy debates as air forces were much more 
expensive to equip, train and operate compared to armies, and the rapid advance of technology 
during this period soon made expensive investments in aircraft and weapons obsolete. In The 
Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Paul Kennedy wrote in 1989 of the “upward spiral” which 
described the increasing cost of each successive generation of military equipment; this was 
particularly the case with aircraft.17 The end result was that fewer and fewer aircraft could be 
procured in each successive generation of more sophisticated, and more costly, types.18 
Within the realm of strategy, there were rapid changes in thinking about a future war 
involving the RCAF.  Escott Reid, an official in the Department of External Affairs, who played 
a key role in the drafting of the North Atlantic Treaty, detailed the events that led to the 
establishment of the Alliance in A Time of Fear and Hope: The Making of the North Atlantic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 See Lieutenant General Guy G. Simonds, “Where We Have Gone Wrong on Defence,” Maclean’s, 23 June 1956 
and “We’re Wasting Millions on an Obsolete Air Force,” Maclean’s, 4 August 1956.  See Major General W.H.S. 
Macklin, “The Costly Folly of our Air Defence Policy,” Maclean’s, 18 February 1956. 
16 Remarks byAir Vice Marshal Frederick Carpenter, Air Officer Commanding (AOC) Air Transport Command, 
Royal Canadian Air Force AOC Conference 15-17 March 1960, Appendix G, “Long Range Future of Canada’s 
Defence Forces – Discussion and Presentations by AOCs,”17 March 1960, DHH 73/1223 Series 3, Subseries XIV, 
Box 103, File 2007. 
17 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 
2000, London: Fontana Press, 1989, p. 570.  For example, in the case of RCAF post-war fighter aircraft, the unit 
flyaway cost increased from the Mustang of $54,000 in 1947, to the 1950s Sabre at $360,000, to the 1960s CF-104 
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Combat and Support Aircraft, St Catherines: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2007 
18 Though the costs of aircraft increased due to the complexity and sophistication of their electronics, weapons 
systems and materials, there were ultimately lower life cycle costs of reduced maintenance due to the increased 
reliability.  However, the early jets and jet engines were very maintenance-intensive.  See David Edgerton, The 
Shock of the Old: Technology and Global History since 1900, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, Chapter 4. 
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Treaty 1947-1949.19  Despite an initial belief that the formation of the alliance would result in 
decreased defence expenditures, the outbreak of the Korean War resulted in a sharp increase in 
alliance defence spending from $20 billion to $54 billion by 1952.20  NATO defence from that 
time reflected the belief that the conduct of a major war would be similar to the Second World 
War, and hence the need for large conventional land, naval and air forces equipped to fight a 
long war of attrition. For the RCAF, this would have meant a build up to include not only an 
organization at War Establishment equipment and manning levels, but with large additional 
numbers of aircraft to replace losses due to battle and operational training, together with the 
necessary stockpiles of fuel, ammunition, spares and technical stores to maintain these fleets of 
aircraft. The North Atlantic Council meeting at Lisbon in 1952 set force goals of 96 divisions 
and 9,000 aircraft for the Central European Region. Even as these goals were agreed to, it was 
tacitly acknowledged that they were unattainable.  The NATO nations could not undertake this 
level of rearmament while also building up their economies, the essential foundation for Western 
strength.   
The stalemate of the Korean War caused the United States and other countries to re-
examine their strategy.  For the American government, this resulted in the adoption of the “New 
Look” by the Eisenhower administration in 1954.  This strategy relied upon the concept of 
Massive Retaliation whereby it would respond with nuclear weapons even in the event of small 
brushfire wars, thereby reducing the need to maintain large armies and tactical air forces in 
peacetime. Great Britain issued its Global Strategy Paper in 1952 that placed increased emphasis 
on nuclear weapons in lieu of large-scale conventional forces.  The adoption of nuclear weapon 
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McClelland and Stewart, 1977. 
20 Ibid. pp. 236-237. 
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based policies was to significantly influence the development air power after the Korean War.  
This major shift in the policies of two of NATO’s major members was reflected in the change in 
alliance strategy from reliance on large conventional forces that would require national 
mobilization of its members to an emphasis on smaller forces-in-being integrated with nuclear 
weapons. This change, embodied in the strategic guidance contained in documents such as MC 
14/1 and MC 48, took place over the short period from 1952 to 1954. Such rapid change did not 
allow sufficient time for the smaller NATO nations to re-equip or re-structure their military 
forces.   
Some of the strategic issues that require exploration include the NATO concerns about 
“closing the gap” with apparently preponderant Soviet bloc armed forces strength that were the 
subject of important staff talks in 1951-52, the emergence of the bomber “gap,” and then the 
better known missile “gap,” and the place of peacekeeping in Western and Canadian policy.  
From the perspective of Canadian air force policy, these and other issues raised myriad 
challenges for a small power in filling specialized roles in a changing alliance strategy while 
addressing national needs for a balanced air force of more diverse capabilities.  The competing 
visions of air power represented by the “Douhet with nukes” approach versus the Mitchell 
“anything that flies” version were constants in the period under discussion.   
The Douhet approach related to the central argument of the Italian general’s The 
Command of the Air (first published in 1921): offensive action through bombing was the essence 
of air power. Other aspects of air power, including fighters, were superfluous.21  In Douhet’s 
view, there was no need for the army or naval services.22  Despite the inconclusiveness of the 
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Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986 and Phillip S. 
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Second World War strategic bombing experience, nuclear weapons provided new impetus to 
Douhet’s theory, particularly in the USAF.23 Strategic bombing proponents, who dominated the 
American service, dismissed tactical aviation (and air defence) with their mantra of “not a pound 
for air-to-ground.”24 In the Canadian context, the RCAF leadership gave primacy to the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons for the interdiction bombing role in NATO and strategic air 
defence in NORAD, and considered other missions as subordinate or unnecessary.   
The contrasting approach to air power, built on the ideas of the U.S. Army aviation 
pioneer General William “Billy” Mitchell, also attached paramount importance to offensive 
action through bombing, but recognized the necessity of supporting the army and navy with 
specialized aviation capabilities tailored to their needs.25 In a Canadian context, advocates of the 
Mitchell approach presented this as a balanced air force consisting of various air power functions 
rather than simply the “nuclear air force.” 
 The importance of air power within the context of Canadian defence policy remains one 
of debate today.  The current debate regarding the acquisition of the F-35 Lightning II Joint 
Strike Fighter as a replacement for the CF-18 for the RCAF perpetuates the unending dispute 
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and angst among Canadians regarding the Avro Arrow cancellation of 1959 – a decision that still 
remains one of controversy over fifty years later.26 
The subject of this study is a critical one as the future of air power has re-emerged as a 
key element in contemporary Western defence planning. The importance of air power appeared 
to be minimized at the end of the Cold War, despite the initial tendency by its advocates to gloat 
how air power had “won” the first Persian Gulf War in 1991 and the Kosovo War in 1999.  In 
subsequent conflicts in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan, air power represented Mitchell’s 
“anything that flies” approach with air power as the enabler for “boots on the ground,” not as the 
final arbiter.  Perhaps, this development was so much the case that contemporary and future 
conflict was seen as “war amongst the people,” with its emphasis on counter-insurgency, with a 
marginal need to understand the utility of air power.27 This represented air power in transition, 
due to changes in military strategy and technology, a phenomenon similar to that faced by the 
RCAF in the late 1950s and 1960s.  Emerging aerospace technologies are transforming air 
power, but at a cost that few nations will be able to afford, including the leading air power 
nations.28 This aerospace transformation will not result in the complete disappearance of manned 
combat aircraft, as prematurely announced in the 1957 British Defence White Paper, but it does 
portend a great reduction in their use and the complementary use of unmanned aerial vehicles.  
The concept of the role of air power has also evolved from that of applying coercive force 
through the use or threatened use of kinetic capabilities to that of an “Intelligence, Surveillance 
and Reconnaissance (ISR) force.” This concept is really not new as it harks back to the original 
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role of air power as enunciated at its birth – providing the capability to see what was on the 
“other side of the hill.”29 
Though the requirements for independent air power and the technology of the manned 
bomber were a perennial issue during its doctrinal apex in the period from the 1930s to the early 
1950s, today’s impending transformation has resulted in the unprecedented questioning of the 
requirement for independent and separate organizations for the future application of air power.30  
Interestingly, two recent British Chiefs of the General Staff, General Mike Jackson and General 
Richard Dannatt, openly criticized what has been perceived as the airpower fixation with “fast 
jets.”31 The tremendous reductions for the RAF contained in the British Strategic Defence and 
Security Review of October 2010 represent one example of this approach.32 In Canada, though 
there have been no overt suggestions to “abolish” the Air Force, one of Lieutenant-General Rick 
Hillier’s first acts when appointed Chief of the Land Staff in 2003 was to submit a memorandum 
to the government recommending an army-centric approach to the Canadian Forces.33 Similarly, 
the widespread interest in the proposed acquisition of the Canadian Forces’ next generation 
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fighter capability represents another example of the questioning of the traditional rationale for air 
power.34  This study assists in the assessment of the contemporary air power dilemma by its 
historical analysis of those linkages of politics and economics, strategy and technology from an 
earlier period. 
Literature Review 
 This study also endeavours to provide a critical missing element in the historiography of 
Canadian air power, particularly for the Cold War period.  The historiography of air force 
official history has been marked with as much disappointment as success.35  Although a historical 
section was formed in 1940 at the government’s direction to record the RCAF’s activities in the 
Second World War, there was still a myriad of difficulties promoting its activities.  Firstly, there 
was the opposition from senior RCAF officers who questioned the utility of the historical 
section.  Secondly, RCAF record keeping, both in quality and quantity, left something to be 
desired.  Thirdly, there was the problem of RCAF squadrons serving with the Royal Air Force 
(RAF), whereby tactical records were readily available, but the higher-level operational and 
strategic documentation had to be obtained through the RAF.36  
Starting in 1944, the RCAF Historical Section prepared and issued three volumes entitled 
the RCAF Overseas: the First Four Years, the Fifth Year and the Sixth Year.  This series was not 
intended to be an academic history, but a narrative of RCAF operations for the promotion of 
airmindedness.  The third volume was not published until 1949 and covered the last year of the 
war from September 1944.  Its introductory chapter also espoused the concept of 
“airmindedness” to promote the post-war RCAF: 
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35 Kenneth B. Conn, “The Royal Canadian Air Force Historical Section, The Canadian Historical Review, Vol. 26, 
No. 3, September 1945, pp. 246-250. 
36 Ibid. pp. 246-250. 
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The Regular Force will constitute a highly trained nucleus around which the RCAF 
can be expanded in time of national emergency, while the Auxiliary will provide a 
reserve of fully organized, manned and equipped units which can be mobilized 
quickly into a tactical air component for operations in conjunction with the Canadian 
Army, in the same way that RCAF wings formed part of the 2nd Tactical Air Force 
during the war in Europe.37 
 
In 1946, the Director of the Historical Section, Wing Commander Fred Hitchins, proposed a nine 
volume official history of the RCAF; two volumes to deal with the service’s early history, six 
volumes to cover the Second World War and a ninth volume to encompass specialized topics.38 
However, in an era of fiscal restraint, the minister directed that all work on the history of the war 
be to be concluded by 1 April 1948.39 Hitchins, along with a clerk-typist, was to continue until 
1961 as the Director of the RCAF Historical “Section.”  According to Colonel C.P. Stacey, the 
failure to produce an official air force history resided with Claxton who predicted interest in the 
Second World War would quickly fade so there would be very few readers.40 However, during 
this period, the Army Historical Section, appealing to the more robust tradition of historical 
studies in the land forces, was able to engage in considerable research and publication efforts.  
These included the Canadian Army official history of the multi-volume Second World War 
history and a single volume First World War history.  In addition, the Army Historical Section 
was able to produce a study on “Manpower Problems of the Royal Canadian Air Force during 
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of Canadian Studies, Vol. 19, No. 3, Autumn 1984, p.114. 
39 Ibid. p.114.  The Air Force Historical Section was able to produce RCAF Logbook: A Chronological Outline of 
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197.  According to Stacey, Claxton told him that as the RCAF had fought with the RAF, the British should tell the 
story of the RCAF! 
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the Second World War!”41 The absence of an official RCAF history may have been more the 
result of the lack of support by the RCAF hierarchy than the scepticism and budget cutting of 
Claxton.42  According to Tim Cook in Clio’s Warriors: Canadian Historians and the Writing of 
the World Wars, Air Marshal Wilf Curtis, the Chief of the Air Staff, was culpable for the demise 
of RCAF history: 
Curtis had always acknowledged the importance of an official history in not only 
educating the war’s lessons, but also in publicizing the RCAF’s deeds to all 
Canadians.  Yet it is also clear that the CAS was not willing to devote significant 
resources to the project.43 
 
The production of the initial volume of the Official History of the RCAF fell to Colonel 
Stacey’s replacement, Sydney Wise, in the integrated DND Historical Section.  Production of the 
first volume spanned a thirteen-year period from initial research in 1967 until its publication in 
1980.  The second volume was published in 1986 with the third volume appearing in 1994 just as 
the DND Directorate of History was undergoing a massive reduction.  The introduction to the 
third volume notes, “This is the third of a projected four-volume series outlining the history of 
the Royal Canadian Air Force.”  With the cutbacks in the Directorate of History, the proposed 
fourth volume that would have examined the post-1945 RCAF was cancelled.  The decision not 
to proceed with the fourth volume of the air force official history is perhaps reflective of the 
reluctance to address the study of air power and air force history in Canada.44 Scot Robertson has 
argued that the RCAF has been badly served by historians who “…have tended to focus upon 
aircraft, technology, squadron histories, individual memoirs and the like.  Major efforts at 
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University, 1995, p. 6 and Stacey, A Date with History, p. 196 
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synthesizing Canada’s overall airpower experience are lacking.”45 The absence of this fourth 
volume has had a negative impact on our understanding of the critical role played by the RCAF 
in the post-Second World War period. 
The absence of a comprehensive and scholarly official history may have resulted in a void in 
the historiography, but equally damaging is what D.C. Watt referred to as “The Air Force View 
of History.”46 Watt was commenting on RAF history and specifically that service’s survival 
during the inter-war period by promoting strategic bombing – an ‘independent’ role that kept the 
service free of cooperation with the army and navy and possible loss of resources to those 
services -- and the subsequent acceptance of those ideas as orthodoxy that justified the RAF’s 
concentration on strategic bombing in the Second World War.  In Watt’s view, acceptance and 
espousal of these flawed interpretations by senior RAF leaders led to a narrow view of air power 
in the post-war era.  This lesson is also applicable to RCAF history.  The 1950s may have been 
“the golden age” for the RCAF, based on the receipt of the largest slice of defence resources and 
the necessary political support.  Nevertheless, the RCAF was only able to sustain its position for 
little more than a decade.  This would lead one to suggest that there were other factors at play 
than acceptance of the orthodoxy of ‘independent’ air power by the political leadership and 
public that explain the RCAF’s pre-eminence during this period. 
Within the realm of popular history, several attempts to produce a history of the RCAF during 
the post-war period have had limited success.47 Similarly, individual RCAF squadron histories 
are of dubious utility, produced as they have been either by enthusiasts or by coerced squadron 
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officers.48 These popular volumes are intended to appeal to a broad audience but they do fulfill a 
purpose, not addressed by the official histories, as they act as a reminder that air forces are 
composed of people and not only flying machinery. 
Two key publications that cover the period are James Eayrs’ In Defence of Canada, Volume 3 
– Peacemaking and Deterrence and Volume 4 – Growing Up Allied.49 These volumes provide an 
in-depth analysis of the political and diplomatic dimensions on re-establishing the post-war 
military and early Canadian alliance developments.  However, Eayrs’ works are not exclusively 
focussed on the study of air power and they suffer from the limitations of accessible files from 
that time period.   
Jon McLin’s book, Canada’s Changing Defense Policy, 1957-1963: The Problem of a Middle 
Power in Alliance, is a superbly insightful examination of defence policy in the period after the 
St. Laurent government, under the Progressive Conservative administration of John 
Diefenbaker.50 McLin also provides some useful analysis on the initial difficulties faced by the 
Pearson government that came to power in 1963, but his work is incomplete as it was written and 
published too close to the actual time period under discussion (1967) before the full impact could 
be assessed.  As well, McLin’s work suffers from not having full access to government files for 
the period.   
Stefan Possony’s Strategic Air Power, published in 1949, is essential reading for the 
understanding of contemporary air power.  This unrecognized classic, which details how air 
power involves more than simply airplanes, supplied the framework for the analysis in the 
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present study.51 Possony, an Austrian émigré to the US prior to the Second World War, became a 
strategic analyst at Princeton University and later at the Hoover Institute.  In later years, he 
became known as the “intellectual father of Star Wars,” the US Strategic Defense Initiative of 
the 1980s.52 Possony was a profound early post-war strategic analyst who was largely ignored in 
his time.  Within DND, copies of Strategic Air Power were held in the National Defence Library 
in Ottawa, the RCAF Staff College Library in Toronto and the Royal Military College of Canada 
Library in Kingston so it is likely that some keen RCAF staff officers would have been aware of 
Possony’s work.  An examination of the RCAF during this period and how it developed into the 
Big Air Force was not just a matter of policy, but consisted of the various building blocks 
presented by Possony fifteen “elements of air power” including equipment, infrastructure and 
industry that will be discussed in Chapter 2.53  These types of details are the reality with which a 
professional military staff officer had to contend in the development of the Big Air Force. 
 The role played by nuclear weapons increased in importance throughout the 1950s.  
NATO conventional forces were intended to act as a “tripwire” in response to a Soviet attack, 
with the principal NATO response and defence being based on US strategic and NATO tactical 
nuclear weapons.   This increasing reliance on nuclear weapons at the expense of conventional 
weapons was again reversed in the 1960s with the emergence of more realistic policy options for 
NATO in the form of flexible response presented in MC 14/3. In examining Canadian air power, 
it is essential to consider this increasing role for nuclear weapons both in the context of NATO 
and the defence of North America.   
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The first book to appear on the Canadian acquisition of nuclear weapons was John 
Clearwater’s Canadian Nuclear Weapons: The Untold Story of Canada’s Cold War Arsenal.54 
Clearwater’s book highlights the extent to which the effectiveness of the Canadian armed forces 
depended upon possession of nuclear weapons during the Cold War, particularly for an 
uninformed public who have adhered to the more benign “peacekeeping” image of the Canadian 
Forces.  However, this book does not provide a comprehensive analysis of what the possession 
of nuclear weapons implied for Canadian defence. Within a Canadian context, a commonly 
accepted view has been that Canada, as a junior member in NATO, and the junior member in the 
North American defence, blindly acquiesced to the adoption of nuclear weapons without serious 
analysis or examination. Two more scholarly publications have effectively refuted this assertion.  
In Avoiding Armageddon: Canadian Military Strategy and Nuclear Weapons 1950-63, Andrew 
Richter clearly indicates that Canada was cognizant of the strategic implications related to the 
introduction of nuclear weapons into her armed forces.55 He cites numerous studies, particularly 
on air defence, undertaken by Defence Research Board scientists such as Dr. R.J. Sutherland and 
Dr. George Lindsay.  Sean Maloney’s Learning to Love the Bomb: Canada’s Nuclear Weapons 
during the Cold War provides a detailed study on the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the 
Canadian armed forces examining the myriad issues from both the military and political 
dimensions, and from a Canadian and NATO perspective.56  
Joseph Jockel’s No Boundaries Upstairs:  Canada, the United States, and the Origins of 
North American Air Defence, 1945-1958, provides an excellent background to the issues related 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 John Clearwater, Canadian Nuclear Weapons: The Untold Story of Canada’s Cold War Arsenal, Toronto: 
Dundurn Press, 1998. 
55 Andrew Richter, Avoiding Armageddon: Canadian Military Strategy and Nuclear Weapons 1950-63, Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2002. 
56 Sean M. Maloney, Learning to Love the Bomb: Canada’s Nuclear Weapons During the Cold War, Washington, 
D.C.: Potomac Books Inc, 2007. 
 23 
to the development of the joint United States-Canadian North American Air Defence Command 
(NORAD) agreement.  Jockel points out that although cooperative agreements for the air defence 
of the continent between the two nations did indeed date back to 1946, the conclusion of the 
integrated command was not by no means a “done deal” as is popularly presented.57  Similarly, 
Jockel explains, “the air defence of Canada was a Canadian project, not one Ottawa undertook at 
the behest of the American government.  Claxton was correct to point out that Canada’s air 
defences served American as well as Canadian interests.”58 This perspective contradicts the 
views of those anti-American Canadian ultra-nationalists who argue that Canada was coerced 
into these Cold War military alliances.59 
Linked very closely to the general subject of air defence in the post-war period is the 
large body of literature on the Avro Arrow supersonic fighter. The story of the Avro Arrow has 
assumed icon status in Canadian culture. More ink has been spilt promoting the mythology of the 
Avro Arrow rather than on a reasoned analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the 
aircraft.  This fascination with the Avro Arrow is an example of the ongoing airmindedness that 
continues to prevail among many Canadians, and not only aviation enthusiasts.  Similarly, there 
has been a strong element of nationalism and anti-American sentiment, along with anti-
Diefenbakerism associated with those who harbour a lingering fascination with the project.  
Exceptions include Murray Peden, a wartime RCAF bomber pilot, who was the first to produce a 
book-length study, Fall of an Arrow (1978).  Peden presents a balanced narrative of events and 
concludes that it was economics that killed the project. He does raise the interesting observation 
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that Sweden was able to design and produce indigenous supersonic fighters.60  James Dow 
declared in his 1979 book, The Arrow, “This is not a lament for the Avro Arrow.”61 His study is 
a generally fair examination of the decisions to spend hundreds of millions of dollars on high 
technology and the promotion of an advanced Canadian aircraft industry.62  
Russell Isinger’s 1997 MA thesis, the first scholarly analysis, effectively summarizes the Avro 
Arrow story:  
…the project’s demise was the thus largely inescapable consequences of three 
interrelated factors: a flawed weapons acquisition process driven by an overly 
ambitious Royal Canadian Air Force, dramatic strategic shifts, and harsh financial 
realities.63 
 
Isinger’s well-reasoned analysis did not prevent continued attempts at capitalizing on the 
fascination with the Avro Arrow.64 This study will address the Avro Arrow project, but it needs 
to be placed within the larger context of the build up of air power during this period and 
subsequent developments. 
One cannot appreciate the political and strategic aspects of air power without a basic 
knowledge of technological developments.65 The Modern War Machine: Military Aviation since 
1945 covers the various aspects such as the impact of nuclear weapons, jet engines, 
aerodynamics and structures, avionics, and the various types and roles of aircraft.  
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Among the best of the books that have examined the development and service of specific 
Canadian military aircraft are Larry Milberry’s The Avro CF-100 (1981) and The Canadair 
Sabre (1986).66 A recent scholarly publication is Randall Wakelam’s Cold War Fighters: 
Canadian Aircraft Procurement, 1945-54 that examines RCAF acquisition of the Canadair Sabre 
and Avro CF-100 aircraft, when the planning to contend with the manned bomber threat was at 
its peak.67 Wakelam makes it clear that, contrary to popular perception, the RCAF and the 
government were not happy with the implementation of the CF-100 programme by Avro 
Canada.    
Vital as the production of military aircraft was to the realization of the Big Air Force 
concept, the history of the Canadian aircraft industry remains to be written.68 Indeed, the only 
scholarly journal article to appear on Canada’s post-war aviation industry is Lawrence Aronsen’s 
piece in The International History Review in 1991.69 
Assessments of the value and effectiveness of Canadian air power are mostly absent; one 
exception being air power historian Scot Robertson’s superb chapter, “Reflections on the 
Canadian Experience,” contained in Aerospace Power: Beyond 100 Years of Theory and 
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Practice, the proceedings of the 2003 Aerospace Power Forum conducted by the Centre for 
Defence and Security Studies at the University of Manitoba. 
For those who wish to begin to understand Canadian air power, Robertson’s views provide a 
valuable insight into the major challenges.  Robertson notes:  
Aside from the three volumes of the official history of the RCAF from its origins in 
the Great War to the end of the Second World War, its story remains largely untold, 
except in the most fragmented manner.  That is, perhaps, one of the greatest gaps in 
the body of Canadian military history, and something that the military history 
community should rectify.70  
 
According to Robertson, these gaps are the result of “an immature strategic culture,” not only 
found at the highest levels of what passes for strategic thought in this country, but also in the 
military services themselves. If one accepts this line of reasoning, then it goes a long way to 
explaining the circumstances and resulting decisions of the 1950s and 1960s.71  
  The absence or limited research on the various personalities who directly influenced the 
development of air power during this period is a great limitation.  There is only one now dated 
biography (published in 1967) on Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent that says almost nothing 
about his views on defence, despite its critical importance throughout his administration.72 This 
is a major gap in view of Douglas Bland’s observation that  “Canada’s policy for national 
defence tends to be whatever the prime minister of the day says it is.”73  Defence ministers have 
fared better.  David Bercuson’s True Patriot deals with Claxton, the MND from 1947 to 1954, 
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who was a strong supporter for the initial Cold War expansion of the RCAF.74 Reginald Roy’s 
biography of Pearkes includes details of his time as the Progressive Conservative Party’s defence 
critic and later as the MND in the aftermath of the Liberal government’s defeat in 1957.75 
Pearkes’ short tenure as the MND included key decisions related to the RCAF including the 
cancellation of the Avro Arrow, re-equipment of both the Air Division and Air Defence 
Command, the re-equipment and expansion of Maritime Air and Air Transport Commands, and 
the decline of the Auxiliary Force.  Paul Hellyer’s memoirs provide useful insights that cover the 
period from his time as the Associate MND in the last days of the St. Laurent government, as the 
opposition Liberal Party defence critic and finally as MND in the Pearson government.76 Other 
key personalities, who have had the benefit of a biography, in this case, two biographies, include 
long time Liberal Cabinet minister, C.D. Howe, who was key to the RCAF build up as the 
minister of defence production during the early 1950s.77 There is a distinct lack of studies on the 
Canadian military leaders of the period.  In the case of the RCAF, Warrior Chiefs contain 
chapters on two key Chiefs of the Air Staff, Wilf Curtis and Roy Slemon, but these are brief 
accounts.78 Randy Wakelam is currently researching a biography on Curtis that is intended to 
address this long-standing gap in the historiography of RCAF senior leadership. Notably absent 
for the literature is anything of substance on the last two Chiefs of the Air Staff, Hugh Campbell 
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and Larry Dunlap, who held this key appointment during the crucial period of the late 1950s and 
early 1960s.79 
In contrast to both the United States and United Kingdom, there has been limited 
academic writing on the topic of air power in Canada. A rare exception is Robert Sutherland’s 
1950 PhD dissertation from the University of Toronto.80 It describes the growth in importance of 
military aviation from its initial beginnings in the First World War to maturity in the Second 
World War, and suggests that the emergence of the atomic bomb had not rendered conventional 
armaments and strategies obsolete.  Dr. Sutherland is remembered for his contributions to 
Canadian strategic analysis whilst a member of the Defence Research Board until his untimely 
death at the age of 45 in 1967.81 
Alexander (Sandy) Babcock’s PhD thesis, The Making of a Cold War Air Force: 
Planning and Professionalism in the Postwar Royal Canadian Air Force, 1944-1950, argues that 
it was the air force’s application of its outstanding planning skills in the early post-war period 
that enabled to the RCAF to gain such prominence during the “Golden Years” of the 1950s.82 
However, it will be argued that the reasons for the RCAF’s pre-eminence were a lot more 
complex than the premise that the Air Force had better planners.  The Canadian Army and Royal 
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Canadian Navy also had ambitious plans for post-war expansion, most of which did not reach 
fruition.83 
Two complementary PhD theses from Queen’s University have also added to our 
understanding of the RCAF and continental defence during the 1950s.   Richard Goette, Canada, 
the United States and the Command and Control of Air Forces for Continental Air Defence from 
Ogdensburg to NORAD, 1940-1957, and Matthew Trudgen, The Search for Continental 
Security: The Canadian-American Relationship and the Development of the North American Air 
Defence System, 1949-56, add to the pioneering research conducted by Joseph Jockel on the 
origins of Canada’s post-war air defence system.84 It is important, however to consider the 1950s 
RCAF in a broader framework than continental air defence. The RCAF’s key part in NATO’s re-
armament, national and alliance maritime operations, and its capabilities in strategic as well as 
tactical air transport are essential to an understanding of Canadian air power and RCAF 
expansion.85 
Among MA theses that have contributed to the literature are Stephen Nemeth’s Canadian 
Postwar Fighter Aircraft Acquisitions: An Analysis of the Strategic, Economic and Political 
Factors (1989) and Glen Berg’s Scrambling for Dollars: Resource Allocation and the Politics of 
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Canadian Fighter Aircraft procurement, 1943-1983 (1994) that attempt to analyze the historical 
background of RCAF fighter procurement.86 In dealing with the aftermath of the St. Laurent 
period, mention must also be made of Robert Clark’s Canadian Weapons Acquisition: The Case 
of the Bomarc Missile.87 Clark was a former Air Weapons Controller whose illustrates the 
difficulty in implementing new technology into the force structure when the strategic 
environment has been overtaken by apparently decisive technological change.88 
Journals 
 An examination of contemporary aviation journals for this thesis represented an untapped 
treasure trove of information as they included well-informed commentary on and debates about 
various aspects of air power.  Some of the leading journals were Canadian Aviation, Flight, Air 
Pictorial and The Aeroplane.  Canadian Aviation included a monthly column on RCAF affairs 
along with feature stories on Air Force developments.  The latter three journals were British 
publications that occasionally included articles on the RCAF and Canadian aviation, reflecting 
the still strong Anglo-Canadian links during this period.  The journalists writing in these 
publications were dedicated aviation specialists who spent years in the field.  In the early 1950s, 
Canadian Aviation writers included Ronald Keith, Ross Wilmot and Victor Koby.  Starting in 
the late 1950s and continuing until 1980, retired RCAF Wing Commander John Gellner 
contributed on a monthly basis.89  The British journals included contributions from such authors 
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as John Fricker, William Green and Bill Gunston who became world-renowned aviation experts 
and  have only recently relinquished their roles.  Also, the RCAF publication, The Roundel, was 
not merely a public relations journal, but included insightful articles on RCAF developments, 
along with reprints on air power topics from other Allied journals such as the RAF Quarterly and 
the USAF Air University Review. 
Archival Sources 
With the broad approach of this thesis, there were several concerns related to archival 
usage.  One potential problem that was identified early in the research was the fact that many 
files related to Canada’s air force and the Cold War remain classified.  There was a concern that 
the submission of Access to Information and Privacy (ATIP) requests would involve 
considerable time without a guarantee that the results would provide the desired information.  
Archival sources used in this study were declassified Canadian government files primarily 
available from the Department of National Defence Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH) 
collection.  Many of these files duplicate  those that are found in Library and Archives Canada 
RG 24.  The Colonel Robert Raymont collection was particularly important for researching the 
post-Second War period from the late 1940s until the early 1960s.  Raymont served as the 
Executive Staff Officer to the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, resulting in his access to 
many files at the higher levels within DND and the government.  Given the thesis’ broad 
approach, another concern was the amount of time that would be consumed researching a vast 
quantity of files when the essence of the information being sought was contained in the Chiefs of 
Staff Committee and Air Council files included in the Raymont collection.  In addition, the 
Raymont collection usually, though not always, contained copies of Cabinet conclusions and 
Cabinet Defence Committee minutes.  The minutes from Air Council, Chiefs of Staff Committee 
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and Cabinet Defence Committee meetings were especially useful in following the trend of RCAF 
development during the critical period of the 1950s.90 Equally useful were the proceedings of the 
annual Air Officer Commanding (AOC) conferences that included verbatim discussions, an 
aspect missing from the more concise and bureaucratic meeting minutes.  Unfortunately, these 
types of files ceased to be kept by 1964 with the creation of a single integrated Canadian Forces 
staff that superseded the air force, army and naval staffs in Ottawa.  
RCAF planning was a key element in implementing the Big Air Force concept and files 
containing Plans G and H in particular offer a wealth of information for the build up of the 
RCAF after 1948 into the early 1950s.  The 1962 Report of the Special Studies Group on Long-
Range Objectives for the RCAF (the “Carpenter Report”) makes for fascinating reading with its 
detailed strategic analysis along with the recommendations for an alternative RCAF force 
structure to deal with the expected international environment.91 The “Carpenter Report” was a 
refreshing read; rather than working from the usual service premise of justifying the need for a 
new aircraft, Carpenter’s Special Studies Group proceeded on the principle of first determining a 
possible future security environment, and then recommending the types of equipment and 
organization that might best meet the requirement.  Much of the methodology, analysis and 
recommendations contained in the Carpenter Report remain current to this day.  In a similar 
manner, the 1963 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Defence Policy under the chairmanship of 
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Dr. Sutherland remains a useful study that challenged contemporary conventional defence 
thinking. 
 RCAF equipment files are subject to a “hit or miss” approach.  Some files are fully 
accessible while others remain restricted.  The Avro CF-105 Arrow files are accessible and 
provide a wealth of information that allows the researcher to follow the programme’s 
development and demise.92 However, in the case of the Sparrow II air-to-air missile, intended as 
the Arrow’s armament, the files remain restricted.  The files on the re-equipment of the Air 
Division are open and provide an interesting perspective on aircraft selection from the 1950s.93 
Though occupying a relative minor role in Canadian air power, the files on the selection of the 
CF-5 aircraft in 1965 also offer insights into the foibles of Canadian aircraft procurement.94 
However, files on the acquisition of the CF-101B Voodoo interceptor in 1961 remain 
inaccessible, as do the files on the CF-18 selection in the 1970s. 
 In the case of other RCAF subjects in RG24, it is also a “hit and miss” affair.  Nearly all 
files related to No. 1 Air Division remain restricted or closed, though some Operations Planning 
files from the early 1950s are available, later ones are not.  The Mobile Striking Force files are 
open, but in the case of Air Defence, many files still remain restricted.  Strategic level RCAF 
logistics planning also remains restricted.  As well, though some files on nuclear weapons have 
been opened, there are still closed files on the subject.  Numerous files related to NATO and to 
Anglo-Canadian or American-Canadian defence relations also remain closed.  There are 
numerous intelligence files from the period that have yet to be de-classified, and this restriction 
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was another area that prevented a complete understanding of the threat faced by the RCAF and 
also limited a more comprehensive perspective on comparative air power.  The RCAF files 
appear to be in disarray with the disruption of the 1960s defence reorganization.  Some degree of 
order returned with the establishment of Air Command in 1975, but those files are not yet 
accessible.95  
 Personal papers – some of which have been used to publish biographies or memoirs – 
have filled in some of the gaps in official documents.  The personal papers of Claxton provide a 
useful perspective on his tenure as MND.  Unfortunately, the Curtis and the Dunlap papers do 
not offer much on their time as chiefs of the air staff.  Furthermore, the complete absence of 
personal papers or memoirs by Slemon and Campbell are crucial gaps in the public record.  For 
the later period of the 1970s and beyond, the Manson papers remain closed. 
 For the in-depth background development of NATO strategy during the 1950s, the 
NATO archives at SHAPE were of invaluable assistance. 
Thesis Outline 
This study is organized into seven chapters and an epilogue.  Chapter 2 examines the 
general development of air power since 1945 to place the Canadian story in an international 
context, including the definition of air power and airpower functions, and the impact of 
technology, industry and economics.  The focus of Chapter 3 is the development of air power in 
Canada up to 1950, with an emphasis on the beginnings of RCAF expansion during 1948-1950.  
Chapter 4 examines the build up of the RCAF contribution to NATO defence during the period 
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1950-1957.  It assesses the 5 February 1951 Defence Programme that set in motion the 
implementation of the Big Air Force concept.  Though the emphasis is on No. 1 Air Division, its 
place in NATO, and the impact on Canada of changing NATO strategy, the chapter also details 
the Canadian contribution to the Korean War.  Chapter 5 treats the build up of the home – based 
RCAF during the period 1950-1957. The focus will be on the implementation of the air staff’s 
Plan H towards realization of the Big Air Force concept in Canada.  Chapters 6 and 7 consider 
the decline and ultimate demise of the Big Air Force during the Diefenbaker government from 
1957 to 1963 and the Pearson government from 1963 to 1968.  The Epilogue concludes the study 
with a summary of the fate of the air force during the remaining Cold War years.  It covers the 
period from 1969 to 1991 with the Trudeau and Mulroney governments, including the air force’s  
partial recovery after the indecision, confusion and uncertainty of the Diefenbaker-Pearson 
decade and the early Trudeau years.   
 This study represents an examination of the role played by Canadian air power during a 
critical period of the nation’s history.  Within this Canadian context, national leaders from all 
backgrounds often failed to comprehend the linkages between politics, strategy and technology, 
and how these inter-related factors had a profound effect on the development of Canadian 
defence policy.96 This study illustrates a consistent trend in the development of Canadian air 
power and its contribution to Canadian defence.  The RCAF had a major strategic defence role in 
Europe and North America during the 1950s, but rapid technological changes greatly diminished 
that role by the early 1960s.  As succinctly noted by aviation historians Stephen J. Harris and 
Robin Higham, “Service doctrine that is not in harmony with government policy is likely to 
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produce circumstances in which air forces will fail; government policy made in isolation of 
service capabilities tends to do the same.”97 The particular strategic and political circumstances 
of the early to mid 1950s brought such harmony, and made the Big Air Force a reality, but that 
harmony proved fragile in the face of profound and fast-paced change in the late 1950s and 
1960s.  
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Chapter 2 
The Evolution of Air Power since the Second World War 
 
From its nascent form during the First World War until its partial demise in the late 
1960s, air power very much reflected the Western way of war.  The origins of the concept of 
independent air power lay in revulsion at the heavy casualties incurred in the land battles of the 
First World War, a faith in technology, and a conviction that aviation offered a relatively 
bloodless way of striking at the enemy, and producing victory.  In a similar manner, the 
inconclusive ground war in Korea, in contrast to the apparently decisive results of the nuclear 
attack on Japan in 1945, brought renewed emphasis on strategic air power by Western powers in 
the decade after the Korean War armistice, not least because it seemed the only answer to the 
superiority of the Soviet bloc in ground forces.  Throughout this post-Second World War period, 
the importance of each of the three thematic pillars, politics and economics, military strategy and 
technology, varied over the course of time.  This often reflected reactive policy on the part of 
governments due to rapidly changing military strategic and technological factors that in turn 
presented a fiscal challenge for implementation. 
The Changing Meanings of  “Air Power” 
  Proponents of air power have often used the term without explaining its meaning or 
deliberately using vague language that implies greater capabilities than can be achieved in 
reality.  Steve Call, in Selling Air Power: Military Aviation and American Popular Culture after 
World War II, captures such a promotional effort in his description of the closing scene of the 
1955 movie, The Court-Martial of Bill Mitchell.  This movie deals with the 1925 trial of 
Brigadier-General William Mitchell, an early advocate of air power.  The final scene in the 
movie has Mitchell leaving the courthouse and looking up at the sky, where “he looks up at a 
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formation of biplanes…as that image morphs into a formation of F-86 Sabre jets flying a 
starburst maneuver….”1 Another film released in 1955, Strategic Air Command, includes 
dramatic film footage of the U.S. Air Force B-36 Peacemaker intercontinental strategic bomber, 
and equally loving footage of the B-47 Stratojet all-jet bomber.2  Clearly, the intent of these 
1950s films was to inculcate airmindedness among the general population.  In writings on 
aviation even prior to the First World War, however, the term, “air power” was employed 
without a clear explanation.  The first recorded use of the term was attributed to science-fiction 
writer H.G. Wells’ 1908 novel, The War in the Air: “The massed aeronautics park that had been 
established…to give Germany…the air power and the empire of the world.”3  In 1909, naval 
affairs journalist Fred T. Jane wrote, “Air power can hardly be more than one of many factors in 
deciding the issue of future wars.”4 During the inter-war period, the thinking of that triumvirate 
of early air power theorists, Giulio Douhet, Hugh Trenchard and Billy Mitchell dominated the 
“air power debate” with their very large claims for the military potential of aircraft, specifically 
for strategic bombing in the case of   Douhet and Trenchard, and more generally on the part of 
Mitchell’s advocacy of multi-purpose air forces.5 
Early in the Cold War, the RAF War Manual – Part 1 – Operations, AP 1300 (March 
1950) explained, “Air power means the use of the air to enforce the national will.”6  
Furthermore, the manual proceeded to declare  “…air power is the determining factor in modern 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Steve Call, Selling Air Power: Military Aviation and the American Popular Culture after World War II, College 
Station, TX:  Texas A&M University Press, 2009, p. 1. 
2 Ibid. p. 115-119. 
3 Air Vice Marshal Tony Mason, Air Power: A Centennial Appraisal, London: Brassey’s (UK) Ltd, 1994, p. 1. 
4 Ibid.  
5 See Phillip S. Meilinger, “Giulio Douhet and the Origins of Airpower Theory,” and “Trenchard, Slessor, and Royal 
Air Force Doctrine before World War II, and Mark A. Clodfelter, “Molding Airpower Convictions: Development 
and Legacy of William Mitchell’s Strategic Thought,” in Phillip S. Meilinger (ed.) The Paths of Heaven: The 
Evolution of Airpower Theory, The School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell Air Force, Alabama: Air 
University Press, 1997. 
6 Air Ministry.  Royal Air Force War Manual – Part 1 – Operations, AP 1300, January 1950, p. 19.  
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war.”7 In developing air power, the composition of the Air Force was based upon “the primary 
agent of Air Power is the strategic bomber….”8 The manual did recognize that a balanced Air 
Force had to include the other five main components, namely, “Fighter, Tactical Air Force, 
Maritime, Photo Reconnaissance, and Transport Squadrons.”9 The RCAF Officers’ 
Examinations Study Material, Readings in Air Power, published in 1955, provided insights into 
Canadian conceptions of air power.  In an address to the Montreal United Services Institute in 
1952, Air Commodore Clare L. Annis pointed out that the “first and main role of air forces is to 
destroy enemy air power, and that the second stage of this main role is then to exploit the air over 
the enemy’s heartland with air weapons.”10  
RAF Air Vice Marshal Tony Mason noted that the question of “what is air power” has 
continued to occupy air power thinkers through to the present day.11 Over the course of the past 
half-century, a more limited and restrained approach to the use of the term “air power” has 
evolved.  For example, in the 1999 edition of British Air Power Doctrine, AP 3000, air power 
was defined as “the ability to project military force in air or space by or from a platform or 
missile operating above the surface of the earth.  Air platforms are defined as any aircraft, 
helicopter or unmanned air vehicle.”12  Similarly cautious is the 2007 publication Canadian 
Forces Aerospace Doctrine: “aerospace power – that component of military power that is 
applied within or from the aerospace environment to achieve effects above, on and below the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Air Commodore Clare L. Annis, “The Role of the Air Forces,” Address delivered before the Montreal United 
Services Institute, 21 February 1952, from Readings in Air Power, RCAF Officers’ Examinations Study Material, 
Issued on the Authority of the Air Officer Commanding Training Command, May 1955, p. 1.  See also Air 
Commodore C.L. Annis, “The Significance to Air Defence of Some Recent Technical Trends,” Address to the 
Montreal Air Force Veterans’ Association, 12 November 1954. 
11 Mason, Air Power: A Centennial Appraisal. 
12 Ministry of Defence, British Air Power Doctrine (AP 3000) 3rd ed. 1999, p. 1.2.1. 
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surface of the earth.”13  In a later 2009 edition of the British AP 3000 publication, air (and now 
space) power is defined as “the ability to project power from the air and space to influence the 
behaviour of people or the course of events.”14 Looking back to 1950, it can be seen that the 
promoters and practitioners of air power during that era attributed a much greater importance to 
air power as the final arbiter in peace and war. 
Air Power Functions 
“Independent” air power consisted of five major operational functions that developed and 
evolved separately from one another as dictated by military circumstances during the First World 
War. The “control of the air” function evolved on two lines of development. Control of the air 
over the battlefield aimed at gaining local air superiority over the enemy so that friendly forces 
could engage in battlefield attack and reconnaissance/observation.  The more challenging task of 
controlling national air space – air defence –involved the use of long-range detection equipment, 
aircraft, antiaircraft artillery, and searchlights coordinated by an extensive command and control 
system that featured a network of detecting stations, plotting rooms, and command centres linked 
by rapid communications.  Ground attack included close air support (CAS), battlefield air 
interdiction (BAI) and tactical reconnaissance in support of the army.  CAS involved the use of 
aircraft armed with machineguns and bombs in the direct support of the army, whilst BAI was 
the use of aircraft in a ground attack role aimed at striking the enemy’s rear area logistics 
installations, bridges, troop concentrations and other vital points.  The use of aircraft as the “eyes 
of the army” in reconnaissance and observation, the original raison d’être for the employment of 
air power remained a key role, using aerial photography and wireless communications for 
artillery spotting.  Long range bombing by an “independent” air force was aimed at striking at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Department of National Defence.  Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine, B-GA-400-000/FP-000, Canadian 
Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre Production Centre, Trenton, Ontario, 2007, p. 60. 
14 Ministry of Defence.  British Air and Space Power Doctrine (AP 3000) 4th ed. 2009, p. 7. 
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the enemy’s critical industrial and military targets, and civilian population centres.  Aircraft 
conducted maritime operations that could include anti-submarine patrols, anti-shipping strikes 
against surface vessels, and coastal reconnaissance.15 The air transport function emerged in a 
rudimentary fashion during the inter-war period, mostly relying on converted bombers for this 
role. 
These six air power functions matured during the Second World War, forming the basis 
for the conduct of air power in the post 1945 period.16 Their post-war application increased the 
demand for highly specialized aircraft with the exception of using fighters and bombers to fulfill 
the air reconnaissance function.  Doctrine in all major air forces emphasized that air superiority – 
the defeat or at least suppression of the enemy air force – was the essential basis for the conduct 
of both offensive and defensive air operations.17 
For the bomber offensive function, American and British strategic bomber experience in 
the Second World War informed much of the thinking about future operations.18  Increasingly 
complex technology and the associated costs limited the establishment and maintenance of 
strategic bomber forces to only a few nations in the post-war period. Only the US, the UK and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 R.A. Mason, Air Power: An Overview of Roles, Brassey’s Airpower: Aircraft, Weapons Systems and Technology 
Series, Volume 1, London: Brassey’s Defence Publishers Ltd, 1987.  Depending on the organizational structure of 
national armed forces, maritime operations often remained a naval air arm responsibility even after the 
establishment of an independent air force. The air transport function made its debut in Iraq during the 1920s and 
gained critical importance during the Second World War.  However, it was not until after the Second World War 
that air transport gained an importance on par with other air power functions. 
16 Royal Air Force War Manual, Part 1 – Operations. 
17 Ibid. p. 21.  In the Lees Knowles Lectures, Tedder wrote, “that air superiority was the prerequisite to all war-
winning operations, whether at sea, on land, or even in the air.” (p. 32) Tedder’s comments on the importance of 
attaining air superiority are discussed in Tami Davis Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of 
British and American Ideas About Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002, p. 
283. 
18 RAF War Manual – Part 1 – Operations, see Chapter 5, The Bomber Offensive. For a technical understanding of 
strategic bombing, see Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Knight, Strategic Offensive Air Operations, Vol. 8 Brassey’s 
Air Power: Aircraft, Weapons Systems and Technology Series, London: Brassey’s (UK) Ltd, 1989. For a history of 
bombing in the post-war era, see David Wragg, The Offensive Weapon: The Strategy of Bombing, London: Robert 
Hale Limited, 1986, Chapter 8 – “Decline and Fall” and Kenneth P. Werrell, Death From the Heavens: A History of 
Strategic Bombing, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009, Chapter 7, “The Post-war Era: The End of 
Propeller-Powered Bombers,” pp. 155-176, and Chapter 8, “Between Korea and Vietnam: The Transition to Jets,” 
pp. 180-206. 
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the USSR operated bombers for the delivery of nuclear weapons, and the unaffordable cost of 
bomber modernization brought the RAF to end this role by 1969.19   
In air defence operations, Britain had gained considerable experience in strategic air 
defence during the Second World War, but neither the United States nor Canada had to contend 
with strategic air defence during the war.20 From the late 1940s to the late 1950s, air defence 
developed to the peak of its post-war strength and prominence in national defence 
establishments.21  Initially, air defence methods and equipment resembled those used during the 
Battle of Britain in 1940, but the introduction of fast and high-flying jet aircraft necessitated the 
development of sophisticated new methods and technology.22 As air defence forces achieved 
their peak growth by the late 1950s, the nature of the threat changed from long-range strategic 
bombers to that of ICBMs.  Air defence forces were greatly reduced in size and their role had 
changed from the active defence of urban areas/territorial air defence to that of acting as a trip-
wire defence for strategic retaliatory forces. 
With the emphasis on strategic bomber and air defence forces, tactical air forces in the 
post-war period were often neglected – except when needed for actual combat as in the Korean 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 It was not until the 1960s that France developed a medium bomber nuclear-armed capability for its Force de 
frappe, whilst a few nations including Australia maintained a conventional bombing capability.  In the immediate 
post-war period, the RAAF used Avro Lincoln bombers that were replaced by Canberra light jet bombers in the 
1950s that in turn were replaced by General Dynamics F-111s in the 1970s. 
20 The only enemy aircraft shot down by RCAF Home War Establishment aircraft was a Japanese Zero during the 
Kiska campaign in Alaska in 1942. 
21 Numerous publications provide both a technical explanation and a history of air defence operations.  For a 
technical understanding, see Group Captain M.B. Elsam, Air Defence, Vol. 7 Brassey’s Air Power: Aircraft, 
Weapons Systems and Technology Series, London: Brassey’s (UK) Ltd, 1989. Air superiority is closely associated 
with air defence – for a technical understanding, see Air Vice Marshal J.R. Walker, Air Superiority Operations, Vol. 
5 Brassey’s Air Power: Aircraft, Weapons Systems and Technology Series, London: Brassey’s (UK) Ltd, 1989.  For 
historical perspectives, see Peter Wykeham, Fighter Command: A Study of Air Defence 1914-1960, London: Putnam 
& Company, Ltd, 1960, especially Chapter 20, “The Jet Age,” and Michael J. Gething, Sky Guardians: Britain’s Air 
Defence 1918-1993, London: Arms and Armour Press, 1993, for the periods 1948 and 1958.  
22 Kenneth Schaffel, “the U.S. Air Force’s Philosophy of Strategic Defense: A Historical Overview,” in Stephen J. 
Cimbala (ed.), Strategic Air Defense, Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc, 1989, p. 15. 
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War.23 This neglect was in direct contradiction to the importance tactical air support achieved 
during the Second World War, ultimately with the large Allied Tactical Air Forces that 
supported the land campaign in North-West Europe in the last year of the war.24  Yet the 
development of dedicated ground attack aircraft in the post-war period was not a priority with air 
forces; usually older fighter aircraft were adapted for the roles of CAS, BAI and tactical 
reconnaissance in support of the army.  The build up of NATO air forces during the 1950s 
included considerable tactical air power but the weaponry and techniques did not change 
significantly from the Second World War and Korea.  
 The Battle of the Atlantic during the Second World War demonstrated the vital 
importance of maritime air operations.25 In this context, maritime air operations refer to the use 
of land based, fixed wing aircraft for anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare (what has 
been referred to as anti-shipping), surveillance and subsidiary tasks such as air-sea rescue and 
meteorological reconnaissance.26 Maritime air operations were often ignored during the post-war 
period despite the development of a large submarine fleet by the USSR.  Modern aircraft design 
inevitably led to the development of specialized aircraft, as bombers were no longer suitable for 
maritime missions. 27  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 See A Special Correspondent, “Aircraft Over the Battlefield: Lessons of the Korean Campaign,” Air Pictorial, 
Vol. XV, No. 3, March 1953. 
24 See RAF War Manual – Part 1 – Operations, Chapter 8, Land-Air Warfare.   For various studies detailing the 
importance of ground support during the Second World War, see Richard P. Hallion, Strike from the Sky: The 
History of Battlefield Air Attack, 1911-1945, Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1989, Ian Gooderson, Air 
Power at the Battlefront: Allied Close Air Support in Europe 1943-1945, London: Frank Cass, 1998, and Ian David 
Hall, Strategy for Victory: The Development of British Tactical Air Power, 1919-1943, Westport, CT: Praeger 
Security International, 2008. For a technical understanding of modern air-to-ground operations, see Air Vice 
Marshal J.R. Walker, Air-to-Ground Operations, Vol. 2 Brassey’s Air Power: Aircraft, Weapons Systems and 
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25 See RAF War Manual – Part 1 – Operations, Chapter 7, Sea-Air Warfare. For a technical understanding, see 
Group Captain B.C. Laite, Maritime Air Operations, Vol. 11 Brassey’s Air Power: Aircraft, Weapons Systems and 
Technology Series, London: Brassey’s (UK) Ltd, 1991. 
26 Ibid. pp.  2-5, and RAF War Manual – Part 1 - Operations, Chapter 7. 
27 RAF War Manual – Part 1 – Operations, p. 19.  The maritime patrol role was assigned to the US Navy, not the 
USAF, in which capacity the specialized Neptune was the primary maritime aircraft. 
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Though military air transport operations had become an essential function during the 
Second World War, it had low priority until the late 1950s.28 Most long-range transports were 
military adaptations of civilian airliners such as the Handley Page Hastings, Canadair North Star, 
and Douglas C-54 and C-118.29 Only the USAF developed large numbers of heavy lift aircraft 
such as the C-124 Globemaster.30 Most air forces were limited to a tactical capability using 
wartime twin-engine Dakota transports, supplemented by some larger twin-engine rear-ramp 
equipped Flying Boxcar transports.31  
Air reconnaissance continued in importance after 1945.32 During the Second World War, 
this function evolved to consist of low flying tactical air reconnaissance and high flying strategic 
reconnaissance with the adaptation of existing fighter and bomber aircraft.  Tactical 
reconnaissance by the USAF and the RAF was key in the support of army operations both in 
NATO and Korea.33  The conduct of strategic reconnaissance, particularly into the vicinity of 
enemy airspace, was a US and British priority.34 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 See RAF War Manual – Part 1 – Operations, Chapter 9 – Air Transport Operations.  For a technical 
understanding of military air transport operations, see Group Captain Keith Chapman, Military Air Transport 
Operations, Vol. 6 Brassey’s Air Power: Aircraft, Weapons Systems and Technology Series, London: Brassey’s 
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31 See Kenneth P. Werrell, “The Dark Ages of Strategic Airlift: the Propeller Era,” Air Power History, Vol. 50, No. 
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transport capability using the Canadair four-engine North Star aircraft. 
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Group Captain G.J. Oxlee, Aerospace Reconnaissance, Vol. 9 Brassey’s Air Power: Aircraft, Weapons Systems and 
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33 Infield, Chapter 9, “Air Reconnaissance in Korea.” 
34 See Paul Lashmar, Spy Flights of the Cold War, Stroud, UK: Sutton Publishing Limited, 1996. Specialized 
strategic reconnaissance aircraft such as the Lockheed U-2 were developed in the early 1950s. 
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  The analysis in Possony’s Strategic Air Power of 1949 featured what he referred to as the 
fifteen elements of air power summarized in Table 2-1 below.35  These elements, which identify 
the essential building blocks of air power from a national perspective as well as particular service 
needs, are especially useful to understand Canada’s situation in the early Cold War. They will 
inform the analysis in subsequent chapters. 
Table 2-1 - Elements of Air Power 
Raw materials and fuels Guided missiles and atomic 
weapons 
Industrial potential, tool 
reserves and 
 high rate of technological 
progress 
Aircraft 
Bases and protective forces Manpower 
Communications and electronics Training 
Logistics and supplies Morale 
Auxiliary services Intelligence 
Airborne forces Research and inventiveness 
Source: Stefan T. Possony, 
Strategic Air Power, p. 35 
Tactics-Strategy-Planning 
 
  A nation that has access to the necessary raw materials to manufacture aircraft, along 
with guaranteed supplies of aviation fuel is obviously in a better strategic situation as an air 
power than a nation that is not – consider the tenuous position of Japan in the Second World 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Stefan T. Possony, Strategic Air Power: The Pattern of Dynamic Security, Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 
1949, p. 35. 
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War, for example. In the case of industrial potential, which was vital to the expansion of the 
RCAF, Possony identified the following characteristics: high level of technology and 
inventiveness, organizational ability, the size of the aircraft industry, a capability for the rapid 
conversion of industry to aircraft and parts production, the size and productivity of the machine 
tool industry, efficient use of manpower, and effective cooperation between the air force and 
industry.36 In the area of communications and electronics, radar was an essential aspect of the 
early warning system against air attack, in the Canadian case notable in the development of the 
three radar chains across the country during this period.  
Auxiliary services included such aspects as aerial mapping and photographic services, 
meteorological services, aviation medicine, and the design and production of individual flying 
clothing and equipment that in many cases draws on the results of specialized medical research.37 
These were areas in which the RCAF had long-standing capabilities dating back to the earliest 
days of the service in the 1920s because of the extraordinary demands of flying operations in 
Canada’s environment.   
Although airborne troops in the case of Canada, the UK and the US belonged to the army 
rather than the air force, Possony saw them as contributing to air power because of the speed and 
mobility with which they could be deployed without reliance on airfields, though he noted their 
limited ability to hold ground.   At the same time he remarked that “in arctic war they [airborne 
troops] are indispensable,” a principal role of the Canadian Mobile Striking Force that will be 
discussed in subsequent chapters.38 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Ibid. p. 37.  These factors had been developed in Canada during the course of the Second World War, the only 
exception being that no aircraft engines had been manufactured during the war. 
37 Ibid. p. 39.  Canada undertook significant research and development in aviation medicine with its RCAF Institute 
of Aviation Medicine.  See Peter Allen, “The Remotest of Mistresses: The Franks Flying Suit,” CAHS Journal, Vol.  
21, No. 4, Winter 1983. 
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Possony considered the atomic bomb to be “an air power weapon.” During the period 
treated in the present study nuclear weapons became an overriding consideration in war planning 
and in the development of the RCAF.39  
Though air power is more than simply airplanes, aircraft are the essential element based 
on a combination of quantity, quality, and specialization.  In Possony’s estimation, 
“approximately six planes are needed for every plane serving at the front.”40 However there was 
the conundrum between the issue of quantity versus quality resulting from the increasing 
technological complexity and increased cost of aircraft.  The need for specialized aircraft added 
to the quantity and quality of aircraft required for a balanced air force, which raised increasingly 
lofty hurdles for all air forces during the early Cold War.  
 According to Possony “manpower is one of the chief conditions of aerial victory.” Apart 
for the need for multiple flying crews for each aircraft, there is a need to ensure an adequate 
supply of manpower amounting to 25 to 30 personnel to support each flyer.41 The efficient use of 
reserve force personnel is an obvious requirement, as is effective flying training and ground 
trades training to supply sufficient personnel with the right qualifications in a timely fashion.  
The training imperative was clearly recognized by the Allies during the Second World War with 
the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, and its success was repeated albeit on a much 
smaller scale with NATO flying training in Canada during the Cold War.   
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Morale, one of the foundations of military effectiveness, consists of tangible and 
intangible items such as belief in a cause, conditions of service that develop an esprit de corps, 
and a belief that one has a chance of survival.42 Though the Cold War flyers did not have the 
high loss rates of the Second World War (especially in RAF Bomber Command), flying in the 
Korean War and in the Cold War was still a risky and dangerous business.   
The importance of intelligence has often been ignored or underrated in studies of 
Canada’s Cold War forces.  Weak air intelligence during this period resulted in a number of 
surprises for Western nations, including an underestimation of Soviet aircraft such as the MiG-
15, overestimating Soviet bomber development and the threat to North America, and 
underestimating the Soviet missile threat.  
 According to Possony, “Technical superiority is perhaps the most important single 
condition upon which the outcome of aerial warfare depends.”43 The basic problem of how to 
organize research in order to achieve this technological superiority represents the greatest 
challenge, not least because it may impinge on the existing organization and its “sacred cows,” 
resulting in resistance to new equipment and methods.44 The battle between bombers and 
missiles was representative of such a struggle.  More generally, dramatic shifts in Western 
alliance strategy (and tactical roles derived from that strategy) that were driven in no small part 
by technological change were to have an enormous impact on the RCAF’s leadership and 
planning – Possony’s final element – after 1957.45 Taken as a whole, Possony’s fifteen elements 
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describe what was embraced by the RCAF’s Big Air Force concept, and help to pinpoint how 
changes in the international and domestic situation led to the demise of that ambition. 
Technology, Industry and Economics  
The atomic bomb, jet propulsion, rockets and radar were the principal technologies to 
emerge from the Second World War that profoundly affected post-war air power. 46 Apart from 
these advanced technologies, aircraft development underwent rapid changes in terms of 
performance, materials, and production during the Second World War.  In the first decade of “jet 
power” from 1945 to 1955, aircraft technology underwent more revolutionary changes compared 
to the previous decade.47 In the late 1940s, though piston-engine fighters such as the Spitfire, 
Mosquito and F-51 Mustang remained the mainstay of Western air forces, they were 
supplemented and then replaced by early British jet fighters, the Gloster Meteor and the De 
Havilland Vampire, that had both appeared in the later stages of the Second World War.  These 
aircraft remained in service in several western air forces until well into the 1950s, albeit in 
improved versions.48 
In contrast to international sales of the Vampire and Meteor, the United States’ first 
effective jet fighter, the Lockheed F-80 Shooting Star, had only limited export success, though it 
did ultimately reach wider markets as an advanced jet trainer, the T-33, including licensed 
production by Canadair for the RCAF.49 The F-80 was supplemented by the Republic F-84 
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Thunderjet fighter-bomber in USAF service.50 The F-80 and F-84 were straight-wing jet fighters, 
but with the flight of the North American F-86 Sabre prototype in 1947, the US swept 
significantly ahead of the British in fighter development.51 Relations between the UK and the US 
were decidedly cool in the immediate post-war period, and in the case of the aircraft industry, 
there was open competition between the industries of the two nations.52 Relations reached their 
lowest point in 1946 when the Atlee government authorized the sale of the Rolls-Royce Nene 
turbojet engine to the USSR that were used to power the Mikoyan MiG-15 jet fighter.53  
The USAF was not well served by its early all-weather interceptor aircraft. The Northrop 
F-89 Scorpion was the first attempt to produce a twin-seat all-weather fighter, but this aircraft 
had considerable shortcomings.54 The Lockheed F-94 Starfire, an all-weather two-seat radar 
equipped development of the F-80 was another design that had serious limitations resulting in 
the development of the F-86 air superiority fighter as a one-man all-weather interceptor in its F-
86D version, albeit with limitations in this role. In the case of all three interceptors, they adopted 
the superior “collision course interception” utilizing 2.75 inch folding fin aircraft rockets 
(FFARs) rather than the traditional “pursuit course interception” that involved attacking the 
bomber from the rear.55 Subsequent developments included the single seat F-102 Delta Dagger 
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supersonic interceptor that also had its share of problems, and eventually the twin seat F-101 
Voodoo and single seat F-106 Delta Dart by the late 1950s.56 
  In the RAF, cannon-equipped two-seat radar equipped all-weather/night fighter versions 
of the standard Vampire/Venom and Meteor were used being replaced with the more modern 
Gloster Javelin all-weather fighter in 1956.57 The first US supersonic fighter, the North 
American F-100A Super Sabre, first flew in 1953; its British counterpart, the English Electric 
Lightning did not fly supersonic until 1958.  The F-100, used primarily as a fighter-bomber, was 
soon followed with other second generation “Century fighters” including the F-101 Voodoo, F-
102 Delta Dagger, F-104 Starfighter, F-105 Thunderchief and F-106 Delta Dart.58  From the 
start the F-102 and F-106 were designed to serve as single-seat interceptors.  The F-101 was 
originally designed as an escort fighter and fighter-bomber, but it gained its prominence in the 
interceptor and reconnaissance roles. The F-104 was originally designed as a high altitude 
interceptor for the USAF, but it was to serve in much larger numbers with allied air forces 
primarily in the low-level nuclear strike-reconnaissance and fighter-bomber roles.59  The F-105 
represented the “New Look” tactical fighter-bomber that included an internal bomb bay designed 
to carry small nuclear weapons.60 
Despite the institutional focus on bombers as the key aircraft in the air force, post-war 
bomber development was much more limited.  Until 1950, the Avro Lincoln provided the RAF 
with its principal heavy bomber capability despite being a marginal improvement over the 
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wartime Lancaster.61 Britain may have lagged in the development of jet fighters, but the British 
produced the finest light bomber in the post-war period.  The English Electric Canberra first 
flew in 1951 and was produced in bomber, intruder and reconnaissance versions. Apart from its 
export to fifteen nations, the Canberra was also unique in that it was adopted by the USAF and 
licence-built in the US.62 In light bomber development, the US did not fare well in the immediate 
post-war period producing the four engine B-45 Tornado light jet bomber that failed as a bomber 
though some were utilized in the reconnaissance role.63 In the Korean War, it was the B-26 
Invader from the Second World War that dominated the light bomber squadrons.  
The B-29 formed the basis for the USAF Strategic Air Command (SAC) in the immediate 
post-war period, but it was the massive B-36 Peacemaker whose development had begun during 
the war that was intended to be the premier bomber.64 Although capable of intercontinental 
range, the B-36, too slow to successively penetrate Soviet airspace, was supplemented by the B-
50, an improved version of the B-29.65 The 2,000 B-47 Stratojets, the first American all-jet 
strategic bomber dominated SAC during the 1950s.66 First flown in 1952, the B-52 entered 
service in 1956 and represented the zenith of US strategic bomber development.67 The high 
altitude Mach 2 B-58 Hustler bomber appeared in the late 1950s post-Sputnik period, but saw 
only limited service for a decade until being retired by 1970.68 For the RAF, the development of 
long-range strategic bombers to carry the British nuclear deterrent was based on four separate 
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designs from Shorts, Vickers, Avro and Handley-Page.69 The Shorts Sperrin was quickly 
dispensed with, and the Vickers Valiant, Avro Vulcan and Handley-Page Victor (the “V-
bombers”) became the focus of Bomber Command.70 
The launch of Sputnik was to have a double effect on future fighter and bomber 
development.  In the case of fighters, it was becoming apparent that the Soviet bomber threat was 
not as critical as previously perceived; therefore it was redundant to undertake massive 
investment in air defence.  Various interceptors were cancelled including the North American F-
108 Rapier and Republic XF-103 in the US, the Saunders-Roe SR.177 in the UK and the Avro 
CF-105 Arrow in Canada.71 The proposed British Avro 730 supersonic bomber was cancelled in 
1957, but it was not until the 1962 that the high altitude Mach 3 North American XB-70A 
Valkyrie was cancelled.72 
Numerous improvements in all aspects of aircraft technology occurred during the 1945-
55 period, but there were only limited changes in aircraft armaments, particularly in conventional 
weaponry as fighter aircraft continued with gun armament.  For the USAF, the 0.50 inch 
machinegun was still the preferred gun armament though it was now recognized (and borne out 
by Korean War experience) that this weapon was inadequate for modern air-to-air warfare.73 
RAF aircraft already used 20mm cannon as standard, and by the 1950s, aircraft such as the 
Hawker Hunter were armed with the 30mm cannon as the new standard.  With the adoption of 
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the M61 Vulcan 20mm rotary cannon by the late 1950s, USAF aircraft finally acquired suitable 
gun armament.74 Though initially equipped only with machineguns, the eventual preferred 
weapon for American and Canadian jet interceptor fighters was the 2.75 inch Folding Fin Air 
Rocket (FFAR) fired in salvos by the aircraft on a collision course interception with the enemy 
bomber.75  Guided air-to-air missiles entered service only in the late 1950s included the infrared 
homing Sidewinder and both infrared and radar versions of the Falcon.76  A nuclear-armed 
unguided air-to-air rocket, the Genie, was produced for USAF use against enemy bombers.77 
Conventional air-to-ground weaponry did not change during this period from the ordnance of the 
Second World War, consisting of free-fall bombs of various sizes (usually a pair of 500 pound or 
1000 pound bombs on a fighter-bomber) and 5 inch High Velocity Air Rockets (HVAR).  Air-to-
ground weapons delivery methods remained the same as conducted during the Second World 
War.  It was in the area of nuclear weapons where miniaturization enabled their carriage by 
fighter aircraft such as the F-84 Thunderjet for example. 
The trend had been for larger and more complex combat aircraft that were also more 
expensive. To reverse this trend and increase the numbers of available of combat aircraft, NATO 
issued a requirement in 1954 for a “lightweight fighter.”78 The term “lightweight fighter” was 
interpreted to mean a less capable aircraft so that there was no strong interest in adopting this 
type of aircraft.  The competition resulted in nine designs being submitted including five French, 
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two Italian and two British proposals.79 The winner of the competition was the Italian Aeritalia 
G.91 that was adopted only by Italy, Germany and Portugal, but rejected by both Greece and 
Turkey.80 
The development of more complex aircraft also increased the maintenance requirements 
for air forces both in terms of the length of time that an aircraft might be unserviceable and the 
number of specialized maintenance personnel required.  Aircraft could no longer be repaired 
with some sheet metal and scissors, but rather required extensive repair of the numerous “black 
boxes” that were described as: 
…Large, bulky and felt like a ton weight, and they were packed with valves 
basically like those in old-fashioned radios which consumed kilowatts of power, 
pumped out heat and went wrong at the drop of a hat…. The MTBF (mean time 
between failures) was often in single figures, and when something went wrong it 
took hours of tracing and with luck, rectification by fiddling work with 
screwdrivers and even soldering irons.81 
Similarly, the introduction of jet engines added new problems as the early jet engines had a very 
short life span compared to piston engines, in some cases as low as fifty hours.82 
In the post-war period, the aircraft industries continued to enjoy government largesse 
related to the funding of the development and production of numerous aircraft projects.83 In the 
case of the UK, the duplication of various designs came to an end with the Defence White Paper 
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in 1957 that prematurely predicted the end of manned combat aircraft.84 This resulted in an 
industry rationalization that by the mid 1960s saw the existence of two major aircraft 
conglomerates, the British Aircraft Corporation and Hawker Siddeley Aviation.85 In the US, a 
similar situation existed and a number of aircraft companies could no longer compete, resulting 
in their demise or amalgamation with their more robust competitors.   
Closely associated with the political dimension was the constant issue of defence economics, as 
air forces were creations of governments. Defence economics was a key factor particularly as air 
forces were much more expensive to equip, train and operate compared to armies, and the rapid 
advance of technology during this period soon made expensive investments in air force 
equipment obsolete. The end result of the sharply rising costs was that each successive 
generation of designs saw fewer and fewer aircraft entering service, a case of budgets dictating a 
hard choice between quality and quantity.86 The increasing cost of aircraft was an issue in the 
early 1950s, even prior to the production of the more complex second and third generation 
fighters that emerged during this decade.87 The utilization of cheaper aircraft particularly for 
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ground attack remained an issue, especially in light of their need in the Korean War.88 The search 
for the right combination of costly complex aircraft and cheaper less sophisticated types (a 
“high” and “low” mix) was a constant struggle.89  
Conclusions 
Viewed from the perspective of the three intertwined pillars of defence and economics, 
military strategy and technology, the post Second World War period was one of tremendous 
change and rapidly shifting priorities.  In the immediate post-war years, fiscal restraint and the 
deep retrenchment of existing forces limited the modernization of air power.  New technology 
such as nuclear weapons, jet fighters and rockets had yet to have a discernible impact, and there 
was little impetus for military strategy to embrace these potential “game changers.”.  Despite the 
emergence of the Cold War in the late 1940s, the catalyst for increased defence spending – and 
the essential support for this spending by national governments – came from the outbreak of the 
Korean War in 1950.  However, the financial strain of what amounted to permanent mobilization 
led to a new military strategy based on the use of nuclear forces rather than large conventional 
forces.  Reliance on nuclear weapons as a first response to aggression ultimately proved to be 
inflexible and dangerous, and ineffective in dealing with “brushfire wars” that threatened the 
balance between East and West.  Thus the western powers complemented their nuclear forces 
with some expansion of conventional military forces in the 1960s.  In fact, combat in the small 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 See John W.R. Taylor, “Economy in Ground Attack,” The Royal Air Force Quarterly and Commonwealth Air 
Forces Journal, Vol. 5, No. 1, January 1953, and Howard S. Fowler, “Ground Attack,” Air Pictorial, Vol. XV, No. 
4, April 1954. 
89 See Michael Handel, “Numbers Do Count: The Question of Quality Versus Quantity,” Journal of Strategic 
Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3, September 1981. In contrast, see Possony’s comment that “quantitative relationships are less 
important in aerial warfare…” (p. 34). However, Possony was alluding to the elements of air power that provide 
those other qualitative factors. 
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wars of the 1950s and 1960s relied on modernized Second World War equipment or the 
adaptation of more modern equipment for conventional operations. 
 The experience during the two World Wars and in the post-1945 period clearly 
demonstrated the importance of air power.  However, the promises by the air power theorists 
about its decisive impact were not substantiated.  Historian Michael Howard noted,  
So long as there are these three elements in which war must be fought, there will be a 
need for three armed services, each exercising their own skills and their own 
specialty.  But they can only serve a single, coordinated strategy, in which air power 
will play its appropriate part.  Air power, as such, will not by itself win wars.90  
 
Air mindedness was the driving force for the prominence for air power during the early 
post-war Second World War period. The air power functions had matured with this wartime 
experience.  Though the union of jet powered bombers and nuclear weapons in the 1950s 
represented the apogee of air power for the RAF Bomber Command and the USAF Strategic Air 
Command, it was by no means the sole focus of air power.  Though the strategic bomber 
persisted as the institutional focus for the RAF and the USAF, and to a much significantly lesser 
degree by the Soviet Dalnaya Aviatsiya, most air forces were focused on the tactical air defence 
and close air support functions.  The exception was the strategic air defence function conducted 
by the RCAF and the Royal Swedish Air Force (RSAF). However, it was Mitchell’s “anything 
that flies” approach to air power that proved its usefulness rather than the “Douhet with nukes” 
or a conventional bombing strategy.  Conventional bombing was employed by both the USAF in 
Korea and Vietnam and by the RAF in a number of colonial campaigns with questionable 
efficacy. Air force tactical reconnaissance and fire support for land operations proved essential in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Michael Howard, “The Concept of Air Power: A Historical Appraisal,” Air Power History, Vol. 42, No. 4, Winter 
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Vol. 3, No. 1, Spring 2000. 
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numerous conflicts, along with the increased use of transport aircraft for strategic and tactical 
movement and helicopters for battlefield mobility. 
The reality of the application of air power presented itself in the small wars of the period, 
the British with their colonial campaigns and the United States with the air war in Korea, along 
with the Berlin airlift.  In these small wars, air power reverted to the role of a supporting arm to 
land power operations.  Despite the utility of air power for the successful conduct of these 
brushfire wars, political leaders and military strategists remained fixated on air power’s 
importance as the final arbiter in the event of global thermonuclear war.  This was reflected in 
the amount of funding allocated to air power, partly to build up large air forces, but also to meet 
the high cost of rapid technological developments.   
This reliance on air power derived from a number of elements in the Western world’s 
military belief system.  Foremost was the conviction that air power could substitute for large 
armies in dealing with the Communist threat.  There was an inherent belief in the superiority of 
technology.  A further rationale for air power was the perception that it represented a relatively 
bloodless way to strike at the enemy.  The lacunae in the emphasis on strategic air power were 
demonstrated in the numerous small wars of the post-war period.  Anglo-American victory in the 
Second World War meant that air power occupied a prominent place in the determinants for that 
victory.  When it came to re-establishing defence organizations in the post-war environment, the 
prominence of air power was recognized both by the Allied powers, the defeated Axis powers 
and by nations that had remained neutral during the war.  This factor was to exert an influence on 
the re-organization of air forces from being ancillary arms to a nation’s army and navy when 
originally formed during the inter-war period, to being re-established as independent air arms, a 
third service, equal in status to armies and navies.  Separate naval aviation branches were also 
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established in recognition of the importance of naval aviation during the war.  In addition, armies 
began to establish small air arms within their organizational structure.  
Technology was also a driver for air power during this period.  Every nation wanted to 
display its national technical prowess in the jet age with the development of a shiny jet fighter.  
However, most of these advanced aircraft projects undertaken by secondary and tertiary powers 
were doomed to failure.  Even the US and the UK had to contend with the cancellation of costly 
aircraft projects.  Closely linked with the complexity of new technology, were the increased costs 
associated with advanced aircraft projects both in their design, production and maintenance.  
These factors were to greatly influence the post-war development and expansion of the RCAF 
that will be explored in subsequent chapters. 
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Chapter 3 
The Development of Canadian Air Power to 1950 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to provide the background on the development of air power in 
Canada in the period up to 1950.  An understanding of the early developments of Canadian air 
power is essential in appreciating the expansion of the RCAF during the Cold War period, 1948 
to 1957.  This chapter will provide a brief overview of the development of air power up to and 
including the Second World War, but the emphasis will be placed on the beginnings of RCAF 
expansion in the period 1948-1950.  Areas to be covered include the inter-war development of 
the RCAF, renewed emphasis on the military aspects of the RCAF after 1935, initial planning for 
the RCAF contribution to the Second World War and the actual RCAF contribution to the war, 
and the initial post-war development of the RCAF and the Canadian aircraft industry.  
Defence policy analyst Douglas Bland has posited the view that “…Canadian defence 
policy…is…whatever the prime minister of the day happens to think it is, or says it is.”1 Despite 
the desire in Canada from both politicians and the public alike for “…a well-organized, snappy 
defence force that will be a credit to Canada without being too expensive,” during the inter-war 
period, the Canadian defence forces had a very low priority for spending until re-armament 
began after 1935.2 This was particularly the case when it came to the matter of air power.    
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For Canada’s defence forces, the establishment of an aviation component was 
problematic from the earliest days.3 During the course of the First World War, there were seven 
separate “air forces” in which Canadians served  – Canadian Aviation Corps (1914), Royal 
Flying Corps (1914-1918), Royal Naval Air Service (1914-1918), Royal Flying Corps Canada 
(1917-1918), Royal Air Force (1918), Canadian Air Force (1918-1919) and Royal Canadian 
Naval Air Service (1918).4 At the war’s end, both the CAF and RCNAS were disbanded, but in 
February 1920, the Canadian government did authorize a “new” Canadian Air Force (CAF), a 
part-time air militia to provide refresher training for former wartime pilots.  During the course of 
1922-23, a Permanent Force of 307 personnel was approved, becoming the Royal Canadian Air 
Force (RCAF) on 1 April 1924.5 However, the RCAF was subordinate to the Militia, with the 
senior RCAF officer, appointed as the Director RCAF.  It was not until 1938, on the eve of war, 
that the RCAF gained its autonomy as a separate service with the Chief of Air the Staff co-equal 
with his Militia and RCN counterparts.   
During most of the inter-war period, the RCAF was not a fighting force, with the 
majority of its pilots described as “bush pilots in uniform.” In its principal roles, one-half was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See the following articles on early attempts at Canadian military aviation by Wing Commander F.H. Hitchins, the 
RCAF Air Historian:, “Too Expensive a Luxury” – Part I, The Roundel, Vol. 11, No. 6, July-August 1959, and “Too 
Expensive a Luxury” – Part II, The Roundel, Vol. 11, No. 7, September 1959, and  “Canadian Aviation Corps,” The 
Roundel, Vol. 11, No. 8, October 1959. 
4 See S.F. Wise, Canadian Airmen and the First World War, The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force – 
Volume I, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980, and W.A.B. Douglas, The Creation of a National Air Force, 
The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force – Volume II, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986.   
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Ploughshare?” Canadian Defence Quarterly, Vol. 25, No.1, September 1995, Wayne Ralph, Barker VC, Toronto: 
Doubleday Canada Limited, 1997, Chapter 12, “Barker and the Foundation of the RCAF.” For the period 1924-
1931, see Desmond Morton, “A Non-Operational Air Force: The RCAF 1924-1931,” in W.A. March, ed., Sic Itur 
Ad Astra: Canadian Aerospace Power Studies, Volume 3, Combat if Necessary, But Not Necessarily Combat, 
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devoted to military flying training, while the remainder of the RCAF roles consisted of civil 
flying – aerial photography for mapping and survey, forest fire patrols and anti-smuggling 
patrols.6 During the Great Depression, the RCAF was severely hit with cutbacks with its budget 
being reduced from $7.5 million in 1930-31 to $1.75 million in 1932-33.7 This resulted in the 
release of seventy-eight officers, 100 airmen and 110 civilians – a significant number in such a 
small force of 1,100 personnel.8 The positive side of these reductions was a greater emphasis 
being placed on military training. Indeed, just prior to the onset of the Great Depression, the 
RCAF acquired its first combat aircraft since 1919 with nine Armstrong Whitworth Siskin 
fighters (1927) and six Armstrong Whitworth Atlas Army Co-operation Aircraft (1928-29).9  In 
addition, construction began of RCAF Station Trenton in 1931, this station becoming a key 
installation during both the Second World War and the Cold War.  It was also during this period 
that the first Non-Permanent squadrons were established, providing a RCAF “footprint” into the 
civilian community across Canada.10 
In 1936, with the beginning of re-armament, the government made the RCAF the top 
defence priority.  In April 1939, a new expansion programme was announced to consist of 5,000 
in the Permanent Force and 2,200 auxiliary air force personnel (as the Non-Permanent Force had 
been renamed in 1938) to be equipped with 527 aircraft organized into eleven Permanent Force 
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and twelve Auxiliary squadrons.11 However, when war was declared in September 1939, the 
RCAF consisted of 3,100 Permanent Force and 1,100 Auxiliary personnel equipped with 270 
aircraft of twenty-three different types of which 124 were operational aircraft including only 
thirty-nine aircraft that could be considered modern.12 
Canadian Air Power and the Second World War 
With the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, the Canadian government was 
hoping to make its participation one of “limited liability.”13 Greatly sensitive to the enormous 
casualties suffered in the First World War, the government believed that its participation could 
focus on air power, including the provision of training in Canada, and the development of 
aircraft manufacturing.  In the event, the demands of English Canadian cabinet ministers, 
reflecting public expectations that the country would contribute land forces as in the First World 
War, compelled the government to send a single army division. Hopes that Canada could limit its 
contribution to this token land force and a more substantial air force effort were dashed by the 
fall of France in 1940, and it now become a matter of total war.  Canada built up a large Army 
contribution, First Canadian Army, along with much larger air and naval contributions than had 
ever been imagined.   
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In the case of the RCAF, expansion comprised three components.14 First, there was the 
British Commonwealth Air Training Plan (BCATP).  Second, there was the RCAF Overseas that 
ultimately peaked at forty-eight squadrons by 1945 including fifteen bomber, fourteen day-
fighter, three fighter-reconnaissance, four night-fighter and intruder, six coastal, three transport, 
and three Air Observation Post (AOP) squadrons serving in every theatre of war.  Third, there 
was the RCAF Home War Establishment (HWE) that peaked at thirty-seven squadrons operating 
fighter, bomber reconnaissance and transport squadrons principally in the Eastern (nineteen 
squadrons) and Western (eighteen squadrons) Air Commands.  During the course of the war, the 
RCAF expanded into the fourth largest Allied Air Force operating as a “full menu” Tier one air 
force in which 232,632 men and 17,030 women (RCAF Women’s Division) served – all 
volunteers.15 There were 17,100 fatal casualties, including 10,000 who served with RAF Bomber 
Command. At its peak strength in January 1944, The RCAF establishment consisted of 215,000 
personnel consisting of BCATP (100,000), HWE (65,000) and RCAF Overseas (46,000). 
During the Second World War, the RCAF had a “good war,” with the success of the 
BCATP, the very large contribution of air forces to both home defence and the offensive against 
the Axis overseas.  An additional aspect of the RCAF effort was its linkage with the tremendous 
growth of the Canadian aircraft industry, over 16,000 aircraft being produced during the course 
of the war.  These factors were to provide the impetus for the development of a large post-war air 
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force, particularly when the Cold War became “hot” with the outbreak of the Korean War in 
1950. 
  The nascent airmindedness that had taken hold in Canada during the 1920s had 
exploded during the course of the war.  Jonathan Vance noted “when the RCAF ballooned from 
a few thousand members in 1939 to a quarter of a million six years later, it fundamentally 
changed the relationship between aviation and the general population.”16  It was not only those 
quarter of a million Canadians in RCAF uniform that were affected, but to those numbers must 
be added the 122,000 employed in the aircraft industry, 50,000 Royal Canadian Air Cadets, and 
the tens of thousands of civilians who were employed at RCAF and BCATP bases across the 
country and the 30,000 members of the Aircraft Detection Corps – these people all had families 
and friends. The media also played a crucial role in promoting this airmindedness.17      
Planning for Post-War Air Power  
The very important part played by air power in the Canadian effort in the Second World 
War did much to stimulate continued airmindedness after 1945.  Planning for the post-war 
RCAF had begun while the Second World War was still in progress with the completion of the  
“Brief on Post-War Planning for the Royal Canadian Air Force” by Air Commodore K. M. 
Guthrie, the Deputy Air Member Air Staff (Plans) in December 1943.18  This document outlined 
the four principles that were to be used as a guide for future planning.  First, the RCAF should be 
capable of both defensive and offensive operations.  Second, the RCAF should be organized to 
enable its rapid transition from peacetime to wartime footing.  Third, the RCAF should include 
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an air and ground training system capable of rapid expansion.  Fourth, the RCAF had to be 
highly mobile, capable of deploying and fighting in either North America or overseas. 19   
The Air Force planners eventually developed a plan for a post-war Regular RCAF that 
was to consist of sixteen squadrons comprising four day fighter, two medium bomber, four heavy 
bomber, two general reconnaissance, two long-range transport, one troop transport and one 
photographic survey squadrons.20  The RCAF would require 30,000 personnel to operate these 
squadrons and to train the Auxiliary and Reserve Force.  The estimated annual budget to support 
this force was $78 million.21 (This proposed force structure should be compared with the pre-war 
RCAF with its 4,000 personnel and $10 million budget in 1938-39.) In the event, government 
restraints on spending considerably reduced the organization recommended by the planners.22  
On 28 February 1946, Colin Gibson, the Minister of National Defence (Air), made a 
speech to the Empire Club in Toronto entitled “Air Power in Canada” that outlined the 
government’s policy. 23 With a strength of 16,100 personnel, the Permanent Force was to consist 
of eight squadrons – two bomber reconnaissance, two transport, one fighter reconnaissance, one 
fighter-bomber, one air observation post (AOP) and one photographic squadrons – and eight 
composite flights to include communications, air-sea rescue, glider and target towing.  The AOP 
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and glider units would consist of both RCAF and Army personnel.24 The Auxiliary Air Force 
would consist 4,500 personnel manning ten fighter, three fighter-bomber and two fighter-
reconnaissance squadrons.25 Gibson explained: “the Auxiliaries are intended to provide a force 
fully organized, manned and equipped which…can be mobilized for operations in conjunction 
with the Army, in the same way that RCAF wings formed part of the 2nd Tactical Air Force 
during the war in Europe.”26 Gibson also mentioned a RCAF Reserve of 10,000 officers and 
men, the continuation of the Air Cadets created during the war, and the retention of the RCAF 
Staff College that would work closely with the other services and the RAF and USAAF.27 One-
third of the eleven-page speech was devoted to research, including the Test and Development 
Establishment at Rockcliffe, the Winter Experimental Establishment at Edmonton and the 
Institute of Aviation Medicine in Toronto. Gibson noted that the RCAF was to be equipped with 
Canadian designed and manufactured jet fighters (including their engines).28 This post-war 
RCAF was to require an annual budget of $59 million when fully implemented.29 Gibson was 
proposing the creation of a balanced air force designed for offensive and defensive operations, 
embodying the same concepts as the more ambitious plans previously put forward by the air 
staff.30 
The Early Post-War RCAF 1946-47 
The RCAF ended the war with a personnel strength of 164,846 on 31 May 1945.  Much 
of this force was demobilized over the next year, but there were also a number of overseas 
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30  Bomber squadrons had been deleted from the original proposals, but a large number of fighter and fighter-bomber 
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commitments that required RCAF units.  Four fighter squadrons were deployed in Germany as 
part of the British Air Forces of Occupation (BAFO), the three squadrons of No. 120 (Transport) 
Wing had also deployed to the Continent in support of the Canadian Army Occupation Force 
(CAOF), two bomber squadrons were deployed in Great Britain on transport tasks, an AOP 
squadron was included in the CAOF, and a Canada-based transport squadron provided overseas 
support.  However, with the withdrawal of the CAOF in 1946, these RCAF units were 
disbanded, leaving no combat squadrons in the Regular Force.31 The Regular RCAF roles were 
limited to air transport, search and rescue, and air photography and mapping with five flying 
squadrons.32 Seven Auxiliary squadrons were formed in 1946 consisting of No. 400 Squadron 
(Toronto), No. 401 Squadron (Montreal), No. 402 Squadron (Winnipeg), No. 418 Squadron 
(Edmonton), No. 424 Squadron (Hamilton), No. 438 Squadron (Montreal) and No. 442 Squadron 
(Vancouver).33  Apart from an Auxiliary fighter squadron establishment of 265 personnel for 
each unit, there was also a need for RCAF Regular Force support detachments varying in size 
from fifty to 100 personnel depending whether or not the Auxiliary squadron was co-located on 
an existing RCAF station.34 
In December 1946, Brooke Claxton was appointed as the MND, a post that he was to 
occupy until 1954 during the period that included most of the RCAF post-war build up.35 Though 
he had a long-time interest in foreign policy and international affairs, until this appointment, 
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Claxton had not previously been involved in defence issues.36 Claxton had served with the 
Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) overseas in the First World War so he was sympathetic to 
the notion of emphasizing air power in order to avoid land force commitments that could be so 
politically divisive and so costly in terms of human life.  Though the RCAF was to be the major 
beneficiary of defence resources during his tenure, Claxton was no simple proponent of what 
Bland has referred to as the “strong service” concept that promoted the view that a “strong army, 
navy and air force in and of themselves will provide for a strong national defence.”37 Indeed, 
Claxton had originally been appointed as the MND by Mackenzie King with the primary remit to 
“consolidate, reduce and rationalize” DND and the three services through the elimination of 
duplicate activities that had emerged during the Second World War with three Defence Ministers 
and large autonomous military services.38 Claxton was more concerned with re-establishing a 
defence establishment grounded on sound governance and an effective civil-military relationship 
rather than simply creating large military services.39  
A second aspect of Claxton’s responsibilities was to bring clarity and coherence to the 
Canadian-US bilateral defence relationship, while also controlling costs of any commitments.40  
In this capacity, even prior to his appointment as MND, Claxton was presented with the issues 
that were to confront his Department at the special Cabinet meeting on defence on 14-15 
November 1946.  In the Chiefs of Staff briefings to the Cabinet, Air Marshal Robert Leckie, the 
CAS, pointed out that that the Military Cooperation Committee, a sub-committee of the 
Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD) had plans for the build up of a massive air defence 
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37 Bland, “Everything Military Officers Need to Know About Defence Policy-Making in Canada,” p. 23. 
38 Bercuson, p. 163. 
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system, a plan to which Leckie was opposed.41  Leckie believed that the US military based this 
proposed build up on the idea that the next war would begin with an attack on North America 
whilst the Canadian view was that such an attack would only be a diversion.  At Claxton’s 
suggestion a high level bi-lateral meeting was held on 16-17 December to clarify the issues 
where the Canadian delegation learned that the US official view was that “ ‘the threat to the 
physical security of North America…would be slight’ for at least the next five or six years.”42 
With this perspective, it provided the Canadian government with the case not to proceed with a 
heavy investment in air defence at this time.        
With the uncertainty of the international situation, the absence of an immediate threat and 
the need for Canadian fiscal soundness, the government at this time was not in any haste to 
develop large-scale armed forces as envisaged by the military planners.  After only two months 
into his appointment as MND, and having been briefed by the Chiefs of Staff, on 17 February 
1947 Claxton set down in a memorandum his concept of Canadian defence that reflected 
government policy strictly to limit defence expenditures.  These remarks were used as the basis 
for his later statement in the House of Commons.43 According to Bercuson, in the absence of 
well-developed intelligence sources, Claxton relied on “guesswork” to arrive at his forecast 
based on budgetary reality.44  Claxton spoke of the three roles for the armed forces: defence of 
Canada, aid to the civil power, and a contribution to collective defence with friendly nations or 
under the auspices of the United Nations.  He believed that there were only two potential theatres 
in which Canadian forces might be required to fight – however, there would be no requirement to 
fight in the primary theatre of Western Europe in the next five years, whilst any attack on the 
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North American theatre would be of secondary nature.45 In fulfilling these roles, factors such as 
the impact of technology, the employment of the reserve forces, and budget restraint had to be 
taken into consideration. In the case of the air force, it would assist in the defence of Western 
Europe and North America, including “…if bombing is still in vogue co-operate in bombing the 
enemy.”46 In Claxton’s view, a future war would evoke a similar response on the part of Canada 
as the previous two world wars – mobilization would take place after the outbreak of war, and it 
would not make sense to create this mobilization force in peacetime.47 Claxton was prudent 
enough to argue on behalf of his Department around the Cabinet table during the budget 
discussions for the 1947-48 Fiscal Year that severely threatened DND.48 Subsequent events 
would change Claxton’s mind regarding the need for the build up of “peacetime” forces-in-
being, including the development of the Big Air Force. 
In Claxton’s position as MND, like-minded individuals surrounded him.  Crucially 
important in view of Bland’s assertion that “defence policy is what the Prime Minister says it is,” 
Claxton enjoyed the full confidence of both Mackenzie King and Louis St. Laurent.  There was 
an evolution in King’s views regarding the international situation during the final year of his 
tenure as Prime Minister.  Following the end of the war in 1945, he had adopted his traditional 
determination to keep defence forces at a minimum.  After receiving a “doom and gloom” British 
briefing in November 1947, “King was strongly influenced if not entirely convinced,” that war 
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46 Ibid. p. 91. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Bercuson, p. 169.  Bercuson notes “the battle over the defence budget left Claxton tired, depressed, and 
exceedingly unhappy with his role at DND….[however]…The budget-slashing of January-February 1947 was not 
repeated.” 
 73 
with the USSR might be imminent.49 King was also deeply moved by the death of Jan Masaryk 
in the Czech coup d’état of March 1948.50 Subsequent discussion between King and Lester 
Pearson (then the undersecretary of state for External Affairs) and the British High 
Commissioner broached the subject of a transatlantic arrangement between North America and 
the Western European Union for collective defence. 
As King’s second-in-command, Louis St. Laurent who attended the Dumbarton Oaks and 
San Francisco Conferences, was formally appointed as the Secretary of State for External Affairs 
in 1946, a job King had previously always done himself.  St. Laurent was considered more 
internationally-minded than King and detailed his perspective on Canada’s place in the world in 
the January 1947 Gray lecture.  Discussing the various principles that were the cornerstone of 
Canadian policy, St. Laurent noted the importance of accepting international responsibilities.51 
Upon becoming Prime Minister in November 1948, St. Laurent continued with this 
internationalist approach as witnessed by Canadian acceptance of the North Atlantic Treaty in 
1949 followed up with sizeable Army and RCAF contributions to the Integrated Force in 1951, a 
considerable contribution to the United Nations forces upon the outbreak of the Korean War in 
1950 and greatly expanded defence cooperation with the US for North American defence.   
Lester Pearson was another official who greatly contributed to the changed circumstances 
of the post-war Canadian government.  Appointed as the Undersecretary of State for External 
Affairs in 1946, Pearson represented a refreshing difference in External Affairs from the King 
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years of inactivity to an atmosphere where “Pearson and his career-diplomat colleagues…were 
determined to be present at the creation of the post-war international system.”52 Like Claxton, 
Pearson was a First World War veteran who had not only served in the Army, but also had some 
limited experience with the Royal Flying Corps.53 As the Undersecretary of State, Pearson was 
very often in attendance at the Chiefs of Staff Committee meetings where he provided the 
External Affairs perspective on defence issues with obvious international impact.  Pearson’s 
perspective regarding the USSR was seen as representing the dominant one in External Affairs 
by late 1946 noting that “without some fundamental change in the Soviet state system and in the 
policies and views of its leaders, the USSR is ultimately bound to come into open conflict with 
western democracy.”54 In the fall of 1948, Pearson became a welcomed addition to the Cabinet 
with his transition from foreign service officer to politician becoming the Secretary of State for 
External Affairs where he continued his international activist approach over the next nine 
years.55 
At the service level, the RCAF was represented by Air Marshal Wilfred Curtis, a veteran 
of both the land and air forces from the First World War who assumed the appointment of the 
Chief of the Air Staff on 1 September 1947, a position he was to hold until January 1953 during 
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the build-up of the Big Air Force.56 In examining Curtis’ role as CAS, it is useful to consider 
Claxton’s views on the characteristics required for a successful Chief of Staff.  These traits 
included a “silent soldier”  (i.e. refraining from public commenting on government policy), 
recognition of the “national facts of life,” including always taking the Canadian point of view 
and acknowledging the civilian control of defence policy: there had to be congruency between 
military plans and national objectives.57 Potential Chiefs of Staff should have top-level NDHQ 
service to understand both military administration and civil-military relations, experience in 
high-level command, international service in London, Washington or NATO, and attendance at a 
senior defence college.58  
In all categories but one – he had not attended a staff or defence college – Curtis 
exceeded the desired criteria for his appointment.  During the inter-war period, Curtis had 
worked in private business while remaining a “citizen soldier” in the Militia, and later “citizen 
airman” in the RCAF Auxiliary.59 Promoted to the rank of Wing Commander and command of 
No. 101 (Auxiliary) Wing in December 1938, Curtis was instrumental in preparing No. 1 
Manning Depot in Toronto to undertake the surge of recruits upon the outbreak of war in 
September 1939.60 Curtis enjoyed a meteoric rise in the wartime RCAF being promoted to the 
rank of Air Vice Marshal and the Air Member for Air Staff  (AMAS) by January 1944.  As an 
Air Commodore, Curtis served overseas between November 1941 and January 1944 as the 
Deputy Air Officer Commanding for the RCAF Overseas.  In this capacity, he demonstrated his 
outstanding administrative and staff skills and his strong advocacy of Canadianization of the 
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overseas RCAF, all the while conducting himself with tact and diplomacy.  In his last wartime 
appointment as Air Member for Air Staff (AMAS), Curtis had been focussed on the planning for 
Canadian participation in Tiger Force (projected for the final offensives against Japan, but never 
deployed) along with being the senior Canadian officer on the PJBD and involvement on the 
Working Committee on Post-Hostilities Problems.61  After the war, Curtis served as the Air 
Member for Air Plans (AMAP) as well as the acting CAS during most of 1946.62 Certainly in the 
mind of his superior, Air Marshal Leckie, the retiring CAS, Curtis was an excellent choice to be 
his successor.63 
The Liberal government’s airmindedness had the support of the Progressive Conservative 
defence critic, Georges Pearkes, a proponent of a strong air force.64 Reginald Roy noted, 
“Despite his long association with the army, Pearkes considered the air force to be Canada’s first 
line of defence.  In 1949 he suggested that there should be three dollars spent on the air force for 
every dollar spent on the army.”65 
 Despite Gibson’s reassuring words expressed in “Air Power in Canada,” less than a year 
later, on 16 January 1947, fiscal restraints forced the Government to limit the forces to only 
seventy-five per cent of the approved 1946 establishment.  For the RCAF, this meant a ceiling of 
13,663 personnel rather than 16,100.  Despite the fiscal constraints, there was a limited 
expansion of the Regular RCAF in 1947 with the establishment of No. 417 (Fighter-
Reconnaissance) Squadron equipped with the North American Mustang and No. 444 (AOP) 
Squadron equipped with the Auster Mk. VI, both squadrons being located at the Canadian Joint 
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Air Training Centre (CJATC), Rivers, Manitoba.66 An additional Auxiliary squadron, No. 406 
(Tactical Bomber) Squadron was established at Saskatoon, equipped with North American B-25 
Mitchell twin piston-engine light bombers.  These new squadrons, organized into the Mobile 
Tactical Wing, were intended to provide air support to the Canadian Army’s Mobile Striking 
Force (MSF), an airborne and air transportable force of brigade group strength intended to repel 
a Soviet lodgement on Canadian territory.67  Additional air support for the MSF was based on the 
Dakota Mk. IV transport that equipped RCAF transport squadrons.  
Another RCAF role was the provision of air-sea rescue (ASR) flights in accordance with 
the RCAF being assigned the responsibility as the co-ordinating agency by the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).68  During the course of 1947, an ASR flight was 
established on the East and West coasts and at Edmonton equipped with Vickers Canso 
amphibian aircraft and Noorduyn Norseman light transports.  In personnel matters, although 
prospects were good for recruiting aircrew and technical officers, there was a continuing problem 
with the shortage of maintenance technicians amounting to almost 2,000 positions, a 
considerable number in a small air force.69 
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The RCAF from 1948 and the Berlin Blockade 
  It was during 1948 that the reality of the tensions in the international system came to the 
forefront, and policy makers commenced the slow advance towards Canadian re-armament.  The 
Communist Party coup d’état in February in Czechoslovakia was followed by the Soviet 
blockade of Berlin that began in June and was to last until the following May.  Though the 
RCAF may have been short of combat air power in the spring of 1948, it certainly possessed an 
adequate number of transport aircraft and crews organized into three squadrons – No. 412 
Squadron at Rockcliffe and No. 435 Squadron at Edmonton were equipped with the twin-engine 
Dakota Mk. III and Mk. IV, while No. 426 Squadron at Dorval was in the process of replacing its 
Dakota aircraft with the four-engine Canadair North Star transport.70 The decision not to 
participate in the Berlin airlift was a political one, though Claxton raised a number of military 
uncertainties that would have emanated from the military staff.  If one considers Canada’s 
extensive post-war international engagement, then Leigh Sarty was correct in saying that 
“Canada’s refusal to take part in the airlift therefore seems puzzling.”71  
The Canadian government’s response to the Berlin blockade was particularly perplexing 
because the Canadian government, having come to appreciate the danger of another war in 
Europe, promoted the establishment of a trans-Atlantic collective defence organization. Both 
Maurice Pope, head of the Canadian Military Mission in Berlin, and the High Commissioner to 
the United Kingdom, Norman Robertson, had been informally approached about the possibility 
of Canadian assistance in the airlift.72  When the issue of Canadian participation was raised at the 
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30 June Cabinet meeting, the previous waffling on the part of Prime Minister Mackenzie King 
disappeared when it was reported in the British press that Canada had been asked to help with 
the blockade, this earning the ire of King who felt that this was a replay of the 1922 Chanak 
Crisis.73 However, Sarty correctly explained that the differences in the geo-strategic 
circumstances between the two events were quite obvious.74  Claxton commented on the “great 
complexity” of the airlift operation, noting that a RCAF contribution of five or six North Star 
aircraft would be “a very small fraction of the aircraft needed.”75 However, Claxton’s major 
focus was the fear that an RCAF aircraft might be involved in an “incident.”76 Claxton further 
supported his argument against participation on the grounds that Canada had not been involved 
in determining policy in Germany.77 St. Laurent, the Secretary of State for External Affairs 
supported Canadian participation, noting the need for firm and joint action, and that if war 
resulted, “Canada would necessarily be involved,” a point with which King and the Cabinet 
agreed.78 But as a result of this very narrow legalistic and diplomatic interpretation, King could 
state in the House of Commons on 30 June that “no request …for food stocks or for air 
transport” had been received from the British authorities, this approach remaining the official 
Canadian position throughout the airlift.79  
The timidity of the Canadian position became even more evident with the contribution of 
ten RAAF Dakota aircraft complete with crews and the South African Air Force contribution of 
fifty pilots for RAF service.  In an editorial entitled “The Shame of Silence,” The Globe and 
Mail commented, “there is a time and place for diplomatic protocol.  Friends do not stand on 
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ceremony in an emergency and the Berlin blockade has been very much an emergency.”80  Later 
at the Cabinet meeting on 25 September, Claxton advised that a squadron of ten Dakota aircraft 
with ninety aircrew and 219 ground crew was immediately available, but the Cabinet still 
declined to make a Canadian contribution.81 According to Sarty, in the matter of Canadian civil-
military relations, “the defence policy machinery was designed to take many considerations into 
account, and if the other factors outweighed the need to take military action then those factors 
would prevail.”82 The lack of participation by the RCAF in the Berlin airlift demonstrated that 
the existence of a military capability did not necessarily ensure its use.  Canadian non-
involvement in the Berlin airlift provides another example to support Bland’s thesis regarding 
Prime Ministers and defence policy-making. 
The earlier limitations on the RCAF establishment were short-lived with the 28 
December 1948 announcement that changing circumstances necessitated an expanded defence 
programme for 1949, including numerous improvements for the RCAF.83 This change heralded 
an increased Canadian willingness to assume international responsibilities by St. Laurent on his 
succession to Mackenzie King as Prime Minister on the latter’s retirement in November 1948.  If 
there had been some uncertainty towards the future international situation in 1947, moreover, it 
now become quite evident that the Soviet Union had become the dominant threat to peace in 
Europe.  The Czech coup d’état in February 1948 and the Berlin blockade that commenced in 
June were manifestations of Soviet aggressiveness.  Apart from the maintenance of armed forces 
of 2.8 million personnel (including 2.444 million in the Soviet Army), there had been the 
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Tushino air display on 3 August 1947 that revealed the existence of the Tu-4 Bull long-range 
bomber (reverse-engineered Boeing B-29) that could clearly attack targets in Western Europe 
and Alaska.   It was also known that the Soviet Union was endeavouring to develop a nuclear 
bomb, though the detonation of such a device in August 1949 was unexpected and subsequently 
added to more immediate Western war fears. 
The new defence programme resulted in a fundamental shift in RCAF planning away 
from the originally envisaged balanced air force that could conduct a myriad of air power 
functions to one that emphasized a focus on air defence.  This programme included the 
procurement of new jet fighters, including the North American F-86 Sabre, and acceleration of 
the development of the Canadian CF-100.84 With the greater emphasis placed on air defence for 
both for the Regular and Auxiliary components, there was a need for an effective command and 
control resulting in the establishment of a new formation headquarters, No. 1 Air Defence Group 
at Air Force Headquarters (AFHQ) Ottawa on 1 December 1948, which moved to St Hubert on 1 
November 1949.85  
The establishment of the Air Defence Group provided some limited command and 
control of air defence in Eastern Canada, though the RCAF was certainly in no position to re-
fight the Battle of Britain.  This emphasis justified the role of eight Auxiliary squadrons, four of 
which were to be partially equipped with the Vampire, but also included the expansion of the 
Regular component from two to nine fighter squadrons. The expansion plan increased the 
Auxiliary force from ten to thirteen flying squadrons, and authorized the formation of seventeen 
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Aircraft Control and Warning Squadrons by 1951 along with the intent to increase the Auxiliary 
force to a strength of 25,000 personnel by 1954.86 The defence programme reinforced the 
transition of the command and control structure of the post-war RCAF from a geographic to a 
functional organizational concept. 
RCAF Organizational Changes 
In 1938, the RCAF established its command system based on a geographical command 
structure, Eastern Air Command, Western Air Command, Central Air Command and the North-
West Air Command, with the exception of Training Command.  This type of organizational 
structure was to endure throughout the Second World War for the RCAF Home War 
Establishment.  After the war, there was a gradual transition away from the geographical 
command structure towards one based on a functional approach.87 The Eastern and Western Air 
Commands were disbanded on 1 March 1947 whilst Central Air Command (HQ Trenton, 
Ontario) and North-West Air Command (HQ Edmonton) continued to operate. 
To the outsider, air force organization may have appeared confusing with the various 
types of nomenclature used for in the building blocks of the air force structure; in some cases, it 
was downright contradictory.  For the most part, RCAF organization followed the RAF pattern, 
though there were some anomalies.  The smallest building block was the squadron commanded 
by a squadron leader or wing commander.  A squadron could be either a flying unit or a ground 
unit such as an Aircraft Control and Warning squadron.  The number of aircraft in a flying 
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squadron varied on the type of aircraft that equipped that squadron, but normally a Sabre fighter 
squadron had a Unit Establishment  (UE) of twenty-five aircraft whilst a CF-100 fighter 
squadron consisted of eighteen aircraft.  A transport or maritime reconnaissance squadron that 
involved a large number of aircrew usually consisted of twelve aircraft. Two or three flying 
squadrons were then organized into a wing normally commanded by a Group Captain as was the 
case in No. 1 Air Division in Europe.  In Canada, a Group Captain normally commanded a 
RCAF station; a station could include one or more flying squadrons.   
During the Second World War, RCAF overseas squadrons were usually organized as part 
of RAF functional commands.  RCAF fighter squadrons serving with the RAF had been 
organized into wings that had been part of a group that in turn was part of the 2nd Tactical Air 
Force or Fighter Command, the next higher organizational building blocks.  In the case of 
bomber squadrons, these were organized into bases that formed into a group that had Bomber 
Command as the next higher organization.  
After the war, a hybrid organizational structure was initially adopted that consisted of 
commands and groups, the former being the legacy of the wartime structure whilst the groups 
were transitional towards the functional organizational concept.  As the RCAF slowly expanded 
starting in the late 1940s, the groups were replaced by commands that included a large number of 
subordinate stations and units within each command.  Whereas Group Captains had commanded 
the post-war groups; air officers in the rank of Air Commodore or Air Vice Marshal commanded 
the commands. The exception to this organizational construct was the Air Division that was 
formed for the command and control of Canadian fighter wings assigned to the Integrated Force 
in NATO.  No. 1 Air Division was commanded by an Air Vice Marshal and was equal in status 
with the Canadian-based commands.  No. 5 Air Division was a subordinate formation within Air 
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Defence Command commanded by an Air Commodore. No. 14 Group was formed within 
Training Command under the command of an Air Commodore to exercise command and control 
for the units and stations responsible for the conduct of NATO training. 
This functional approach was more in keeping with the assigned defence tasks of the 
RCAF.  The first functional command to be established was Maintenance Command in 1945 
tasked with the responsibility for the disposal of thousands of aircraft.  Maintenance Command 
was re-named Air Materiel Command on 1 April 1949 to better reflect its post-war 
responsibilities in providing logistics support to the remainder the RCAF.   
In the initial post-war organization of the RCAF, groups subordinate to the existing 
geographical commands had been established to reflect the actual RCAF operational structure.  
No. 9 Group (HQ Rockcliffe), an independent formation, was responsible for air transport 
operations, whilst No. 10 Group (HQ Halifax) for maritime air operations was subordinate to 
Central Air Command, and No. 11 Group (HQ Winnipeg) responsible for Army tactical support 
operations and No. 12 Group (HQ Comox) responsible for Pacific coast air defence were 
subordinate to the North-West Air Command.  With the disbandment of the geographical 
commands, these Groups were first raised to independent status and eventually to Command 
status.  The first of the new operational Commands was the transition of No. 9 Group to Air 
Transport Command on 1 April 1948.  No. 1 Air Defence Group was re-named Air Defence 
Command 1 June 1951 to reflect the priority and importance of its status within the RCAF.  
Training Command was established on 1 April 1949 replacing the Central Air Command.   To 
administer the NATO programme on the Prairies, No. 14 Training Group was established as a 
subordinate formation on 1 August 1951.  No. 10 Group was re-named Maritime Group on 1 
April 1949 and became Maritime Air Command on 1 June 1953.  No. 11 Group was re-named 
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Tactical Group on 1 April 1949, re-named once again as the Tactical Air Group on 1 August 
1951 merging with the North-West Air Command, finally being re-named as Tactical Air 
Command on 1 June 1953.  No. 12 Group was re-named No. 12 Air Defence Group within Air 
Defence Command on 1 July 1951, becoming No. 5 Air Division on 1 September 1955.  
Table 3-1 – Transition of RCAF Command Structure 1946 and 1950 
1946 1950 
Central Air 
Command 
(HQ 
Trenton) 
No. 10 Group 
(Halifax) 
Training 
Command (HQ 
Trenton) 
 
Maritime Group 
(HQ Halifax) 
North-West 
Air 
Command 
(HQ 
Edmonton) 
No. 11 Group 
(Winnipeg) 
No. 12 Group 
(Vancouver) 
North-West Air 
Command  
No. 12 Group 
Tactical Group 
(HQ Winnipeg) 
Maintenance Command (HQ 
Rockcliffe) 
Air Materiel Command (HQ 
Rockcliffe) 
No. 9 (Transport) Group (HQ 
Rockcliffe) 
Air Transport Command (HQ 
Rockcliffe) 
 No.1 Air Defence Group (HQ St 
Hubert) 
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In the case of air defence, it took some years to bring increased capabilities to the new 
organization.  When authorized in 1946, the six original Auxiliary squadrons had been equipped 
with the Harvard advanced trainer aircraft.  It was only in the Spring 1948 that five of these 
squadrons were equipped with the Vampire jet fighters – No. 400 Squadron Toronto, No. 401 
Squadron Montreal, No. 402 Squadron Winnipeg, No. 438 Squadron Montreal and No. 442 
Squadron Vancouver.88  However, only No. 438 Squadron was allocated to the Air Defence 
Group, the other fighter squadrons were part of Training Command or the North-West Air 
Command.  Two additional Auxiliary fighter squadrons were established in 1948, No. 403 
Squadron in Calgary and No. 420 Squadron in London, equipped with the Harvard.89 In 
September 1948, No. 1 (Fighter) Operational Training Unit at St Hubert was formed to train 
pilots on the Vampire in the air defence role of metropolitan areas.  Subsequently, the first 
Regular Force Vampire fighter squadron, No. 410 Squadron, was formed at St Hubert on 1 
December 1948 as part of No. 1 Air Defence Group. In fact, this was the only Regular Force 
fighter squadron as No. 417 Squadron at Rivers, Manitoba, equipped with the Mustang fighter-
bomber, was disbanded on 1 August 1948.90  The build up of the Air Defence Group proceeded 
at a slow pace as the second Regular Force Vampire squadron, No. 421 Squadron, was only 
established at RCAF Station Chatham, New Brunswick in September 1949.91  
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When originally authorized in 1946, the roles of the original seven Auxiliary squadrons 
were intended to reflect what had been announced by Gibson in his February 1946 Empire Club 
speech; that is, RCAF squadrons that could support the Canadian Army in the field.  
Consequently, of the seven squadrons, four were fighter-bomber, one was light-bomber and only 
two were designated as fighter squadrons.  However, a year later, six of the squadrons were re-
designated as fighter squadrons and one light-bomber squadron, with no fighter-bomber 
squadrons. 
The paucity of air defence aircraft had been noted at the Chiefs of Staff Committee 
meeting in December 1946 when discussing the Canadian-United States Joint Appreciation and 
Basic Security Plan.92 The CAS, Air Marshal Leckie, noted that though a fighter wing was not a 
“top priority” for FY 1947-48, he also observed “it was important…to give the government some 
of idea of increases which would later be required in the strength of the Air Force to meet the air 
menace.93 Leckie visualized the numbers required as likely in the neighbourhood of 25,000 and 
wished the government to know this.”94 This increase represented a fifty per cent increase in 
actual RCAF personnel strength.  Prior to raising a fighter wing, the more immediate measures to 
be undertaken in order to establish an air defence system included the survey and selection of 
sites for radar stations, airfields and anti-aircraft weaponry.95 Although there was no immediate 
air threat to Canadian territory, the existence of the Tupolev Tu-4 Bull long-range bomber added 
to concerns about the near future.96 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 DHH 73/1223, Series 3, File 1301. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid. p. 1. 
95 Ibid. p. 1. 
96 The Tu-4 Bull had a range of 3,300 miles – it was unable to reach the heartland of North America, but could strike 
London, UK, and Alaska from bases in Siberia. 
 88 
Post-war defence planning for the RCAF was initially not directed at a specific threat, but 
the RCAF did undertake various initiatives to promote its independence and general readiness.  
Of prime importance was the agreement between the Canadian Government and Avro Canada on 
31 October 1945 that authorized the design and development of a “single-seater jet-type fighter 
airframe to meet the requirements of the Department of National Defence specifications of AIR 
7-1, Issue 1.”97 Subsequently, the RCAF determined that its requirements were for a twin-engine, 
two-seater all weather interceptor fighter for the defence of Canada.98 In August 1946, Avro 
Canada submitted three proposals based on the revised requirements with the RCAF accepting 
the design in October that best met its requirements, but the detailed design work did not 
commence until May 1947.99 The decision to undertake this project for a complete aircraft – 
airframe, engine, fire control system and weapons – was based on the Second World War 
experience whereby the Canadian Government was often at the mercy of the US or the UK when 
it came to equipping the RCAF. The specifications of AIR 7-1 called for an aircraft that did not 
exist in 1945 -- or even in 1950 -- in either country.100 The main role intended for this interceptor 
was to defend against the Tu-4 Bull.   To obtain the aircraft as soon as possible for the RCAF, the 
aircraft was of a conventional design; the Orenda engines under development were innovative 
and were the greatest risk to the project’s success. The prototype XC-100 aircraft first flew on 19 
January 1950, with the first aircraft being delivered to the RCAF on 13 October 1951.  The 
decision to undertake the development of an indigenous jet combat aircraft was to have 
significant impact on the development of the RCAF and the Canadian aircraft industry during the 
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1950s providing an impetus for the concept of the Big Air Force.  However, this project was 
fraught with difficulties that will be discussed in later chapters. 
A second decision taken by the RCAF in 1945 was to acquire a limited number of jet 
fighters to provide RCAF pilots with jet aircraft experience in an economical manner.  The 
RCAF had conducted trials with both the Meteor and the Vampire in 1946, ultimately opting for 
the Vampire fighter.101 The RCAF bartered with the RAF for the largest number of jet fighters it 
could obtain in exchange for 200 late-model Spitfire fighters that were still considered more 
suitable by the RAF for overseas service.102 Ultimately, the decision turned on numbers  – sixty-
six Meteors or eighty-five Vampires in exchange for the Spitfires.103 The Vampire did not have 
an ejection seat; possessed a marginal speed increase compared to piston engine fighters and had 
very short range that diminished its usefulness in the Canadian environment.  It was also 
maintenance-intensive, a fault common to many of the first-generation jet fighters.104 Despite its 
limitations, the Vampire did serve the purpose of providing the RCAF, particularly the Auxiliary 
squadrons across the country, with jet fighters, pending the acquisition of more modern 
aircraft.105 
The third decision that was to greatly impact the RCAF was that to acquire the North 
American Sabre fighter under licenced production in November 1948.106  The Sabre represented 
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the ultimate day jet fighter at the time and was considerably more expensive than the Vampire.107  
Indeed, the decision to acquire the Sabre resulted in some minor controversy on the part of the 
Official Opposition.108 George Drew, the leader of the Progressive Conservative Party attempted 
to score political points by noting that 800 Vampire fighters could have been obtained for the 
cost that the government was willing to expend to obtain 100 Sabre fighters, notwithstanding the 
definitive increase in capability represented by the latter aircraft.109 
 A common misperception was that the RCAF became “fighters first” in the early post-
war period.110 In fact, the RCAF still adhered to the concept of a balanced air force, including 
bombers. It was acknowledged that in the event of war, the requirement for fighters for European 
(including British) defence would be essential at the outset.111 However, two Auxiliary 
squadrons equipped with the B-25 Mitchell light bomber operated from 1946 to 1958 in support 
of the MSF.  At one point, a tactical bomber version of the CF-100 was under consideration as a 
Mitchell replacement.  For planning purposes, the RCAF used various post-war bomber designs 
(i.e. Boeing B-50, Boeing B-47, English Electric Canberra, Vickers Valiant and the Avro 
Vulcan) as benchmarks for its ongoing desire for a long-range bombing capability.112  Similarly, 
in NATO discussions on “Closing the Gap” in Allied strength in 1951, a second proposed RCAF 
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air division assigned to Europe was to consist of tactical jet bombers.  This will be discussed in 
Chapter 4.  
 The RCAF was committed to providing some of its scarce resources during this period to 
support the Canadian Army’s MSF.  In its initial planning for the post-war period, the Canadian 
Army had envisaged the establishment of a large peacetime army based on its wartime 
experience.  Similar to the other services, the Canadian Government did not accept this view and 
the Army’s personnel strength was based on a 25,000 man organization, though fiscal restraints 
kept this number limited to 20,000.  The Regular Force was assigned its traditional role of 
training the Reserve Army to expand to a force of six divisions in the event of its mobilization.  
However, for the first time in its history, the army was also given a peacetime role to provide an 
airborne/air transportable brigade group (23rd Canadian Infantry Brigade Group) to defend the 
country against the threat of small incursions by the Soviets, some that might include the attempt 
to establish airfields in remote northern areas of Canada and Alaska that would threaten southern 
parts of Canada and the United States.   
Support to the MSF entailed a sizable commitment of RCAF aircraft strength during this 
period.  First, there was the CJATC at Rivers, Manitoba, consisting of aviation elements from the 
three services.  Out of an establishment personnel strength that was to grow to 800, over 500 of 
these positions were from the RCAF.113  The CJATC, a key unit within No. 11 Group 
(eventually Tactical Air Command), with a focus on Land-Air Warfare was one of the first joint 
organizations in the Canadian armed forces.114 Though it was to be comprised of a relatively 
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small portion of the RCAF, the CJATC performed key joint air activities with the other services 
highlighting the high degree of airmindedness present in the RCN and Canadian Army.115  The 
CJATC ultimately expanded to include the Airborne School, the Air Supply School, the 
Transport Air Support School and the Tactical Air Support School (the latter two units being key 
to the Land/Air Warfare component), the Light Aircraft School and the Helicopter School.116 
RCAF flying units at the CJATC included the Tactical Fighter Flight (TFF) equipped with the 
Mustang piston-engine fighter and the Transport Support Flight (TSF) equipped with the Dakota 
transport. 117 Some Second World War vintage Hadrian gliders remained in service until 1955. 
Commencing in 1948, the RCN annually deployed its fighter-bomber squadrons to Rivers to 
undertake close air support training in support of the Army both at Rivers and at Camp Shilo.118 
During the first summer in 1948, these squadrons were equipped with Seafire piston-engine 
fighters and Firefly piston-engine fighter-reconnaissance aircraft. Subsequently, until 1956, the 
RCN aircraft consisted of Sea Fury piston-engine fighters and Avenger piston-engine bombers.  
After 1956, the RCN McDonnell Banshee jet fighters participated in this training.119 
A second RCAF component to support the MSF was the Mobile Tactical Wing located at 
Rivers.  It initially consisted of three squadrons in 1947 – No. 406 (Light Bomber) Squadron 
(Auxiliary) from Saskatoon, and two Regular Force squadrons, No. 417 (Fighter 
Reconnaissance) and No. 444 (AOP) Squadrons.  A second Auxiliary light bomber squadron, 
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No. 418 Squadron from Edmonton had been established as one of the original Auxiliary fighter-
bomber squadrons in April 1946, though it was re-designated as a light bomber squadron by 
January 1947. Both squadrons were to operate the Mitchell bomber with a unit establishment of 
eight aircraft until the Mitchell was withdrawn from service in 1958.  
 Originally, two additional Auxiliary squadrons were allocated to support the MSF.  No. 
402 (Winnipeg) and No. 403 (Calgary) Auxiliary squadrons were designated as fighter-bomber 
units intended to perform close air support and fighter-reconnaissance tasks in support to the 
MSF.  No. 402 Squadron had been one of the original Auxiliary squadrons formed in April 1946 
and was equipped with the Harvard trainer.  In April 1948, the squadron received a nominal 
number of Vampire jet fighters, but in the Korean War emergency in the Fall of 1950, it 
exchanged the Vampires for Mustang piston-engine fighters. No. 403 Squadron had been formed 
in October 1948 equipped with the Harvard trainer.  In the Fall of 1950, the squadron received 
the Mustang fighter that remained its principal equipment until the aircraft was withdrawn from 
service in 1956.  In response to the perceived increased air defence threat, these two fighter-
bomber squadrons were transferred from the Tactical Air Command to Air Defence Command in 
November 1953.  The two Regular Force squadrons were disbanded in 1948-49, leaving only the 
ill-equipped Auxiliary squadrons to support the MSF.   
The third RCAF component assigned to support the MSF was No. 11 Group HQ 
(originally in Winnipeg, but moved to Edmonton in August 1951) that acted as the higher HQ for 
the Mobile Tactical Wing. The transport squadrons of Air Transport Command were the final 
RCAF element that was key to the viability of the entire MSF concept. The entire aircraft 
establishment of twenty-seven Dakota Mk. IV transports were assigned to support the MSF, and 
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the introduction of the North Star transport added considerable airlift capability.120 Though there 
was training and doctrinal research conducted on land-air operations, in reality, the air 
component lacked both the adequate air support and airlift to ensure that the MSF, even if it had 
been at its established strength, was an operationally ready formation.121 
 Apart from its responsibility to provide limited airlift support for the MSF, Air Transport 
Command conducted scheduled twice weekly trans-Canada flights for the movement of military 
personnel.  The Command also continued to conduct photographic survey operations though 
both No. 413 and No. 422 Squadrons were disbanded in 1949, with only No. 408 Squadron being 
retained albeit with the much more capable Lancaster Mk. 10P aircraft in lieu of the Dakota and 
Mitchell.   
The organization and employment of maritime aviation was the product of national and 
inter-service politics, service culture and history.122 During the Second World War, there had 
been no RCN Aviation Branch; RCN personnel wishing to be aviators were seconded to the 
Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm.123 At the same time, the RCAF adhered to the RAF approach to the 
command of maritime aviation, with squadrons employed in either Eastern Air Command or 
Western Air Command as part of the Home War Establishment for the RCAF or serving 
overseas in RAF Coastal Command.  
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In its proposed post-war fleet, the RCN intended to operate two light-fleet aircraft 
carriers.124  The two-carrier fleet never did materialize, but the RCN managed to keep one 
aircraft carrier in operation throughout the post-war period until 1970.125 Initial post-war RCN 
aircraft consisted of Seafire fighters and Firefly reconnaissance fighters already obsolete when 
they entered RCN service in 1946.  The Seafire was replaced in 1948 with the considerably more 
capable Sea Fury that was to remain in front line service until 1954.126  In 1950, RCN naval 
aviation received a major upgrade with the approval to purchase seventy-five second-hand US 
Navy Grumman Avenger aircraft.  Used as a torpedo bomber during the Second World War, the 
Avengers in RCN service were to be modernized for the anti-submarine role that was now 
becoming the principal focus of the RCN.  It was noted that these aircraft were being acquired 
for the cost of only two RCAF Sabre jet fighters, but provided a considerable improvement in 
RCN anti-submarine capability.127  This purchase was strongly opposed by the RCAF and 
highlighted the animosity that had existed between the two services since 1946.128   
From the RCAF perspective, the view was that flying was an Air Force function and the 
RCN had no mandate to establish a “land based air force” as suggested in RCAF allegations.129 
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The RCAF also posited the opinion that a separate naval air arm could neither be operationally 
effective nor cost efficient.130  From a RCN perspective, the RCAF did not comprehend the 
special requirements for carrier aviation and had not provided the required support necessary for 
its shore-based aircraft at RCAF Station Dartmouth. The supposed inequity of command was 
illustrated by the Dartmouth situation where the RCN utilized eleven aircraft hangars operating 
fifty-six aircraft with 900 personnel whilst the RCAF operated two hangars, five aircraft and 250 
personnel, yet command remained with the RCAF.  This situation was eventually rectified with 
the transfer of Dartmouth to the RCN as HMCS Shearwater in December 1948.131  In response 
to the RCAF challenge to the very existence of the Aviation Branch, it should be noted that the 
RCN did provide the sole Canadian air defence resources to the East Coast and contributed a 
significant anti-submarine capability with its fifty modernized Avenger aircraft. The Sea Fury 
and Banshee fighters, though purchased primarily for fleet defence, also provided a robust close 
air support capability, a role for which the RCAF had a minor and declining interest.132  
 Initial post-war planning had not included the establishment of RCAF maritime 
squadrons, but after 1948 RCAF plans consistently identified a requirement for three Maritime 
Patrol squadrons, including one on the West Coast.  No. 10 Group Headquarters with a maritime 
focus had been established at Halifax on 1 March 1947, but No. 2 (Maritime) Operational 
Training Unit was only formed in November 1949 at RCAF Station Greenwood, with the first 
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maritime reconnaissance squadron, No. 405 Squadron, being established on 31 March 1950.133  
A second maritime reconnaissance squadron, No. 404 Squadron, was established on 30 April 
1951 at Greenwood, conducting its first operational flight in August.134 
RCAF Planning 
 Early in his tenure as the MND in January 1947, Claxton presented the Cabinet Defence 
Committee with proposed changes to the Chiefs of Staff Committee responsibilities that placed 
the planning process within the military domain whilst providing government control through 
spending and resource allocation, along with placing “trust in the military not to commit the 
Canadian government to inappropriate activities.”135 This type of process was to effectively work 
with the presence of a strong Minister such as Claxton, trusted senior military Chiefs of Staff 
such as Lieutenant General Foulkes and Air Marshal Curtis, and civilian participation such as the 
Undersecretary of State for External Affairs attending meetings.  As one who paid attention to 
the smallest details, Claxton was able to keep matters under his strict control. However, Claxton 
was to note, “the great danger of planning activities…is that the planners, generally very bright 
officers…live and work without regard for the facts of national life.  Unless they are very closely 
supervised, they are apt to draw up plans that are utterly unrealistic and impossible of fulfillment.  
Military planning on this scale sought ideal solutions; military programming invariably has to be 
aimed much lower.”136 The only instance where this process was sidetracked occurred during the 
“Closing the Gap” discussions when Curtis appeared to be offering the provision of a second air 
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division of light bombers to NATO.  However, later on after Claxton’s tenure, weaknesses in the 
strategic level planning process adversely affected the RCAF’s long-term future. 
To provide some coordination to the services’ disparate plans (and estimates), an Inter-
Service Planning Group was formed and began meetings in December 1946.137 However, Air 
Commodore C.R. “Larry” Dunlap, representing AMAS, argued in light of the government’s 
expenditure cap for a substantial re-allocation of the available defence resources to the RCAF.138 
According to Babcock, Dunlap’s perspective revealed that the RCAF was focused on its own 
self-interest and was ready to challenge the government on the air force’s size.139  In addition, it 
revealed that Dunlap was “a strong and forceful character, traits that the RCAF leadership 
required to change the fortunes of the air force.”140   Interestingly, the CAS, Air Marshal Leckie 
disagreed with the requirement to immediately re-allocate resources to the RCAF.141 However, 
the Chiefs of Staff Committee supported the notion that the RCAF should ultimately be allocated 
about 50 per cent of the defence budget at some future date.142 Within the RCAF, Group Captain 
Robert Ripley noted that the RCAF’s failure to date was due to the haphazard approach to 
planning that was being conducted and this in large part was due to the absence of a full-time 
planning staff on the Air Staff.143 As Babcock notes, “…the future of the air force depended 
upon the ability to identify and articulate requirements in an effective manner.  Planning required 
the participation of those with strategic vision, capable of foreseeing air force requirements and 
working out solutions.”144 To correct the deficiencies in the RCAF planning process, a Current 
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Plans and Estimates Committee was established in May 1947 subordinate to a new senior Air 
Staff position, the Air Member Air Plans, an Air Vice Marshal.145 The Committee, headed by the 
Deputy AMAP, an Air Commodore, included representation from the Directorate of 
Organization and Establishment, Directorate of Operational Requirements, Directorate Air Plans 
3 and the office of the Deputy Minister DND.146 The Committee was able to improve air 
planning by establishing priorities, accurately forecasting requirements and establishing yearly 
estimates.  Eventually, a five-year planning cycle was adopted to provide a more long- term 
stabilized forecast. 147 Curtis had been the initial AMAP, but he had been the acting CAS for the 
past year and assumed the CAS position on 1 September 1947, so Dunlap as his deputy had been 
the acting AMAP and assumed the AMAP position as an Air Vice Marshal when formally 
vacated by Curtis.  Dunlap was to remain in this appointment until 1949 when replaced by Air 
Vice Marshal A.L. James who was to be involved in the build up of the Big Air Force.  With 
Curtis’ intimate background in air force planning, he was able to provide that strategic vision and 
leadership during his tenure as CAS.  This was not to be the case with future CAS appointees in 
subsequent years. 
Planning for the initial post-war RCAF has already been described, but peacetime 
planning was an iterative process that was continually revised to contend with the evolving 
strategic (also political and fiscal) environment.  Post-war RCAF plans developed from Plan A to 
Plan H during the period from December 1945 to August 1952.  Initial post-war planning was 
based on the usage for five years of existing aircraft types, though subsequently there were 
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substitutions for modern aircraft such as the Vampire replacing the Spitfire.148 One can view the 
evolution of these various plans with Plan B representing a modest but still ambitious approach, 
Plan E representing the constrained fiscal reality of 1947-48 and Plan F reflecting the more 
dangerous international situation of 1948-49 and hence the need for large air power planning. 
Plan E, for example in July 1948, illustrated the reality of the existing weakness of the RCAF to 
provide for the nation’s air defence.  Randall Wakelam noted  
The RCAF owned 28 Mustangs and 10 in service, against an operational requirement for 
36.  There were 81 Vampires on the books with 23 in service, against a requirement for 
57….[Air Marshal Wilf Curtis] had already presented a request to the CDC [Cabinet 
Defence Committee] for the purchase of an additional 27 Vampires to ensure adequate 
stocks to cover increased operational needs…and attrition until 31 March 1951.149 
 The increasing international tensions throughout 1948 resulted in further developments 
for the RCAF both for its planned peacetime structure and wartime mobilization.  The result was 
the promulgation of Plan F (October 1948) that has been described as “easily the most 
comprehensive RCAF plan to date.  It included a detailed examination of operational and 
training requirements and provided extensive expenditure proposals which allowed the 
government to identify the cost of each air force role.”150  By 1953/54, Plan F envisaged the 
RCAF to consist of twenty Regular and twelve Auxiliary squadrons.151 The Regular squadrons 
were to consist of nine fighter, one medium bomber, three maritime, three transport, one long-
range transport, one transport survey and two long-range reconnaissance (photography) 
squadrons.  The Auxiliary squadrons would comprise ten fighter and two tactical bomber 
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(Organization) identified a requirement to 1953 amounting to 320 Vampire and 342 CF-100 fighters (p. 56). 
150 Babcock, The Making of the Cold War Air Force: Planning and Professionalism in the Postwar Royal Canadian 
Air Force, 1944-1950, p. 190. 
151 Ibid.  Table 5: Plan F Squadron Allocation, p. 192 
 101 
squadrons.152 The total peacetime aircraft establishment requirements would consist of 384 
aircraft, including 228 fighters and sixteen bombers, expanding in wartime to 639 aircraft, 
including 475 fighters and forty-four bombers.153 
The continuance of increased tensions in Europe prior to the outbreak of the Korean War 
precipitated the development of Plan G that was originally approved by the Cabinet on 20 
February 1950.154  Upon the outbreak of the Korean War, further changes to Plan G were 
initiated with the revised version being promulgated 1 September 1950.155 The intent of the 
revised Plan G was to build up the RCAF to a force structure of sixteen Regular squadrons at 
War Establishment (WE) and twelve Auxiliary squadrons at half war strength by 1 December 
1953 or sooner if possible.156 The revised Plan G increased the number of fighter squadrons in 
Air Defence Command from three to six day fighter squadrons each with twenty-five Sabres and 
from two to three CF-100 all-weather squadrons each with eighteen aircraft.157 The three 
additional Sabre squadrons were intended for overseas service.  Maritime Air Group was to be 
increased from two to three Maritime Patrol squadrons each with twelve Lancasters, with the 
third squadron being allocated to the West Coast.158  
Priorities for implementation of the revised program were assigned over a three-year 
period from August 1950 to December 1953.159 Earlier estimates of the potential direct threat of 
Soviet nuclear weapons being capable of striking North America were revised from the original 
date of 1956/57 based on Soviet progress in the development of nuclear and thermonuclear 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 Ibid. 
153 Ibid. 
154 DHH 96/24, Plan “G” for the RCAF, 1 September 1950. 
155 Ibid.  
156 Ibid. Section “A,” Green Tab 1, p. 2. 
157 DHH 96/24, Plan “G” for the RCAF (1 September 1950), Serial No 4 10 Aug 50 as amended by Serial No 84 11 
Aug 50, p. 1. 
158 Ibid. p. 2. 
159 Ibid.  pp. 5-6. 
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weapons.160 This threat highlighted the importance of air defence forces to protect vital areas in 
cooperation with the US.  Revised estimates on the build up of the Soviet submarine fleet also 
justified the build-up of Maritime Air Group that expanded to become Maritime Air Command 
in 1953.161 However, “the possible threat of small-scale, Commando-type raids” necessitated 
RCAF tactical and transport elements to be organized into Tactical Air Command in 1953 to 
support the Canadian Army’s MSF.162 In addition to these three peacetime tasks that also had a 
wartime role, two additional wartime tasks included the provision of reinforcements for overseas 
operations and the contribution to “the execution of strategic air offensive operations.”163 An 
important aspect of Plan G was the inclusion of planning for mobilization of the RCAF in the 
event of war and the maintenance of a relatively large reserve organization.164 The Regular Force 
structure included 204 day and all weather fighters, forty-eight long-range maritime and area 
reconnaissance aircraft, and forty-four medium, heavy tactical and long-range transport 
aircraft.165 The Auxiliary squadron structure was based on a total of seventy-two trainer, 120 
fighter and sixteen tactical bomber aircraft.166 The progressive build up of the RCAF during 
1948-50 is illustrated at Table 3-2 below, showing only the expansion of the RCAF Regular and 
Auxiliary combat elements. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 DHH 96/24, Plan “G” for the RCAF (1 September 1950), Section “A,” Green Tab 2, p. 1. 
161 Ibid. p. 1. 
162 Ibid. p. 1. 
163 DHH 96/24, Plan “G” for the RCAF (1 September 1950), Section “B,” Blue Tab 1, p.1. 
164 DHH 96/24, Plan “G” for the RCAF (1 September 1950), Section “C,” Pink Tab 1. 
165 DHH 96/24, Plan “G” for the RCAF (1 September 1950), Section “B,” Blue Tab 3. 
166 DHH 96/24, Plan “G” for the RCAF (1 September 1950), Section “C,” Pink Tab 4. 
Table 3-2 - Comparison - Development RCAF Planning 1948-1950 – Combat Units	  
Force Structure	   Aircraft	  
Plan E	  
Regular  2 x Fighter	   8 Vampire, 4 Harvard	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Squadrons	  
(36 aircraft)	  
1 x Fighter 
Reconnaissance	  
8 Mustang, 4 Harvard	  
Auxiliary 
Squadrons	  
(120 aircraft)	  
7 x Fighter	  
1 x Fighter	  
5 x Fighter	  
2 x Tactical Bomber	  
8 Vampire, 4 Harvard	  
12 Harvard	  
No Aircraft	  
8 Mitchell, 4 Harvard	  
Plan F	  
Regular 
Squadrons	  
(164 aircraft)	  
9 x Fighter	  
1 x Medium Bomber	  
4 x 
Maritime/Reconnaissance	  
12 Vampire/Sabre/CF-100	  
8 Medium Bomber	  
12 Lancaster	  
Auxiliary 
Squadrons	  
(136 aircraft)	  
10 x Fighter	  
2 x Tactical Bomber	  
 
12 Vampire/Mustang	  
8 Mitchell	  
Plan G	  
Regular 
Squadrons	  
(252 aircraft)	  
6 x Day Fighter	  
3 x All Weather Fighter	  
 3 x 
Maritime/Reconnaissance	  
25 Sabre	  
18 CF-100	  
12 Lancaster	  
Auxiliary 
Squadrons	  
(208 aircraft)	  
8 x Fighter	  
2 x Fighter-Bomber	  
2 x Tactical Bomber 
 
12 Vampire, 6 Harvard 
12 Vampire, 6 Harvard	  
8 Mitchell, 6 Harvard	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Canadian Aircraft Industry 
During the inter-war period, the Canadian aircraft industry was negligible with a work 
force of 1,000 who annually produced only forty aircraft.  However, the industry expanded to an 
unprecedented size during the course of the Second World War with 122,000 workers who 
manufactured 16,448 aircraft during the six years of the war.167 Early in the war, it was believed 
that Canada’s industrial output, including its aircraft production, might be the nation’s major 
contribution to the war effort.  Apart from the production of thousands of trainer aircraft to 
equipment the BCATP training schools, the industry was also engaged in the production of 
combat aircraft to assist its major allies, the US and the UK.  A major lesson learned from the 
experience during the Second World War was that the Canadian aircraft industry was not always 
geared towards producing the necessary aircraft to meet Canadian requirements.168  In a similar 
manner, the Allied aircraft industry often had the RCAF much further down the production line 
behind the US and UK air forces regardless of the perceived strategic necessity of aircraft for the 
RCAF.169 W.A.B. Douglas points out that Canadian Hurricane production was focused on 
supplying the RAF not the RCAF for home defence and the US produced Liberator bomber for 
the RCAF Bomber-Reconnaissance role in Canadian coastal waters was a long time coming after 
meeting US and British requirements.   
In planning for the establishment of the post-war aircraft industry, the emphasis was not 
necessarily on military aircraft.  C.D. Howe, the Minister and his Department of Munitions and 
Supply (DMS) had a vision for the post-war industry that did not coincide with RCAF military 
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168 One example was the production of the Curtiss Helldiver naval dive-bomber exclusively for the US Navy. 
169 W.A.B. Douglas, “The Air Defence Dilemma in Canada, 1939-1943,” Canadian Defence Quarterly, Vo. 14, No. 
2, Autumn 1984 and Fred Gaffen, “Canada’s Military Aircraft Industry: Its Birth, Growth and Fortunes,” Canadian 
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requirements.170 In post-war planning for the aircraft industry, Howe wanted to focus the 
industry on the development and production of civil, not military, aircraft. The aircraft industry 
had a strong focus in the industrial heartland of Canada with companies such as Canadair and 
Canadian Car and Foundry in the Montreal area, and de Havilland Canada and Avro Canada in 
the Toronto area. However, there were hundreds of suppliers located across the country, along 
with major aircraft repair and overhaul facilities in other large urban centres such as Vancouver, 
Winnipeg, Edmonton and Halifax.171 Canadair’s initial post-war focus was on converting 
wartime Dakota military transports into civil airliners to handle the increased of civilian air 
travel in Canada.172 The other major Canadian aircraft manufacturers were also focused on the 
design and production of civil aircraft.  De Havilland Canada designed and produced the DHC-1 
Chipmunk primary trainer intended for flying clubs and the RCAF, and more importantly, the 
DHC-2 Beaver, which became the quintessential bush plane.173 Avro Canada, though it had been 
awarded the contract to develop and produce a Canadian jet fighter, was also engaged in the 
development of a civil jet transport, the Avro Jetliner.174 Eayrs wrote  “At its disposal [the 
RCAF] were thousands of aircraft – Spitfires, Hurricanes, Mosquitos and Lancasters – all of 
them out of date.”175 However, despite the planned development and acquisition of modern jet 
fighters such as the Sabre and CF-100, the RCAF was to utilize hundreds of modernized and 
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Bristol Aeroplane Company of Canada Ltd in Montreal, Winnipeg and Vancouver.  See “The Canadian Industry” 
and “The Canadian Industry: Ancillary Companies,” Flight, 24 August 1956. 
172 Ron Pickler and Larry Milberry, Canadair: The First 50 Years, Toronto: CANAV Books, 1995, pp. 36-48. 
173 Fred W. Hotson, de Havilland in Canada, Toronto: CANAV Books, 1999.  For development of the Chipmunk, 
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reconditioned Second World War aircraft such as the Harvard, Mitchell, Lancaster, Dakota, 
Canso, and Expeditor until the 1960s and beyond. 
Historian Jeffrey Noakes has suggested that the RCAF leadership had considerably more 
influence on development and procurement than has been previously acknowledged.176  Within 
the RCAF, there were differing views on the approach that the RCAF should undertake.  On one 
hand, Air Vice Marshal E.W. Stedman, the Director General of Air Research (DGR) supported 
development of a civil airliner that coincided with the approach of the DMS.  On the other hand, 
Air Vice Marshal A. Ferrier, the Air Member for Aeronautical Engineering (AMAE), supported 
the development of aircraft intended for RCAF use.  Indeed, the initial Canadian designed and 
produced aircraft was the Canadair North Star four-engine long range transport, though 
undoubtedly useful to the RCAF, was intended for use by Canada’s civil airlines.177 The North 
Star based on the Douglas DC-4 and DC-6, but powered by British Rolls-Royce Merlin engines, 
went into service with the RCAF, Trans-Canada Airlines, Canadian Pacific Airlines and the 
British Overseas Airways Corporation.  However, at the same time, agreement was obtained to 
support the development of a Canadian jet fighter.  Another part of the RCAF thrust was the 
need to develop Canadian designed and produced jet engines.178 
 The RCAF promulgated its aircraft procurement policy in 1949 based on the premises 
that: “ a) a sound aircraft industry must be maintained in Canada. b) the RCAF cannot afford to 
depend upon overseas supply sources for major items of equipment if comparable is available on 
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178 For the origins and early development of jet engines in Canada, see Greig Stewart, “Canada and the Development 
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this continent.”179 This policy was established on the results of the RCAF experiences of the 
Second World War.  Another “lesson learned” from this wartime experience was the necessity of 
manufacturing aircraft engines in Canada, an activity that had not occurred during the war, 
leaving Canada dependent on foreign suppliers.180 The perceived capabilities of the Canadian 
aircraft industry knew no limitations with the development of the Avro Canada CF-100 jet 
fighter and the Jetliner and the licensed production by Canadair of the North American Sabre jet 
fighter, the most advanced fighter of the time.181 An example of this unbounded confidence was 
revealed during the negotiations between the Canadian government and North American 
Aviation on licence production of the Sabre.  The negotiations had resolved all but one of the 
issues – that concerning the production of the wing and spar components of the airframe that in 
the view of ‘Dutch” Kindelberger, president of North American Aviation, was beyond the 
capabilities of the Canadian aircraft industry.  C.D. Howe was quite willing to go along with 
Kindelberger that these components could be shipped from Los Angeles.  However, Air Marshal 
Wilf Curtis adamant that these components should be manufactured in Canada, won the 
argument.182 
In response to the increasing international tensions, there was also a greater emphasis on 
the maintenance of a healthy Canadian aircraft industry.183 Apart from the obvious improvement 
towards standardization with US industry, Lawrence Aronsen suggested that this was just part of 
the integration of the Canadian aircraft industry with its US counterpart because the costs of 
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Canadian production to meet just the needs of the RCAF was not economical; longer production 
runs were essential.184 However, it would be incorrect to suggest that the decision to license-
produce the Sabre was part of the integration of the industry with the US and rejection of 
continued acquisition of the Vampire fighter represented a turning away from British industry.185 
Jack Granatstein advanced such an argument -- how Britain’s weakness drove Canada into the 
arms of the US (the so-called “Americanization” of the RCAF). The evidence in the case of both 
the aircraft industry and the RCAF, however, would suggest that the earlier historical links with 
the UK and the strengthening of those linkages during the Second World War remained strong 
throughout the 1950s.186 In the case of the Sabre, it was a matter of selecting the best aircraft.  
The Vampire was useful in introducing jet aircraft into the RCAF, but it was obsolete, and did 
not serve in an operational environment. 
The RCAF and the Defence Budget 
 Essential to the expansion of the RCAF after 1948 was the great increase  in defence 
spending and the RCAF allocation within that budget. From Table 3-3, it can be noted that the 
RCAF experienced a fifty per cent increase in its 1948-49 budget that reflected the early 
expansion and increased tempo.187 
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Table 3-3 - Comparison RCAF and DND Budgets 1946-1950 (as 
Percentage of Total Budget) 
Fiscal Year RCAF DND Total 
1946-47 $99m (26%) $387m 
1947-48 $60m (25%) $240m 
1948-49 $90m (34%) $268m 
1949-50 $136m (40%) $344m 
 
Within the DND total budget, there was a definitive trend in favour of the RCAF.  This upward 
trend of the RCAF allocation was to continue, peaking at fifty-six per cent of the DND budget in 
Fiscal Year 1953-54 and thereafter remaining more than one-half of the total DND budget until 
1962-63, declining to forty-seven per cent by 1965-66 (See Table 5-7 in Chapter 5).188  
  RCAF personnel strength increased only gradually.  Because of the lead-time to recruit 
and train personnel, the expansion was only starting to manifest itself in the Fiscal Year 1949-50 
as illustrated at Table 3-4. 
Table 3-4 - RCAF Personnel Strength 1946-1950 189 
Fiscal Year Regular Force 
Officers/Airmen/Total 
Auxiliary/Reserve  
Officers/Airmen/Total 
1946-47 2,140/10,487/12,627  
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1947-48 2.076/9,941/12,017 247/497/744 
1948-49 2,701/11,851/14,552 429/998/1427 
1949-50 2844/14131/17274* 
Total includes 299 
Flight Cadets 
624/1733/2369* 
Total includes 12 Flight Cadets.  
Add 837 Flight Cadets (University 
Air Training Plan).  
 
Conclusions 
 For Canadians who believed that the post-Second World War focus of the nation would 
be on implementing the Report on Social Security in Canada (the Marsh Report), the renewed 
emphasis on military expansion to meet the challenges of the emerging Cold War must have 
caused disillusionment. Canada’s international responsibilities were clearly stated by Louis St. 
Laurent, then the Secretary of State for External Affairs, in the 1947 Gray Lecture presented at 
the University of Toronto on 13 January.190  Claxton’s 17 February memorandum on “Canada’s 
defence” was certainly synchronized with the position set forth by St. Laurent.  An appreciation 
of airmindedness by the key decision makers in Ottawa was the essential factor that provided an 
environment that allowed the development of air power to prosper in political, defence and 
industrial circles.  Though the Soviet threat based on strategic bombers became a focus by 1948, 
the RCAF still did not abandon the principle of establishing a balanced air force encompassing 
all six air power functions. In addition, Possony’s elements of air power, though often existing in 
embryonic form during this period, still were part of the RCAF’s framework.  One weakness that 
ultimately was to adversely affect future RCAF planning was the absence of a strategic-level 
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“thinking” framework – an issue that becomes apparent with the expansion of the 1950s.191  A 
criticism at the time was the absence of a Canadian version of President Truman’s Air Policy 
Commission of 1948.192 Whether such an approach would have resulted in an avoidance of later 
strategic difficulties will be explored in subsequent chapters. 
 The period 1945-1950 represented one of transition for the RCAF. Assessed within the 
framework of the three pillars, there had been some gains and losses.  In the political sense, it 
was certainly recognized that the RCAF was the third service equal with the Canadian Army and 
RCN, unlike the pre-war situation, and there was now the emerging trend of the RCAF’s prime 
importance in Canadian defence.  In addition, conscious government decisions to pursue a 
national aircraft strategy were generally well supported and sensible.  Unlike a later criticism that 
defence in general and the services in particular were driven by Alliance requirements, the 
RCAF in the late 1940s was focused on meeting Canadian strategic requirements. However, the 
reality of the late 1940s was that the RCAF was ill prepared to effectively contribute to the 
national defence – the deficiencies of this situation were well publicized at the time with 
Exercise Eagle, a MSF event held in August 1949.193 Despite the RCAF’s immediate lack of 
modern equipment, the decisions to proceed with the development and production of the Avro 
Canada CF-100 and the licensed production of the Canadair Sabre acknowledged the importance 
of advancing technology and represented a critical forward step in the soon to emerge Big Air 
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Force concept.  The RCAF’s paucity of operational capabilities, especially combat power,  was a 
reflection of politics, fiscal reality, strategic uncertainty and the rapid progression of aircraft 
technology.  However, this situation was to quickly change on 25 June 1950. 
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Chapter 4 
Canadian Air Power – European Build Up 1950-1957 
Introduction 
The outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950 was the catalyst that changed the 
perspective of the government and DND towards the maintenance of armed forces in peacetime.  
This new perspective was to affect governments and the armed forces for the next forty years.  In 
the case of the RCAF, policies were enacted that made it the largest service until the end of the 
Cold War, and from 1951 until the mid 1960s, fully one half of the DND budget was allocated to 
the RCAF.  The Big Air Force was set into play with the 5 February 1951 announcement by 
Brooke Claxton of a three-year $5 billion defence build up with an emphasis on air power.  
Although this chapter will focus on the RCAF contribution to NATO, No. 1 Air Division, 
it is first necessary to examine the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 and the Canadian 
response.  The chapter will then review the RCAF planning for expansion in 1950 and 1951 in 
Plans G and H. The bulk of Chapter 4 will examine the establishment of No.1 Air Division, the 
1952 NATO Lisbon Conference, “Closing the Gap” discussions and the proposal for a second 
RCAF Air Division, the transformation of NATO strategy and its impact on airpower, the 
importance of logistics in the Air Division’s readiness and capability, and conclude with the 
examination of the planning for a Soviet –NATO air war.  
 The deployment of RCAF squadrons overseas was a milestone that created the third 
largest “European” air force after the United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) and RAF 
Germany.  It was not only the size of the RCAF contribution that counted.  In terms of quality, 
the RCAF No. 1 Air Division, with twelve squadrons equipped with the Canadair Sabre, 
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represented the zenith of advanced air power in the early 1950s, and was essential for Western 
European defence.  The establishment of the Air Division as the very visible RCAF contribution 
to NATO was initially the top priority in the making of the Cold War air force.  The build up of 
RCAF air power in its home based establishment, particularly Air Defence Command, was the 
focus for expansion in the second half of the 1950s, and will be discussed in the following 
chapters. 
Outbreak of the Korean War and the Canadian Response 
Though increasing tensions in Europe and the detonation of a Soviet atomic bomb in 
1949 had provided an impetus for limited Canadian re-armament, it was the outbreak of the 
Korean War on 25 June 1950 that was the catalyst for the creation of the Big Air Force.1 The 
North Korean invasion revealed the RCAF’s inability immediately to respond to the needs of 
collective security with a contribution of combat aircraft.2 RCAF  holdings of aircraft potentially 
useful for combat totalled eighty-five Vampire jet fighters and thirty Mustang piston-engine 
fighters, along with fifty-nine Mitchell and over 200 Lancaster wartime bombers, including 
stored aircraft.3 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See Robert Bothwell, The Big Chill: Canada and the Cold War, Toronto: Irwin Publishing, 1998.  Bothwell 
suggests that “Korea was the occasion, but it was not the main cause or object of Canada’s defence effort…. With 
the testing of an atomic bomb by the Soviet Union in 1949 and as tensions continued to grow between the Soviet 
Union and the West, NATO member-states took steps to establish a military arm.” (p. 40). Bothwell seriously 
underestimates the impact of the surprise attack in Korea on Western (including Canadian) defence.  It was after the 
outbreak of the Korean War that concrete steps to establish an integrated force in NATO were acted upon and only 
then did the Canadian government undertake this massive three-year $5 billion re-armament programme deciding to 
deploy troops and aircraft overseas in Europe. 
2 RCAF operational combat aircraft at this time were limited to Mustang and Vampire fighters. Though United 
Nations air forces made wide use of the Mustang during the early part of the war, the Vampire did not see service in 
this theatre. 
3 At this time, a total of sixteen Mitchell light bombers equipped two Auxiliary Squadrons, while approximately 100 
Lancaster aircraft were undergoing modernization for maritime reconnaissance, photographic, and search and rescue 
roles. 
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  The initial Canadian contribution to the United Nations’ efforts was the dispatch of 
three RCN destroyers, announced on 29 June. In the meantime, No. 426 Squadron undertook 
preparations in advance of its being tasked to participate.4 On 12 July, the CAS wrote to the 
AOCs of Air Transport Command and Air Materiel Command to advise that since the USAF did 
not have sufficient airlift, RCAF participation would be welcomed.  Cabinet approval for the 
provision of the long-range transport squadron was granted on 19 July, and the CAS issued 
direction for the integration of No. 426 Squadron into the USAF Military Air Transport Service 
(MATS) under its operational control, bringing the Unit Establishment (UE) to its wartime level 
of twelve North Star aircraft and noting that RCAF aircraft were not to operate in Korea.  On 25 
July, the first six aircraft departed from Dorval for McChord Air Force Base, Washington where 
the squadron conducted airlift operations over the next four years between McChord and Kaneda 
Air Base in Japan.  As No. 426 Squadron did not operate in the Korean theatre, this contribution 
was not recognized in non-Canadian accounts of the air war in Korea.  At the low point for the 
United Nations forces in December 1950 when they were being pushed south by Chinese 
Communist Forces, there was the possibility that No. 426 Squadron might be involved in air 
operations in Korea to assist with the evacuation of the UN forces.5 Fortunately from both the 
government’s and the RCAF perspectives, this situation did not develop. However, apart from 
the USAF and the RAF, the RCAF was the only participating air force in the Korean War 
capable of providing a strategic transport capability using its North Star transports. The RCAF 
Air Transport Command had demonstrated this capability in January 1950 with its first around-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Lawrence Motiuk, Thunderbirds for Peace: Diary of a Transport Squadron, Ottawa: Larmot Associates, 2004. 
5 DHH 73/1223 Series 2, File 2559, Brooke Claxton, Memorandum for the Prime Minister, 5 December 1950. 
 116 
the-world flight that carried External Affairs Minister Lester Pearson to the Commonwealth 
meeting in Colombo, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka).6  
 The expansion of the RCAF for the remainder of the 1950-51 Fiscal Year (ending 31 
March) was quite limited.  In August 1950 the US government responded positively to a 1949 
request for the purchase of 100 Mustang fighters.7 Three additional fighter squadrons were 
authorized with a mixture of available aircraft – No. 411 Squadron (Auxiliary) at Downsview on 
1 October 1950 equipped with Harvard trainers, and two Regular Force squadrons, No. 416 
Squadron (Mustangs) at Uplands on 8 January 1951, and No. 441 Squadron (Vampires) at St 
Hubert on 1 March 1951.8  As a result of the Korean emergency, most of the Vampire fighters 
that had equipped the Auxiliary squadrons were withdrawn and re-assigned to the Regular Force 
squadrons to bolster their strength.9 
Re-equipment of the Auxiliary squadrons with the Mustang commenced in November 
1950 for Nos. 402, 403, 420, 424 and 442 Squadrons.  In the process, Nos. 402 and 442 
Squadrons relinquished their Vampires.  However, re-equipment did allow for a larger Unit 
Establishment with the Mustang.  For example, No. 442 Squadron increased its strength from 
four Vampire fighters to twelve Mustang fighters.10 For the other three squadrons, delivery of the 
Mustang represented an improvement from the previously operated Harvard trainers, and though 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Motiuk. 
7 Jim Lyzun, “Maple Leaf Mustangs: P-51Ds and ‘Ks in Canadian Service,” Air Enthusiast, No. 93, May-June 2001, 
p. 47.  See “First Five Mustangs Arrive for RCAF,” Canadian Aviation, Vol. 23, No. 11, November 1950. 
8 During the period of 1950-52, RCAF re-equipment proceeded at a dizzying pace as witnessed by the rapid re-
equipment of these squadrons. RCAF Regular fighter squadrons re-equipped from Mustangs and Vampires to Sabres 
and CF-100s, while some Auxiliary squadrons re-equipped from Harvards to Mustangs and Vampires. 
9 Lyzun, p. 54. 
10 Grant MacDonald and Terry Strocel, 442 Squadron History, Comox: 442 Transport and Rescue Squadron, 1987, 
p. 59. 
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the Mustang did not represent the most modern equipment, it was the best equipment then 
available to the RCAF.   
It would be some time before the more advanced Avro Canada CF-100 and Canadair 
Sabre fighters would be available for service.  In the case of the CF-100, the prototype first flew 
on 19 January 1950 and the first aircraft for the RCAF was delivered on 17 October 1951.  
However, developmental problems with the CF-100 delayed the first deliveries to the 
Operational Training Unit until July 1952, with the first operational squadron only being formed 
in August 1953.11 One casualty in the efforts to hasten the CF-100 programme was the eventual 
cessation on the development of the Avro Canada C102 Jetliner.12 In the case of the Sabre, a 
fully developed design, the prototype Canadair machine first flew on 8 August 1950 with the 
initial production version, the Sabre Mk.2, first flying on 2 January 1951.  The initial squadron, 
No. 410 Squadron received its Sabres starting in May 1951 and was ready to deploy to England 
by November 1951.13 
 In a similar manner to her sister Commonwealth air forces such as Australia and South 
Africa, the RCAF could perhaps have offered a squadron of Mustang piston-engine fighters, a 
type of aircraft that was desperately needed in the first months of the war in the Close Air 
Support (CAS) and interdiction roles.14 However, this type of contribution would have weakened 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Larry Milberry, The Avro CF-100, Toronto: CANAV Books, 1981. 
12 Jim Floyd, The Avro Canada C102 Jetliner, Erin, Ontario: The Boston Mills Press, 1986, see pp. 89-90, 98-99 
and 109 for a discussion to terminate the Jetliner’s development. The Jetliner represented another example of “what 
could have been” for both the Canadian aircraft industry and the broader Canadian experience. Whereas the Avro 
Arrow lives on in Canadian historical mythology, undoubtedly assisted by the nature of its demise by the 
Diefenbaker government, the Avro Jetliner was quietly shelved.  The Jetliner had the distinction of being the second 
civil jetliner in the world to fly - two weeks later than the British De Havilland Comet – and the first in North 
America (pp. 136-137). 
13 Larry Milberry, The Canadair Sabre, Toronto: CANAV Books, 1986. 
14 See B. Lyman, The Significance of Australian Air Operations in Korea, Air Power Studies Centre, Paper No. 2, 
RAAF Fairbairn, ACT, March 1992.  Lyman argues that the RAAF contribution of a Mustang squadron (replaced 
with Meteor jet fighters) demonstrated the political utility of air power for Australia. 
 118 
home defence and by the time that a fully trained squadron could have been dispatched overseas, 
the Mustang had been replaced by more modern aircraft.  More important, there is no evidence 
the government considered the contribution of a RCAF combat squadron in the early stages of 
the war, though the possibility of dispatching a Sabre jet fighter squadron arose at a later date.15 
In the end, the RCAF combat contribution to the air war in Korea consisted of twenty-two fighter 
pilots flying in exchange positions with USAF Sabre squadrons.16 Additional contributions 
included forty RCAF Flight Nurses who served with the USAF on aero-medical evacuation 
flights, one RCN fighter pilot on exchange with the US Navy, sixteen Canadian Army officers 
who served as Forward Air Controllers with the USAF, and four Canadian Army pilots who 
served with the AOP Flight in the 1st Commonwealth Division.17 
Canada and NATO 
Western governments viewed the invasion of the Republic of Korea as the prelude to an 
invasion of Western Europe by the Soviets, and the Korean War acted as the impetus for the 
build-up of air forces on the European continent. The Western European economies were still 
suffering from the consequences of six years of war and the maintenance of effective armed 
forces assumed a relatively low priority. Among the European nations that maintained armed 
forces, considerable numbers of troops were engaged in the various conflicts associated with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
15 DHH 73/1223, File 2000, Minutes of a Conference of Air Officers’ Commanding, 17-18 January 1952, p. 6.  The 
issue of sending a RCAF Sabre squadron arose during the AOC Conference held on 17-18 January 1952.  The 
government did not favour sending a squadron to Korea, as any commitment would have meant a reduction in the 
European contribution. If the Korean War had continued into 1954, there was a proposal to deploy a RCN squadron 
of twelve Sea Fury piston-engine fighters and fourteen pilots aboard a Royal Navy carrier.  See DHH 73/1223 File 
1327, Record of Cabinet Defence Committee Decision, 92nd Meeting, 17 March 1953. 
16 William T. Y’Blood,  “Allied Air Forces,” Air Power History, Vol. 47, No. 2, Summer 2000, p. 51. The existence 
of RCAF exchange pilots flying with USAF squadrons was acknowledged.  For a detailed account of these 22 
Canadian fighter pilots, see Hugh Halliday, “In Korean Skies,” Canadian Aviation Historical Society Journal, Vol. 
24, No. 4, Winter 1986. 
17 Carl Mills, “Canadians in the Korean War,” Air Force Magazine, Vol. 34, No. 4, April 2011. 
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independence struggles in their colonies.  While the Soviet Union continued to maintain an army 
of 2.5 million soldiers organized into 175 divisions, by 1948, the US Army had fallen to 525,000 
with only two weak divisions in Germany.  Similarly, the British Army maintained only two 
weak divisions on the Continent.  Allied air power had also been reduced to perilously low 
levels.  The RAF in Germany (BAFO), for example, consisted of only ten squadrons equipped 
with 120 wartime Spitfire, Tempest and Mosquito aircraft with a fifty-nine per cent serviceability 
rate.18  
The Soviet Union had established puppet Communist regimes in the countries that it had 
occupied in their advance against the Nazis; the Greek Civil War in 1946-47, the Communist 
coup d’état in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin blockade increased Western European fears.  The 
existence of strong Communist parties in France and Italy added to these concerns.  To deal with 
the potential threat, Britain, France and the Benelux countries signed the Brussels Treaty in 1948 
as a fifty-year mutual defence pact. It was recognized that without the support of the United 
States, the defence of Western Europe could not be secured.  This led to the North Atlantic 
Treaty that was signed on 1 April 1949.19 
With the advent of the treaty, there was the assumption, noted in Chapter 1, that defence 
expenditures would not increase because the Alliance could deploy pooled resources more 
effectively, creating, in Lester Pearson’s words, “ a balanced collective force”20 That optimistic 
view was demolished by the demands of the Korean War.  The twelve NATO nations had spent 
$20 billion on defence in 1950 and this increased to $54 billion by 1952.  In Escott Reid’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Bill Taylor, Royal Air Germany since 1945, Hinckley: Midland Publishing, 2003, p. 29. 
19 The background to the establishment of NATO and Canadian efforts is well described by Escott Reid, Time of 
Fear and Hope: The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty 1947-1949, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 
1977. 
20 Ibid. p. 234 
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opinion, “The creation of the North Atlantic alliance did not result in rearmament.  Rearmament 
was the result of the Korean War.”21  
The coordination of these greatly increased national efforts to create a balanced collective 
force, moreover, proved to be much easier in theory than in practice.  In order to achieve such a 
balance, it would have been necessary to unbalance national armed forces.  Reid, in April 1950, 
noted: 
…the North Atlantic alliance had “nearly all the naval forces that it is estimated 
would be required by 1954, whereas it only [had], in aggregate, about one-third of 
the air forces and one-fifth of the land forces required.” Presumably, it would have 
been in the interests of the alliance if countries such as the Netherlands and Canada 
had replaced their navies by coast guard services and put the savings into air and land 
forces….The North Atlantic allies did not do this.  Inertia and vested interests of each 
of the branches of the armed forces in each of the capitals fought against it….The 
opportunity was lost to build a more integrated, less expensive and more efficient 
allied defence force.22 
When expansion of Canada’s armed forces was undertaken in 1950-51, this was exactly the 
conundrum that confronted the Canadian government.  Although Canada had joined NATO as an 
ally in a military alliance, it was certainly not the intention of the Canadian government in 1949 
to send troops abroad.23 Once again, the Korean War was the catalyst for this decision. 
The Defence Build Up  
In the summer of 1950, the Canadian government had announced the contribution of 
military forces to assist in the United Nations in Korea – three RCN destroyers, RCAF No. 426 
Transport Squadron and the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade, with the Army contribution clearly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Ibid. p. 236. 
22 Ibid. p. 240. 
23 The Canadian government viewed NATO as more than a military alliance, it was also intended to promote 
economic cooperation.  See Jon B. McLin, Canada’s Changing Defense Policy, 1957-1963, Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1967.  McLin discusses in detail the issue of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty regarding 
economic cooperation, pp. 12-26. 
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representing the most substantial effort.  During the fall of 1950 and the winter of 1951, 
contributions to the build up of NATO integrated forces in Europe became the focus with the 
announced contribution of a RCAF air division of eleven (later twelve) fighter squadrons and the 
27th Canadian Infantry Brigade totalling over 12,000 military personnel.  
The three year $5 billion re-armament programme announced by Claxton on 5 February 
1951 clearly outlined the RCAF build-up that included forty (later forty-one) regular and reserve 
squadrons with 3,000 aircraft, a radar system with fighters for the air defence of Canada, an air 
division in Europe, the establishment of a large training organization and a robust aircraft 
industry to manufacture aircraft for both the RCAF and other nations.24 Claxton explained that 
Canada’s most substantial contribution to the planned force in being will be our 
air force participation…. Because of the large requirements of the RCAF not only 
in building up to its total of 40 regular and auxiliary squadrons, but also in the 
training services, the RCAF will, we expect, have more men than the army has 
today and will be spending as much as the other two services put together.25 
The Globe and Mail noted “that Canada will become the third ranking air power in the free 
world and probably the second ranking air training nation.”26 Claxton’s announcement set in 
motion the development of the RCAF structure for the next decade that included the concept of 
the Big Air Force.  Pronouncements regarding Canada becoming a world-class air power were 
not limited to Canada as evidenced by articles in the British aviation journal Air Pictorial.27 
 The increased tensions in Europe prior to the outbreak of the Korean War had 
precipitated the development of RCAF Plan G that was originally approved by the Cabinet on 20 
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25 House of Commons Debates, 21st Parliament, 4th Session, 5 February 1951, pp. 95-96. 
26 Globe and Mail, 6 February 1951. 
27 See James Hay Stevens, “Canada – One of the Greatest Centres of the Next Generation,” Air Pictorial, Vol. XIV, 
No. 5, May 1952, and William Green, “Canada as an Air Power – Double Role in European and North American 
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February 1950.28 Upon the outbreak of the Korean War, further changes to Plan G were initiated 
with the revised version being promulgated 1 September 1950.29 The intent of the revised Plan G 
was to build up the RCAF to a force structure of sixteen Regular squadrons at War Establishment 
(WE) and twelve Auxiliary squadrons at half war strength by 1 December 1953 or sooner if 
possible.30 The revised Plan G increased the number of fighter squadrons in the Air Defence 
Group from three to six day fighter squadrons each with twenty-five Sabres and from two to 
three CF-100 all-weather squadrons each with eighteen aircraft.31 The three additional Sabre 
squadrons were intended for overseas service.  Maritime Air Group was to be increased from two 
to three Maritime Reconnaissance squadrons each with twelve Lancasters, with the third 
squadron being allocated to the West Coast.32 In Air Transport Command, No. 426 Squadron 
was increased to twelve North Star aircraft and No. 435 Squadron at Namao, Alberta was to be 
re-equipped with C-119 Flying Boxcar twin-engine tactical transports by 1953.33 Training 
Command was to be expanded to handle the increased RCAF training load and to train 150 RAF 
pilots annually.34 For planning purposes, the RCAF personnel establishment was revised 
upwards to 26,146 military and 6,541 civilian members.35 The production rates were increased 
for Sabre, CF-100, Lancaster and Harvard aircraft.  
Priorities for implementation of the revised program were assigned over a three-year 
period from August 1950 to December 1953.36 First priority was to bring No. 426 Squadron up 
to War Establishment (WE) as soon as possible to support the Korean War, followed by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 DHH 96/24, Plan “G” for the RCAF (1 September 1950). 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid.  Section “A,” Green Tab 1, p. 2. 
31 DHH 96/24, Plan “G” for the RCAF (1 September 1950), Serial No 4 10 Aug 50 as amended by Serial No 84 (11 
August 1950), p. 1. 
32 Ibid. p. 2. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. p. 3. 
36 Ibid. pp. 5-6. 
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establishment of four day fighter and two all-weather fighter squadrons that were to be 
operational by December 1952. The regular fighter squadrons were to be equipped and trained 
for rapid overseas deployment.37 Two Maritime squadrons were to be operational by October 
1951, provision for the training of RAF pilots was to be in ready by early 1951, and a Mustang 
fighter squadron was to be established as soon after delivery as possible of the aircraft.38 For 
1953, priorities were envisaged to add two day fighter and one all-weather fighter squadrons, one 
Maritime squadron and a C-119 transport squadron by December 1953.39  
Establishment of the Air Division 
Canada’s overseas contribution to European based NATO air forces was originally 
conceived as an eleven squadron air division that was expected to consist of three squadrons with 
a total of seventy-five aircraft in the interceptor day fighter role, seven squadrons with a total of 
112 aircraft in the fighter-bomber role and one squadron with sixteen aircraft in the fighter-
reconnaissance role.40 This was subsequently changed to a twelve squadron air division to 
consist of 203 and eventually 300 interceptor day fighters.41 
To assist with this build-up and gain operational flying experience, the Canadian 
government deployed No. 421 Squadron in January 1951 to the UK equipped with sixteen RAF 
Vampire F.B. Mk.5 jet fighters and two Meteor T. Mk.7 jet trainers, with the intention that this 
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40 DHH 73/1223, Series 3, Sub-series 14, File 2000-2001, Minutes of a Conference of Air Officers Commanding 
and Group Commanders, 6-7 December 1950, p.6) see also DHH 73/1223, Series 3, Sub-series 2, Cabinet Defence 
Committee, “Cabinet Conclusions of February 1st, 1951 – North Atlantic Medium Term Defence Plans: 
Commitments.” 
41 DHH 73/1223, Series 3, Sub-series 14, Box 102, File 2000-2001, Minutes of a Conference of Air Officers’ 
Commanding and Group Commanders, 17-18 January 1952, p. 7. “The AMCJS  [Air Member Canadian Joint Staff] 
London (Air Commodore Costello) wondered whether it was likely that our F86s would be pressed into a tactical 
role in Europe.  The CAS (Air Marshal Curtis) stated that this was very unlikely as the RCAF contribution 
represented the only major interceptor force in Europe today and in all likelihood would remain so.”  
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would ultimately develop into a wing of three Sabre squadrons.42 No. 421 Squadron conducted 
operations from RAF Odiham under the operational control of RAF Fighter Command until 
October 1951, returning to Canada in December to be re-equipped with the Sabre and returning 
to Grostenquin, France as part of No. 2 (Fighter) Wing in October 1952. 
The deployment of No. 1 (Fighter) Wing with three Canadair Sabre Mk. 2 equipped 
squadrons to North Luffenham, England commenced in November 1951 where it remained until 
1955 under the operational control of RAF Fighter Command.  This marked the beginning of the 
build up of the Air Division and a significant RCAF contribution to the defence of Western 
Europe.43 The remaining three Wings destined for No. 1 Air Division were formed in Canada 
and then shipped overseas to France and West Germany during 1952-53, with the Air Division 
being completely deployed on the continent by 1955 with the re-location of No. 1 (Fighter) Wing 
to Marville, France.44 
NATO air power as part of the integrated force in the Central Region was grouped into 
Allied Air Forces Central Europe (AAFCE) that was established at Fontainebleau, France on 2 
April 1951.45 AAFCE was subordinate to Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) also at 
Fontainebleau, which in turn was subordinate to Allied Command Europe (ACE).  The role of 
AAFCE was to provide command and control for NATO air assets in the Central Region, 
organized into two air forces, the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force (2ATAF) under British command, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 See Minutes of 118th Meeting of Air Members, 6 October 1950.  Initial discussions on the possibility of a RCAF 
fighter squadron deployed overseas had commenced in 1949.  See Carl Christie, “Swords for Peace: RCAF Sabres 
with RAF Fighter Command,” in W.A. March, ed., Sic Itur Ad Astra: Canadian Aerospace Power Studies, Volume 
3, Combat if Necessary, But Not Necessarily Combat,  Department of National Defence: Canadian Forces Aerospace 
Warfare Centre, Trenton, Ontario, 2011.   
43 Ibid.  See also 1 Fighter Wing: The First Year 1951-52, RCAF North Luffenham, Rutland, England, 1952. 
44 See Ross Wilmot, “The RCAF in SACEUR,” Canadian Aviation, Vol. 26, No. 6, June 1953. 
45 See W.T. Gunston, “AAFCE – Part 1: The Background to NATO and its Constituent Formations,” Flight, No. 
2318, Vol. LXIII, 26 June 1953, and “AAFCE – Part 2: The Present Allied Command,” Flight, No. 2327, Vol. 
LXIV, 28 August 1953. 
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consisting of British, Belgian and Dutch air forces, and the 4th Allied Tactical Air Force (ATAF) 
under US command that consisted of American, French and Canadian air forces.  4ATAF 
consisted of the US 12th Air Force, a formation in USAFE, the 1er Division Aerienne of the 
Armée de l’Air and the RCAF’s No. 1 Air Division.  The ATAFs were assigned to support each 
of the Army Groups in the Central Region with 2ATAF in support to Northern Army Group 
(NORTHAG), and 4ATAF responsible to support the Central Army Group (CENTAG).  As part 
of 4ATAF, No. 1 Air Division was to be stationed at four airfields in eastern France and West 
Germany.  
 The initial establishment of 4ATAF Headquarters as a double hatting of the USAFE 12th 
Air Force caused some concerns about the Canadian air division’s participation in planning and 
decision-making.  The development of an integrated NATO headquarters rather than employing 
a national Headquarters (i.e. a USAFE formation Headquarters) would have been preferable, but 
this issue was ultimately resolved.46 Another contentious command and control issue was the 
potential break up of the Air Division to fight as individual squadrons and wings rather than as a 
complete formation.  For example, AAFCE planning staff had tentatively earmarked some 
RCAF squadrons to deploy to Norway in the event of war based on Canadian experience in 
Northern flying conditions.47 This proposal was shelved, but illustrated the need for Canadian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 DHH 73/1223, Box 36, File 640, Letter from General Charles Foulkes, Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee to 
General Alfred M. Gruenther, Supreme Commander, Allied Powers Europe, 1 March 1954.  In this letter, Foulkes 
refers to the need to train RCAF officers as they had very little experience at an operational headquarters, an activity 
that did not occur during the Second World War as “…the RAF used the RCAF as fillers and this did not give them 
an opportunity to develop staff officers and commanders.” 
47 See DHH 73/1223, Series 3, File 1306, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Minutes of the 493rd Meeting of the Chiefs of 
Staff Committee, 10 May 1951. 
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vigilance to ensure that the Air Division operated as an operational entity rather than being 
broken up into smaller tactical contributions.48 
Interestingly, the concurrent dispatch of the RCAF Air Division and the Army Brigade to 
Europe for NATO defence showed evidence of the recent historical sensitivities and cultural 
baggage of the two services.49 The large Army created during the Second World War generally 
had a “good war,” particularly with the creation of the First Canadian Army which had provided 
that service with a considerable degree of autonomy.  Therefore, in the case of the Canadian 
NATO brigade, service under the command of the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) as part of 
NORTHAG did not present grounds for angst among the soldiers.50 By contrast, the RCAF’s 
Second World War overseas experience wherein over fifty percent of RCAF aircrew served as 
individuals in RAF units despite the government’s long struggle with the British to form RCAF 
squadrons and higher level formations in accordance with the Article XV of the British 
Commonwealth Air Training Plan agreement had been the cause of considerable frustration for 
Canadian airmen.  There was no burning desire for the RCAF to once more serve under the 
command of the RAF.  In addition, there was the argument that the RCAF was flying the same 
aircraft as USAFE with attendant requirements for similar supply, maintenance and flying 
procedures.   The Canadian NATO brigade received its air support from 2ATAF until 1970 when 
the Canadian land and air formations were amalgamated into Canadian Forces Europe.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 DHH 73/1223, File 2001, 1 Air Division Précis for AOCs Conference, 14-17 January 1957, Future Role, p. 16.  
This issue regarding the split use of the Air Division remained a sensitive one, and arose again during the late 1950s 
when an integrated European air defence system was being developed. 
49 See DHH 73/1223, Series 3, File 1306, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Minutes of the 503rd Meeting, 14 August 1951, 
Item II, Grouping of Canadian Forces in Europe.  See Air Commodore K.L.B. Hodson, The RCAF Air Division in 
Europe, Address to the United Services Institute, London, Ontario, 15 December 1954, p. 3. 
50 See Stephen J. Harris, “The Post-War Army in Canada and NATO,” in John Marteinson et al, We Stand on 
Guard: An Illustrated History of the Canadian Army, Montreal: Ovale Publications, 1992. 
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The Sabre Mk.2 fighters that initially equipped the Air Division were more modern than 
the contemporary aircraft that equipped the other NATO air forces.  The Air Division began the 
migration to the continent in 1952 with the establishment of No. 2 (Fighter) Wing at 
Grostenquin, France with the build up to twelve squadrons organized into four wings comprising 
300 Sabre fighters completed by 1953.  In addition to the four airfields, the Air Division 
maintained a Headquarters at Metz, France and a logistics base at Langar, England.  Additional 
flying units consisted of a transport flight with Bristol Freighter cargo aircraft and a 
communications flight with Dakota transport aircraft.  In addition to the Unit Establishment of 
twenty-five Sabre fighters per squadron, each squadron was equipped with two T-33 jet trainers. 
At full strength, the Air Division numbered over 6,000 personnel.51 In terms of personnel, though 
this may have represented only twelve per cent of the total Regular RCAF personnel, the Air 
Division with its twelve fighter squadrons, included the majority of the twenty-one Regular 
fighter squadrons.  Apart from the requirement to recruit and train the required air and ground 
crews and build hundreds of Sabre fighters, there was also the requirement to completely build 
the four airfields and their associated infrastructure.  This large contribution of funding required 
to develop this infrastructure is often omitted when examining the Canadian contribution to 
NATO. 
The air assets assigned to AAFCE were expected to perform the following roles: day and 
all-weather air defence and air superiority, close air support and air interdiction and tactical 
reconnaissance.  During the 1950s, there were considerable differences among the various 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 See Air Commodore K.L.B. Hodson, The RCAF Air Division in Europe.  Address to the United Services Institute, 
London, Ontario, 15 December 1954 and Hamilton District Officers Institute, 3 November 1955.  Hodson provides a 
good description of the Air Division’s development.  See also “Sabre Power for NATO,” Canadian Aviation, Vol. 
29, No. 2, February 1956, pp. 48-49. 
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NATO assigned air forces regarding both the quantity and quality of these contributions.52 The 
qualitative and quantitative variances among the various air forces of the Central Region 
(excluding the USAFE) between 1950 and 1955 are highlighted at Table 4-1 and Table 4-2 
below.  In 1950, the use of Second World War vintage piston-engine fighters was still 
widespread, along with the introduction of a limited number of first generation jet fighters such 
as the British Vampire and Meteor.  Within five years as a result of the NATO military build up, 
the older aircraft had all but disappeared from front line service to be replaced with modern 
British and, more frequently, modern US combat aircraft.  For France, modern domestically 
developed and produced aircraft (i.e. Dassault Aviation) replaced its earlier reliance on older 
British and American aircraft.  This situation was still very dynamic, as within the next five years 
–by 1960 – modern aircraft once again replaced older models as will be discussed in Chapter 6.  
In addition, the Luftwaffe, non-existent in 1955, had emerged by 1960 as a major air arm for 
NATO forces in the Central Region.  Issues such as advancing technology, changing strategy, 
and evolving force structures were all factors that were to have an impact on the future of the Air 
Division.   
The Air Division had begun to exchange its Sabre Mk.2 fighters for the improved Sabre 
Mk.5 in 1954, but this programme was short lived with the introduction of the more advanced 
Sabre Mk.6 aircraft in 1955.  The Air Division reached the peak of its capabilities with this 
version of the aircraft, though the 1956-1957 replacement of four Sabre squadrons by a similar 
number of CF-100 all-weather squadrons represented an improvement of the Air Division’s total 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 See Christopher J. Bowie, Mark Lorell and John Lund, Trends in NATO Central Region Tactical Fighter 
Inventories: 1950-2005, RAND Note N-3053-AF, Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, May 1990. 
	  
 129 
air defence capabilities.53 Originally, it had been intended to replace all the Sabre squadrons with 
CF-100 aircraft, but this became unaffordable.54 
Table 4-1 - NATO Central Region Airpower 
1950 
Source: Trends in NATO Central Region Tactical 
Fighter Inventories 1950-2005, RAND Note N-
3053-AF 
Country No. of 
Sqns 
Aircraft Role55 
Belgium 5 
2 
1 
Spitfire 
Mosquito 
NF.30 
Meteor F.4 
IDF 
AWX 
IDF 
Canada 0 -  
Denmark 1 
1  
Meteor F.4 
Spitfire 
IDF 
IDF 
France 7  
7 
3 
Vampire 
P-47 
Thunderbolt 
P-38 
Lightning 
IDF 
GA 
Recce 
Netherlands 5 
1 
Meteor F.4 
Spitfire 
IDF 
IDF 
Great 
Britain 
9 
2 
1 
Vampire 
FB.5 
Mosquito 
B.35 
Meteor FR.9 
IDF 
GA 
Recce 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Victor Koby, “CF-100s in New NATO Strategy,” Canadian Aviation, Vol. 30, No. 2 February 1957. 
54 DHH 73/1223, Series 3, File 1306, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Minutes of 482nd Meeting, 16 January 1951, pp. 4-
5. 
55 IDF – Interceptor Day Fighter, AWX – All Weather Fighter, GA – Ground Attack, Recce – Reconnaissance. 
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Table 4-2 - NATO Central Region Airpower 
1955 
Source: Trends in NATO Central Region Tactical 
Fighter Inventories 1950- 
2005, RAND Note N-3053-AF 
Country No. of 
Sqns 
Aircraft Role 
Belgium 3 
6 
10  
2 
F-84E/G 
F-84G 
Meteor F.8 
Mosquito 
NF.30 
IDF/GA 
IDF/GA 
IDF 
AWX 
Canada 12 Sabre IDF 
Denmark 1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
Meteor 
NF.11 
Hunter F.4 
F-84G 
F-84G 
RF-84G 
AWX 
IDF 
IDF 
GA 
Recce 
France 6 
6 
2 
5 
3 
3 
3 
3 
F-84F 
Ouragan 
Vampire 
F-84G 
Mystere IIC 
Mystere IVA 
Meteor 
NF.11 
RF-84F 
GA 
IDF/GA 
IDF 
GA 
IDF 
GA 
AWX 
Recce 
Netherlands 9 
4 
Meteor F.8 
F-84F 
RF-84F 
IDF 
GA 
Recce 
Great 
Britain 
6 
5 
5 
2 
3 
5 
1 
3 
2 
1 
Sabre F.4 
Hunter F.4 
Venom FB.1 
Venom FB.4 
Meteor 
NF.11 
Canberra 
B.2 
Canberra 
PR.3 
Canberra 
PR.7 
Meteor FR.9 
Meteor 
IDF 
IDF 
IDF/GA 
IDF 
AWX 
GA 
Recce 
Recce 
Recce 
Recce 
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To fully appreciate the impact of the Air 
Division to Western European defence, it is 
necessary to review the comparative 
strengths of other NATO air forces at this 
time.56 AAFCE in the Central Region at 
this time comprised less than 1,000 aircraft in total between the two ATAFs.  A considerable 
portion of the British and French air forces, plus elements of the Dutch and Belgian air forces, 
were involved in operations in their declining empires.  This obviously limited their ability to 
reinforce the NATO Central Region.  The Royal Netherlands Air Force, for example, obtained 
its first jet fighters in 1948, consisting of thirty-eight British Meteor fighters.  Additional aircraft 
were obtained from Britain and, in 1951, licensed production of the aircraft was undertaken, but 
a serious air force build up did not begin until 1953.  The Belgian Air Force established its first 
squadron of nineteen Meteor jet fighters in 1949 and licensed production was undertaken, though 
piston-engine Spitfire fighters remained in service until 1951.  Other NATO air forces, outside 
the Central Region, were also small and poorly equipped.  The Royal Norwegian Air Force had 
formed a squadron of twenty-nine Vampire jet fighters by the time this nation had joined NATO 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 There are few studies on comparative NATO air power. Despite its publication date (1958), one of the best 
references remains William Green and John Fricker, The Air Forces of the World: Their History, Development and 
Present Strength, London: Macdonald & Co (Publishers) Ltd.  For a study of USAFE, see Eduard Mark, Defending 
the West: The United States Air Force and European Security 1946-1998, USAF History Office, Cees Steijger, A 
History of USAFE, Airlife Publishing, and Robert Jackson, Strike Force: The USAF in Britain since 1948, London: 
Robson Books Ltd, 1986.  For an examination of RAF Germany, see Bill Taylor, Royal Air Force Germany since 
1945, Hinckley, England: Midland Publishing, 2003, and the Royal Air Force in Germany 1945-1993, The Royal 
Air Force Historical Society Seminar, 9 December 1998.  For the Luftwaffe, see James S. Corum, “Building a New 
Lufwaffe: The United States Air Force and Bundeswehr Planning for Rearmament, 1950-1960,”The Journal of 
Strategic Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1, March 2004, James S. Corum, “Starting from Scratch: Establishing the 
Bundesluftwaffe as a Modern Air Force, 1955-1960, Air Power History, Vol. 50, No. 2, Summer 2003, and Stuart 
Peach, “The Fall and Rise of the Luftwaffe, RAF Air Power Review, Vol. 10, No. 2 Summer 2007.  For the smaller 
NATO air forces, see William Green, “Dutch Fortify Defenses in the Air,” Canadian Aviation, Vol. 20, No. 7, July 
1949, William Green, “Small Danish Air Force Accents Training Effort Planning Jet Squadrons,” Canadian 
Aviation, Vol. 24, No. 2 February 1951, and Øistein Espenes and Nils E. Naastad, “The Royal Norwegian Air Force: 
A Multi-Purpose Tool during the Cold War, Air Power History, Vol. 47, No. 1, Spring 2000. 
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in 1949 whilst the Royal Danish Air Force formed its first squadron of twenty-three Meteor jet 
fighters that same year.  The higher priority within national budgets for the re-equipment and 
build up of these NATO air forces may have been hindered as these services had only recently 
become independent air forces; thus they lacked the influence within government enjoyed by the 
RCAF.  
In Canada, the major effort in the massive three-year $5 billion build up of the armed 
forces was directed towards the expansion of the RCAF and the production of associated aircraft.  
The period of the 1950s has been referred to as the Golden Age of the RCAF and indeed this 
initially appeared to be the case at the time.  Eayrs described the immediate post-war years of the 
RCAF: 
Spirits were highest in the Air Force, and rose with the passing of the years.  Since 1946, 
the RCAF, capitalizing upon (but not capitulating to) doctrines of air power sedulously 
propagated in the United States, had been able consistently to attract the largest share of 
recruits.  Since 1947, it had been able to secure the largest share of budgets.57 
The enormous challenges associated with the recruiting, training, organizing and equipping 
the Air Division’s 6,000 officers and airmen (including 500 Sabre fighter pilots) along with their 
twelve squadrons of 300 Sabre jet fighters and their sustainment has generally not been given the 
attention that it deserves. The establishment of the RCAF Air Division is particularly significant 
when considering the small size of the RCAF in comparison to the USAF and RAF.  USAF jet 
fighter strength in Korea in July 1953 was 297 Sabre and 218 F-84 Thunderjet aircraft.58 USAFE 
meanwhile expanded from 371 aircraft in four wings (F-47 Thunderbolt piston-engine and F-80 
jet fighters) in 1950 to 2,100 aircraft in sixteen wings, mostly Sabre and F-84 aircraft, by 1954.59 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Eayrs, In Defence of Canada – Volume 3, p. 122. 
58 Ray Wagner, The North American Sabre, London: Macdonald & Co (Publishers) Ltd, 1963, p. 76. 
59 Mark, Defending the West, p. 36.  By December 1956, all USAFE fighter-bombers were capable of carrying 
nuclear weapons. 
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The RAF’s 2nd Tactical Air Force in Germany at this time consisted of over 500 aircraft, but they 
were mostly Vampire, Venom and Meteor fighters, with only ten squadrons equipped with the 
modern Canadair Sabre Mk.4.60 For a short period of time, No. 1 Air Division was second to 
USAFE in the availability of a large number of modern advanced jet fighters in NATO Europe.  
Despite the implementation of this Big Air Force concept, there were plans to develop an even 
larger organization. 
“Closing the Gap” and the 1952 Lisbon Conference  
An important political and military factor was that with a small population of fourteen 
million Canada was not able to maintain a large army.  A large air force provided an alternative 
manner in which to raise substantial and effective armed forces in peace-time and at the same 
time had greater appeal to the public because of the glamour of aviation, and  the promise of  the 
opportunity to learn technical skills.  The political advantage in maintaining a large air force was 
to counter any possibility of conscription, long a divisive issue.61 Despite the bitter discord in the 
two World Wars, proposals for conscription arose with the demand for Canadian troops in 
Korea.62 Though conscription proposals came primarily from the Chief of the General Staff and 
retired generals, the RCAF Association at their annual convention in 1951 also called for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Taylor, pp. 62 and 70. 
61 Eayrs, In Defence of Canada – Volume 3.  Original post-war planning for the Canadian Army had been based on a 
regular force of 55,788 and a militia of 177,396 to be raised through universal military training, p. 79.  See J.L. 
Granatstein and J.M. Hitsman, in Broken Promises: A History of Conscription in Canada, Toronto: Oxford 
University Press, 1977.  They discuss the Cold War experience with proposals for conscription in Canada. 
62 The issue of conscription arose shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War and prior to the dispatch of Canadian 
troops to Korea. See Colonel Wallace Goforth, “Now: A Real Defence,” Saturday Night, Volume 65, Number 46, 
22 August 1950 and Michael Barkway, “How Much Manpower for Defence?” Saturday Night, Volume 65, Number 
47, 29 August 1950. Just prior to the 5 February 1951 defence programme announcement, the issue of conscription 
arose again, Warren Baldwin, “PM Says Mind Open About Conscription,” The Globe and Mail, 2 February 1951, 
p.2. The potential massive need for Army manpower also arose during the “closing the gap” deliberations with the 
Army’s proposals for a one or two division contribution to European based forces that could not have realistically 
been maintained without resorting to conscription. See DHH 73/1223 Series 1, Box 13, File 265, Consideration of 
MRC 5/2 and Canadian Proposals to Close the Gap, 10 September 1951.  In retirement, Lieutenant-General Simonds 
continued to argue for conscription.	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conscription.63 For the RCAF, however, conscription was not an acceptable or desirable 
approach to staff the air force.64 Maintenance of this large air force on a purely volunteer basis 
saved the government from having to deal with the unpopular topic of conscription.  It also 
resulted in the recruitment of women into the post-war RCAF.65 
The offensive capabilities of the home-based RCAF were relegated to the two Auxiliary 
squadrons equipped with the piston-engine Mitchell of Second World War vintage, but the 
adoption of tactical bombers by the RCAF continued to be an active issue throughout 1951.  In 
this case, however, the issue was based on the proposed creation of a second RCAF air division 
in Europe equipped with twelve squadrons of tactical jet bombers.66 
 The acquisition of the light bomber air division was part of the larger issue of “closing 
the gap” in the deficiency of air power within SHAPE. Given the Soviet land forces’ 
overwhelming dominance in Europe, NATO viewed the development of robust air power as a 
key element needed to repel a possible Soviet invasion.  Soviet air forces were assessed at 4,400 
aircraft with 1,300 aircraft in reserve “to support the land campaign against Western Europe and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 See General H.D.G. Crerar, “The Case for Conscription,” Queen’s Quarterly, Vol. LVIII, Winter 1951-52, and 
“General Crerar’s Warning,” Saturday Night, Volume 66, Number 24, 20 March 1951. See also “R.C.A.F. 
Association – Second National Convention, 25-26 May 1951,” The Roundel, Volume 3, Number 8, July-August 
1951, pp. 54-55. 
64 DHH 73/1223 Series 3 Sub-series 13, Minutes of the 142nd Meeting of Air Members, 5 December 1951, p. 1. 
65 See Patricia A. Power, With Their Feet on the Ground: Women’s Lives and Work in the Royal Canadian Air 
Force, 1951-1966, Unpublished MA Thesis, Ottawa: University of Ottawa, September 1998. 
66 The issue of a significant increase to the RCAF contribution to European based forces is raised by Eayrs in his In 
Defence of Canada- Volume 4, p. 223.  However, Eayrs relied on Claxton’s memoirs that referred to “an additional 
bomber wing,” and though it is noted that the Canadian contribution would have been “something close to one 
thousand aircraft,” it is never satisfactorily explained.  Roy Rempel in Counterweights: The Failure of Canada’s 
German and European Policy, 1955-1995, Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1996, was the 
first person to address the magnitude of the proposed second air division.  Rempel notes, “The plan for the 
RCAF…would have involved a build-up to an overall strength of some 1400 jet combat aircraft.  This would have 
included adding a second Canadian air division of light jet bombers…. In total, a possible build-up in Europe to 
nearly 500 jet fighters and bombers was envisaged.” p. 111. 
 135 
to take part in the initial air attack against the United Kingdom.67 In comparison, it was assessed 
that NATO might possess a minimum of 1,200 aircraft by 1952; a number that excluded USAFE 
and the UK based Fighter Command.68  
The weak position of air power on the continent reinforced the critical importance of a 
Canadian air contribution to the collective defence of Western Europe.  Plans to address these 
deficiencies were contained in the “Report on Study by the U.S., U.K, French and Canadian 
Chiefs of Air Staff on the Gap in SHAPE Air Power.”69 The endorsement of this report would 
have had enormous implications for both the RCAF and the Canadian defence budget.70 The 
proposed RCAF commitment would have consisted of a total of twenty-five squadrons stationed 
in Western Europe, including the eleven fighter squadrons that had already been committed in 
February 1951.  Apart from the twelve bomber squadrons, the expansion would have 
necessitated an additional fighter squadron and a long-range transport squadron.71 These 
expanded operational forces would also require two additional Basic Flying Training Schools, 
one Advanced Flying Training School, and a light bomber Operational Training Unit.  
Manpower requirements totalled 14,120 that would bring the RCAF establishment to 58,320 
compared to the currently authorized 44,200, with an increase in the RCAF overseas strength 
from 5,678 to 13,316 personnel.72 The aircraft requirements consisted of 790 Sabre fighter and 
364 light bomber aircraft that included the equipment of the two air divisions, reserves, 
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Operational Training Unit requirements, pipeline and wastage. Additional requirements 
consisted of sixteen long-range transport aircraft along with 400 Harvard and 217 T-33 trainer 
aircraft to meet the increased training demands. The implementation of this programme would 
have required an additional $733 million over a three-year period from FY 1952/53 to FY 
1954/55.73 However, even before the issue had been discussed at the 23 May 1951 Chiefs of 
Staff Committee Meeting, Air Marshal Curtis had expressed the view that “the RCAF should not 
enter the light bomber field unless it was absolutely essential.”74  
The issue of “closing the gap” in European based air power was to occupy the attention 
of the Air Staff for some time, culminating in the Lisbon Conference of February 1952.  The 
operational requirements for the additional air assets were refined to consist of a fighter division 
of twelve squadrons each of twenty-five aircraft and a light bomber division of twelve squadrons 
with 192 aircraft. The long-range transport squadron to support the enlarged overseas force was 
to consist of twelve transport aircraft.  To meet the light bomber requirements, 385 Canberra 
aircraft were needed up to FY 1954/55 with an additional unfunded requirement for 192 
Canberra aircraft for War Reserve after FY 1954/55.  Despite the recently announced three-year 
$5 billion defence plan, by the spring of 1951 there was a squeeze on future defence 
expenditures, so the negative reaction of Claxton to these proposals of the “Paris Plan” should 
not appear surprising: 
Our Air Force, though not our government, had been represented in these discussions and 
I believe took an active part in them.  They resulted in allotting to Canada an additional 
bomber wing [sic], which would have brought our contribution to NATO to something 
close to one thousand aircraft, or more than the number to be contributed by either the 
United States or Britain.  Nothing but the unbridled enthusiasm of our airmen could have 
produced such a result.  I was exceedingly annoyed when I heard about it and made our 
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Air Force go right back to the Paris group and say they had acted entirely without 
instruction and we would not be adding any aircraft whatever.75 
 
However, Claxton was wrong to ascribe this view of events as an attempt by the Chiefs of Air 
Staff to undertake an end run around the NATO Military Committee.   
The “Paris Plan” had been discussed in great detail at the Chiefs of Staff Committee 
Meeting on 25 June 1951, and though there were no visible showstoppers, a decision to endorse 
the proposal was deferred pending a review of the impact on army and navy requirements.76 The 
comments by General Charles Foulkes, the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, at the NATO 
Military Representatives’ meeting on 11 October 1951, clearly stated the Canadian viewpoint 
regarding the additional RCAF commitments, noting that “the magnitude of this commitment 
appears to us to be almost staggering and beyond what can be efficiently obtained.”77 Foulkes 
explained that aircraft production bottlenecks, the existing commitment of eleven squadrons to 
the Integrated Force and the nineteen squadrons required for Canadian air defence, plus the 394 
Sabre aircraft to be supplied to the RAF, the doubling in size of the RCAF in two years, and the 
increased training requirements were factors that were fully taxing Canadian air power 
capabilities.   
Foulkes softened his remarks by noting that it might be possible to increase the fighter 
contribution from 203 aircraft in eleven squadrons to 300 aircraft in twelve squadrons.  However, 
he was adamant that the light bomber division could not be considered. The production of 
Canberra aircraft in Canada or their availability from elsewhere was not considered viable and 
the training of the additional personnel was not considered achievable. Despite the personal plea 
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from SACEUR, General Eisenhower, who considered the US, the UK and Canada, as the only 
NATO nations capable of building up their air power, this massive enlargement of the RCAF did 
not proceed.78 In the end, the Canadian air division commitment was increased to the twelve 
squadrons with 300 Sabre fighters with a phased build up of the Air Division to have ninety-six 
aircraft available to SACEUR by December 1952, 219 aircraft by September 1953, 273 aircraft 
by 1 July 1954 and 300 aircraft by December 1954.79 
 Closing the gap in air power remained a critical objective, and not withstanding the 
Canadian view of the “Paris Plan,” the North Atlantic Council at the Lisbon conference in 
February 1952 established force goals for 4,067 combat aircraft by 31 December 1952, 6,500 
aircraft by December 1953 and 9,000 aircraft by December 1954.80 R.N. Rosecrance suggested 
that the promotion of these force structure levels reflected a “conventional WWII strategy” and 
did not take into account the USAF Strategic Air Command or tactical nuclear weapons.81 In any 
event, these targets had no reasonable chance of being achieved as Canadian analysis indicated 
that 5,870 would be the maximum number of NATO aircraft by 1955, a number that did not 
account for the quality of aircraft.82 An additional study in 1954 of the air situation, “SHAPE 
Study on Air Defence in the NATO Area of Europe” noted that there was “virtually no air 
defence at this time.”83 Interestingly, despite the weakness of air defences, the RCAF had been 
requested to stockpile bombs and rockets so that the Air Division could operate in the ground 
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attack role.84 The air staff declined the request because the Air Division had enough to do in 
carrying out the air superiority role. SACEUR had requested that Canada provide an additional 
fighter wing equipped with all-weather fighters, and in 1954 the air staff decided to re-equip one 
squadron in each of the four wings with all-weather CF-100 aircraft with this task being 
completed by 1957.85 Canada was one of the few nations in a position to improve the air power 
situation in Western Europe, and the introduction of the CF-100 into the Air Division 
significantly increased its air defence capability.86 
Air Power and the Transformation of NATO Strategy 
Throughout the period, NATO air forces had to consider the conduct of air operations 
within the context of nuclear weapons.87 At first, it was a matter of conducting air operations 
under the umbrella of the USAF Strategic Air Command as the sole possessor of nuclear 
weapons.  With the Soviet explosion of its first nuclear device in August 1949, NATO air forces 
now had to contend with  the Soviet nuclear threat.  Initial NATO planning proposals to deal 
with the Soviet conventional threat had been based on the build up of massive conventional 
forces of ninety-six army divisions supported by 9,000 aircraft.  This was the essence of the force 
proposals at the February 1952 Lisbon Conference discussed under the auspices of “closing the 
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gap.”  It soon became apparent that the NATO nations had neither the political, economic, or 
military wherewithal to raise and maintain such massive forces in peacetime.  Despite the 
inability of NATO to realize the Lisbon force goals, NATO strategic guidance in the immediate 
aftermath of the Lisbon Conference adhered to the massive expansion of conventional forces: 
It has been assessed by sources with knowledge of weapons of mass destruction that, 
although by the period 1953-1954 their effect on the conduct of war will not dictate a 
need to reduce current NATO force goals, greater availability of such weapons and 
increased delivery capability during the period 1954-1956 may then necessitate re-
evaluation of the requirements for a successful defence of the NATO area.  However, as 
the conventional NATO forces at present in being fall far short of requirements, no 
relaxation can be allowed in their planned expansion until the development of weapons 
justifies a reassessment….88 
Despite public pronouncements on the build up of conventional forces, ongoing studies 
examined the utility of introducing battlefield nuclear weapons for the defence of Europe as early 
as 1952.89 Starting in the mid-1950s and continuing into the 1960s, NATO strategic planning and 
the associated force structure proposals were based on much smaller conventional forces 
supported by nuclear weapons, including battlefield tactical nuclear weapons developed as a 
result of miniaturization. NATO strategic planning and its emphasis on nuclear weapons was 
also undoubtedly assisted by the national strategies of the largest members that emphasized 
nuclear equipped forces – the US in its adoption of Massive Retaliation in 1953 with the election 
of the Eisenhower administration, and the British 1952 Global Strategy Paper issued by 
Churchill’s government. 
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 In the case of NATO strategy, reliance on nuclear weapons was initially embodied in the 
NATO Military Committee key documents such as MC 48 (Final) dated 22 November 1954, 
“The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Few Years.”90 Looking to 
1957, it was envisaged that:  
…during the period under consideration an appreciable number of atomic weapons, 
along with the capability to deliver them, will become available both to NATO and 
the Soviets…. the Military Committee has concluded that the advent of atomic 
weapons systems will drastically change the conditions of modern war.91 
A particular difficulty at this time was the perception that the air defence of Europe was not 
sufficiently effective, particularly with the introduction of nuclear weapons.92 Existing active and 
passive air defence measures would not provide the necessary defence, and striking at the 
Soviets’ nuclear weapons prior to an attack on NATO countries and their defence installations 
was considered the only feasible method.93  
 At the time that MC 48 was approved, it was envisaged that a war would consist of two 
phases – an initial intense period of thirty days involving the use of nuclear weapons to gain 
“atomic superiority,” followed by a phase of undetermined duration with conventional forces 
supported by nuclear weapons.94 To contend with the changed nature of war, the concept of 
operations contained in MC 48 was based on more modest NATO forces-in-being along with 
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“the ability to make immediate use of atomic weapons.”95 This approach was to have immediate 
and long-term implications for the Air Division’s concept of operations and equipment.  
 Further development of NATO strategy resulted in the endorsement of MC 14/2 dated 23 
May 1957, the NATO Military Committee report on the “Overall Strategic Concept for the 
Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area.”96 This strategy was viewed as NATO’s 
adoption of Massive Retaliation.97 The revised strategy placed the emphasis on the deterrent 
value of military forces – the shield forces (the forces-in-being) and the supporting nuclear 
deterrent forces.  The strategic concept still envisaged a two-phase war – the initial nuclear 
exchange, including the use of thermonuclear weapons, followed by a second phase of 
undetermined length.  However, it was now believed that the intensity of the nuclear exchange 
during the first phase would seriously impede any sort of mobilization during the second phase.98 
This second phase was dubbed “broken backed warfare” to describe the type of residual yet 
uncertain degree of conflict.  Key to the revised strategic concept, both for the deterrent strategy 
and, in the event of war, was the need for air forces to establish air supremacy, along with a 
strong emphasis on offensive capabilities to strike at Soviet offensive air and missile forces, and 
to conduct interdiction and close support to NATO land and naval forces.99 
 The transformation of NATO strategy over the five-year period from 1952 to 1957 was to 
have great implications for Canadian defence policy in general, and the Air Division in 
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particular.  The implementation of the latest NATO strategy relied upon forces-in-being with just 
sufficient national logistics support to ensure the conduct of operations during this initial phase, 
and a much-reduced emphasis on potential mobilization and subsequent logistics support. These 
changes were based on the concept of a short war.  For the Air Division, it would mean that it 
was no longer required to stock a pipeline of War Reserve aircraft, nor maintain the extensive 
logistics chain that had been initially developed for the Air Division’s support.  Though the 
nuclear threat to NATO air forces called for dispersion to enhance their survivability, ultimately, 
logistics support was limited to thirty days stocks located “behind the wire” at each of the Air 
Division’s four airfields.  
 In the interim, USAFE began to equip some of its combat squadrons with nuclear-armed 
aircraft.100 This arming of aircraft with tactical nuclear weapons was to intensify after 1957 and 
into the early 1960s, initially with the five RAF Canberra-equipped interdiction squadrons and 
eventually included other NATO allies (including Canada) that equipped their air forces with 
nuclear-armed aircraft under US custodial control, a topic that will be discussed in Chapter 6.101 
Similarly, within the realm of NATO military exercises, the emphasis on the conduct of a 
nuclear war began to assume critical importance.  The most notable of these exercises was 
Exercise Carte Blanche conducted in June 1955 described as “…. the most fantastic war game 
the world can ever have seen was played out on the airfields and in the skies over Western 
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Germany.”102 This exercise involved the two complete ATAFs, along with additional air 
resources from the USAF, RAF and French Air Force operating a total of 3,000 aircraft.  
Exercise Carte Blanche was unique in that it represented the “new way of war” with “355 
tactical nuclear bombs being dropped in three days of which 268 fell on German soil.”103 The 
exercise scenario assumed that the explosion of these notional nuclear weapons was to be 
responsible for up to 1.7 million dead and 3.5 million wounded in West Germany.104 Within the 
military context of the exercise, if a nuclear ground burst hit an airfield, it was considered totally 
destroyed, while an air burst would result a graduated damage assessment and the re-opening of 
that airfield for flying operations.105 
In the 1950s, even in the early stages of this emerging NATO strategy based on a 
fundamental reliance on nuclear weapons, notable critics voiced their views, including General 
Matthew B. Ridgway, the US Army Chief of Staff, followed by his successor, General Maxwell 
Taylor, who after his retirement, wrote The Uncertain Trumpet, a critique of this policy.106 
Similar critics arose in Canada, particularly Lieutenant General Guy Simonds, who had retired as 
Chief of the General Staff in 1955 and set forth his views in a series of magazine articles in 
1956.107 
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Nevertheless, during the latter part of the 1950s there was the transformation of NATO 
strategy from an emphasis on the build up of its conventional forces to modest conventional 
forces-in-being backed up by nuclear weapons.  During this period, nuclear weapons were often 
regarded as the same as conventional munitions, just with more explosive power.108 Experienced 
senior RAF officers such as Michael Armitage and Tony Mason, in Air Power in the Nuclear 
Age, posited the view that for NATO air forces “Tactical air power was no longer primarily 
concerned with close air support, interdiction or counter-air operations with conventional 
weapons.  Instead, nuclear weapons would be used for interdiction and counter-air tasks.”109 
Similarly, with the premise that only a fraction of the Soviet bombers armed with thermonuclear 
weapons were required to break through NATO air defences to inflict unimaginably devastating 
destruction there was the acknowledgement that there was “no strategic requirement for air 
defence.”110 These changes were to fundamentally alter the utility of the Air Division by the late 
1950s and the requirement for a large RCAF fighter formation based in Western Europe. 
No. 1 Air Division and Logistics – The Weak Link? 111 
The study of air force logistics is limited, and the study of RCAF logistics has been 
negligible.  The phrase that “amateurs talk about strategy and tactics, while real professionals 
deal with logistics” has often been used without substance, but it does apply to the RCAF in the 
1950s.112 Certainly the service recognized the importance of logistics planning and 
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implementation in order to meet the immediate requirements for expansion to 50,000 personnel, 
3,000 aircraft, forty-one operational squadrons and a large training organization.   However, such 
was the urgency in deploying the twelve fighter squadrons to Europe to provide a credible 
deterrent that there was a weak link in the logistical support needed to sustain war operations. 
Canada’s armed forces each maintained a separate logistics system.113  Integrated 
logistics also did not exist within the alliance.  In the words of the NATO Logistics Handbook,  
The responsibility of nations is to plan and provide the logistics support for their forces to 
meet Allied plans…. This aim is straightforward but it is important to remember that 
nations organize and support their armed forces in different ways….114 
 A distinction must be made between Consumer Logistics, that is, “…the reception of the initial 
product, storage, transport, maintenance (including repair and serviceability), operation and 
disposal of materiel,” and Production Logistics which focused on “research, design, 
development, manufacture and acceptance of materiel,” tasks that were performed by the 
Department of Defence Production in the 1950s, though with inputs the Technical Services 
Branch at Air Force Headquarters (AFHQ).115 Consumer Logistics (now also referred to as 
“operational logistics”) was the purview of the operational flying commands and formations, 
such as the Air Division. 
Within the RCAF, various logistics activities associated with Consumer Logistics were 
conducted at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.  At AFHQ in Ottawa (the strategic 
level), the Air Staff included the Air Member for Technical Services (Air Vice-Marshal rank) 
with subordinate Chiefs of Development, Construction Engineering and Materiel (Air 
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Commodore rank) with the emphasis on policy development.  The Air Materiel Command (the 
operational level), commanded by an Air Vice-Marshal (with 5,341 military personnel) was 
responsible for the provision of logistics support to the entire RCAF.116 The Air Materiel Base 
(AMB) concept originally developed for implementation in the home-based Air Materiel 
Command, was also adopted to support No. 1 Air Division with No. 30 AMB established at 
Langar, England to support the Air Division located in eastern France and Germany.117 
By 1955, No. 1 Air Division consisted of a Division Headquarters (formed 1 October 
1952 in Paris, and moved to Metz 13 April 1953) that included a Support Unit, Combat 
Operations Centre, Tactical Aircraft Control Centre, an Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, 
and Telecommunications (Telecom) Squadron, located at Metz, France, and four Fighter Wings 
as follows: No. 1 Fighter Wing (Marville, France), No. 2 Fighter Wing (Grostenquin, France), 
No. 3 Fighter Wing (Zweibrucken, West Germany)  and No. 4 Fighter Wing (Baden-Söllingen, 
West Germany).   Each Wing consisted of a Wing Headquarters, an Airfield Defence Unit and 
three Fighter Squadrons with a total of 1,289 military and 118 civilian personnel.118  
Air Division logistics support was based on a limited degree of self-sufficiency for each 
Fighter Wing (the tactical level), augmented by USAFE support arrangements, with operational 
level support being provided by No. 30 AMB.  RCAF logistics policy was “to utilize USAF and 
RAF resources as far as practicable in order to economize on manpower and materiel resources 
and to avoid unnecessary duplication.”119 Each Fighter Wing station was self-contained for its 
basic support needs including supply, construction engineering, ammunition, petroleum oil, and 
lubricants (POL), administration, and food services.  The Wing supply section stocked thirty 
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days whilst the Wing maintenance section was designed to conduct aircraft repair requiring a 
maximum of fourteen days.120 A salvage section was established in one Wing to conduct salvage 
activities on behalf of the four Wings.121 POL, ammunition, and rations were obtained through 
the USAF using Logistics Support Arrangement (LSAs).122 A NATO pipeline system was 
eventually created, including the Central European Pipeline System (CEPS) that serviced the 
Canadian airfields with bulk aircraft fuel.123  
Interestingly, Plan H also called for an Air Materiel Wing to be established on the 
Continent that would operate in the Communications Zone to the rear. The Air Materiel Wing 
would provide mobile support to the Fighter Wings that were expected to re-deploy from their 
operating airfields in the event of war. The Air Materiel Wing was to consist of a Mobile 
Telecom Repair Unit, a Mechanical Engineering Light Repair Unit, Repair and Salvage Unit, Air 
Stores Park, Fuel and Ammunition Park and a Field Hospital.124 When the Air Division was 
created, this organization was not included, but the need for this type of organization 
subsequently arose on various occasions and the implications of not creating it were to severely 
impact on operational readiness.  However, in accordance with Plan H, the RCAF adopted a 
policy that until SHAPE determined specific mobility requirements, RCAF would not establish 
any Continental based logistics units with the role for providing mobile back-up logistics 
support. 
No. 30 AMB at Langar (Nottinghamshire, England) was activated in September 1952 and 
Group Captain O.E. McCormick, the Commanding Officer commented that it was “ a common 
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mistake to regard 30 AMB as merely a big supply depot,” a misperception shared by RCAF non-
logistics personnel.125 In addition to storage and distribution, its functions included repair and 
overhaul, and local procurement. A considerable amount of contract work was conducted on 
behalf of No. 30 AMB by the Department of Defence Production detachment in London.  No. 30 
AMB consisted of No. 312 Supply Depot that maintained twelve months of stocks and also 
included the unique function of handling all medical supplies, instruments, and drugs through an 
attached medical stores detachment, No. 314 Technical Services Unit, and No. 5 Air Movements 
Unit attached to No. 137 Transport Flight with five Bristol Freighter aircraft.  The Freighters 
conducted five weekly flights to each of the bases on the Continent, delivering twenty-five per 
cent of required materiel, approximately 100,000 lbs per month, while the remainder was 
shipped using train and boat.126  
The command and control of No. 30 AMB was a contentious issue, as the RCAF logistics 
concept would have dictated that No. 30 AMB operate as a formation under Air Materiel 
Command.  Given its location and wartime role, however, it was more practical to place No. 30 
AMB under command of Headquarters No. 1 Air Division.127 Time and distance factors were 
important considerations when assessing the viability of the support concept. From No. 30 AMB 
Langar to the No. 1 Air Division airfields, it was approximately 600 km representing 2.5 hours 
flying time in a Freighter (cruising speed 166 mph).  In comparison, from the No. 1 Air Division 
airfields to the Inner German Border (IGB), the distance was approximately 400 km representing 
less than thirty minutes flying time for aircraft operating from East German or Czech air bases. 
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The perennial issues affecting the logistics readiness of No. 1 Air Division were never 
resolved, including stockpiling policy and the mobility of logistics support units.  The SHAPE 
policy for holding ninety days of supply at each Wing was based on thirty days in the immediate 
vicinity with the remaining sixty days held in the communications zone to the rear.128 Given the 
absence of mobile support units, the RCAF was forced to rely on Canadian airfields or USAF 
storage depots for the storage of its stocks, facilities that would be vulnerable in the event of war.  
An additional vulnerability was the lines of communications between No. 30 AMB in the UK 
and the air bases on the continent.  The RAF Chief of Air Staff, Marshal of the RAF Sir Dermot 
Boyle, believed that only Fighter Command aircraft would be allowed to fly across the Channel 
during the first seven days of war, a situation that might have dire consequences for emergency 
replenishment of spares support and hence aircraft availability for the Air Division.129  
Although the RCAF had a plan to implement a phased programme to transform the Air 
Division into a fully mobile tactical force by 1954, this did not occur.130 The AAFCE Emergency 
Plan called for No. 4 (Fighter) Wing to immediately redeploy from its Baden-Söllingen airfield 
to a location west of the Rhine River, but the ability to perform this task would have been 
severely limited by the lack of sufficient vehicles.131 In time, with the adoption of a NATO 
strategy based on fighting a nuclear war, the linked issues of stock dispersion and mobility 
became more crucial to the survivability and hence the effectiveness of the Air Division.  Other 
issues, such as peacetime and wartime support agreements with the USAF, particularly for POL 
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and rations, were successfully negotiated during this period.132 Another successfully resolved 
issue was the approval for the provisioning of War Reserve Materiel for fuel and ammunition 
based on the Air Division Unit Establishment of 300 Sabre fighters.133 In 1955, the government 
finally decided that the Air Division would not maintain a War Reserve of aircraft, a requirement 
that would have entailed an additional 490 Sabres besides the 300 aircraft on the Unit 
Establishments.134 This decision reflected a changing view of war – from the long war to the 
short war concept.  
No. 1 Air Division and the Third World War in the 1950s 
So, what would the Third World War been like if it had occurred in 1953?  The planning 
assumptions contained in 1 Air Division RCAF Operations Plan 1-53 provide some insights: 
- Soviet offensive would be launched with little warning 
- Allies would defend in depth along the Rhine River 
- Soviets would possess air superiority, bordering on air supremacy 
- Both Allies and Soviets would use atomic weapons (atomic weapons up to 70 KT could 
expected to be used in attacks on Air Division airfields) 
- Bacteriological and Chemical Warfare might be used by both sides 
- Soviets would use all possible means to upset internal order of Allied nations by 
subversive action of Communist minorities 
- Soviet electronic warfare would disrupt signals communication between Air Division HQ 
and subordinate units135 
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Within the NATO Order of Battle, there were approximately 4,000 combat aircraft. Within the 
Central Region, AAFCE consisted of two Allied Tactical Air Forces, 2 ATAF in the North and 4 
ATAF in the South the latter with approximately 1,200 aircraft consisting of: 
12th Air Force (USAF) - 225 fighters 
1ere Division Aerienne (Armée de l’Air)  - 696 fighters 
No. 1 Air Division RCAF  - 300 fighters 
Each ATAF was associated with a NATO Army Group in the Central Region.  2ATAF was 
affiliated with the Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) consisting of British, Canadian, Belgian, 
Dutch and Luxembourg troops, whilst 4 ATAF was associated with the Central Army Group 
(CENTAG) with American and French troops.  
The conduct of 4ATAF air operations were assigned to two categories, offensive and 
defensive operations, each including a number of tasks.  The offensive tasks included attack of 
enemy aircraft on the ground and air installations to inflict maximum attrition on enemy air 
capability, escort of bomber forces, air defence of the combat zone, and close support to ground 
forces in the event of a major threat or breakthrough on the Rhine river line.  Defensive tasks 
included air defence of the combat zone, particularly Rhine river crossings during withdrawals of 
Allied forces, and the protection of airfields, depots and equipment stockpiles. Wing 
Commanding Officers were also to prepare their airfields, installations, equipment and supplies 
for demolition.136 
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No. 1 Air Division’s mission as laid down by 4ATAF included the following tasks: air 
defence, air superiority, escort and fighter cover, fighter sweeps against ground targets, close 
support of ground forces, and visual reconnaissance and strike verification.  With the primary 
task of air defence, No. 1 Air Division could only conduct other types of operations upon the 
orders of the Commanding General of 4ATAF, its higher operational headquarters.137 
Soviet air forces confronting NATO included approximately 12,000 aircraft in the tactical 
air arm, Frontovaya Aviatsiya (FA = Frontal Aviation) consisting of MiG-15 jet fighters, Il-28 
twin-engine jet bombers and Il-10 piston-engine ground attack aircraft.138 There were an 
additional 1,500 fighters in the Protivo Vozdushnaya Oborona Strany, (PVO Strany = Anti-Air 
Defence of the Nation) that could be used to gain air superiority, while the Dalnaya Aviatsiya 
(DA = Long-Range Aviation) force possessed 600 Tu-4 medium bombers, that though intended 
for a strategic role, could be re-assigned to tactical targets.139 
Clive Baxter described the conduct of a future war in “The 12 Day War” that appeared in 
Canadian Aviation in February 1956.140 On M-Day, The Russians could begin with massive 
nuclear attacks on important Western centres. Concurrently, American and British strategic 
bombers would be streaking towards their targets in the USSR or satellite nations.  
 For the Air Division, along with the other elements in the ATAFs, the first two days of 
war would be spent deep in Communist territory supporting the interdiction campaign to destroy 
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supply lines to isolate the Soviet ground and air forces.  Canadian Sabre squadrons would be 
engaged in “enormous and frightening dogfights with vast numbers of Communist fighters” over 
Czechoslovakia, Poland and other satellite nations. By M+2, all remaining Allied aircraft would 
swing over to the new role, with half providing defence of NATO ground forces, with the other 
half continuing the interdiction campaign.   Baxter commented  “Twelve days after the outbreak 
of war, Strategic Air Command will have totally destroyed Russia’s ability to continue fighting.  
If they have not done this, we will have lost the war.”141 
Conclusions 
The political, economic, and strategic conditions within Canada were aligned to promote a 
modern and well-equipped RCAF in the post-war period.  However, even the deteriorating 
international situation and Canadian membership in NATO did not portend the creation of a Big 
Air Force, let alone its overseas deployment to Europe.  These developments came about as a 
result of the Korean War in Asia.  With Plan G and subsequently Plan H, Air Force planners had 
provided the government with a readily implementable programme for RCAF expansion, and it 
was underwritten with the required political will and financial commitments.    
Though there is now a tendency to discount the Canadian contribution to NATO, for a 
period during the 1950s, the Canadian contribution, particularly the Air Division, was a critical 
component to Western Europe defence (and indirectly to the defence of Canada).  The 
deployment of No. 1 Air Division represented the concept of forward defence that has been a 
theme throughout post-war Canadian defence.  Canada played a tremendous part in the build up 
of Western European air power through its contributions of Mutual Aid for hundreds of Allied 
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aircraft, the development of infrastructure in the form of airfields and ancillary support, and the 
training of thousands of NATO aircrew.  However, akin to the notion of what really counts are 
“boots on the ground,” so it was with “fighters on the runway” in the form of No. 1 Air Division.  
It was a remarkable achievement that the RCAF was able to recruit, train, equip and deploy 
overseas twelve squadrons of 300 modern jet fighters in a period of forty-six months from the 
announcement on 5 February 1951.142 However, within a year, even as the build up of the Air 
Division and the RCAF was occurring, there were concerns about the financial viability of the 
massive $5 billion three-year re-armament programme.143 This concern was to influence the 
effectiveness of the Air Division. 
 The government’s firmness not to submit to external pressures for the proposed second 
RCAF air division in Europe was illustrated by the “Closing the Gap” negotiations and the 
February 1952 NATO Lisbon Conference. This confirmed that there were definite limits of how 
far the government would go regarding its defence commitments.  The government acceded to 
the request to increase the Air Division Unit Establishment from 203 to 300 Sabre fighters, but 
the proposed second Air Division of light bombers was a non-starter.  Even the increase to No. 1 
Air Division’s operational aircraft strength was subject to limitations.  For example, the 1,760 
RCAF technicians needed to conduct maintenance on the additional Sabre aircraft were not 
forthcoming.144 Early in the planning process, it was intended to completely replace the Sabre 
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143 DHH 73/1223, Series 3, File 1307, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Minutes of a Special Meeting, 15 January 1952, 
pp. 2-4. 
144 DHH 73/1223, Series 3, File 1306, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Minutes of 507th Meeting, 25 September 1951, p. 
3.  The existing technician manpower had to service an increased number of aircraft with a resulting impact on 
aircraft availability and operational readiness. 
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day fighter squadrons with the CF-100 all weather aircraft.145 Ultimately, this was not affordable 
and only one squadron in each of the four wings received the CF-100.   
In addition, airfield ground defence was clearly inadequate.  Using RAF Regiment 
standards as a benchmark, there should have been approximately 2,000 officers and airmen 
dedicated to the task of passive and active defence.146 Rather than 500 ground defence personnel 
at each airfield, the ground defence unit strength was 260 personnel.  To fill the gap, technicians 
and other support personnel might be required to “drop their tools” and participate in the defence 
of the airfield, but that distraction would mitigate against maximizing aircraft sorties, presumably 
the raison d’être for the Air Division. As well, ground defence weaponry to counter low-level air 
attack left something to be desired.  There were suggestions for trials of 20mm and 40mm anti-
aircraft guns, but less effective 0.5 inch machineguns were issued for “morale purposes.”  
Though No. 1 Air Division was a war-fighting organization, it suffered from a number of 
logistics deficiencies that would have severely hampered its effectiveness in war – dispersion, 
mobility, sufficient stockpiles of supplies, an adequate number of aircraft technicians, and a War 
Reserve of aircraft – all these matters required additional money and people.147 The Air Materiel 
Wing was never established on the continent, and throughout this period, logistics support for the 
Air Division relied upon the doubtful ability of No. 30 AMB to provide support from England or 
through arrangements with USAFE that might not endure in the event of war.148 By 1955 when 
the last of the four Fighter Wings of the Air Division had been deployed to the Continent, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 DHH 73/1223, Series 3, File 1306, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Minutes of 482nd Meeting, 16 January 1951, pp. 4-
5. 
146 DHH 73/1223, File 2000, Minutes of a Conference of AOCs and Group Commanders, 17-18 January 1952, p. 10. 
147 David French has described this chimera of defence (in the case of the British Army of the Rhine) as 
“Potemkinism.”  See David French, Army, Empire and Cold War: The British Army and Military Policy 1945-1971, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. p. 308 
148 DHH 73/1223, File 1825, Minutes of the 207th Meeting of the Air Members, 30 November -1 December 1954 
and DHH 73/1223, File 1826, Minutes of the 210th Meeting of the Air Members, 24 January 1955. 
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winds of change, represented by restraint in defence expenditures and the adoption of the short 
war concept, had ensured that corrective measures would not be implemented.  The Air Division 
was blessed with excellent aircraft, superior flying training, experienced leadership and high 
morale.  However, if the Third World War had erupted during this critical period of the 1950s, 
sustainable logistics would have been its Achilles heel. 
Whether or not the maintenance of sizable armed forces, including a Big Air Force, 
provided the Canadian government with a correspondingly greater influence within NATO has 
been a perennial issue.  In examining the situation of the early 1950s, David Bercuson concluded 
that Canada did have that influence, but only so long as the country was committed to great 
expansion of its military effort.149 With the setting of much larger – and still more costly -- force 
level targets such as at the Lisbon Conference, Canada’s interest in military expansion began to 
wane.150 As well, the Soviet explosion of a thermonuclear bomb in 1953 started what has been 
referred to as the “continentalization” of Canadian defence policy with an increased emphasis on 
North American air defence.151  
Another aspect of this strategic re-alignment was the change in the concept of war.  
Instead of a long drawn out war that involving mobilization of industry and manpower, regular 
forces-in-being would quickly fight “the twelve day war” in a nuclear environment.152 The 
adoption of the short war scenario had significant military, industrial and financial repercussions.  
There was no longer a requirement to procure hundreds of additional aircraft as War Reserves 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 David Bercuson, “Canada, NATO, and Rearmament, 1950-1954: Why Canada Made a Difference (But Not For 
Very Long),” in Making a Difference? Canada’s Foreign Policy in a Changing World Order edited by John English 
and Norman Hillmer, Toronto: Lester Publishing Ltd, 1992. p. 104. 
150 Ibid. p. 117. 
151 Ibid. p. 106. The remark regarding the “continentalization” of Canadian defence policy has been attributed to Jon 
B. McLin in Canada’s Changing Defense Policy, 1957-1963: The Problem of a Middle Power in Alliance, 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967. 
152 Baxter, “The 12 Day War.” 
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and similarly with the diminution of Auxiliary and Reserve personnel, a greatly reduced 
requirement to provide aircraft and equipment to these squadrons. Consequently, the requirement 
to stockpile large quantities of fuel, ammunition and other supplies along with an elaborate 
logistics system was very much reduced with the adoption of a short war concept.153 Reductions 
in military requirements meant that the aviation industry could not be sustained at the high tempo 
of production that had begun with the Korean War.  Most significantly, these military strategic 
and industrial changes were to affect the financial outlook and the amount of funding that 
political leaders were willing to be made available to support the defence effort.   
Part of the reason for weakening political support was the great extent to which Canadian 
force structure and weapons procurement proved to be subject to the whims of allied 
requirements rather than meeting Canadian interests.154 Douglas Bland argued that  
There are…several related factors that cause Canadians to act as dependents in 
defence matters. One reason is embedded in our military history and Canadian 
officers’ profound lack of confidence in Canada’s legitimate right to act as a 
sovereign nation – especially in matters of defence…. James Eayrs called it 
“growing up allied,” but in many important aspects Canada’s military profession 
has never grown up at all…. In the post-colonial days Canadians deferred to the 
British and in both world wars Canadians conceded national command to allied 
strategies and allied officers…. The NATO experience was no different.155 
One matter that was not discussed at the time was the casualties incurred by the Air 
Division during its existence from 1951 to 1969.  The precise number remains unclear, but the 
Choloy Military Cemetery, near Nancy, France, includes 122 officers and 146 other ranks that 
died while serving with No. 1 Air Division.156 The actual number is probably well over 300, if 
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those lost in the training pipeline are included.157 For example, 107 Sabre pilots were killed 
including fifty-one flying with the Air Division.158 CF-100 flying accidents in Canada and 
Europe accounted for the loss of ninety-two aircrew.159 RCAF members also died in the crash of 
T-33 jet trainers and Dakota and Freighter transport aircraft while serving with the Air Division.   
RCAF losses were estimated at an average of twenty-five to thirty aircrew killed in flying 
accidents every year.160 The operation of the Big Air Force during the 1950s had a human cost 
that has often been forgotten. 
It was during this initial NATO air power build up that the three pillars of politics, 
strategy and technology aligned most closely and effectively, which in turn reflected the close 
alignment of air force planning and government policies.  Aside from the USAF, the RCAF was 
the leading air force in the European theatre with twelve squadrons comprising 300 aircraft: the 
superb Sabre, the top day fighter of the period. However, there were political limitations to the 
extent that the government would support RCAF expansion.  This was very much evidenced by 
the government’s refusal to consider a second air division equipped with light jet bombers. 
Similarly, the decisions not to increase the number of ground technicians to support the increased 
number of Sabre fighters, or ensure the logistics self sufficiency or the ground defence of the Air 
Division clearly indicated there was a limit to the political and fiscal support for the RCAF.  
Equally troubling was the emergence of a new NATO strategy based on the use of offensive 
nuclear weapons just as the Air Division achieved its full operating capability in 1954 as a 
conventionally armed formation designed for the air defence and air superiority roles.  
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The forward deployment of the Air Division during the early 1950s did much to realize 
the idea of the Big Air Force.  Even as the Air Division achieved the peak of its effectiveness in 
1956-57, however, its future represented a quandary to the RCAF planners in securing the future 
of the Big Air Force.  This will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 5  
Canadian Air Power – Canada Build Up 1950-1957 
Introduction 
 This Chapter will examine the build up of the home-based RCAF during the period from 
1950 to 1957.  It was the home-based RCAF that represented the bulk of RCAF manpower, 
budget and equipment.  This was the Air Force that was most visible to Canadians, contributing 
to the airmindedness of the 1950s and the notion of the “Golden Age of the RCAF.”  Apart from 
the Regular RCAF that was to grow in strength to over 50,000 personnel by 1955, there was the 
principal RCAF Reserve component, known as the Auxiliary Force, University Reserve Training 
Plan flight cadets, the RCAF Reserve Force Cadet Instructors, the Royal Canadian Air Cadets, 
the Ground Observer Corps, the RCAF Association, RCAF veterans, the RCN Aviation Branch, 
the Canadian Army Aviation Branch, DND civilian employees assigned to RCAF units, 
Department of Defence Production (DDP) employees assigned to the aircraft division, and the 
Canadian aircraft industry.  This large group of people and their families represented a 
significant number of Canadians who had ties to the elements of air power within a national 
population of 14 million in 1951. 
 Chapter 5 will focus on the implementation of Plan H that embodied the Big Air Force, 
including an examination of the functional command organization that was the framework of the 
greatly expanded RCAF.  The development of each command – Air Defence Command, Tactical 
Air Command, Maritime Air Command, Air Transport Command, Training Command and Air 
Materiel Command – will be explored to determine how each contributed to the development of 
the Big Air Force.  The role of the Auxiliary Force will also be included, as this was a key aspect 
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of the RCAF expansion during the 1950s. Finally, the central role played by the Canadian 
aviation industry will be discussed. 
Impact of Korean War and RCAF Expansion 
 As noted in Chapter 4, RCAF expansion in the near term after the outbreak of the Korean 
War was quite limited.1 The Auxiliary squadrons gave up their Vampires in order to equip the 
Regular squadrons, but the Auxiliary squadrons in turn were re-equipped with a larger number of 
Mustangs, and units that had previously been equipped only with Harvards also received 
Mustangs.  With the 5 February 1951 announcement of the $5 billion three-year rearmament 
programme, RCAF expansion began in earnest, but the immediate priority was for the Sabre 
fighter squadrons assigned to No. 1 Air Division.  These NATO squadrons were established and 
trained in Canada, then deployed overseas.  In 1954, with completion of the initial expansion, the 
RCAF comprised forty-one Regular and Auxiliary squadrons, 3,076 aircraft and over 45,000 
Regular Force personnel.  One year later, the service reached its target manpower ceiling with 
50,000 personnel, a strength maintained for the next decade. 
RCAF Organization 
 The post-war RCAF Command re-organization was essentially complete by July 1953.  
With the exception of the Tactical Air Command that was to be disbanded in 1959, this 
Command structure was to remain intact until the integration of the three armed forces in 1965.   
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Air Defence Command 
 There have been numerous studies of RCAF air defence during the post-war period.2  
Most studies have correctly focussed on the larger issues of Canada-US military cooperation, and 
Canadian civil-military relations, particularly the establishment of the integrated North American 
Air Defence organization (NORAD) in 1957 and the subsequent controversy over arming RCAF 
aircraft and missiles with nuclear weapons.  However, many historians have not appreciated the 
importance of the development of the RCAF Air Defence Command as the principal component 
in the Big Air Force concept.  The organization was more than pilots and aircraft, and included a 
complex, continent-wide system of command, control and communications facilities, airfields, 
radar stations and other infrastructure. 
As previously noted, initial post-war planning for the RCAF did not envisage a large air 
defence organization.3 The balanced air force concept did include fighter squadrons, but this was 
part of a structure that also included fighter-bomber, fighter-reconnaissance and bomber 
squadrons.  While Air Marshal Leckie, CAS in 1944-47 suggested that a relatively large air 
defence organization might be needed; his notion of a large air defence organization fell far short 
of what ultimately developed in the 1950s.  Under the February 1951 defence plan for a forty-
one squadron air force, the RCAF was to assign nine Regular and ten Auxiliary fighter squadrons 
to Air Defence Command.  These flying squadrons represented only a portion of the total air 
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defence effort of Canada.  Until the introduction of a computerized air defence system in the 
early 1960s, the Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE), air defence was a labour-
intensive activity, with manual plotting, co-relation and transmission of data much as in the 
Battle of Britain in 1940. Air Defence Command featured an elaborate Aircraft Control and 
Warning system that included radar stations across the country and 50,000 civilian members of 
the Ground Observer Corps who supplemented the radar stations as the “eyes and ears of the 
RCAF.”4  
The Pinetree Line, the most southern and the first of three radar lines that were ultimately 
built across Canada, initially included sixteen RCAF manned stations and eighteen USAF 
manned stations.5 Approximately 400 personnel manned each station, consisting of up 200 
military and civilian personnel to support the 200 air force personnel in the resident Aircraft 
Control and Warning Squadron.6 Given the geographical isolation of these stations, there was a 
need to be self-sufficient with the services and amenities usually associated with a large RCAF 
station. There were also fourteen Auxiliary Aircraft Control and Warning Squadrons intended to 
augment the Regular RCAF Aircraft Control and Warning Squadrons. Air Defence Command 
included an Army Anti-Aircraft Command Headquarters co-located with Air Defence Command 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See Bill Prager, “Ground Observer Role,” Canadian Aviation, Vol. 28, No. 8, August 1955, H.C.D. Upton, “The 
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Headquarters at St Hubert with the role of coordinating Medium Anti-Aircraft Regiments that 
were included in the Army Reserve.7   
Air Defence Command represented the core of the Big Air Force. By 1957, it consisted 
of more than 14,500 RCAF Regular personnel out of a service strength that totalled 51,000.8 The 
bulk of the 5,600 Auxiliary Force personnel strength was also dedicated to the air defence role.  
The significance of this large Air Defence Command was the RCAF’s massive investment in a 
strategic air defence system, an endeavour undertaken by only one other middle power, Sweden.9 
The growth of the large Air Defence Command represented a new and dark dimension in 
Canadian airmindedness: fear of Soviet attack.  Aside from polemic books on the air threat by 
such authors as Alexander de Seversky, there were many alarmist articles in mass-market 
magazines such as Mechanix Illustrated, Science and Mechanics and Popular Science, American 
publications that were widely read in Canada.10 
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 The growth of Air Defence Command was undertaken through a slow and incremental 
approach, both in terms of organization and equipment.  When first established in December 
1948, Air Defence Command consisted of one Regular fighter squadron.  The second Regular 
squadron was not established until November 1949.  Though nominal fighter squadrons had been 
established in the Auxiliary, they were tokens in terms of the quantity and quality of equipment 
and were not integrated through any sort of proper Command and Control system.  After the 
outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, there was only a minor expansion of the air defence effort 
with the acquisition of an additional 100 Mustang fighters.  On 1 June 1951, the autonomous No. 
1 Air Defence Group was raised to full command status within the RCAF as Air Defence 
Command.  At this time, the Auxiliary fighter squadrons were placed under the command of Air 
Defence Command, the beginning of a Command and Control system.  However, the long time 
required to establish the air defence system raised the ire of the Official Opposition defence 
critic, Major General George Pearkes who in February 1952 stated that   
Canada is virtually defenceless against air attack.  In effect Canada has no air 
defence to direct attack at present…nor is she likely to have for many months to 
come.  Our fighters are nonexistent.  If we are to rely upon these auxiliary fighter 
squadrons to produce the direct defence of Canada, it must be realized that they will 
very soon have to be equipped with aircraft not less efficient than the CF-100, and it 
takes a very long time to train pilots and to organize ground crews when the 
personnel of the fighter squadrons are working solely on a part-time basis.  No matter 
how interested the individuals concerned may be, no matter how much time they are 
prepared to devote to the study of their work, I am very doubtful whether the 
auxiliary squadrons can be brought up to that state of efficiency which will enable 
them to be considered a first-line of defence against air attack here in Canada.11 
There was, however, reinforcement of the air defences by squadrons forming in Canada for 
No. 1 Air Division in NATO.  Normally, three squadrons at a time were established and spent a 
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year in training prior to dispatch overseas.  During their time in Canada, these squadrons, 
equipped with the Sabre Mk.2 day fighter, provided an additional forty-eight interceptors to Air 
Defence Command, until the last of the Air Division squadrons were dispatched overseas in 
1953 (see Table 5-1). 
Table 5-1 Air Defence Command – No. 1 Air Division Sabre 
Squadrons 1951-53 
 
Date Established Squadron Location Remarks – 
to Europe 
No. 1 (Fighter) Wing 
1 Mar 51 441 St Hubert HMCS 
Magnificent 
13-28 Feb 
52 
1 Sep 51 439 Uplands Leapfrog I 
30 May-14 
Jun 52 
1 Oct 51 410* St Hubert HMCS 
Magnificent 
19 Oct-13 
Nov 51 
No. 2 (Fighter) Wing 
8 Jan 51 416 Uplands Leapfrog II 
28 Sep-10 
Oct 52 
1 Nov 51 430 North Bay Leapfrog II 
28 Sep-10 
Oct 52 
15 Dec 51 421** St Hubert Leapfrog II 
28 Sep-10 
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Oct 52 
No. 3 (Fighter) Wing 
1 Aug 51 413 Bagotville Leapfrog III 
7 Mar-6 
Apr 53 
1 Jul 52 434 Uplands Leapfrog III 
7 Mar-6 
Apr 53 
1 Aug 52 427 St Hubert Leapfrog III 
7 Mar-6 
Apr 53 
No. 4 (Fighter) Wing 
1 Nov 52 414 Bagotville Leapfrog IV 
27 Aug-3 
Sep 53 
1 Jan 53 422 Uplands Leapfrog IV 
27 Aug-3 
Sep 53 
1 Mar 53 444 St Hubert Leapfrog IV 
27 Aug-3 
Sep 53 
* Regular Fighter Squadron since 1 Dec 48, ** Regular Fighter 
Squadron since 15 Sep 49. 
 
 
The first CF-100 equipped squadron for home air defence was not formed until April 
1953 due to technical challenges that delayed production of the aircraft.  As a long-range all-
weather interceptor, the CF-100 marked a significant increase in Air Defence Command’s 
capabilities.  However, the stand up of the CF-100 squadrons was a relatively slow process.  In 
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addition to producing new fighters and training aircrew, it was necessary to re-activate RCAF 
stations at North Bay, Cold Lake, Uplands, Comox and Bagotville to accommodate jet fighters.  
The Air Defence Command was to consist of nine CF-100 squadrons each of eighteen aircraft at 
RCAF stations across the country, with an emphasis on the industrial heartland of Eastern 
Canada. Achieving the target strength of nine squadrons was further delayed with the decision in 
1954 to re-equip four of the twelve squadrons in the Air Division with CF-100 all-weather night 
fighters in order to improve that formation’s capabilities.  In late 1956 and early 1957, four of the 
existing CF-100 fighter squadrons in Air Defence Command were deployed overseas to join 
each of the Air Division’s four wings.  To replace these overseas CF-100 squadrons, four 
additional squadrons with CF-100s were established within Air Defence Command, with the last 
squadron coming online by August 1957 (See Table 5-2). 
Table 5-2 Air Defence Command - Initial CF-100 Squadron Build-Up 
1951-54 
Date Established Squadron Location 
 
1 Apr 53 445 North Bay 
1 Jun 53 423 St Hubert 
1 Oct 53 440 Bagotville 
15 Mar 54 419 North Bay 
21 Jun 54 428 Uplands 
1 Oct 54 425 St Hubert 
1 Oct 54 432 Bagotville 
1 Nov 54 409 Comox 
15 Nov 54 433 Cold Lake 
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Air Defence Command CF-100 Squadrons to No. 1 Air Division 1956-
57 (Op Nimble Bat) 
1 Nov 56 445 North Bay 
12 Feb 57 423 St Hubert 
11 May 57 440 Bagotville 
5 Aug 57 419 North Bay 
Replacement Air Defence Command CF-100 Squadrons 1956-57 
1 Nov 56 410 Uplands 
1 Feb 57 416 St Hubert 
1 May 57 413 Bagotville 
5 Aug 57 414 North Bay 
 
The Auxiliary fighter squadrons equipped with Mustangs and Vampires began to replace 
these aircraft with the Sabre Mk.5 in 1955 a process that was also completed by 1957.  The Sabre 
Mk.5 had equipped the Air Division from 1953 to 1955 when replaced with the more advanced 
Sabre Mk.6.  Of the ten Auxiliary fighter squadrons, only six were re-equipped with the Sabre, 
the remainder retaining their Mustang piston-engine fighters until the aircraft were withdrawn 
from service in 1956.  
 The nineteen Regular and Auxiliary fighter squadrons that were ultimately established in 
Air Defence Command did not provide complete interceptor coverage across the country.  
However, there were additional fighter aircraft assets that could be called upon.  For example, on 
the East Coast, the forty Sabre fighters assigned to No. 1 (Fighter) Operational Training Unit at 
Chatham, New Brunswick could be made available for fighter tasks if required in an 
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emergency.12  There was also No. 3 (Fighter) Operational Training Unit at Cold Lake with fifty 
CF-100 all weather fighters whose primary role was to train pilots and radar officers for the 
operational Air Defence Command squadrons.13  As well, the RCN aviation branch maintained 
two fighter squadrons at HMCS Shearwater at Dartmouth, Nova Scotia.  Intended for fleet 
defence on the RCN’s sole aircraft carrier, only one fighter squadron at a time was embarked 
onboard the carrier.  From 1948 until 1954, these squadrons were equipped with a total of 
seventy-four Hawker Sea Fury, high performance piston-engine fighters.  After 1956, the fighter 
squadrons re-equipped with thirty-nine second-hand ex-USN McDonnell Banshee aircraft, the 
only jet fighter to be operated by the RCN. The capabilities of the Banshee in the air defence role 
were enhanced with the addition of Sidewinder guided air-to-air missiles, the first Canadian 
fighter to be so equipped.  USAF interceptor squadrons were located at Goose Bay, Labrador and 
Stephenville, Newfoundland along with the USAF Aircraft Control and Warning Squadrons at 
those stations.14 
 By  1954, the original RCAF build-up proposed in Plan H of August 1952 was achieved. 
The nine Regular CF-100 equipped squadrons were stationed at Comox, Cold Lake, North Bay, 
Uplands, St Hubert and Bagotville.  The ten Auxiliary squadrons were located at Vancouver, 
Calgary, Winnipeg, London, Hamilton, Downsview and St Hubert. Joint studies conducted by 
the RCAF Air Defence Command and the USAF Air Defense Command, however, concluded 
that this force was insufficient to defend the entirety of Canadian airspace.15 The Chiefs of Staff 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 No. 1 (Fighter) OTU was primarily used to train Sabre pilots for No. 1 Air Division.  See Victor Koby, “A Post-
Graduate Course: Sabre School for Battle,” Canadian Aviation, Vol. 28, No. 6, June 1955. 
13 Les Edwards, “Welding the CF-100 Team,” Canadian Aviation, Vol. 30, No. 2, February 1957. 
14 Lloyd H. Corbett, Jr. and Mildred W. Johnson, A Handbook of Aerospace Defense Organization 1946-1980, 
Office of History, Aerospace Defense Center, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, 31 December 1980. 
15 See Victor Koby, “Air Defense Needs Planning,” (Editorial), Canadian Aviation, Vol. 28, No. 5, May 1955.   
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Committee therefore sought authorization for an additional six CF-100 squadrons along with a 
revised role for the Auxiliary squadrons. 16  
It was intended that these changes be implemented in two phases during the period 1957-
59 to include the acquisition of new aircraft, additional manpower, the upgrading of existing base 
facilities and the construction of new bases.  The first phase of an additional three CF-100 
squadrons involved a capital expenditure of $136 million, annual recurring costs of $37 million 
and an additional 411 officers, 1,863 other ranks and 683 DND civilians. 17 The second phase 
with another three CF-100 squadrons would require $92 million in capital expenditures, $33 
million in annual recurring costs and an additional 294 officers, 1,402 other ranks and 330 DND 
civilians.18 If this programme had been approved, it would have increased the RCAF 
establishment to 54,110 Regular Force officers, airmen and airwomen, 5,600 Auxiliary officers, 
airmen and airwomen, and 16,184 DND civilians for a total of 76,294 personnel supporting the 
RCAF.19  
With this proposed expansion, Air Defence Command would have consisted of fifteen 
CF-100 squadrons located at fifteen bases across the country.20 This expansion would have 
upgraded the facilities at other existing RCAF stations at Val d’Or, Casey (both in Quebec), 
Namao, Alberta, Gimli, Manitoba and Saskatoon, along with new bases at Kapuskasing, Nakina, 
Sunstrum (all in Ontario), Prince George, British Columbia and Yorkton, Saskatchewan.21 The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 DDH 73/1223, Box 20, File 356, Memorandum from Minister of National Defence to Cabinet Defence 
Committee, “Additional Regular Force Air Defence Squadrons and Bases,” 29 February 1956.  See also DHH 
73/1223, Series 1, Box 89, “Brief for Meeting of Consultation Continental Defence,” 2 December 1955. 
17 “Additional Regular Force Air Defence Squadrons and Bases.” 
18 Ibid. 
19 Honourable Ralph Campney, Minister of National Defence, Report on National Defence, Ottawa: Edmond 
Cloutier, Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationery, 1957. 
20 “Additional Regular Force Air Defence Squadrons and Bases.” 
21 DHH 73/1223, Box 20, File 356.  As described in Chapter 4, if the RCAF had implemented a second Air Division 
of light bombers for NATO, this would have incurred an additional 14,120 RCAF personnel.  If added to the Air	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effect would be to thicken the air defence north of the principal industrial areas of Quebec and 
Ontario, and provide air defence across the Prairies and the interior of BC.    
A key aspect of the proposal was acknowledgement that the Auxiliary squadrons, which 
were originally to be re-equipped with the CF-100 under Plan H, would be unable to meet the 
increased demands of high readiness and well trained aircrews.  The Chiefs of Staff Committee 
now proposed that six Auxiliary squadrons located in Downsview, St Hubert and Vancouver be 
each re-equipped with eight Sabre fighters and four T-33 jet trainers  “to provide a reserve of 
trained aircrew and F-86 aircraft.”22 The remaining four Auxiliary squadrons at Hamilton, 
London, Winnipeg and Calgary were to be re-equipped with “four light helicopters of the Bell 
type and four light transport of the Otter type.”23  These four squadrons would assume a 
“Disaster and Rescue” role.24 (Three of these four squadrons were re-equipped, not with Bell 
helicopters or Otter light transports, but with the Expeditor light transport which was inferior in 
capabilities to the Otter.)25 
Cabinet, however, did not approve the expansion plan. Fiscal worries were starting to 
impinge upon the government’s willingness to sustain a large defence budget.  The expansion 
was to have been implemented during Fiscal Years 1957/58, 1958/59, and 1959/60.  Capital 
expenditures would have amounted to $228.6 million along with a recurring cost of $69 million 
– a significant increase considering the RCAF budget for 1957-58 consisted of $814 million, a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Defence Command expansion, there would have required 68,230 Regular RCAF personnel along with the Auxiliary 
and DND civilians for a total RCAF establishment of 90,014.  In comparison, the total strength of all three services 
amounted to 117,177 on 31 December 1956.  
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid.  The “Bell type” light helicopter is presumed to be the Bell 47 model. 
24 Ibid.  This “disaster and recue role” was intended for operations in the event a nuclear attack, similar to the 
National Survival role being assigned to the Militia at this time. 
25 The fourth Auxiliary squadron, No. 420 Squadron at London, was disbanded 1 September 1956.	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decrease from the previous year’s budget of $863 million.  For the next two years, the RCAF 
budget declined further with $797 million in 1958-59 and $743 million in 1959-60.26   
  In terms of equipment, Air Defence Command experienced a rapid turnover and diversity 
in its equipment over the course of a single decade.   When first established in 1948, Air Defence 
Command consisted of a token number of Vampire first generation jet fighters complemented by 
Mustang piston-engine fighters along with several “fighter” squadrons that had so far had been 
equipped only with Harvard trainers. By early 1951, the RCAF’s Regular and Auxiliary 
squadrons were able to muster about eighty-five Vampire and 130 Mustang fighters.27 The 
Vampire could not be considered as the most modern and effective jet fighter by this time, 
particularly given the Canadian operating environment.28  However, the Vampire served the 
useful purpose of providing both Second World War aircrew and post-war new entries with 
experience on operating jet aircraft.   
Richard Rohmer, who served as the Commanding Officer of No. 411 Auxiliary Squadron 
in Downsview in the early 1950s, claimed that the Auxiliary squadrons were the “first line of 
defence,” writing that: 
Make no mistake.  In 1951 the two Vampire squadrons at Toronto had first-line 
responsibilities for air defence of any Soviet bomber attack against southern Canada.  
The squadrons were no flying club.  They were RCAF units high in personal danger 
and risk.29  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 See Table 6-1 in Chapter 6 for the RCAF budget. 
27 See Jim Lyzun, “Maple Leaf Mustangs: P-51Ds and ‘Ks in Canadian Service,” Air Enthusiast, Vol. 93, May-June 
2001, Hugh A. Halliday, “The Problems with Vampires: Air Force Part 38,” Legion Magazine, April 2010, Robert 
G. Guillet, “The Vampire Years,” Canadian Aviation Historical Society Journal, Vol. 43, No. 2, Fall 2005, and J.E. 
Vernon, “Adventures in Procurement: Canada’s First-Generation Postwar Fighters,” Canadian Aviation Historical 
Society Journal, Vol. 47, No. 2, Summer 2009. 
28 Halliday. 
29 Richard Rohmer, Generally Speaking: The Memoirs of Major-General Richard Rohmer, Toronto: Dundurn Press, 
2004, p. 214. 
 175 
In reality, given the limited level of training, and the quality and quantity of equipment in 
the Auxiliary squadrons along with the absence of a modern Aircraft Control and Warning 
System, only a token defence could have been made in the face of a Soviet bomber attack on 
Canadian urban areas.30 Nor did it matter, for there were no Soviet bombers with the range to 
reach Toronto or any other major Canadian city at this time.   
North American air defence plans were based on a future threat analysis, rather than 
actual Soviet operational capabilities.  The Tu-4 Bull with its maximum unrefuelled range of 
3,300 miles represented a threat to the United Kingdom and Alaska, but it was not a threat to the 
heartland of North America, unless the Soviets were able to capture some Northern airfields 
from which to launch bombing operations against more southern North American targets.  The 
first Soviet medium jet bomber, the Tu-16 Badger, began to enter service in October 1953, but 
with a range of 3,600 miles still did not present a threat to North America. The Myasishchev M-4 
Bison that first appeared in 1954 was intended to be an intercontinental range bomber, but 
technical problems with the aircraft required such extensive modifications that it was essentially 
a new aircraft that finally emerged in late 1957 with a range up to 7,300 miles and capable of in-
flight refuelling that could strike targets in North America.31  
 The most important aircraft in Air Defence Command was the CF-100 with the first 
production version, the Mk.3, entering service in 1953. It proved to be an effective interceptor 
fighter throughout the 1950s.  Developed to meet the specific Canadian operating environment, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 This was certainly the view of fellow Progressive Conservative defence critic, George Pearkes (see p. 165 above).  
Rohmer resigned from the RCAF Auxiliary in protest of the weak air defence situation, and pursued partisan politics 
with the Progressive Conservative Party. 
31 See Yefim Gordon, Soviet Strategic Aviation in the Cold War, Manchester, UK: Hikoki Publications Limited, 
2009, pp. 215-230. By the time that the Soviets had an operational intercontinental bomber, their main effort was 
directed towards the development of ICBMs. 
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the CF-100 was superior to contemporary American and British interceptor fighters.32 The 
aircraft underwent improvements from the initial Mk.3 version through to the Mk.4A and Mk.4B 
and the final Mk.5 version.  The initial Mk.3 version was equipped with an eight 0.50 inch 
machinegun belly pack.  The Mk.4 version retained the gun pack, but added wing tip pods each 
with twenty-nine 2.75 inch unguided Folding Fin Aerial Rockets.  The Mk.5, the final production 
version that appeared in 1955, dispensed with the gun pack, but retained the wing tip rocket 
pods.   
A proposed CF-100 Mk.6 version was intended to be equipped with four Sparrow II air-
to-air guided missiles.  However, this version was cancelled in 1956, based on the premise that 
the CF-100’s replacement, the Avro CF-105 Arrow would soon enter service. In retrospect, the 
cancellation of the CF-100 Mk.6 was to have a profound effect on the future Air Defence 
Command fighter component.33  The realization that the Auxiliary squadrons would not be 
capable of effectively operating the sophisticated CF-100 fighter also affected the structure of 
Air Defence Command.  This decision not to re-equip the ten Auxiliary squadrons reduced the 
requirement for the number of CF-100 fighters by 180 aircraft, not including attrition or reserve 
aircraft.34 The 1956 proposal to establish six additional Regular squadrons, which was rejected 
by the government, would have partly made up this number with a requirement for 108 CF-100 
aircraft, exclusive of attrition or reserve aircraft.   
A total of 692 CF-100 aircraft were produced, including seventy Mk.3, 278 Mk.4A and 
Mk.4B, and 332 Mk. 5 aircraft.  Excluding the Mk.3 aircraft that were used mostly for training 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 E.R. Johnson, “Stopgap Interceptors,” Aviation History, Vol. 24, No. 5, May 2014.  See H.R. Foottit,  “File 
Analysis: AFHQ S60-3-63 The Avro CF-100,” The Roundel, Vol. 4, No. 9, October 1952. 
33 See “Penny-wise Cutback Might be Dollar Folly,” (Editorial), Canadian Aviation, Vo. 30, No. 10, October 1957.  
This editorial argued that this was a necessary evolutionary stage for both the RCAF and industry.  Apart from the 
introduction of an air-to-air missile system on fighter aircraft, the CF-100 Mk. 6 was to include afterburners on its 
engines. 
34 DHH 96/24, Box 9, File 4, Plan “H” for the RCAF, 1 August 1952, p.16. 
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and the fifty-three Mk.5 aircraft sold to the Belgian Air Force, there were a total of 278 Mk.4 and 
279 Mk.5 aircraft available for RCAF service for the operational training unit and operational 
squadrons.  By 1957, the four CF-100 Mk.4 squadrons in No. 1 Air Division (seventy-two 
aircraft) and the nine CF-100 Mk.5 squadrons (162 aircraft) in Air Defence Command made a 
total of 234 operational CF-100 aircraft in the RCAF.  There were fifty additional aircraft for No. 
3 (Fighter) Operational Training Unit at Cold Lake, along with other aircraft for attrition and a 
maintenance reserve.  However, with a total production of 557 CF-100 Mk.4 and Mk.5 aircraft 
for the RCAF, there was undoubtedly a surplus of aircraft, particularly in view of the decisions 
not to equip the Auxiliary squadrons or to establish the six additional Regular squadrons.35  
As the CF-100 was beginning to enter service in 1953, the RCAF was already 
considering a replacement interceptor fighter.  This requirement called for a two seat, twin 
engine all weather interceptor capable of speeds up to Mach 1.5 and attaining a 60,000 foot 
altitude.36 The initial requirement called for the production of up to 600 aircraft to re-equip the 
twelve fighter squadrons in No. 1 Air Division along with the nineteen Regular and Auxiliary 
fighter squadrons in Air Defence Command.  The cancellation of the Avro Arrow project by the 
Progressive Conservative government and its impact on the Big Air Force concept will be 
discussed in Chapter 6.  However, even by December 1955, there were sufficient alarm bells 
about the efficacy of the project to cause concerns with the Liberal government that resulted in a 
slowing down of the project.37 As well, there were the emerging strategic and technological 
changes that were to soon alter the entire concept of air defence.  As noted in previous Chapters, 
these changes were to affect all countries, including the US and the UK.  However, unlike the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 See Robert Bradford, “Canadian Innovation- CF-100 Story,” Air Enthusiast, No, 44, 1977, p. 165. 
36 DHH 73/1223, Series 3, Subseries 13, Air Council #2, Minutes of the 178th Meeting of the Air Members, 7 July 
1953. 
37 DHH 73/1223, File 1329, Cabinet Defence Committee, Record of Cabinet Decision, 7 December 1955. 
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major powers, Canada with its singular investment in the Avro Arrow project, had little 
flexibility to consider other nationally based options.  With this focus on air defence, the RCAF 
was ignoring other ongoing air power developments such as the increased emphasis on 
conventional forces to engage in “brushfire wars” using tactical air support, air transport, or 
battlefield mobility provided by helicopters.38 
In early 1956, Air Defence Command was to reach the peak of its strength of its combat 
aircraft strength with nine Regular and ten Auxiliary squadrons as shown at Table 5-3. 
Table 5-3 Air Defence Command – Regular and Auxiliary Squadrons by Base 
1956 
Location Squadron Aircraft 
 
Remarks 
Chatham, NB No. 1 (Fighter) Operational 
Training Unit 
Sabre  
Bagotville, QC 432, 440 Squadrons CF-100  
St Hubert, QC 423, 425 Squadrons CF-100  
St Hubert, QC 401, 438 (Aux) Squadrons Sabre   
Uplands, ON 428 Squadron CF-100  
North Bay, ON 419, 445 Squadrons CF-100  
Downsview, ON 400, 411 (Aux) Squadrons Sabre  
London, ON 420 (Aux) Squadron Mustang Disbanded 1 
Sep 56 
Hamilton, ON 424 (Aux) Squadron Mustang  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 The future of the Air Division in SACEUR had resulted in some discussion in Chiefs of Staff Committee 
meetings, but in 1957, the RCAF and DND were a long away from making a decision for future re-equipment. 
 
 179 
Winnipeg, MB 402 (Aux) Squadron Mustang  
Calgary, AB 403 (Aux) Squadron Mustang  
Cold Lake, AB 433 Squadron CF-100  
Cold Lake No. 3 (Fighter) OTU CF-100  
Vancouver 442, 443 (Aux) Squadrons Sabre  
Comox 409 Squadron CF-100  
 
This pinnacle was to be a short-lived as by 1957, strategic uncertainty was beginning to 
jeopardize the future of the Big Air Force concept. 
Tactical Air Command 
 Though tactical air power to support the Canadian Army was originally envisaged to be a 
key role for the post-war RCAF, ultimately this turned out not to be the case.  The RCAF did not 
provide significant resources for the ground support role until the late 1960s.39 In the meantime, 
as described in Chapter 3, land-air warfare concepts and doctrine were kept alive at the CJATC, 
with tactical air support being provided by mostly Auxiliary squadrons that worked with the 
Canadian Army MSF. The Mitchell was obsolete in 1946 when it was assigned this role; that the 
RCAF kept the aircraft in service with the light bomber squadrons until 1958 clearly indicates 
the low priority assigned to this role by the RCAF.   Though there were various suggestions 
regarding a light bomber replacement, none of the proposals gained traction.40 One MSF After 
Action Report recommended that the RCAF squadrons assigned to support the MSF replace their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 No. 10 Tactical Air Group with its CF-5 jet tactical fighters was the outcome of the 1964 Defence White Paper, 
but it was also overtaken by events as will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
40 John Lyzun, “Twenty Faithful Years: The B-25 in RCAF Service,” Air Enthusiast, No. 64, July-August 1996.  
Though obsolete in the bomber role, the Mitchell was still a useful aircraft during this period serving as a 
navigational trainer, and a few as VIP transports. 
 180 
Second World War- era Mustangs and Mitchells with two squadrons of F-84G jet fighter-
bombers and a squadron of B-45 Tornado jet bombers.41 Other proposals were to adapt the CF-
100 interceptor to the tactical bomber role or replace the Mitchell with the English Electric 
Canberra light jet bomber.42 The revised Plan H of August 1952 included two light twin jet 
bomber squadrons each of eighteen aircraft to be equipped by April 1957.43  By this time, 
however, the changed strategic circumstances that raised doubts about the necessity of the MSF 
precluded replacement with more modern aircraft.44  
 Additional tasks for Tactical Air Command included the operation of the RCAF Survival 
Training School and Search and Rescue in an extensive region of Western Canada including 
Alberta, Saskatchewan, northern British Columbia, the Yukon, and the western half of the North 
West Territories.45  Still, considering that there were only two Auxiliary light bomber squadrons 
allocated in support to the MSF, the personnel and infrastructure overhead associated with 
Tactical Air Command seemed rather large.  Total personnel strength amounted to 1,785 officers 
and airmen by April 1957.46 Tactical Air Command included a large Headquarters at Edmonton 
whose strength of 237 Regular officers and airmen represented thirteen per cent of the total 
Command establishment.  This percentage compares unfavourably with other Commands such as 
Training Command HQ – 3 per cent, Air Transport Command HQ – 2.6 per cent, and No. 1 Air 
Division HQ – 3.6 per cent.47 In addition, a considerable number of Regular RCAF staff were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Arnold P. Vaughan, 418 City of Edmonton Squadron History, Belleville: The Hangar Bookshelf, 1984, p. 77. 
42 DHH 73/1223, Series 3, File 1305, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Minutes of a Special Meeting, 3 July 1950. 
43 DHH 96/24, Box 9, File 4, Plan “H” for the RCAF, 1 August 1952. 
44 Raymond Stouffer, “Military Culture and the Mobile Striking Force,” in P. Whitney Lackenbauer and W.A. 
March, eds., Sic Atur Ad Astra, Canadian Aerospace Power Studies – Volume 4: De-icing Required!  The Historical 
Dimension of the Canadian Air Force’s Experience in the Arctic,  Department of National Defence: Canadian 
Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre, Trenton, Ontario, 2012. 
45 “Tactical Air Command,” Canadian Aviation, Vol. 28, No. 6, June 1955. 
46 Tactical Air Command also included one of three RCAF Bands – see E.A. Kirkwood, “The Bands of the RCAF,” 
The Roundel, Vol. 7, No. 7, July-August 1955. 
47 DHH 96/24, Box 4, File 9, Plan “H” for the RCAF (1 August 1952). 
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allocated to the manning of several RCAF stations with few aircraft and considerable support to 
the two operational Auxiliary squadrons; 411 Regular RCAF and 370 DND civilian personnel 
were assigned to the RCAF stations at Edmonton and Whitehorse.  The two operational 
Auxiliary light bomber squadrons (each with an operational strength of eight Mitchell aircraft) 
were each supported by seventy-one Regular RCAF personnel in addition to the Auxiliary 
squadron personnel.  The largest single unit in Tactical Air Command was the CJATC that 
included a total of 426 RCAF personnel and eighty-eight DND civilians.  The CJATC also 
included almost one-half of the aircraft allocated to Tactical Air Command that amounted to 
thirty-three aircraft out of a total of seventy-two aircraft.   
In examining the RCAF Tactical Air Command role in supporting the MSF, Raymond 
Stouffer noted that “…instead of realizing its potential at directing or controlling tactical support 
operations, TAC’s mandate had not progressed much beyond that of North-West Air Command, 
which it had replaced.”48 In other words, despite its functional name, Tactical Air Command was 
a hybrid organization assigned to command the large geographical area of Western Canada.  The 
various studies on the MSF indicated that neither the RCAF nor the Canadian Army were strong 
service advocates for the MSF role.49 In the case of the RCAF, tactical support to the Army was 
not seen as a priority in the promotion of the Big Air Force concept.  As Canadian Army support 
for the continued existence of the MSF waned, then the rationale for Tactical Air Command also 
diminished.  The two Auxiliary squadrons assigned to support to the MSF, No. 406 and No. 418 
Squadrons, relinquished their Mitchell light bombers in June 1958 re-equipping with Expeditor 
light transports with initial re-assignment to Training Command, with a further transfer to Air 
Transport Command in 1961. At one point, RCAF planners suggested to the Chiefs of Staff 
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Committee that Tactical Air Command and Air Transport Command be amalgamated to create 
an Air Transport and Tactical Command with the emphasis on the air transport aspects.50 
However, this proposal was rejected and Tactical Air Command was disbanded effective 1 
January 1959.51 Remnants of the Tactical Air Command were distributed between Training 
Command and Air Transport Command.   
The application of effective air power calls for centralized command and control.  In this 
instance, there should have been a single “air component commander” assigned to command and 
control all RCAF air elements assigned to support the MSF.  Eventually, a Tactical Group 
Headquarters was formed to coordinate air movements and tactical air support for the MSF 
Brigade Group with this Joint Army/Air Headquarters being established at Winnipeg, but not as 
a permanent organization.52 However, the issue of sufficient airlift for the MSF remained a 
concern as its required air transport came from Air Transport Command squadrons not Tactical 
Air Command.  These Air Transport Command squadrons were not dedicated to supporting the 
MSF and had responsibility for other tasks that will be discussed in the Air Materiel Command 
and Air Transport Command sections below. In addition, though the RCAF and Canadian Army 
developed the necessary doctrine for airborne operations and air re-supply associated with the 
MSF, the absence of a permanent joint MSF Headquarters commanding both the Army and 
RCAF components reinforced the questionable validity for the MSF concept in the first place.  
CJATC, as a unit in Tactical Air Command also included a small Army aviation component 
initially focused on the AOP role using light aircraft, but it started to expand in 1955 to include 
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 183 
helicopter reconnaissance for the armoured corps.53 Army interest in aviation continued to grow 
with plans for helicopters and transport aircraft for battlefield mobility.54 
 With the emphasis for the build up focused on No. 1 Air Division and Air Defence 
Command, the Tactical Air Command was the Cinderella command in the RCAF.  With the 
demise of the MSF and the retirement of the Mitchell bombers in 1958 with no replacement, 
there was little purpose or interest to maintain Tactical Air Command.  
Maritime Air Command 
The embryonic RCAF maritime group was also to suffer from Cinderella status 
throughout the 1950s in terms of status, budget, personnel and aircraft.55 Unlike Tactical Air 
Command, however, Maritime Air Command was to emerge as a well-equipped formation by 
the end of the 1950s.56 
Maritime Air Command, as we have seen, had to contend with a competitor – the RCN 
Aviation Branch that had evolved into a small but efficient air arm with two fighter and two anti-
submarine shipboard squadrons.  A further enhancement to the RCN was the 1953 decision to 
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procure McDonnell Banshee jet fighters.57 The peak of development and expansion for the RCN 
Naval Aviation Branch was reached with the Cabinet decision in 1953 authorizing the 
production of 100 Grumman Tracker anti-submarine aircraft.58  The Tracker, to be license-built 
by de Havilland Canada, was to provide the RCN with an advanced state-of-the-art aircraft used 
by the US Navy.  In light of its ongoing competition with the RCN regarding the ownership and 
operation of maritime aircraft, the RCAF questioned the operational effectiveness and economic 
efficiency of this purchase.59 By 1956, with the acquisition of the Banshee fighter, the Tracker 
anti-submarine aircraft and helicopters, the RCN Aviation Branch had achieved its maximum 
growth with 3,000 officers and men, one aircraft carrier, one shore-based air station, along with 
five Royal Canadian Naval Reserve flying squadrons.60 
 The previously authorized East Coast maritime reconnaissance squadrons, No. 404 and 
No. 405 Squadrons at Greenwood, were both operational by August 1951.  A third maritime 
reconnaissance squadron, No. 407 Squadron, was established at Comox on the West Coast on 1 
July 1952.  The primary role of the maritime reconnaissance squadrons was anti-submarine 
operations, with the secondary role of anti-surface raider operations, including limited strike 
operations.61 Maritime Air Command also included No. 101 Communications Flight at HMCS 
Shearwater, and No. 103  (Greenwood) and No. 107 (Torbay) Rescue Units.62 No. 2 (Maritime) 
Operational Training Unit and the three maritime reconnaissance squadrons were all equipped 
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with the Lancaster Mk.10MR aircraft.63 The Lancaster Mk.10MR was a refurbished Second 
World War Lancaster Mk. 10 bomber modified to include “nose and tail turrets, sonobuoy 
capacity, rear-facing F.24 camera, extra fuel tanks, depth charges, radio and radar navigation 
aids.”64 It was only due to the existence of this large number of Lancaster aircraft in storage that 
made it possible for the RCAF to form these maritime reconnaissance squadrons in the early 
1950s, as neither the United Kingdom or the United States had maritime aircraft to spare.  
Initially, the maritime reconnaissance squadron Unit Establishment had been twelve Lancaster 
aircraft, but this was increased to sixteen aircraft by 1954.65 The three squadrons, including the 
West Coast squadron, with their forty-eight aircraft were assigned to NATO under the Supreme 
Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT).66 
It was recognized in 1949 that the Lancaster maritime reconnaissance aircraft was 
obsolete and a replacement aircraft would be needed by 1955.67 The RCAF decided to proceed 
with a two-aircraft approach for the Lancaster replacement.68 As an interim replacement for the 
Lancaster, the procurement of twenty-five Lockheed Neptune medium-range aircraft was 
authorized in December 1953.69 At the same time, the government approved the procurement of 
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fifty Canadian-built Bristol Britannia (later to be named the Argus) long-range maritime 
aircraft.70 With the restraints in the 1952-53 budget, the question was raised of reducing or 
eliminating the Neptune contract.71 Ultimately, this was not considered a feasible approach, as 
Lancaster attrition would reduce the number of available maritime aircraft.  Neptune aircraft 
entered service between March and September 1955 with No. 404 and No. 405 Squadrons at 
Greenwood.   
In the case of the new four-engine long-range maritime patrol aircraft, the only other 
possible candidate was the Avro Shackleton MR Mk.4, a Canadian version of the Shackleton MR 
Mk.3 then under development for RAF Coastal Command.72 Earlier marks of the Shackleton 
(MR Mk.1 and Mk.2) were already in service with the RAF.  The Shackleton was a development 
of the Lincoln bomber, itself a development of the Lancaster.  The Shackleton proposal was 
rejected as not being much more modern than the existing Lancaster Mk.10MR.   
In order to provide the proposed maritime patrol aircraft with extended range while 
operating at lower altitudes, the turbo-prop engines on the Bristol Britannia design were replaced 
with piston-engines and an unpressurized fuselage adopted.  The prototype Canadair CP-107 
Argus was first flown in March 1957 with the aircraft entering RCAF service in 1958.  The 
Argus proved itself to be an exceptional maritime patrol/anti-submarine warfare aircraft, 
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benefiting both the RCAF and Canadian industry.73 With its development, Canada was one of 
four Western countries that were able to develop and produce this specialized type of aircraft.74 
With the introduction of the Argus aircraft in 1958, the Command began to enjoy a higher status 
and increased importance.75 The Argus replaced the Neptune with No. 404 and No. 405 
Squadrons on the East Coast, with a third Argus-equipped squadron, No. 415 Squadron, being 
formed at RCAF Station Summerside, PEI.  Re-equipment with the Argus allowed No. 407 
Squadron on the West Coast to retire its Lancasters in 1959, substituting them with Neptune 
aircraft.  The budget crunch of the late 1950s reduced the Argus contract from the originally 
envisaged fleet of fifty aircraft to thirty-three aircraft, the last being produced in 1960.  The 
reduction in the Argus contract also resulted in the Neptune aircraft remaining in service with 
No. 407 Squadron until 1968.    
 Despite the ongoing animosity between the RCAF and RCN over maritime aircraft, steps 
were initiated in 1956 to establish closer coordination of anti-submarine activities with the set up 
of the joint RCN/RCAF “Sea-Air Warfare Committee.”76 Subsequently, The “RCN/RCAF 
Concept of Maritime Operations” was approved by 17 April 1957 and re-affirmed in 1959, with 
the establishment of an integrated RCN and RCAF Headquarters for Maritime Command 
Atlantic.77 
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 The RCAF had generally won the bureaucratic battles associated with the Big Air Force 
concept, but in the case of Maritime Air Command and the RCN, these skirmishes resulted in a 
draw.  The RCAF was able to promote the Big Air Force Concept for Maritime Air Command 
along with new equipment such as the Neptune and the Argus.  At the same time, it had to make 
concessions to the RCN that enabled its Aviation Branch to flourish throughout the 1950s.  
Air Transport Command 
 In examining the RCAF Command organization during this period, one discovers that 
there was a hierarchy among the various operational Commands.  The top tier Commands were 
unquestionably Air Defence Command and No. 1 Air Division.  The second tier consisted of 
Maritime Air Command and Air Transport Command, with Tactical Air Command in the bottom 
tier.  Maritime Air Command and Air Transport Command were of similar size in numbers of 
personnel and aircraft.  However, during the 1950s, the similarities ended there.  Whereas 
Maritime Air Command spent over half the decade employing refurbished Second World War 
Lancaster bombers in the maritime patrol role primarily in support to SACLANT in NATO, Air 
Transport Command was re-equipped with modern transport aircraft and employed world-wide 
in strategic and tactical roles in support to NATO, the UN and home defence.  By the mid 1950s, 
the increased importance of Air Transport Command ensured that it would be re-equipped to 
replace its aging equipment.  The organization of the Command during the 1950s was to remain 
intact throughout the Cold War until the 1990s.  
For the strategic transport role, No. 426 Squadron at Dorval, Quebec, was equipped with 
twelve Canadair North Star four-engine transports.78 This was rather unique as only a few air 
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forces, such as the USAF and RAF, operated strategic transport aircraft on global routes.  As 
discussed in Chapter 3, the principal focus of No. 426 Squadron during the Korean War period 
1950-54 was supporting the airlift between the continental United States and Japan.79 No. 426 
Squadron was also heavily tasked in Arctic re-supply flights, other domestic flight schedules, 
and logistics support to No. 1 Air Division overseas that included thrice-weekly regular 
scheduled flights between Dorval, Quebec and the United Kingdom.80 With the end of the 
Korean airlift in 1954, new tasks included annual deployment flights to the former Indo-China 
for Canadian Forces personnel assigned to the International Control and Supervisory 
Commission and support to Operations Random and Nimble Bat involving the flyover of Sabre 
Mk.5 and Mk.6 and CF-100 fighters to No. 1 Air Division.81 In order to perform its long-range 
transport role, No. 426 Squadron was to become the largest flying squadron in the RCAF 
consisting of 440 personnel in 1957.82  
 In the fall of 1956, No. 426 Squadron participated in Operation Rapid, the airlift 
supporting the United Nations deployment to Egypt in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis.83  This 
operation was to forever increase the importance of Air Transport Command in general, and 
strategic airlift in particular, within both the RCAF and the broader Canadian defence context.  
Strategic airlift was to gradually increase in its importance over the next decade that enabled the 
government to undertake a broader participation in both UN peacekeeping missions and NATO 
activities due to the existence of this capability. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 W.D. Stevenson. “Operation ‘HAWK’,” The Roundel, Vol. 6, No. 11, December 1954. 
80 Laurence Motiuk, Thunderbirds for Peace: Diary of a Transport Squadron, Ottawa: Larmot Associates, 2004.  
See also H.C. Langille, “Royal Canadian Air Force Air Transport Command,” Air Power, Vol. 1, October 1953. 
81 Motiuk.  Op Random was the flyover of new Sabre Mk.5 and Mk.6 aircraft to Europe and Op Nimble Bat was the 
flyover of the four CF-100 squadrons to Europe. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
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 Air Transport Command also included No. 412 Squadron that consisted of North Star and 
Canadair C-5 four-engine transports, De Havilland Comet jet transports, along with Dakota, 
Mitchell and Expeditor transport aircraft.  The RCAF became the first military service in the 
world to operate jet transport with its Comets though disaster elsewhere was to affect their use 
until modifications were carried out.  The two Comets had been procured on the premise that 
four additional North Star transports were required by the RCAF but not available from 
Canadair.84 No. 412 Squadron was a VIP transport squadron flying VIP missions in Canada and 
overseas for high ranked government officials along with the Royal Family when visiting 
Canada.  To conduct its role, No. 412 Squadron was another large squadron with 306 personnel 
located at RCAF Station Rockcliffe near Ottawa.85 
 The two “workhorse” squadrons in Air Transport Command were No. 435 and No. 436 
Squadrons.  Formed in 1946 at Edmonton, No. 435 Squadron was initially equipped with the 
Dakota twin-engine transport and used to support tactical transport operations in Western 
Canada including support to the MSF.   In 1952, No. 435 Squadron began partial replacement of 
the Dakota with twelve C-119 Flying Boxcar twin-engine transports though four Dakota aircraft 
remained in service with the squadron.  No. 436 Squadron was formed at Dorval in 1953 as a 
second tactical transport squadron also equipped with twelve Flying Boxcar and four Dakota 
aircraft.  In comparison to the Dakota, the Flying Boxcar represented a significant improvement 
in airlift capability not only in matters of range, speed and carrying capability, but was a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 DHH 73/1223, File 1325, Memorandum, Deputy Minister of National Defence to Chief of the Air Staff, 22 
October 1951.  The original proposal cited a requirement for four Comets, a one-to-one purchase to rectify the 
shortage of North Star aircraft.  The Cabinet on 5 October had deferred the acquisition of the Comets at that time, 
but subsequently, approval was granted for the procurement of two aircraft.  See also T.G. Coughlin, “Jet Travel – 
A.T.C. Style,” The Roundel, Vol. 11, No. 4, May 1959. 
85 DHH 96/24, Box 9, File 4, Plan “H” for the RCAF, 1 August 1952.  No. 412 Squadron moved to RCAF Station 
Uplands in Ottawa in 1955. 
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particularly a considerable improvement for parachute operations both for dropping troops and 
aerial re-supply.86 The Flying Boxcar transports continued in service with the two squadrons 
until the mid 1960s.  Both squadrons were also tasked for the rapid delivery of high priority 
cargo from the two Supply Depots co-located at Edmonton and Downsview (No. 436 Squadron 
had moved from Dorval in 1956).  The two Flying Boxcar equipped squadrons also assumed 
much of the Arctic re-supply task from No. 426 Squadron.87 The Flying Boxcar squadrons were 
also expected to support the mobility required by the maritime reconnaissance squadrons in their 
wartime role that expected them to be operating from bases other than their home stations.  
However, it became problematic for these aircraft to undertake both their logistics roles and be 
available for parachute operations in support of the MSF.  Original procurement plans had called 
for the acquisition of forty-eight Flying Boxcar aircraft, but it was decided that thirty-five aircraft 
would be sufficient to meet RCAF requirements.88 
 The fifth flying squadron in Air Transport Command was No. 408 Squadron that was not 
in fact a transport squadron, but was equipped with the Lancaster P.R Mk.10 photo-
reconnaissance and A.R.Mk.10 area reconnaissance aircraft located at Rockcliffe.89 No. 408 
Squadron had been the last surviving squadron that formed No. 22 (Photographic) Wing in the 
late 1940s responsible for the aerial mapping of Northern Canada.  Along with its photographic 
work, No. 408 Squadron was now tasked with “area reconnaissance” of Northern Canada.  In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 “Packets for RCAF Boxcars on Wings.”  See also Alwyn T. Lloyd, Fairchild C-82 Packet and C-119 Flying 
Boxcar, Hersham: Ian Allan Printing, 2005.  For a RCAF pilot’s assessment of the C-119, see H.G. “Aussie” 
Maxwell, “The Fairchild C-119 in the RCAF,” CAHS Journal, Vol. 32, No. 1, Spring 1994.  According to Maxwell, 
the major problem with the C-119 was the inadequate engines.  When initially procured in 1952, RCAF C-119s had 
limited telecom and navigation equipment as they were intended for use solely in the tactical role.  This deficiency 
had to be rectified in light of their use for long-range operations in the Arctic and the UN. 
87 J.D. Harvey, “Spring Re-supply in the Arctic,” The Roundel, Vol. 7, No. 8, September 1955. 
88 DHH 73/1223, Series 3, Sub-series 13, Air Council #2, Minutes of the 156th Meeting of Air Members, 28 May 
1952.  The original Army requirement to airlift one battalion and also meet RCAF needs was based on forty-eight 
aircraft.  The requirement to airlift the entire MSF Brigade Group was calculated at 114 C-119 transports.  See 
Maloney, “The Mobile Striking Force and Continental Defence 1948-1955.” 
89 Halliday, “Lancasters Hit Civvy Street.” 
 192 
reality, its purpose was to ensure the surveillance of Canadian territory particularly against any 
incursions by the Soviets.90  With its long-range endurance, the Lancaster remained suitable for 
this role until withdrawn from No. 408 Squadron service in April 1964.  As part of Plan H in 
1952, it had been proposed to re-allocate No. 408 Squadron to Tactical Air Command.  This re-
allocation did not occur and, in retrospect with the early demise of Tactical Air Command by 
January 1959, was the correct decision to retain the squadron in Air Transport Command. 
 As mentioned, the Suez Crisis in 1956 was to provide the impetus for the enhanced 
importance of Air Transport Command, not only with the strategic airlift provided by No. 426 
Squadron North Star aircraft, but with other Air Transport Command elements as well.91 No. 435 
and No. 436 Squadrons provided twelve Flying Boxcar aircraft organized into No. 114 
Communications Flight that operated the airlift of UN forces between Capodichino, Italy and 
Abu Suweir, Egypt.92 In addition, No. 115 Communications Flight was established at El Arish, 
Egypt with RCAF three Dakota and four Otter transports to provide theatre support to UNEF I.93 
The provision of these limited Air Transport Command resources did have an impact on support 
to other operations, but the Canadian contribution to UNEF I marked the beginning of numerous 
RCAF air transport contributions to peacekeeping over the next forty years.  
Apart from the four transport squadrons in Air Transport Command, there was No. 4 
(Transport) Operational Training Unit equipped with a mixture of Expeditor, Dakota, Flying 
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2007.  See also J. Wright, “Staking a Claim: The RCAF Asserts Arctic Sovereignty,” Air Force Magazine, Vol. 33, 
No. 1, Spring 2009.  According to the No. 408 Squadron history, this “spying” role did not really get underway until 
the late 1950s. 
91 J.A. Connolly, “Determined on Delivery,” The Roundel, Vol. 9, No. 1, January-February 1957. 
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Boxcar and North Star aircraft located at RCAF Station Trenton.  Its purpose was to provide the 
operational crew training for aircrew destined to fly transport aircraft.   
Apart from Air Transport Command assets, there were numerous small transport flights 
located throughout the RCAF that provided integral transport for staff at the Headquarters of the 
other flying Commands and for Search and Rescue tasks.94  No. 1 Air Division included No. 137 
Transport Flight equipped with five Bristol Freighter aircraft used to support the Air Division on 
the continent from No. 30 Air AMB at Langar, England.  In addition, the Air Division 
Headquarters maintained a flight of one Dakota and four Expeditor aircraft, while each of the 
four Fighter Wings and the AMB was equipped with an Expeditor transport.  Each of the home-
based flying Commands included a number of Communications or Communications and Rescue 
Units located across the country.95 Maritime Air Command included No. 101 Communications 
Flight at Dartmouth, Nova Scotia with Expeditor and Dakota aircraft, No. 103 Rescue Unit at 
Summerside, PEI, with Lancaster, Dakota, Canso, and Otter aircraft and a Sikorsky S-51 
Dragonfly or Vertol H-21 helicopter while No. 107 Rescue Unit at Torbay, Newfoundland 
consisted of three Lancaster aircraft.96 Training Command operated No. 102 Communications 
and Rescue Flight at Trenton and No. 111 Communications and Rescue Flight at Winnipeg both 
equipped with Expeditor, Dakota, and Otter aircraft and Sikorsky S-51 Dragonfly and Vertol H-
21 helicopters.  Air Defence Command operated No. 104 Communications Flight at St Hubert 
with Expeditor and Dakota transport aircraft.  No. 12 Air Defence Group, a formation within Air 
Defence Command, included No. 121 Communications and Rescue Unit at RCAF Station Sea 
Island (Vancouver), the largest unit of this type, equipped with Lancaster, Dakota, Otter, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Limited research has been conducted on the histories of these various flying units; one history is Grant Y. Smith, 
Seek and Save: The History of 103 Rescue Unit, Erin, Ontario: The Boston Mills Press, 1990. 
95 S.R. Miller, “Search and Rescue in the R.C.A.F.,” The Roundel, Vol. 3, No. 2, January 1951. 
96 The RCAF obtained its first helicopters in 1947, seven Sikorsky S-51 Dragonfly, whose tasks included SAR.  In 
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Canso aircraft, and Sikorsky S-51 Dragonfly and Vertol H-21 helicopters.  Tactical Air 
Command included No. 105 Communications and Rescue Unit at Edmonton with Expeditor, 
Dakota, and Otter aircraft and Sikorsky S-51 Dragonfly and Vertol H-21 helicopters.  The 
Transport Support Flight at the CJTAC included three Flying Boxcar and six Dakota transport 
aircraft.  To provide logistics support during the construction of the Mid-Canada Line, No. 108 
Communications Flight was established 1 June 1954 at RCAF Station Rockcliffe equipped with 
a total of twenty-two H-19, H-34 and H-21 helicopters, the only rotary wing unit in the RCAF.97 
A total of eighty aircraft outside Air Transport Command were allocated to these transport, 
communications and rescue units, a considerable number in comparison to the 103 transport 
aircraft in Air Transport Command. 
 By the late 1950s, Air Transport Command began to undergo changes, including 
expansion after the disbandment of Tactical Air Command with the absorption of most of its 
units and bases into Air Transport Command.  An additional change was the relinquishment of 
fighters and bombers by the Auxiliary squadrons in 1958 resulting in their re-equipment with 
Expeditor light transports and their transfer to Air Transport Command by 1961.  In recognition 
of the critical importance of the role played by airlift, the Cabinet Defence Committee in August 
1956 approved the proposal to procure new strategic transport aircraft to replace the remaining 
eighteen North Star transports.  As was the case with the Canadair Argus, the replacement 
aircraft was based on the Bristol Britannia design to be manufactured by Canadair but powered 
with four turboprop engines.  The initial order was for eight CC-106 Yukon aircraft with the 
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intent of the eventual replacement of the North Star on a one-for-one basis for a total of twenty-
four aircraft.98 The RCAF support to UN operations during the Suez crisis resulted in a public 
call for increased RCAF transport capabilities to enable the rapid deployment of troops, a goal 
eventually achieved within the next decade.99 
Training Command 
 Training Command, with its Headquarters at RCAF Station Trenton, Ontario, developed 
into the second largest Command in the RCAF during this period.  The RCAF had undergone 
tremendous expansion during the period from 1950 to 1955, and the growth of Training 
Command was crucial to the development of the Big Air Force concept.  The RCAF had based 
its expansion on an end state of 46,500 trained personnel, along with a constant training 
population of 3,500 officers and airmen.  With 11,180 personnel, Training Command was the 
second largest Command in the RCAF representing twenty-two per cent of the RCAF personnel 
establishment, but with 1,003 aircraft on its establishment, this represented thirty-four per cent of 
the total of 2,968 aircraft in the RCAF in 1956.100 
 Apart from training RCAF personnel, a critical Canadian contribution to NATO during 
this period was the training of NATO aircrew.101 In 1950, the RAF requested that the RCAF 
undertake annually to train 150 RAF aircrew candidates. The RCAF accepted this commitment, 
and the training programme was expanded to include aircrew trainees from the other NATO 
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nations.  During 1952-53, the general expansion of the RCAF added nineteen stations, schools 
and training units to Training Command, with many of the re-opened stations having been 
wartime BCATP airfields.102 This expansion allowed an increase in aircrew training from 460 to 
2,540 candidates annually and an increase in annual ground crew training from 3,100 to 9,500.103 
Apart from the training of additional Canadian aircrew to meet the increased demand, this 
expansion allowed for the training of 1,400 NATO aircrew annually.  The NATO air training 
plan operated as a mini-BCATP, producing a total of 8,517 graduates between 1950 and 1958 
when the programme ended, divided between 3,218 Canadian and 5,299 NATO graduates.104 
The NATO air training for NATO aircrew candidates commenced with English language 
training (for non-English speakers) at the Language School at RCAF Station London, along with 
Canadian orientation and familiarization.105 This was followed by six weeks training with a 
minimum of twenty-five flying hours on the Chipmunk primary trainer at the Primary Flying 
Training School at RCAF Station Centralia, Ontario, then basic flying training for thirty weeks 
on the Harvard with 165 flying hours at one of three Flying Training Schools located at Moose 
Jaw, Claresholm or Penhold.106 With graduation from basic flying training, the pilot candidate 
moved on to the Advanced Flying School for sixteen weeks with the T-33 Silver Star jet trainer 
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for eighty hours flying training.  Candidates were awarded their wings on graduation from the 
Advanced Flying School.   
Future Sabre pilots were sent to No. 1 (Fighter) Operational Training Unit at Chatham, 
while pilots destined to fly CF-100s or multi-engine aircraft in Air Transport Command or 
Maritime Air Command were sent to the Instrument Flying School at Saskatoon.  Future CF-100 
pilots underwent a minimum of twenty-two hours flying training on the T-33, whilst the future 
multi-engine maritime and transport pilots underwent more extensive instrument flying training 
using the Expeditor and Mitchell aircraft.  After graduation from the Instrument Flying School, 
future CF-100 pilots were assigned to No. 3 (Fighter) Operational Training Unit at Cold Lake, 
and future pilots for Maritime Air Command and Air Transport Command were assigned to No. 
2 (Maritime) Operational Training Unit at Greenwood and No. 4 (Transport) Operational 
Training Unit at Trenton respectively.107 Graduates from the Advanced Flying Schools selected 
to be flying instructors were sent to the Flying Instructors’ School at Trenton.   
Observer training was conducted in its entirety at the Air Observers School (part of the 
RCAF Air Navigation School) at RCAF Station Winnipeg, consisting of a twenty weeks basic 
observer course followed by seventeen to twenty-six weeks specialized training in three 
categories: observer (radio), observer (air interceptor) or observer (navigator).108 This flying 
training was conducted on twin engine Expeditor, Dakota or Mitchell aircraft.  To facilitate this 
NATO air training plan, a separate formation, No. 14 Training Group with Headquarters at 
Winnipeg, was established within Training Command, to administer eight RCAF stations in 
Western Canada. 
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 The RCAF was quickly able to ramp up the training to meet the demands for both the Big 
Air Force concept in the RCAF and the NATO air training plan for a number of reasons.  First, 
1951 was considered the year of the “re-tread” by veterans when a significant number of those 
who joined (or rather re-joined) the RCAF were former wartime aircrew or ground crew from six 
short years before.109 During that year, the RCAF expanded by nearly fifty per cent from 22,000 
to 35,000 personnel.  There were numerous former RCAF personnel who simply needed some 
refresher training in order to resume their duties as compared to new entries.  A second reason 
for the ability to easily expand was that there were numerous mothballed BCATP stations, 
particularly in Western Canada, that were still available as training airfields.  Still, to re-activate 
the airfields and flying stations, it was more than simply a matter of turning the lights back on, as 
runways had to be extended to meet the demands of jet aircraft operations.110  
The existence of a good supply of training aircraft and a supporting aircraft industry was 
the third reason why the RCAF was able to effectively expand its training establishment during 
the early 1950s.  The Harvard and T-33 were manufactured in Canada, whilst the Mitchell and 
Expeditor were received from US sources.  The Chipmunk primary trainer was the first aircraft 
developed by De Havilland Canada after the Second World War, and it soon entered RCAF 
service.111 The Harvard aircraft had been widely used by the RCAF during the Second World 
War and had been manufactured in Canada by Noorduyn Aviation at Montreal. After the war, 
Canadian Car and Foundry manufactured a newer version in Canada at its Cartierville plant, 
along with the refurbishment of numerous wartime Harvards.112 With the RCAF expansion 
commencing in 1951, Canadair undertook the licensed production of 656 T-33 Silver Star jet 
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trainers, a success story for both the RCAF and the Canadian aviation industry.113 The T-33 jet 
trainer was the perfect complement to the RCAF Sabre and CF-100 jet fighters.114 The Lockheed 
T-33 jet trainer had been based on a two-seat version of the F-80 jet fighter that served with the 
USAF in the late 1940s and early 1950s, including Korean War service.  Apart from its advanced 
training role, the T-33 was adopted for widespread use by RCAF Regular and Auxiliary fighter 
squadrons for jet refresher and continuation training, and for tactical fighter training at 
CJATC.115  
Training Command was able to muster 500 Harvard, 600 T-33 Silver Star, 100 Mitchell 
and 280 Expeditor aircraft to conduct aircrew training during the 1950s.116 The availability of 
large numbers of these multi-engine aircraft such as the Expeditor, Dakota and Mitchell enabled 
the RCAF to train thousands of observers and multi-engine pilots during this period.117 
 In addition to the various flying schools of No. 14 Training Group located in Western 
Canada, Training Command consisted of a myriad of ground training schools, mostly located in 
Ontario and with several units in Quebec.  Training Command stations included Trenton, 
Aylmer, Camp Borden, Centralia, Clinton, London, and the RCAF College in Toronto, all in 
Ontario, along with RCAF Station St Jean, Quebec.118 Training Command also included small 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 Jim Lyzun, “Pure Canadian Silver: Canada’s T-Birds,” Air Enthusiast, No. 72, November-December 1997.  For a 
pilot’s perspective, see W.M. “Turbo” Tarling, “T-Bird,” CAHS Journal, Vol. 29, No. 4, Winter 1991. 
114 The soundness of the aircraft’s design was attested by its longevity in RCAF service, only being retired in 2005 
as a result of defence economies. 
115 Much to the disdain of the RCAF, the RCN adopted the T-33 for jet training and for fighter squadron refresher 
and continuation training. 
116 William Green and John Fricker, The Air Forces of the World: Their History, Development and Present Strength, 
London: Macdonald & Co (Publishers) Ltd, 1958, p. 59. 
117 See Bob Butt, The RCAF and CF Dakota 1943-1989: From Debutante to Matriarch, Winnipeg: Spartan Printing 
Ltd, 1989.  According to Butt, the seventy-two Dakotas (fifty-eight Mk. III and fourteen Mk. IV) were on RCAF 
strength on 1947.  An additional eleven were added in 1951 and sixteen in 1953 (p. 31). 
118 At this time, it was referred to as RCAF Station St John’s.  See J.S. Harrison, “Stations of the RCAF: St John’s, 
P.Q.,” The Roundel, Vol. 11, No. 8, October 1959. 
 200 
elements attached to support the RCAF Reserve University Squadrons located at seventeen 
Canadian universities with a strength of nearly one thousand flight cadets.119 
Air Materiel Command 
 First formed in 1945 as Maintenance Command, the title changed to Air Materiel 
Command in 1949 to better reflect the complexity of its responsibilities in the new age of air 
power.  Air Materiel Command was a key organization in allowing the RCAF to implement the 
Big Air Force concept with Air Materiel Command serving as the conduit for the expenditure of 
the bulk of the RCAF’s capital procurement and construction budget.  Possony’s “elements of air 
power” had certainly recognized that modern air forces were highly dependent on effective 
logistics.120  The “elements of air power” applicable to logistics, engineering, and construction 
engineering included the availability of raw materials and fuels, national industrial potential, tool 
reserves, a high rate of technological progress, communications and electronics, logistics and 
supplies, the availability of auxiliary services, aircraft, skilled manpower, research and 
inventiveness, and the interconnected linkages between strategy, tactics and planning.121 The 
RCAF clearly understood the importance of these elements with the importance assigned to Air 
Materiel Command.  The command, with its headquarters at Rockcliffe, consisted of 5,341 
RCAF officers and airmen along with DND civilian employees.122 Air Materiel Command 
Headquarters conducted the normal Command function of the command and control of its field 
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August 1959.  These articles provided a perspective on URTP summer training. 
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121 Ibid. 
122 DHH 96/24, Box 4, File 9, Plan “H” for the RCAF (1 August 1952).  See also “Air Materiel Command,” 
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Air Materiel Command, Air Vice-Marshal John L. Plant. 
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units, but also included the necessary staff to conduct logistics support for the entire RCAF.123 
Thus the command headquarters staff included a Chief Logistics Officer at the rank of Air 
Commodore, along with five logistics staffs and two executive staffs.124 The logistics staff 
consisted of aircraft, armament, equipment general, construction engineering, and 
telecommunications.125  
Air Materiel Command Headquarters activities were closely integrated with the AFHQ 
Air Member for Technical Services (AMTS).126 The AMTS staffs were focussed primarily on 
the development of logistics and engineering plans and policies, and the control of the enormous 
procurement and construction-engineering budget.127 There was also a close relationship between 
Air Materiel Command Headquarters and the Department of Defence Production that was 
actually engaged in the procurement of materiel from industry.128 The logistics and engineering 
functions in the RCAF were conducted along several levels of support depending on various 
factors such as complexity, cost, manpower and location.129 Within an operational Command, 
first line support existed at the squadron or unit level, with second line support being a Station 
responsibility.  Air Materiel Command conducted third line support through its various depots 
and units.130  Fourth line support was provided by industry both in Canada and in other 
nations.131  
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In the case of Air Materiel Command, its functions included materiel management to 
include procurement, inspection, warehousing, distribution and salvage; policy for engineering 
and supply functions, materiel requirements forecasting, command and control of units, aircraft 
testing and acceptance, aircraft ferry in North America, and construction engineering.132 With the 
RCAF expansion, the plan was to organize Air Materiel Command on the basis of two AMBs in 
Canada with the intent “ to combine, at one location, the functions performed by a supply depot, 
repair depot, construction engineering unit, explosives depot and technical services unit.”133 Each 
AMB was to be staffed by 3,000 RCAF personnel and civilian employees.134  There was an 
AMB, to serve eastern Canada that was built upon No. 1 RCAF Supply Depot at Downsview, 
and the other, for the west, from No. 7 RCAF Supply Depot at Namao.135  As we have seen in 
chapter 4, a third AMB, which formed part of No. 1 Air Division, outside of Air Materiel 
Command, was established at Langar, England.  
The establishment and growth of the two AMBs in Canada were intended to coincide 
with the expansion of the Operational and Training organization.  Despite the initial optimism in 
Plan H as promulgated in August 1952, the AMBs never were organized as a result of budget 
constraints that began that same year. 
 A positive change in the new logistics concept was to concentrate aircraft spares, 
supporting parts and components at the two supply depots at Downsview and Namao compared 
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to the previous distribution method whereby these items were scattered across the country at 
regional Supply Depots. The increasing use of airlift to deliver high priority supply items across 
the country was achievable with the co-location of these two supply depots with No. 435 
Squadron at Namao and No. 436 Squadron at Downsview, both equipped with Flying Boxcar 
transports.  No. 426 Squadron North Star aircraft were also available to undertake long-range 
strategic airlift to deliver high priority cargo, particularly to No. 1 Air Division in Western 
Europe.  
 As the AMB concept was not fully implemented for the RCAF, Air Materiel Command 
units remained scattered across the country.  Air Materiel Command was responsible for the 
command of two RCAF stations, RCAF Station Rockcliffe, and RCAF Station Lincoln Park, 
Calgary.136 The supply units consisted of No. 1 Supply Depot, Downsview, No. 2 Supply Depot, 
Vancouver, No. 3 Supply Depot, Rockcliffe, No. 5 Supply Depot, Moncton, New Brunswick, 
No. 7 Supply Depot, Namao, and No. 11 Supply Depot, Calgary.137 Explosives storage for the 
RCAF was performed at No. 13 Explosives Depot, Angus, Ontario, No. 16 Explosives Depot, 
Debert, Nova Scotia, and by “X” Group at No. 7 Supply Depot, Namao.138 There were two repair 
depots, No. 6 Repair Depot, Trenton and No. 10 Repair Depot, Calgary.  The single RCAF 
construction-engineering unit, intended to operate as a “US Seabee” organization, consisted of 
No. 2 Construction and Maintenance Unit at Calgary.139 Miscellaneous units included No. 10 
Technical Services Unit, Calgary, No. 11 Technical Services Unit, Montreal, No. 12 Technical 
Services Unit, Toronto, the Photographic Establishment, Rockcliffe, and No. 1 Requirements 
Unit located at the USAF Air Materiel Command base at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, 
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139 S.G. French, “No. 2 Construction and Maintenance Unit,” The Roundel, Vol. 9, No. 9, November 1957. 
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Dayton, Ohio.  Air Materiel Command flying units consisted of the Central Experimental and 
Proving Establishment (CEPE) at Uplands for aircraft flight development and testing, and No. 
129 (Acceptance and Ferry) Flight responsible for the delivery of RCAF aircraft across North 
America.140 
RCAF Auxiliary Force and Reserve 
 Initial planning for the post-war RCAF had envisaged a major role for the Auxiliary 
squadrons and units.  The February 1951 RCAF expansion plan with its build up to forty-one 
flying squadrons, envisaged twelve Auxiliary fighter and bomber squadrons.  The Auxiliary 
expansion also included Aircraft Control and Warning squadrons, technical training, intelligence 
and medical units.  There were 793 RCAF Regular personnel allocated in support of the 
Auxiliary squadrons and units, principally from Air Defence Command and Tactical Air 
Command.  Of these 793 personnel, 638 RCAF Regular officers and airmen (eighty per cent) 
were assigned to support Auxiliary wings, squadrons and units in the larger urban areas 
including Montreal, Toronto, Vancouver, Hamilton, London, Edmonton, Calgary, and 
Winnipeg.141 Unlike the Army Reserve that maintained units and sub-units in numerous small 
towns across the country, RCAF Auxiliary and Reserve units were specifically located in the 
large urban centres of Canada. 
 The plan to develop a large Reserve component within the RCAF was curtailed by the 
1952-53 defence budgetary restraints.  Plan H had proposed an Auxiliary personnel 
establishment of 14,895 officers and airmen allocated as follows: Group Headquarters – eighty-
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six, Wing Headquarters – 1,922, Squadrons – 5,004, Radar and Communications Squadrons and 
Aircraft Control and Warning Squadrons – 4,429, Technical Training Units – 2,515, Reserve 
Medical Units – 611, and Intelligence Units – 328.142  In addition, there a requirement for a 
further 10,105 personnel in the RCAF Primary Reserve including the University Reserve 
Squadrons, RCAF Air Cadet (Officers), student summer training, Reserve Tradesmen Training 
Plan (RTTP), and those individual personnel undergoing refresher flying or mobilization 
assignment training.143  This proposed Reserve establishment called for a total of 25,000 
personnel.144 
No. 1 (Auxiliary) Group Headquarters was formed 15 January 1951 with the intent of 
commanding No. 11 (Operational) Wing and No. 12 (Technical Training) Wing that included the 
Auxiliary units in the Montreal area and province of Quebec.  However, the Wing Headquarters 
were not formed, and No. 1 Group directly commanded its subordinate Auxiliary units.  No. 2 
(Auxiliary) Group Headquarters was formed on 15 January 1951 to command No. 14 
(Operational) Wing and No. 15 (Technical Training) Wing that included the Auxiliary units in 
the Toronto area.  The Group Headquarters, intended as the Auxiliary Headquarters link to Air 
Defence Command Headquarters, were disbanded in March 1957 perhaps reflecting the 
diminished importance of the Auxiliary for the direct defence of Canada.  
 A total of nine Auxiliary Wing Headquarters were established (out of a proposed twelve) 
– with the exception of the Wing Headquarters at Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver (each of two 
flying squadrons), the wings at Calgary, Edmonton, Saskatoon, Winnipeg, London and Hamilton 
commanded only one flying squadron, though they did include non-flying units such as Aircraft 
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and Warning squadrons, and other types of Auxiliary units.  The role of the Wing was to 
undertake the necessary administrative and technical functions to allow the squadrons to 
concentrate on their flying responsibilities.145  
The last of the twelve authorized Auxiliary flying squadrons were formed by 15 
September 1951 (No. 443 Squadron in Vancouver), but these squadrons did not achieve their 
proposed total personnel strength of 5,004 officers and airmen (417 personnel in each 
squadron).146 Radar and Communications Units were each established in Montreal and Toronto, 
along with fourteen (out of seventeen proposed) Auxiliary Aircraft Control and Warning 
squadrons across the country.147 Apart from being located in those cities that had an Auxiliary 
Wing Headquarters with a fighter squadron, independent Aircraft Control and Warning 
squadrons were established in Halifax, Ottawa, Sherbrooke, Windsor, Quebec City, Trois 
Rivières and Victoria.  As was the case with the Auxiliary flying squadrons, the manning 
establishment of 4,429 personnel for the Aircraft Control and Warning units was never 
achieved.148 
 The establishment of Technical Training Units and Auxiliary Medical Units achieved a 
mixed success.149  Whilst sixteen out of the proposed seventeen Auxiliary Medical Units were 
established, only nine of the proposed fifteen Technical Training Units were formed.150 Four 
Auxiliary Intelligence Units were established in Montreal, Toronto, Winnipeg and Toronto.  In 
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common with other Auxiliary units, the Medical, Technical Training and Intelligence units did 
not achieve their desired force levels.151 
 The Auxiliary fighter squadrons and the Aircraft Control and Warning squadrons each 
had an assigned role within Air Defence Command, as did the two light bomber squadrons in 
Tactical Air Command. The Aircraft Control and Warning squadrons were not intended to 
operate with the fighter squadron in their wing, but rather to augment Regular RCAF Aircraft 
Control and Warning squadrons.  With the announced changes in 1956-57, the twelve Auxiliary 
flying squadrons underwent radical change.  No. 420 Squadron (Mustangs) was disbanded in 
1956, whilst No. 402, 403 and 424 Squadrons exchanged their Mustangs for Expeditor light 
transports operating under Training Command by 1957.  The two Mitchell squadrons, No. 406 
and No. 418 Squadrons exchanged these aircraft for the Expeditor under Training Command in 
1958.  The remaining six Auxiliary fighter squadrons that had only converted to the Sabre Mk. 5 
in 1956 exchanged their aircraft for the Expeditor under Air Transport Command control in 
1958. 
The Auxiliary flying squadrons had operated as part of the “sharp end” of Air Defence 
Command since 1951 and as part of Tactical Air Command since 1947, but they were now 
transferred to Air Transport Command or Training Command.  The Aircraft Control and 
Warning squadrons still reported directly to Air Defence Command, but by 1961 all Auxiliary 
Aircraft Control and Warning squadrons were disbanded with the introduction of the SAGE 
system that automated the air defence functions conducted by these units.    The four Auxiliary 
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Intelligence Units had only been formed in 1953, but they were disbanded by 1958 in the face of 
budget cuts.  Similarly disbandment of the Medical and Technical Training Units started in 1958.   
There was no single predominant factor that could be attributed to the demise of the 
Auxiliary Force by the late 1950s.152 Contrary to Richard Rohmer’s view that the Auxiliary 
squadrons were the “first line of defence,” this was never the case; the readiness of these 
squadrons was always at “M (Mobilization) Day + 90.” 153  Official RCAF correspondence and 
anecdotal evidence from other Auxiliary Force members provide a more moderate assessment of 
the RCAF Auxiliary.154 Fiscal restraint, technological advance, personnel limitations, and 
strategic uncertainty all played a part in the decline of the RCAF Auxiliary.   
By the mid 1950s, the government was searching for defence economies – even in the 
RCAF that continued to enjoy the largest share of the DND budget.  The decision that air 
defence needed to be available “24/7” operating the CF-100 interceptor effectively excluded the 
Auxiliary squadrons.  In addition, the declining importance assigned to the MSF ended the need 
for tactical air support from the Mitchell bomber squadrons.  Advancing technology with the 
introduction of the SAGE system into air defence operations superseded the Auxiliary Aircraft 
Control and Warning squadrons.  A persistent Auxiliary weakness was its inability to provide the 
necessary maintenance using its own personnel due to the high annual turnover (forty per cent) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 Sandy Babcock, “Withered on the Vine: The Postwar RCAF Auxiliary,” in Canadian Military History Since the 
17th Century, 5-9 May 2000, Ottawa: Department of National Defence (A-JS-007-DHH/AF-001), 2000. 
153 DHH 7/1223, Box 9, File 4, Plan “H” for the RCAF (1 August 1952), Section E, Orange Tab 1, p. 151. 
154 See George Stewart, “Auxiliary Pilot,” CAHS Journal, Vol. 47, No. 3, Fall 2009, Leo Pettipas, “Summer Camp,” 
Air Force Magazine, Vol. 34, No. 1, Spring 2010, “New RCAF Auxiliary Prove Their Mettle,” Canadian Aviation, 
Vol. 27, No. 8, August 1954, Chick Childerhose, “Their Sunday Punches Help to Get the Reserve off Paper and into 
the Air,” Canadian Aviation, Vol. 29, No. 7, July 1956, and E.R.T. Park, “On Watch to Strike,” Canadian Aviation, 
Vol. 30, No. 6, June 1957.  See also the following squadron histories that describe 1950s Auxiliary squadron 
activities – 400  “City of Toronto” Squadron, 411 “County of York” Squadron and 442 “City of Vancouver” 
Squadron. 
 209 
of Auxiliary ground crew.155 By the late 1950s, another Auxiliary personnel issue was the 
approaching mandatory retirement for many of its aircrew with wartime experience.156  The loss 
of the fighter and bomber roles and the conversion to light transport for disaster and rescue tasks 
exacerbated the recruiting and retention challenges.157 These difficulties were compounded by 
the inability of the Regular RCAF to effectively explain the new Auxiliary flying role.158 
Uncertainty arose from the changed strategic environment: a nuclear war would be over within a 
matter of days, leaving no time to mobilize reserve forces. 159 
The demise of the Auxiliary Force in the late 1950s represented a grievous blow to the 
Big Air Force concept with the loss of the numerous units that had provided the RCAF with a 
“footprint in the community.”  Though there were RCAF units located near Canadian urban 
areas, these units were still geographically and, more important, socially isolated from the 
general Canadian population.  The fate of the Auxiliary in fact signalled broader difficulties in 
perpetuating the Big Air Force concept.160 
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160 Under fiscal realities, the RCAF had wanted to disband all the Auxiliary flying squadrons, but political pressure 
from the MND prevented the implementation of this measure, so that ten Auxiliary light transport squadrons 
survived until 1964.  As a comparison, The RAF disbanded all its RAF Auxiliary squadrons (which had been 
operating fighters) in 1957. 
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Canadian Aircraft Industry 
The Big Air Force concept would not have been easily achievable during this period 
without the existence of a thriving Canadian aircraft industry.161 The outbreak of the Korean War 
in 1950 provided the impetus for the tremendous expansion of the Canadian aircraft industry, 
particularly with the 1951 defence programme that emphasized the build up of the Big Air Force 
with its forty-one operational squadrons, a large training organization and 3,000 aircraft.162 Over 
the next decade, the industry was to produce a previously unimaginable number of fighters, 
trainers, anti-submarine and transport aircraft both for the RCAF and foreign air forces.163 The 
production of 1,815 Canadair Sabre, 692 Avro Canada CF-100 and 656 Canadair T-33 Silver 
Star jet aircraft was illustrative of the magnitude and importance of the Canadian aircraft 
industry during the 1950s.164 During the Second World War, seventy per cent of the 16,000 
aircraft produced by Canadian aircraft industry had been trainer aircraft. During the 1950s, of the 
approximately 4000 military aircraft produced, sixty-six per cent were combat aircraft.165 At the 
peak of this production in 1953, eighty per cent of total aircraft orders were assigned to military 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 See Lawrence Aronsen, “ ‘A Leading Arsenal of Democracy’: American Rearmament and the Continental 
Integration of the Canadian Aircraft Industry, 1948-1953,” The International History Review, Vol. 13, No, 3, August 
1991 
162 House of Commons Debates, 21st Parliament, 4th Session, 5 February 1951. 
163 See Ronald A. Keith, “Canadian Aircraft Industry Booming,” Canadian Aviation, Vol. 23, No. 12, December 
1950, and  “Air Industry Program Shifts to War Stride Backs RCAF Expansion,” Canadian Aviation, Vol. 24, No. 2, 
March 1951.  See also H.R. Foottit, “R.C.A.F. Progress at Avro Canada,” The Roundel, Vol. 2, No. 11, October 
1950, and “New Life to the Aircraft Industry,” Aircraft, Vol. 12, No. 10, October 1950. 
164 See Milberry, Canadair Sabre and Avro CF-100.  For the Canadair T-33, see Lyzun, and “Lockheed T-33A 
Trainer: Canadair to Build It, the RCAF Will Fly It,” Canadian Aviation, Vol. 24, No. 7, July 1951. 
165 There was still a need to directly import some American aircraft such as the thirty-five Fairchild Flying Boxcar 
tactical transports and twenty-five Lockheed Neptune maritime patrol aircraft.  Given the extremely small 
requirement, all military helicopters were procured from US sources. The RCAF obtained its first seven Sikorsky S-
51 Dragonfly helicopters in 1947.  The next helicopter purchase occurred in 1952 for three Bell 47 and six Vertol H-
21 twin-rotor helicopters. The largest purchase was the ten Sikorsky H-19, six Sikorsky H-34, and an additional six 
H-21 helicopters in 1954.  Both the RCN and Canadian Army procured a very limited numbers of helicopters during 
these years.  British military imports for the RCAF were limited to the two de Havilland Comet jet transports and the 
five Bristol Freighter transport aircraft. 
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sales; the Canadian proportion represented seventy per cent whilst ten per cent were foreign 
sales.166  
In 1954, it was estimated that there were sufficient defence orders to “…keep the 
Canadian aircraft manufacturing facilities in full operation until about 1960.”167 Apart from the 
current Sabre and CF-100 fighter production, there was the ongoing development of a next 
generation jet fighter, the Avro CF-105 Arrow.  Based on the Bristol Britannia design, Canadair 
was busy with the development of the Argus maritime patrol and Yukon strategic transport 
aircraft.168 Despite these earlier rosy predictions, by 1956 the Canadian aircraft industry was not 
working at full capacity.169 The industry had done exceedingly well since 1949, but the future 
was uncertain.170 The production of Sabre and CF-100 fighters ended in 1958.171 The Argus and 
Yukon orders were reduced to meet the increased funding requirements needed to sustain to the 
Avro CF-105 Arrow project.  The uncertainty in the aircraft industry by 1957 was to have 
implications both for the Avro CF-105 Arrow project and the larger aspects of the Big Air Force 
concept.   
Conclusions 
From the perspective of the three pillars of politics and economics, strategy and 
technology, the key factor that allowed the RCAF to pursue the development and implementation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 John Davis, “Aeroplane Industry in Canada,” Canadian Geographic Journal, Vol. XLVII, November 1953.  At 
the time, the author was director of the economics division in the Department of Defence Production. 
167 “Aircraft Plants To Be Kept Active Until 1960,”Canadian Aviation, Vol. 27, No. 2, February 1954. 
168 “RCAF Plans to Purchase Britannias,” Canadian Aviation, Vol. 25, No. 10, October 1952.  At this time, it was 
expected that 80 aircraft would be manufactured. See also “The Canadair Britannia Helps Our Industry,” (Editorial), 
Canadian Aviation, Vol. 27, No. 4, 1954. 
169 “The Canadian Industry,” Flight.  Canadair and Avro Canada were not at full capacity production. 
170 See Ernie Hemphill, “Industry Review: Roll-outs, Unveilings Highlight Year of Significant Progress,” Canadian 
Aviation, Vol. 30, No. 12, December 1957.  See also “Industry’s 10-Year Record,” Canadian Aviation, Vol. 29, No. 
1, January 1956. 
171 The last of 1,815 Canadair Sabres was completed on 9 October 1958, and the last of 692 Avro CF-100s was 
completed on 4 December 1958. 
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of the Big Air Force concept lay with the political will of the Liberal government of Louis St. 
Laurent.  However, there were a number of mitigating circumstances that allowed the political 
will to support the massive expansion of the RCAF during this period.  The Canadian economy 
was generally robust enough to allow for the tremendous increase in manpower for the armed 
forces along with the unprecedented defence budgets.  The increasing danger of open conflict in 
Europe between the West and the Soviet Union only acted as a partial generator of increased 
defence preparedness before 1950.   
The Korean War was the catalyst for the massive Canadian defence expansion announced 
on 5 February 1951.  Closely associated with the more dangerous international situation was the 
build up of Soviet air power in the form of long-range strategic bombers coupled with the A-
bomb after 1949.  Fear increased substantially with the Soviet explosion of a thermo-nuclear 
device in August 1953.  This fear was not focused so much on the immediate threat, but on the 
future threat after 1954.172  
The continuing prevalence of airmindedness throughout Canada after the Second World 
War amongst both the political class and the general public was key to the Big Air Force concept 
taking hold and thriving as part of the $5 billion, three-year defence programme announced in 
February 1951. (See Tables 5-4 and 5-5).  Initial manpower expansion favoured the Canadian 
Army as a result of the UN commitments in Korea and NATO in West Germany.   RCAF 
manpower expansion began in earnest during 1951-52, but it was only with the completion of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 DHH 73/1223, Series 1, File 89, “Reassessment of the Risk,” 29 October 1952, Memorandum from Chairman, 
Chiefs of Staff to Minister of National Defence.  For an unclassified view of the situation, see Field Marshal 
Viscount Montgomery, “ A Look Through a Window at World War III,” (originally published in the Royal United 
Services Institute Journal), reprinted in The Roundel, Vol. 7, No. 5, May 1955.  Also see Marshal of the RAF Lord 
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initial expansion in 1954, and the end of the Korean War, that RCAF manpower as a percentage 
of the total armed services began to creep upwards.  In 1955, the RCAF attained parity in size 
with the Canadian Army, and the following year the RCAF emerged as the largest service, a 
position it was to hold until the end of the Cold War.  The RCAF increased by twenty-five per 
cent in the first year of the Korean War 1950-51 (compared to sixty per cent for the Canadian 
Army).  However, with the February 1951 programme, the RCAF more than doubled in size by 
1954.  By December 1956, RCAF manpower had tripled in size compared to its 31 March 1950 
strength, with 50,540 personnel out of armed services total strength of 117,177 personnel. 
The Reserve components underwent a similar expansion, including the RCAF Auxiliary 
Force, though its rate of growth was not as great as the Regular Force.  In the first year of the 
Korean War, the increase in the strength of the Auxiliary mirrored that of the Regular Force at 
twenty-six per cent.  However, during the subsequent 1951-54 expansion, the Auxiliary Force 
growth rate was three-quarters of that of the Regular Force.  The Auxiliary achieved the peak of 
its post-war manpower in March 1953 with 5,874 personnel, and then slightly declined to 5,600 
officers and airmen by December 1956.  The ratio between Regular and Auxiliary RCAF 
personnel gradually changed to favour the Regular Force.  In 1950, the Auxiliary strength was 
fourteen per cent of that of the Regular Force, peaking at 14.7 per cent in 1952.  By 1954 the 
percentage had decreased to less than twelve per cent, and eleven per cent in 1955 and 
afterwards.    
Given the proximity of the end of the Second World War, in 1951 there were literally 
tens of thousands of former RCAF members available to re-join either the Regular RCAF or the 
Auxiliary.  With their recent experience, many former members required only refresher training 
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to ensure their immediate employment in the RCAF as opposed to new entries who required at 
least a year’s worth of training before posting to an operational unit.   
The expansion programme further increased the RCAF “footprint in the community” 
with the re-opening of numerous airfields and stations, and the expansion of existing stations.  
The RCAF “footprint” also included University Reserve Training Plan candidates attending 
civilian universities, the Royal Canadian Air Cadets’ officer instructors and the cadets, the DND 
civilian employees at RCAF stations and units, RCAF veterans, Ground Observer Corps 
volunteers, and the thousands employed in the Canadian aircraft industry and their suppliers.  In 
total, these various groups and their families would have encompassed approximately two 
million Canadians out of a total population of fourteen million.   
 However, even as this three year, $5 billion expansion programme got underway, there 
were fiscal constraints.173 An early example of this fiscal reality was Claxton’s rejection of a 
second air division of light bombers assigned to SACEUR.  There were later decisions not to 
equip Auxiliary squadrons with CF-100 fighters or expand the number of Regular squadrons in 
Air Defence Command.  The 1951 defence programme was neither sustainable for the long term, 
nor was this long-term support the intent of the government, in reacting to the crises of 1949-50.  
Thus defence spending began to decline in the late 1950s. 
The DND budget illustrated the steady increase focused on the Big Air Force concept 
(See Table 5-6).  In 1950, the RCAF share of the DND budget amount to thirty-six per cent.  
During the first year of the Korean War with the emphasis on the Canadian Army, the RCAF 
shared declined to thirty per cent.  Starting the following year, 1951-52, the expansion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 DHH 73/1223, Series 3, File 1307A, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Special Meeting, 15 January 1952. Economies 
were relatively easy to attain, as the DND budget was underspent for all three Fiscal Years 51/52, 52/53 and 53/54 
in the expansion programme. 
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programme increased the RCAF share to forty-six per cent, followed with forty-nine per cent in 
1952-53 and fifty-one per cent in 1953-54.  Commencing in 1954-55, the RCAF budget share of 
the DND budget remained in the fifty per cent range until the mid 1960s.174 
RCAF manpower was another area where potential economies were ignored in the rush 
to build up.  Though the RCAF tripled in size over six years, there was a considerable amount of 
wastage with recruit intakes that was more noticeable in the later years of expansion (See Table 
5-7).  Over the period of the three-year expansion programme, manpower wastage increased 
from eighteen per cent in 1951-52, to thirty-four per cent in 1952-53, and to fifty per cent in 
1953-54.  Total enlistments in the RCAF during this period were 34,841, with a net increase in 
RCAF manpower of 25,397.  Though there are no clear reasons for the increase in the wastage 
rate, it is suggested that the rate was lower in 1951-52 due to the recruitment of thousands of 
RCAF veterans, the so-called “retreads.”  Despite what appears to be significant wastage rates in 
the RCAF, both the Canadian Army and RCN experienced much higher wastage rates.175 The 
lower RCAF rate might be attributed to higher educational standards demanded of RCAF 
recruits, better selection and hence better quality of recruits, and the high costs of RCAF training 
that would have provided a greater incentive and support for the training system in wanting 
recruits to succeed. 
The organizational structure of the RCAF also played a part in the inefficient use of 
manpower, particularly as noted with the Tactical Air Command.  In addition, support to the 
Auxiliary flying squadrons absorbed a significant number of RCAF Regular personnel.  Within 
Air Defence Command, the perhaps too rapid establishment of the various Aircraft Control and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 The 1956-57 defence economies reduced the RCAF share of the defence budget for that year to 46 per cent. 
175 Canadian Army wastage rates 1951-52, 36 per cent, 1952-53 – 111 per cent (wastage exceeded enlistments) and 
1953-54 – 85 per cent, while wastage for the RCN was 1951-52 – 36 per cent, 1952-53 – 44 per cent, and 1953-54 – 
60 per cent (Brooke Claxton, Canada’s Defence Programme, 1954-55, Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1954). 
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Warning squadrons and their stations on the Pinetree Line absorbed a considerable number of 
RCAF personnel who might have been better employed elsewhere, as some of the stations had a 
very short lifespan as additional unmanned radar lines were constructed to the north of the 
Pinetree Line.  The RCAF Auxiliary peaked at approximately one-thirds of its original proposed 
strength. There was an initial interest by many Second World War RCAF veterans, along with 
the infusion of new entries.  However, once the decision had been made to eliminate the 
Auxiliary fighter and bomber squadrons and convert them into light transport squadrons, interest 
began to wane.  Further, the non-flying units (except for the Aircraft Control and Warning 
squadrons) did not have an operational role.  This made them an easy target for reductions in the 
late 1950s.  In the case of the Auxiliary Aircraft Control and Warning squadrons, it was the 
modern technology in the form of SAGE in NORAD that accelerated their demise and ultimate 
disbandment. 
 By the mid 1950s, the Big Air Force concept for the RCAF remained a firm vision 
among its proponents.  However, there were some unsettling developments.  The idea of 
independent roles for the RCAF was based on strategic air defence, the NATO air contribution 
and the NATO air training role.  These roles were undergoing change at this juncture, resulting 
in uncertainty about their future.  In addition, there was deep disagreement over the roles of 
support to the Canadian Army and the RCN.  The RCAF saw no need for Tactical Air 
Command, but the Canadian Army was pursuing plans to develop its own significant Army 
Aviation element.  In the case of Maritime Air Command, there was the issue “everything that 
flies” being controlled by the Air Force that was strongly contested by the RCN, leaving the 
matter of the need and rationale for two “maritime air forces” unresolved.  Air Transport 
Command had demonstrated its importance in the conduct of air operations for support to the 
 217 
UN in Korea and Suez, but also in support to the other Commands for routine operations, 
including Tactical Air Command in the MSF role.  Air Transport Command was promised new 
aircraft, but not at the expense of new fighters as evidenced by the reduction in the Yukon 
procurement.  This myriad of flying activities conducted by the RCAF and the other services 
exacerbated this ongoing conflict between the two competing visions of air power – “Douhet 
with nukes” versus Mitchell’s “anything that flies.” The diminished importance of the Auxiliary 
Force by the late 1950s added to the developing uncertainty associated with the Big Air Force. 
By 1957, it was recognized that the build up of the RCAF that had begun under the 
perceived threat of imminent war in the early 1950s needed to be re-examined.  The strategic 
situation had changed, along with the technology associated with that strategic environment, 
including the RCAF focus on strategic air defence.  Within this context, the operative expression 
was “uncertainty.” New equipment projects, the Avro Arrow interceptor, the Argus maritime 
patrol aircraft and the Yukon strategic transport were under development and expected to soon 
replace existing aircraft in service.  Fiscal realities had already resulted in defence reductions; in 
the case of the RCAF, it was the Auxiliary that bore significant cutbacks.  Attaining victory in 
the 10 June 1957 Federal election, John Diefenbaker’s Progressive Conservatives replaced the 
long reigning Liberal government of 22 years – a new chapter in the Big Air Force concept was 
about to commence. 
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Table 5-4 - RCAF Personnel Strength: 1950-56 
Regular Force 
Date   Officers    Other Ranks  Total 
31 Mar 50  3,143    14,131   17,274 
31 Mar 51  4,357    18,002   22,359 
31 Mar 52  6,820    25,791   32,611 
31 Mar 53  8,071    32,352   40,423 
31 Mar 54  8,300    37,296   45,596 
31 Mar 55  8,984    40,477   49,461 
31 Mar 56  9,681    40,308   49,989 
31 Dec 56  10,105    40,435   50, 540 
 
Auxiliary Force 
31 Mar 50  636    1,733   2,369 
31 Mar 51  808    2,399   3,207 
31 Mar 52  1,325    3,485   4,810 
31 Mar 53  1,647    4.227   5,874 
31 Mar 54  1,807    3,633   5,440 
31 Mar 55  1,908    3,479   5,387 
31 Mar 56  1,937    3,585   5,522 
31 Dec 56  1,958    3,642   5,600 
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Table 5-5 - Canadian Armed Services (Regular Force) Strength – 1950-56 
 
Year  RCN   Canadian Army      RCAF  Total (RCAF %) 
31 Mar 50 9,259  20,652  17, 274 47,185     (37%) 
31 Mar 51 11,082  34,986  22,359  68,427     (33%) 
31 Mar 52 13,505  49,278  32,611  95,394      (34%) 
31 Mar 53 15,546  48,458  40,423  104,427    (38%) 
31 Mar 54 16,955  49,978  45,596  112, 529   (41%) 
31 Mar 55 19,207  49,409  49,461  118,077    (42%) 
31 Mar 56 19,116  47,573  49,989  116,6783  (43%) 
31 Dec 56 19,005  47,632  50,540  117,177    (43%) 
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Table 5-6 - Defence Expenditures According to Service:  1949-1958 (Millions of Dollars) 
Year   RCN Canadian Army  RCAF  Total *(RCAF %) 
1949-50  74  136  137  385       (36%) 
1950-51  100  212  231  782  (30%) 
1951-52  183  474  651  1,416    (46%) 
1952-53  261  504  913  1,882     (49%) 
1953-54  290  437  915  1,805     (51%) 
1954-55  305  455  815  1,665     (49%) 
1955-56  341  462  799  1,750     (46%) 
1956-57  327  460  864  1,775     (49%) 
1957-58  295  425  814 
 
* Total includes Defence Research Board and Mutual Aid. 
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Table 5-7 - Regular RCAF Growth: 1951-54 – Enlistments/Wastage/Net Increase/Strength 
1950-51 
RCAF Strength 31 March 1951 – 22, 359  
1951-52  
Enlistments – 12,651 
Wastage – 2,339 (18%) 
Net Increase – 10,252 
RCAF Strength 31 March 1952 – 32,611 
1952-53 
Enlistments – 11,825 
Wastage – 4,013 (34%) 
Net Increase – 7,812 
RCAF Strength 31 March 1953 – 40,423 
1953-54 
Enlistments – 10, 365 
Wastage – 5,192 (50%) 
Net Increase – 5,173 
RCAF Strength 31 March 1954 – 45,596 
Totals 1951-52 to 1953-54 
Enlistments – 34,841 
Wastage – 9,444 (27%) 
Net Increase – 25, 397 
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   Chapter 6   
Canadian Air Power and the “Defence Debacle” – 1957-1963 
 
Introduction 
 As the Diefenbaker government assumed power in 1957, there were already 
undercurrents of strategic uncertainty and pressures for defence economies.  Yet the need to re-
equip the RCAF was paramount, the more so because the new government cancelled the costly 
Avro CF-105 Arrow programme, a grievous blow to the domestic aviation industry, even as new 
aircraft types capable of delivering nuclear weapons were needed.  The RCAF turned to 
American designs, the McDonnell CF-101 Voodoo and the Boeing BOMARC surface-to-air 
missile for Air Defence Command, and the Lockheed CF-104 Starfighter for No. 1 Air Division 
in Europe.  The RCAF’s achievement was to create a modern nuclear capable air force, but did 
so in growing chaos as the government divided over the acquisition of nuclear weapons.   
In the midst of this bitter debate, the service made progress in other areas.  The 
introduction of the Argus maritime patrol aircraft resulted in a tremendous increase in the 
capability of Maritime Air Command that attained its peak growth during this period.  Air 
Transport Command was also partially re-equipped, gaining increased importance particularly 
with its involvement in United Nations operations, both in the Middle East and Congo.  These 
undertakings produced tepid acknowledgement among the air staff that there was the possibility 
of increased involvement of conventional air power in so called “ brushfire wars,” including 
peacekeeping under the United Nations. More robust support for such a future force structure – 
an alternative to the nuclear air force – came from the 1962 report of the Special Studies Group 
on Long Range Objectives for the RCAF, the subject of the final part of the present chapter.    
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Throughout the period from 1957 to 1963, there was the continual friction from the three pillars 
of politics and economics, strategy and technology.  Political indecision and tight fiscal 
constraints on the part of the Diefenbaker were unable to come to terms with the profound 
changes in strategy and technology. 
The Diefenbaker Years 1957-63 
 The new MND, George Pearkes, like his Liberal predecessors, Brooke Claxton and Ralph 
Campney, was a First World War veteran. However, Pearkes had also been a professional soldier 
who served in the Canadian Army until 1945, retiring as a Major General; he had been the 
wartime commander of the Pacific Command.  Elected to the House of Commons in 1945, 
Pearkes had been the Official Opposition defence critic.  Unlike his fellow Army generals such 
as Simonds, Pearkes was an avid supporter of air power.  Pearkes’ term as Defence Minister was 
to be short (he left his post in 1960), but the decisions by the government during his tenure were 
to have a tremendous effect on the RCAF during the remainder of the Progressive Conservative 
government and the subsequent Liberal government.1  
 Air Marshal C.R. Selmon’s replacement as CAS, on 1 September 1957, was Air Marshal 
Hugh Campbell, who had risen to prominence during the Second World War as the Director of 
Training (Plans) at AFHQ becoming heavily involved in establishing the BCATP.  Subsequently, 
he served overseas starting in 1942 as the Director of Air Staff at RCAF HQ Overseas, returning 
to AFHQ in January 1944, first as the assistant to the CAS, and then becoming the Air Member 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Pearkes’ more obscure successor, Douglas Harkness, Minister of National Defence, 1960-63, had to contend with 
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for Personnel in April 1945.2 During the post-war period, Campbell served as the first AOC of 
No. 1 Air Division and subsequently as the Vice Air Deputy and then Deputy Chief of Staff 
Operations at SHAPE.3 During his tenure as CAS from 1957 to 1962 Campbell was to oversee 
the extensive transformation of the RCAF in the face of extraordinary challenges.  
Defence Economies 1957-58 
During the last few years of the St. Laurent Liberal government, there had been an 
acknowledgement that the intense defence effort could not be sustained.  The budget by the 
outgoing Liberals for 1957-8 included a $128 million decrease for capital equipment and 
construction.  At the same time the reduced budget had to absorb $71 million in additional 
expenditures for personnel and operating costs due to salary increases, higher prices for goods 
and services, and the entry into service of new radar installations.4   The newly elected 
Progressive Conservative government, demanded further economies, and this became an intense 
staff activity during the summer of 1957 with the aim of reducing defence expenditures from 
$1.723 billion in 1957-58 to $1.5 billion for 1958-59, a 12.5 percent cut.5  This would have 
meant a budget reduction of seventeen per cent for the RCAF in the space of a single fiscal year.6  
However, to soften the impact of reductions, the government instead spread the defence cuts over 
a period of years with $78 million for the current fiscal year, 1957-58 and $111 million for 1958-
59.  Rather than the RCAF budget being reduced from $869 million in 1957-58 to $740 million 
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3 “AM Hugh Campbell Retires as CAS,” The News and Eastern Townships Advocate, St John, P.Q., 17 May 1962.  
http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=wBUAAAA1BAJ&sjid=0CoDAAAAIBAJ7pg=1918%2C3902007 
[accessed 28 January 2015]. 
4 Ralph Campney, Report on National Defence, Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1957, pp. 38-39. 
5 DHH 73/1223, Box 10, File 159, Office of the Chairman Chiefs of Staff – Reduction of Defence Estimates, 16 
August 1957. 
6 Ibid. 
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in 1958-59, the actual reduction was from $813 million to $787 million, representing less than 
four per cent.   
Table 6-1 RCAF Budget – Operations & Maintenance and Capital Expenditures 
Comparison 
Ref:  Chart 4 to Appendix C to Comptroller’s Address to 1964 AOC Conference (Air 
Vice Marshal VSJ Millard)7 
Fiscal 
Year 
O&M 
$ 
Capital 
$ 
Total 
$ 
O&M Ratio 
% 
Capital 
Ratio % 
1953/54 344 571 915 37.6 62.4 
1954/55 393 422 815 46.2 51.8 
1955/56 441 357 798 55.3 44.7 
1956/57 515 348 863 59.7 40.3 
1957/58 536 277 814 65.9 34.1 
1958/59 517 281 797 64.8 35.2 
1959/60 511 232 743 68.8 31.2 
1960/61 514 241 755 68.1 31.9 
1961/62 515 273 788 65.4 34.6 
1962/63 521 194 715 72.8 27.2 
1963/64 557 128 685 81.3 18.7 
1964/65 541 115 656 82.5 17.5 
 
The RCAF reductions proposed in the summer of 1957 included the close-out of facilities 
at Suffield, Churchill, Whitehorse, Goose Bay, Sea Island (Vancouver), Claresholm, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 DHH 73/1223, File 2000, AOC Conference, 14-16 April 1964.  See also Ernie Hemphill, “Better Management 
Stretches Defence Dollar,” Canadian Aviation, Vol. 35, No. 2, February 1962. 
	  
 226 
discontinuation of refresher flying training, a two-thirds reduction in the University Reserve 
Training Plan, the disbandment of the Auxiliary flying squadrons, cancellation of aircrew 
training for Norway, Holland and Denmark, and the disbandment of a wing in No. 1 Air Division 
or a reduction in aircraft per squadron, from eighteen to twelve CF-100s and from twenty-five to 
eighteen Sabre aircraft.8  These proposed reductions amounted to total savings of $55 million, 
including $13 million for disbanding the Auxiliary squadrons, $8 million for NATO aircrew 
training, and $20-22 million for Air Division reductions.9  As a result of the government’s easing 
of the cuts, the reductions proposed for the Air Division and NATO aircrew training were not 
carried out.  Neither was the disbandment of the Auxiliary flying squadrons, though the fighter 
and bomber roles were eliminated and the remaining eleven squadrons assumed a light transport 
role using the Expeditor aircraft. The Auxiliary Force non-flying activities such as Intelligence 
and Technical Training Units were also eliminated.  Some installations were closed, but not Sea 
Island and Goose Bay.10 
Capital equipment reductions were to have more a far-reaching impact on the Big Air 
Force.  Proposed cancellations included the CF-100 Mk. 6 fighter armed with the Sparrow II air-
to-air missile ($54 million), the Sidewinder air-to-air missile for the Sabre fighters ($8 million), 
the Albatross search and rescue aircraft ($14 million), and the Cosmopolitan medium transport 
($5 million). In addition, procurement of the Argus maritime patrol aircraft would be reduced 
from fifty to twenty-five ($18 million). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 DHH 73/1223, Box 10, File 159, Office of the Chairman Chiefs of Staff – Reduction of Defence Estimates, 16 
August 1957. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Sea Island remained open to support the two Auxiliary squadrons finally closing 31 March 1964 when the 
squadrons were disbanded.  The government is still trying to close-out Goose Bay.	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Both the CF-100 Mk. 6 and the Sidewinder missile programmes were cancelled. The CF-
100 Mk. 6 had been intended to equip four squadrons in Air Defence Command between May 
1958 and June 1959, significantly improving its capabilities with missile-armed aircraft, and 
providing a stopgap solution in the event of delays in the Avro Arrow that was scheduled to enter 
squadron service in June 1961.11 The Sidewinder missile was to equip the eight Sabre squadrons 
in the Air Division that would have improved their capability, prolonged their front-line service, 
and thus delayed the need to replace them with a more modern type. 
In the end thirty-three Argus aircraft entered service, but the shortfall from the fifty 
originally planned meant that the Neptune “interim” aircraft had to be retained.  In the case of the 
CC-106 Yukon strategic transport, eight aircraft were to be delivered by February 1961, with 
another sixteen to follow by September 1963 to replace the remaining North Star transports.  
However, Yukon procurement ceased with the delivery of only twelve aircraft.  Acquisition of 
the Grumman CSR-110 Albatross, intended to replace the wartime Canso amphibian aircraft, 
was limited to ten rather than the twenty-four aircraft, while the full order for ten CC-109 
Cosmopolitan transports was completed; this contract helped Canadair in view of the reductions 
in their contracts for the Argus and Yukon.  
 The decline in the RCAF budget was more than thirty percent between the years 1953/54 
and 1964/65.  These cuts were somewhat larger than those absorbed by the Army and the Navy.  
In 1953/54, the RCAF share of allocations for the three services amounted was fifty-six per cent, 
and by 1964/65 it had dropped to forty-seven percent.12 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 CF-100 Mk. 6 aircraft were to consist of seventy-five new production and sixty-seven retrofitted CF-100 Mk.5. 
12 During the Diefenbaker years, the RCAF continued to receive over 50 per cent of the DND budget allocated to the 
three services: 1958-59 – 53 per cent, 1959-60 – 53 per cent, 1960-61 – 54 per cent, 1961-62 – 52 per cent,	  and 
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Air Defence Command Re-equipment 1957-62 
An examination of the significant political and military decision milestones during the St. 
Laurent years shows that the Avro CF-105 Arrow programme had gone awry under the Liberal 
administration.  Initial discussion of a replacement for the CF-100 took place on 21 June 1950 
when Air Vice Marshal A.L. James, the Air Member Technical Services briefed the air staff on 
the proposal for a supersonic fighter to be produced in the next ten years.13  A joint team was 
established to determine the Canadian specifications and study US and UK developments.14 The 
original requirement had called for a single-engine, single-seat aircraft of 30,000 pounds, but this 
was revised to a two-seat, two-engine all weather aircraft of 50,000 pounds with a speed of Mach 
1.5 and capable of operating at 60,000 feet.15 The Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting on 25 
November 1953 recommended that the government proceed with the CF-105 programme to meet 
the requirement for all-weather interceptor capable of countering the jet bomber in the time 
period from 1957 onward. The chiefs noted there was no aircraft under development in the US or 
the UK that met the Canadian needs.  Major General Sparling, the Acting Chief of the General 
Staff, expressed his concern that the programme would be financed from the RCAF estimates 
with a corresponding negative impact on the remainder of the DND budget.  In response, the 
CAS, Air Marshal Slemon stated, “the RCAF would endeavour to finance the planned programs 
from within its financial allocations.  However, it was not possible to anticipate fully all 
expenditures.”16 On 17 December 1953, the Cabinet Defence Committee approved the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1962-63 – 50 per cent [Department of Finance, Public Accounts] cited as Table VI in John W. Warnock, Partner to 
Behemoth: The Military Policy of a Satellite Canada, Toronto: New Press, 1970, p. 324. 
13 DHH 73/1223, File 1826, Minutes of the 108th Meeting of Air Members, 21 June 1950 and File 1822, Minutes of 
the 135th Meeting of the Air Members, 19 September 1951. 
14 Ibid. The joint team consisted of RCAF, Defence Research Board, National Research Council and A.V. Roe 
representatives. 
15 DDH 73/1223, File 1824, Minutes of the 178th Meeting of Air Members, 7 July 1953. 
16 Ibid. 
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development of the Avro CF-105 Arrow at a cost of approximately $27 million, including the 
development of two prototype aircraft but only the airframe. Other major components – the 
engine, the fire control radar, and the weapons systems -- were to be procured as off-the-shelf 
items from other companies.17 The total requirement involved up to 600 Arrow aircraft to equip 
the nineteen squadrons in Air Defence Command, an Operational Training Unit, and provide 
maintenance spares and offset attrition.18 The unit cost was estimated at $1.5-$2 million per 
aircraft at a time when the current production cost for the Canadair Sabre was $500,000 per 
aircraft and $1 million for the CF-100 per aircraft.19  
 The next milestone occurred in March 1955 when Ralph Campney, the MND requested 
the accelerated development of the Arrow reflecting the earlier than expected emergence of 
Soviet long-range thermonuclear armed bombers.  To speed up the process, a new development 
and production procedure would be introduced requiring $191 million for forty Arrow pre-
production aircraft based on eleven aircraft for contractor testing and twenty-one aircraft for 
RCAF testing and attrition spares for the period from 1954/55 to 1959/60.20 Rather than the 
traditional method of using two prototypes, the use of these eleven aircraft would reduce Avro 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 DHH 73/1223, File 1328, Cabinet Defence Committee, Memorandum, 5 February 1954, Cabinet Conclusions of 
17 December 1953.  It was recognized that an engine would have to be developed at a later date.  In the original 
design, the Rolls-Royce RB-106 engine was the intended power plant, but this project was cancelled.  The next 
alternative was the Pratt and Whitney J75, the engine that powered the pre-production aircraft that were flown.  As a 
private venture, Orenda developed the PS-13 Iroquois that was selected for the aircraft.  The Iroquois was flown on 
a B-47 bomber test bed, but not on the Avro Arrow Mk. 2 aircraft before the programme’s cancellation. 
18 The Avro Arrow was intended to replace the CF-100 interceptor for the twenty-one home-based RCAF Regular 
and Auxiliary squadrons each with a proposed establishment of eighteen aircraft per squadron.  However, by 1955 it 
was decided that the CF-100 was too complex an aircraft to be operated by Auxiliary squadrons, so they were never 
equipped with the CF-100. 
19 See  “Is the Price Too High?” Canadian Aviation, Vol. 25, No. 4, April 1952. Despite the experience with the 
Sabre air superiority fighter in Korea, there was a pronounced tendency for Western air forces to proceed with the 
development of heavier and more complex long-range fighters – and hence more expensive aircraft.  See Robert 
Jackson, Cold War Combat Prototypes, Chapter 11, “The Heavy Brigade: Long-Range Fighters.  
20 This was the Cook-Craigie Plan that greatly reduced the design and testing stages of the aircraft’s flying 
development, eliminating the need for a large number of prototypes.  It made for low risk aircraft projects, but it was 
a questionable approach to CF-105 Arrow project development.   See Elliott V. Converse III, Rearming for the Cold 
War 1945-1960, Washington: Historical Office – Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2012, pp. 477-478. 
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Canada’s testing period from 8½ years to 2¼ years.  Similarly, the use of the twenty-one aircraft 
for service testing would allow for “fully operational aircraft to be available to squadrons within 
3 to 3½ years after completion of the first preproduction aircraft.”21 The requests for the aircraft 
and the development of fourteen PS-13 Iroquois engines at a cost of $70 million were approved, 
with costs being met within the existing defence budget.22 There was the proviso attached to the 
approval, “the programme for both the airframe and the engine could be halted or abandoned at 
appropriate stages if this was found to be expedient or necessary.”23 The cost of the aircraft now 
increased to an estimated at $2.5-$3 million while production might range from 100 to 500 
aircraft, the higher estimate being based on the Arrow re-equipping the Air Division as well as 
Air Defence Command.24 The total amount allocated to the Arrow’s development was now $280 
million allowing the programme to continue until 1960.25 
Six months later, at the Cabinet Defence Committee on 27 September 1955, Campney 
noted that Avro Canada had re-assessed its costs thus increasing the total programme to $340 
million.26 Campney requested a re-appraisal of the programme, a re-appraisal that was conducted 
by a government-wide panel.27 As a result, at the 7 December 1955 meeting, the Cabinet agreed 
to a reduction to the Arrow programme that had been previously approved at the 3 March 1955 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 DHH 73/1223, Series 1, File 128, RCAF Equipment Policy, Minister of National Defence, Appendix “A” to 
Cabinet Defence Submission, S10338CF105 – 180, 25 February 1955, Preproduction Program for Supersonic 
Fighter Aircraft (CF-105). 
22 DHH 73/1223, File 1329, Cabinet Defence Committee, Minutes of the 104th Meeting, 3 March 1955.  In the 
meantime, aircraft development would utilize the Pratt and Whitney J75 engine.  Interestingly, the project was to be 
budgeted within proposed defence expenditures that did not consider the possibility for reductions.  At the meeting, 
the view had been expressed that it was highly doubtful that the US would purchase the CF-105 and this proved to 
be result with the meeting between the MND and the US Secretary of the Air Force. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 DHH 73/1223, Series 1, File 632, CF-105 Aircraft – Appendix “A” to Report on the Development of the CF-105 
Aircraft and Associated Weapon System 1952-1958. 
26 This included the development costs of the Iroquois engine and Sparrow II missile. 
27 DHH 73/1223, File 1329, Cabinet Defence Committee, Minutes of the 108th Meeting, 17 November 1955. The 
panel consisted of the CAS as chairman, along with the Deputy Minister, DND, the Chairman, DRB, Deputy 
Minister, DDP, and representatives from the Cabinet Secretariat, Departments of Finance, External Affairs and the 
National Research Council. 
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meeting.28  The programme was revised to allow for the procurement of eleven aircraft, including 
airframe and engines, at a cost of $170 million to be spread over three fiscal years.29 A further 
programme revision in February 1957 reduced the number to eight development aircraft albeit 
with an increased budget to $217 million extended to the end of FY 1957-58, with the cost of 
integrating the RCA Astra fire control system accounting for most of the increase.30 The 
remaining twenty-nine preproduction aircraft would not have to be ordered until FY 1958-59 
while the estimated cost to complete the thirty-seven aircraft programme was now pegged at 
$500-600 million.31 This was the last Cabinet Defence Committee meeting held by the St. 
Laurent government at which the Arrow programme was discussed prior to the June 1957 
general election.   
Further cost increases in the summer of 1957 to integrate the Sparrow II missile with the 
Astra fire control radar prompted the Air Staff to conduct another review.32 At a special meeting 
on financial aspects of the Arrow held on 21 August 1957, the Vice Chief of the Air Staff, Air 
Vice Marshal C.R. Dunlap, noted that the RCAF spent $300 million annually on Operations and 
Maintenance and that no single aspect of the RCAF programme was “over emphasized.”33 Air 
Commodore C.L. Annis, Chief of Telecommunications, commented, “that he had some serious 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 DHH 73/1223, File 1329, Cabinet Defence Committee, Minutes of the 108th Meeting, 17 November 1955.   
29 DHH 73/1223, File 1329, Cabinet Defence Committee, Record of Cabinet Decision, 7 December 1955.  The 
breakdown of the $170 million was $114 million allocated to the airframes and $56 million allocated for the 
engines. 
30 DHH 73/1223, Series 1, File 632, CF-105 Aircraft – Appendix “A” to Report on the Development of the CF-105 
Aircraft and Associated Weapon System 1952-1958.  This was the 113th Cabinet Defence Committee meeting 6-7 
February 1957. 
31 Ibid. 
32 DHH 73/1223, File 1827, Air Council, Aide-Memoire of a Discussion Held the CAS Conference Room, 24 July 
1957.  The cost of integrating the Sparrow II missile with Astra had increased from $65 million in December 1955 
to $126 million in July 1957, challenging the efficacy of continuing with the Sparrow II missile project.  It was 
feared that Sparrow II development would cease development if the CF-100 Mk.6 missile-armed aircraft were 
cancelled, thus depriving the Arrow of its preferred weapon.  The CF-100 Mk. 6 was cancelled, but the Sparrow II 
remained part of the programme.  A conundrum had now emerged that the inherent limitations of the Sparrow II 
would not allow for the full capability of the Arrow to be realized 
33 DHH 73/1223, File 1827, Air Council, A Special Meeting Held in the Office of the CAS, 21 August 1957. 
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doubts that the Air Force could actually afford the Arrow Programme, and at the same time 
discharge its other commitments.”34  Air Marshal Slemon, the CAS, noted that the original 
decision to proceed with the project was a sound one, but in light of the current Arrow costs and 
other RCAF programmes, “viewed realistically the RCAF could not proceed with the Arrow 
programme alone.”35 Dunlap was concerned how the Arrow would impinge upon other 
programmes such as radar improvements, the BOMARC surface-to-air missile, and the ground 
environment system.   He “felt that since BOMARC was considered more much important than 
the Arrow, the Air Force must…have BOMARC with the ground environment and the aircraft to 
support it.”36 As a result of this meeting, it was agreed that representation be made to the US for 
joint participation in the Avro Arrow programme, that alternatives to the Arrow be considered 
along with the costs, and the RCAF wait until the new government detailed its perspectives on 
the Defence Programme.37 
A Cabinet Defence Committee meeting on 19-20 September 1957 approved the 
cancellation of the Sparrow II missile equipped CF-100 Mk. 6 and the disbandment of the 
Auxiliary fighter squadrons.  Though an earlier decision had been made not to equip these 
squadrons with the CF-100, their disbandment confirmed that the maximum requirement would 
not exceed 169 Arrow interceptors.  The aircraft was finally publicly unveiled on 4 October 
1957, with the RCAF finally establishing that same month a dedicated project office to manage 
the Arrow programme.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. Given the integration of North American air defence, Slemon suggested that the US be approached with the 
notion of introducing the Avro Arrow as common weapon with costs to be shared between Canada and the US.  
However, Slemon went on to state that if the US did not accept this proposal, “…then the Air Force should be 
prepared to tell the Government that the Arrow Programme was too costly for Canada to continue alone.” 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
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An Air Council meeting on 15 October 1957 focused its discussion on the need for the 
Arrow: would there be a manned bomber threat to North America from 1961-62 onward; was a 
manned interceptor needed to deal with this threat; and, if a manned interceptor was required, 
should it be the Arrow or another aircraft? 38 The general consensus concluded that the manned 
interceptor and the surface-to-air missile were complementary weapons systems, and that both 
weapons would be required for a Canadian air defence system.39 
On 29 October 1957, the Cabinet Defence Committee authorized a twelve month 
continuation of the development programme to include the procurement of the additional twenty-
nine preproduction aircraft, acceleration of the Iroquois engine development, and the 
continuation of the Sparrow II missile programme.  Although the government decision did not 
imply approval for the total $646 million programme cost, the draft submission to the Cabinet 
Defence Committee did note the previously authorized $216 million to 31 March 1958, along 
with the estimate that the thirty-seven preproduction aircraft programme would cost $646 
million.40 
The first flight of the Arrow occurred on 25 March 1958, but it was during the summer of 
1958 that the Arrow’s fate was determined.   The Chiefs of Staff Committee agreed at their 
meeting on 10 June 1958 that authority would be sought for the continued production of the 
thirty-seven Arrow pre-production aircraft.  In July, however, Lieutenant General Graham, the 
Chief of the General Staff, who had been absent from that June meeting, wrote to the Chairman, 
General Foulkes, noting the absence of a response to Graham’s earlier request for a general 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 DHH 73/1223, File 1827, Air Council, Minutes of the 271st Meeting of the Air Council, 15 October 1957.  
Compared to the latest US fighter under development, the F-106A, the Avro Arrow was considered the superior 
aircraft. 
39 Ibid.   
40 DHH 73/1223, Series 1, File 632, CF-105 Aircraft – Appendix “A” to Report on the Development of the CF-105 
Aircraft and Associated Weapon System 1952-1958. 
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review of air defence and specifically the Arrow programme.41 An ad hoc group examined the 
interceptor’s financial impact on other RCAF programmes and the Army and the Navy. This was 
a key moment in the loss of support for the Arrow.42 At the Cabinet Defence Meeting on 15 
August, Pearkes announced that he and the Chiefs of Staff Committee believed that the only 
recourse was to cancel the Arrow in favour of another aircraft.  However, Prime Minister 
Diefenbaker demanded that the Chiefs of Staff Committee prepare a dossier on the history of the 
project, and this was presented at the Cabinet Defence Committee meeting on 21 August 1958 
with the recommendation “consideration for cancellation.”43 However, at this meeting, the 
Cabinet Defence Committee did not make a decision on cancellation.44 
On 23 September 1958, the government announced the procurement of the Boeing 
BOMARC surface-to-air missile, the Semi Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) system, and 
the gap-filler radars, along with the continued development of the Arrow until March 1959.  In 
effect, the programme was ended on this date, because the government’s direction was to focus 
on cost reduction, something that neither the government nor the RCAF believed could be 
achieved.  The government finally announced cancellation of the Arrow programme on 20 
February 1959.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Isinger, p. 80. 
42 Ibid.  At a Special Chiefs of Staff Committee meeting, there was the complete breakdown towards achieving an 
inter-service even intra-service (RCAF) consensus on the Arrow, either to continue the project in some form or to 
recommend its cancellation. 
43 DHH 73/1223, Series 1, File 632, CF-105 Aircraft – Appendix “A” to Report on the Development of the CF-105 
Aircraft and Associated Weapon System 1952-1958.  The Report included expenditures on the various components 
of the Avro Arrow – airframe, engine, Astra fire control system, and Sparrow air-to-air missile; resumé of CF-105 
development study of November 1955, the USAF appraisal of the CF-105, summary of Cabinet Decisions, Cabinet 
Defence Committee and Chiefs of Staff meetings, extracts from Hansard and discussions with the UK and US.  See 
also Isinger and Denis Smith, Rogue Tory, p. 87. 
44 Isinger. 
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Over the fighter project’s life, the requirement had steadily declined from 600 to 100 
aircraft even as the estimated costs ballooned to something approaching $1 billion.45 If the 
project had adhered to its original scope, development of only the airframe, then it may have 
remained a viable programme, as suggested by Swedish experience.46 The absence of effective 
oversight by both the Liberal and Progressive Conservative governments along with weak RCAF 
project control also contributed to the skyrocketing costs that killed the programme.  Certainly 
political support for the Avro Arrow had become tenuous by 1957; the Liberals would have 
cancelled the programme if re-elected in that year.   
The Arrow cancellation in February 1959 did not negate the requirement for a CF-100 
replacement.47  Despite government rhetoric that the BOMARC selection represented the future 
of air defence, there was still a requirement for a modern fighter to undertake the peacetime 
interception and identification role, along with its wartime role of the initial air defence of the 
continent against attacking Soviet bombers.  In the words of the CAS the RCAF still had “the 
need for an alternative interceptor – as opposed to alternatives to interceptors.”48 To replace the 
CF-100, the RCAF adopted the McDonnell CF-101 Voodoo.49  The US originally proposed to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Ibid. In the face of cancellation, the Canadian government had spent a total of $470 million on the programme. 
46 Sweden continues to develop and produce advanced combat aircraft today.  The SAAB Draken supersonic fighter, 
a contemporary of the Arrow, began its development in 1949, the prototype aircraft flying on 25 October1955, and 
the initial version entering service in 1960.  The Draken was progressively improved in subsequent versions 
remaining in production until 1972 by which time 550 aircraft had been produced for the Royal Swedish Air Force 
and 101 aircraft exported to Finland and Denmark.  Though not as large as the CF-105 Arrow, the Draken was 
equally complex, but the Swedish aircraft was a successful programme with its focus only on airframe development, 
with the licensed production of the other major systems – engine, radar, and missile armament. 
47 See Brent Raycroft, “This and That on Air Defence,” Aircraft, Vol. 22, No. 2, February 1960. 
48 Isinger, p. 83.  See Ernie Hemphill and Peter Brannan, “Shelving the Arrow is Bad Military, Economic 
Medicine,” Canadian Aviation, Vol.31, No. 11. November 1958 and Brent Raycroft, “The Arrow Decision,” 
Aircraft, Vol. 20, No. 11, November 1958.   See also, Andrew Richter, Avoiding Armageddon” Canadian Military 
Strategy and Nuclear Weapons 1950-63, Vancouver: UBC Press, 2002, p. 52. “Campbell wrote [on 21 August 1958] 
that “ I cannot associate myself with the decision to cancel the 105 programme but must recommend that it proceed 
as presently planned or, alternatively, to couple the cancellation of the 105 with the procurement of a supersonic 
interceptor to fill the gap.” 
49 As an interceptor, the McDonnell F-101 Voodoo was inferior to the Avro CF-105 Arrow, but the RCAF did not 
have a choice because no other comparable type was available.  Moreover, the Voodoo specifications fully met the	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simply give the CF-101 to the RCAF, but the Canadian government rejected this on the grounds 
that it would appear as having received foreign aid.50 It was then proposed that the CF-101 be 
provided on the basis of an exchange with the RCAF receiving the Voodoo and the USAF 
receiving the Canadair CL-44 turboprop transport, along with Canada assuming responsibility for 
the sixteen Pinetree Line radar stations in Canada operated by the USAF.  The Canadian 
government also rejected this proposal.51 The accepted proposal for obtaining the CF-101 was 
based on the RCAF assuming responsibility for the Pinetree Line radar stations and paying $50 
million towards the licensed production of 140 F-104G aircraft by Canadair for the Military 
Assistance Program to equip other NATO air forces.52 In exchange the RCAF received sixty-six 
CF-101 interceptors and Canadair received a $200 million order for the F-104G aircraft.53  The 
first CF-101 was delivered in July 1961 and the remainder of the total sixty-six aircraft were 
delivered to the RCAF by May 1962.54 The CF-101 proved to be a reliable and safe aircraft in 
Canadian service.55  In terms of the Big Air Force concept, the numbers of CF-101 aircraft that 
were obtained to replace the CF-100 represented a significant reduction in the strength of Air 
Defence Command.  The nine CF-100 squadrons with 162 aircraft (excluding the Operational 
Training Unit) were replaced with fifty-six CF-101B operational fighters and ten CF-101F 
operational combat-capable trainers equipping five squadrons in Air Defence Command, with all 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
requirements first identified for the CF-100 replacement in 1953: a twin-engine, two-seat long-range interceptor 
capable of Mach 1.5+ equipped with air-to-air guided missiles.     
50 McLin, p. 103. 
51 Ibid. p. 104. 
52 Ibid. p. 105. See also “Voodoo/F-104 Deal Confirmed,” Canadian Aviation, Vol. 34, No. 7, July 1961. 
53 Ibid. 
54 The Voodoos Arrive,” Aircraft, Vol. 23, No. 9, September 1961, “Voodoos with the RCAF,” Canadian Aviation, 
Vol. 34, No. 10, October 1961, and “Five Squadrons get Voodoos,” Canadian Aviation, Vol. 35, No. 6, June 1962. 
Some commentators have referred to this first batch of RCAF Voodoos as “second-hand” aircraft.  In reality, though 
the CF-101 aircraft delivered to the RCAF in 1961 were obtained from USAF holdings, these were still new aircraft. 
55 See R.E. Merrick, “McDonnell’s Voodoo in Canadian Service,” CAHS Journal, Vol. 28, No. 3, Fall 1990. 
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squadrons being declared operational 1 October 1962.56 Initial armament for these aircraft was 
the Falcon conventional-armed air-to-air missile, but the CF-101 aircraft acquired by the RCAF 
were capable of operating the Genie air-to-air nuclear rocket that was armed with a 1.5-kiloton 
warhead though the government proved to be indecisive in finalizing agreements with the US for 
the dual custody of nuclear weapons that would have made the CF-101 aircraft more effective.57  
 During the same period that the RCAF was re-equipping with the CF-101 Voodoo, the 
BOMARC was introduced into RCAF service.58  The government had publicly announced the 
procurement of the BOMARC on 23 September 1958, however, plans to acquire the BOMARC 
had been considered by the RCAF for several years.59 The BOMARC had commenced its 
development in 1950 when missiles were in their infancy, and as the decade progressed, it 
became part of the air defence debate regarding the efficacy of manned fighters versus missiles.60 
The initial version, the BOMARC A, powered by a liquid-fuelled rocket engine along with two 
ramjet engines, could be armed with either a conventional high explosive or nuclear warhead.  
The later BOMARC B was an improved version both in performance and range, powered by a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 The operational squadrons were No. 409 Squadron at Comox, No. 410 Squadron at Uplands, No. 414 Squadron at 
North Bay, No. 416 Squadron at Chatham, and No. 425 Squadron at Bagotville. 
57 See “Voodoo Conversion,” Aircraft, Vol. 23, No. 8, August 1961.  See also Bob McIntyre, Canadian Profile CF-
101 Voodoo, Ottawa: Sabre Model Supplies Ltd Publishing, 1984.  See John Clearwater, Canadian Nuclear 
Weapons: The Untold Story of Canada’s Cold War Arsenal, Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1998, pp. 177-216, for details 
on the Genie rocket in Canadian service. 
58 The most complete story of the BOMARC in Canadian service is Robert H. Clark, Canadian Weapons 
Acquisition: The Case of the BOMARC Missile, Unpublished MA Thesis, Kingston: Royal Military College of 
Canada, 1983. 
59 DHH 73/1223, Series 1, File 89, Brief for Meeting of Consultation Continental Defence 2 December 1955.  This 
briefing refers to “the introduction…sometime after 1962, of ground-to-air long-range guided missiles of the 
BOMARC type into the Canadian air defence system.” (p. 10) See also DHH 73/1223, Series 3, Subseries 13. The 
inclusion of the BOMARC was also considered at the Special Meeting of the Air Members that discussed “Air 
Defence Problems – Long Range Implications” on 5, 8 and 14 September 1954. 
60 See Clayton K. S. Chun, “Winged Interceptor: Politics and Strategy in the Development of the Bomarc Missile,” 
Air Power History, Vol. 45, No. 4, Winter 1998.  By the late 1950s, there was an ongoing debate whether or not 
surface-to-air missile would replace manned interceptors.  See, for example, “Evolution or Revolution,” Air 
Pictorial, Vol. 19, No. 11, November 1957, James Hay Stevens, “Guided Missiles or Aircraft,” Air Pictorial, Vol. 
20, No. 4, April 1958, and Ronald Ivelaw-Chapman, “Missiles – and/or Aircraft,” Air Power, Vol. 6, No. 1, October 
1958. 
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solid fuel rocket engine and the two ramjet engines.61 Unlike the BOMARC A, the BOMARC B 
was armed only with a ten kiloton nuclear warhead.62 Base locations at North Bay, Ontario and 
La Macaza, Quebec were prepared to accommodate two new squadrons, each equipped with 
twenty-eight BOMARC B missiles.   No. 446 Squadron formed at North Bay on 28 December 
1961, followed by No. 447 Squadron at La Macaza on 15 September 1962, though neither 
squadron received its nuclear warheads.  The introduction of the BOMARC missile squadrons 
was part of the air defence network modernization known as the CADIN (Continental Air 
Defence Integration North) programme including the implementation of the Semi-Automatic 
Ground System (SAGE), the installation of a number of new radar stations the modernization of 
the Pinetree Line radar, and the assumption by the RCAF of responsibility for the USAF 
operated Pinetree Line radar stations.63 
The changed nature of warfare brought about by the introduction of thermonuclear 
weapons had re-defined air defence.  Devastation would have been immense if even a small 
number of attacking bombers successfully bombed North American cities.  Air defence was now 
part of nuclear deterrence. The main purpose of the radar warning systems, interceptors, and 
surface-to-air missiles networked by the semi-automatic ground environment was to allow 
retaliatory forces to become airborne in order to survive an attack and deliver counter- attacks 
against the Soviets. The role of air defence changed from the protection of cities, populations, 
and industrial areas to that of defending the deterrent.64 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Peter Brannan, “Introducing the Boeing Bomarc,” Canadian Aviation, Vol. 31, No. 12, December 1958. 
62 Clearwater, p. 55. 
63 The Roundel, Vol. 13, No. 6, July-August 1961.  See also D.S. Terrell, “What is SAGE?” The Roundel, Vol 13, 
No. 5, June 1961. 
64 See M. Lipton, “The Wisdom of Our Air Defence Policy,” The RCAF Staff College Journal, 1956. 
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No. 1 Air Division Re-equipment 1957-63 
 No. 1 Air Division, comprising twelve squadrons equipped with 300 of the latest jet 
fighters, had been deployed to Europe between 1951 and 1954 to bolster NATO European air 
defences.  No less important was the Air Division’s political role in demonstrating Canadian 
commitment to the common defence and promoting the trans-Atlantic connection that was the 
essence of Western strength.  By the mid-1950s, planning commenced to consider a replacement 
for the Sabre and CF-100 fighters. Various inter-related factors had to be weighed in any 
decision to acquire new aircraft.  First, there was the issue of the existing air defence role of the 
Air Division.  Jon McLin described the situation: 
At the time it was first sent to Europe…the air division helped a fill a crucial gap 
in Western Europe’s air defences, a gap caused by the non-existence or ill-
equipped nature of European air forces.  As these air forces were re-built, they 
began to assume increasing responsibility for their own defence. Moreover, the 
basis upon which they did so was not that of an integrated system; largely because 
of French opposition to integration, the single commander, single ground 
environment and single concept of air battle which were needed on military 
grounds did not exist…. Because of this emphasis on the territorial nature of air 
defence, this role was an increasingly uncomfortable one for the Canadian air 
division. 65  
 
Second, there was the change in NATO strategy as represented by MC 70 that placed a reliance 
on nuclear-equipped military forces to deter the Warsaw Pact.66 This strategy included the build-
up of NATO tactical air forces equipped with “tactical” nuclear weapons to be used in the 
interdiction role against various Warsaw Pact targets in Eastern Europe.  Third, there was the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 McLin, p. 115.  See also Glen Berg, Scrambling for Dollars: Resource Allocation and the Politics of Canadian 
Fighter Aircraft Procurement, Unpublished MA Thesis, Kingston: Royal Military College of Canada, 1993, p. 37.  
Berg raises the financial aspects regarding balance of payments and the high operating costs of the Air Division.  As 
well, the Europeans were commencing their re-armament.  However, as Berg points out, the final decision on the re-
equipment of the Air Division was based on political grounds, not economic or military factors. 
66 DHH 73/1223, File 1826, Minutes of a Special Meeting of the Air Members, 20 February 1956.  Subsequently, in 
1956, at a special Air Council meeting, The AOC of No. 1 Air Division, Air Vice Marshal H.B. Godwin argued that 
the Sabres should be given a nuclear weapons carrying capability.  In response, the CAS agreed that the CF-100 and 
the CF-105 interceptors would both have the capability to carry nuclear weapons. 
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political dimension – certainly no one even contemplated the withdrawal of the Air Division.67  
The commitment of the Air Division in 1951 to NATO in Europe was based on the perception of 
a real threat coupled with the weakness of the other NATO European states.  The duration of that 
commitment had been left open at the time, though there was perhaps a very vague 
understanding that it would be withdrawn as the other NATO nations recovered economically 
thus allowing them to do more for their own defence.  Fourth, there was the RCAF bureaucracy 
that understandably promoted the Big Air Force concept that had been realized in no small part 
by the deployment of No. 1 Air Division to Europe.  If returned to Canada, the Air Division most 
likely would be disbanded.  Fifth, the production of a new aircraft would provide the Canadian 
aircraft industry with contracts to offset the impending end of Sabre and CF-100 production. 
 In 1954, the Air Council noted that the North American F-100 Super Sabre, the first US 
supersonic fighter then entering service with the USAF, might be a suitable replacement for the 
existing Air Division fighter aircraft, though nothing came of this proposal.68 Despite the 
difficulties associated with continuing the air defence role, for some time the CF-105 Arrow had 
also been considered as a fighter replacement for the Air Division.   
  The strike reconnaissance role had been proposed to the St. Laurent government in 1956.  
The government, in McLin’s words, “received the proposal unenthusiastically and, like other 
defence matters, postponed it until after the election.”69 It was not simply a matter of whether or 
not the Air Division should adopt the strike role, as SACEUR had recommended that this role be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Roy Rempel, Counterweights: The Failure of Canada’s German and European Policy, 1955-1995, Montreal and 
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1996, p. 27.  The future of the Air Division remained uncertain despite 
Campney’s statement, in February 1957 that, “No replacement was planned for the F-86 aircraft.  Once it became 
obsolete there would be little point in continuing to station the Air Division in France and Germany.” 
68 DHH 73/1223, File 1825, Minutes of the 204th Meeting of Air Members, 4 October 1954.  This discussion 
revolved around replacement of the Sabre in the air superiority/air defence role.  The F-104 was also suggested, 
though the aircraft was still in development, the prototype’s first flight had been 4 March 1954. 
69 McLin, p. 116. 
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adopted in addition to the existing air defence role.  This proposal was not acceptable on the 
grounds “that the assumption of two roles would be inconsistent with the agreed concept of 
balanced collective forces...[and]…a change to a strike role would involve substantial changes in 
the organization, and re-equipment of the Air Division.”70 The Liberal government had no 
objection, in principle, to adopting the strike role, based on the assumption of dropping the air 
defence role, but additional defence expenditures were not acceptable.71 By 1957, re-equipment 
of the Air Division was recognized as a priority issue, but similar, as with Air Defence 
Command re-equipment, the Liberal government made no decision prior to its defeat in the June 
1957 election, leaving the matter to the new Progressive Conservative government.   
 At the NATO Heads of State meeting held 16-18 December 1957, attended by Prime 
Minister Diefenbaker, the government agreed to the principle of arming NATO forces in Europe 
with tactical nuclear warheads.72 At this meeting, Defence Minister Pearkes stated,  
One of our major decisions to be taken is the re-equipment and future role of the 
Canadian Air Division in Europe.  This is not an easy decision to take, as long as 
there are unsettled issues concerning the equipment of our air force in the air defence 
of North America.  These unresolved issues relating both to the defence of 
Canada/United States region, and to our commitments in Europe, naturally have a 
very important bearing on finance.73 
 
The Air Staff studied the requirements for the strike-reconnaissance role between January 
1958 and July 1959 and made a number of submissions to the Chiefs of Staff Committee.  The 
adoption of the strike-reconnaissance role was never in doubt, but as these studies progressed, it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 DHH 73/1223 Series 1, Box 21, File 363, “Future of Canadian Air Division,” Letter from Under-Secretary of 
State for External Affairs to Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, 19 November 1958. 
71 Ibid. 
72 The larger background to the difficulties surrounding NATO strategy are contained in the report by the Canadian 
NATO Ambassador Dana Wilgress, DHH 73/1223, Series 1, Box 21, File 363, “The Present Position of NATO,” 15 
October 1957. 
73 DHH 73/1223, Series 1, Box 149, File 464, Memorandum “Re-Equipment of the Air Division – SHAPE Planning 
Guidance 1957,” 5 February 1959. 
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became obvious that the government wanted to undertake the commitment at the most 
economical cost.  The days of “nothing but the best” for the Big Air Force were now over.74  In 
the RCAF studies, twenty-one various aircraft were apparently considered for the strike role.75 
The Allied Command Europe Minimum Force Studies 58/63 indicated a Canadian air 
contribution of one strike and three attack squadrons, and eight all-weather fighter squadrons by 
1961.76 The RCAF, viewing the air defence role as no longer suitable, preferred to focus on the 
strike role: 
(a) It is a direct contribution to the deterrent, the basis of our strategy. 
(b) The Air Division will remain as a unified command which might not be so if we 
retain aircraft of a basically air defence design. 
(c) It will avoid the complications involving in developing an air defence system on 
an international basis.  It will be some time before the inherent organizational and 
control difficulties in setting up such a system are overcome.77 
 
  The initial RCAF study to re-equip the Air Division, submitted in January 1958, 
proposed eight squadrons with a total of 200 F-105B Thunderchief aircraft to be acquired at a 
cost of $750 million, that number also including additional aircraft for the Operational Training 
Unit, pipeline and attrition spares. This proposal represented an expensive option utilizing a 
heavy supersonic strike fighter.  The submission to the Chiefs of Staff Committee noted, 
“acceptance of the strike role would involve Governmental policy on the use of atomic 
weapons….”78 A subsequent submission classified the various aircraft types into strike/attack 
aircraft, lightweight strike fighter, conventional and lightweight reconnaissance aircraft 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 See “F-104G Contract Decision Defines Government Policy” (Editorial), Canadian Aviation, Vol. 32, No. 9, 
September 1959.  In its rejection of such aircraft as the F-105 and the F-4 Phantom in favour of its ultimate 
selection, the F-104G, the government sought the cheapest option to re-equip the Air Division. 
75 However, many of these aircraft were merely “strawmen” for the programme, being unsuitable, extremely costly 
or unavailable.  The serious contenders were the Grumman Super Tiger, Lockheed F-104G Starfighter, F-105 
Thunderchief, McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom, and the Northrop N156F. 
76 DHH 73/1223, Series 1, Box 149, File 464, S096-11-66/1 (CAS), Future Role and Re-Equipment of No. 1 Air 
Division, 28 January 1958. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
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categories.79 Further analysis on the future role and re-equipping of the Air Division examined a 
number of options including a comparison of the Northrop N156F (eventually to become the F-
5) and the Republic F105, land-based Polaris IRBMs, strike and reconnaissance versions of the 
Avro Arrow, modification of the Sabre for the strike role, and Sabre and CF-100 improvements 
to allow for the continuation of the air defence role.80 On 8 April 1958, General Foulkes and the 
Chiefs of Staff briefed Minister Pearkes on the subject.81 In discussion, the CAS noted that given 
the obsolescence of the existing aircraft, a continuation of the air defence role was not a 
consideration.  Interestingly, General Foulkes noted “there was little use in spending the 
Canadian defence dollar in putting more high performance, high altitude aircraft on permanent 
runways in Europe.  These could be destroyed very easily by missile attack with very little 
notice.”82 Rather than a large sophisticated aircraft such as the F-105B, the Northrop N156F 
seemed a more sensible option.  It was noted, however, 
that the N156F still required the use of runways and might only be useful as an interim solution.  
After this briefing, it was decided to defer any decisions on Air Division re-equipment until the 
Fall 1958.83 By November 1958, the RCAF had refined its requirement based on the need for a 
low-level flying aircraft to penetrate enemy territory rather than a high altitude aircraft. The 
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roles.  The NATO Lightweight Fighter Competition had begun in 1954, with the winning aircraft being announced 
in 1958 as the Italian Fiat G.91 much to the chagrin of the French who believed that any of their three entries was 
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Combat Prototypes, Chapter 17, “Lightweight Fighters,” and Pierre M. Gallois, “Lighter, Slower, Cheaper: NATO’s 
Light Strike Fighter Programme,” Interavia, Vol. XII, No. 9, September 1957. 
80 DHH 73/1223, Series 1, Box 149, File 464, S096-100-66/1, Supporting Data for Chiefs of Staff Committee – 
Future Role and Re-equipment of No. 1 Air Division RCAF, 28 February 1958.  This information was briefed to the 
MND on 8 April 1958. 
81 DHH 73/1223, Series 1, Box 149, File 464, S096-100-66/1 (VCAS), Aide-Memoire – Future Role and Re-
equipping of No. 1 Air Division, 10 April 1958. 
82 Ibid. 
83 DHH 73/1223, Series 1, Box 149, File 464, “Re-equipping of the Air Division,” Synopsis of Briefing to MND on 
8 April 1958, Author unknown, but most likely Colonel Raymont, Staff Officer to Chairman, Chiefs of Staff 
Committee, 9 April 1958. 
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RCAF had narrowed its focus on an examination of the N156F, the Grumman F11F-1F Super 
Tiger and the Blackburn NA 39 Buccaneer.84 Concurrently, the Department of External Affairs 
was engaged in a campaign “to avoid creating any impression, either in Canada or abroad, that 
consideration is being given to the withdrawal of the Air Division from Europe.”85 Shortly 
thereafter on 3 December 1958, when the RCAF had re-examined the commitment for the Air 
Division to conduct both the strike/attack and all-weather interceptor roles, it was determined 
that this was a feasible commitment utilizing one type of aircraft for both roles.86   The preferred 
aircraft was now the Grumman Super Tiger to equip twelve squadrons each with a Unit 
Establishment of eighteen aircraft.87  The total requirement was identified as 340 aircraft to equip 
the Air Division squadrons, the Operational Training Unit, pipeline and attrition aircraft.  The 
Super Tiger would be built under license with a programme cost of $645 million.88 By 23 
January 1959, the Minister had recommended to Cabinet that 214 Super Tiger fighters be 
procured, but only to replace the eight Sabre squadrons at a cost of  $367 million.  The CF-100 
squadrons were not to be re-equipped.89 In February 1959, the cost for the proposed Super Tiger 
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programme was revised at $452 million, this significant increase suggesting that the Super Tiger 
was not the “cheap” solution to re-equipping the Air Division.90 
 During March 1959 while a decision on re-equipping the Air Division appeared 
imminent, two occurrences added to the intrigue and friction associated with the impending 
government decision.  First, there was the letter from Major General George Kitching, 
Commander of the Canadian Joint Staff at the High Commission in London to General Foulkes 
relating his recent unofficial discussions with various NATO air force officers specialized in air 
defence.  From these discussions, Kitching recommended, “that in considering the re-equipment 
of the Air Division we do not in any way [underlining in original letter] get mixed up in the Air 
Defence side of NATO.”91 This recommendation was based on the views of these NATO 
officers that the NATO air defence system would not function and would result in a “bottomless 
pit into which vast sums of NATO funds will be wasted.”92 The second event was the unsolicited 
proposal submitted by Air Vice Marshal (Retired) John Plant from Avro Canada proposing the 
licensed production of the Republic F-105 Thunderchief powered with the Iroquois engine (the 
engine intended for the Arrow Mk. 2) to re-equip the Air Division now that the Avro CF-105 
Arrow programme had been cancelled.93 In response to the Minister, the CAS provided a 
comparison between the F105 and the Super Tiger, noting, “the RCAF prefers the Grumman 
Super Tiger as it offers the best compromise between operational capability on the one hand and 
budgetary limitations on the other.”94 The Memorandum to the Cabinet, dated 5 June 1959, 
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recommended that either the Grumman Super Tiger (the first choice) or the Lockheed F104G 
(second choice) be selected to re-equip the Sabre squadrons in the Air Division:    
Both are high performance aircraft but the F11F-1F has superior flying 
characteristics for low-level strike operations.  The Super Tiger is more flexible 
also in terms of the weapons that it can carry without serious degradation of 
performance.  In addition, the Super Tiger is much better suited for short field 
operations and can be launched by catapult and recovered with arrestor gear.  It 
can, therefore, be operated from shorter runways and a greater variety of 
airfields.95 
 
It appears that there was some vacillation on the part of the Cabinet in making a final decision on 
this expensive re-equipment programme, as the CAS with the concurrence of the Chairman, 
Chiefs of Staff, submitted a memorandum to the Minister two weeks later on 18 June regarding 
the “military need for a decision now on the re-equipping of the air division.”96 At the Cabinet 
meeting the next day, approval was granted for the procurement of 214 aircraft to re-equip the 
Air Division, based on either the Grumman F11F-1F Super Tiger or the Lockheed F104G.97  
The result of a subsequent discussion between the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, the CAS, and 
the DND Deputy Minister, Frank Miller, with the Deputy Minister of the Department of Defence 
Production, David Golden, recommended that the RCAF adopt the F104G for the strike-
reconnaissance role in the Air Division.98  This recommendation was based on the notion of 
greater prospects for reduced costs through shared development and increased production with 
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Division – Designation of Replacement Aircraft, 29 June 1959, and Chairman, Chiefs of Staff to the Minister, Re-
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the F104G rather than the Super Tiger.99  At the 2 July 1959 Cabinet meeting, the government 
approved the procurement of the Lockheed F104G to replace the Sabre fighters in the Air 
Division.100 The cost to procure the CF-104 was $464 million consisting of 200 single-seat CF-
104 strike fighters and thirty-eight CF-104D two-seat trainers.101  The Canadian decision was 
greatly influenced by the West German approval to procure the F104G in December 1958.  Once 
the West Germans had selected the F-104G, it seemed logical at the time that the smaller NATO 
countries would follow suit.102 Though the F104 had originally been designed as a lightweight 
interceptor, the F-104G was specifically developed as a multi-role fighter designed for nuclear 
strike, conventional attack, reconnaissance, and air defence roles.103  In the case of the Canadian 
version, however, the CF-104 was a single-role aircraft, limited to the nuclear strike role in 
Europe.104 The procurement of a specialized aircraft that had no operational role in Canada or 
elsewhere proved to be an expensive decision.  Its selection complicated and increased training 
and logistics costs, as there was still a requirement to maintain another type of fighter aircraft in 
Canada for the air defence role.  The procurement of the CF-104 did at least keep the production 
lines at Canadair open, and additional F-104s were produced for other NATO air forces and paid 
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for by the US Mutual Aid Program.105 In contrast, the Grumman F11F-1F Super Tiger, the 
original preference of the RCAF, had been lauded for its multi-role capability for both air 
defence and strike roles.  In addition, the Super Tiger was portrayed as a suitable aircraft for 
employment on UN operations in other parts of the world.106  The selection of a multi-role 
aircraft would have provided increased flexibility to the RCAF in the deployment of its fighter 
squadrons for use with NORAD at home, with NATO in Europe or supporting UN operations in 
other parts of the world.   
The decision to re-role the Air Division from air defence to strike-reconnaissance, a role 
that by definition implied the use of nuclear weapons, was the principal issue regarding Air 
Division re-equipment. The RCAF had rejected alternative roles such as air transport or 
offensive bombing and there was no requirement for such a role from the Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe (SACEUR).  The SACEUR, General Norstad did not consider the 
withdrawal of the air division as being an option, based on the direct military value of the air 
division and “the example it set for the smaller European nations as the kind of efficient military 
contribution that was within the capacity of small countries to make.”107 When Pearkes 
announced the new strike-reconnaissance role for the RCAF on 2 July 1959, no mention was 
made of nuclear weapons.108 The RCAF Public Relations branch also obfuscated the issue of 
CF-104 armament by stating:  
 
The CF-111 [the original nomenclature for the CF-104] will be capable of carrying a 
wide variety of weapons: any decision as to which of these weapons will be selected 
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is classified….a recent Lockheed News release on this aircraft described it as being 
capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear weapons.”109  
 
It was not only the fact that the RCAF had acquired the CF-104 for a purely nuclear strike role 
that remained obscure, but it was also the size of the potential nuclear weapons that could be 
used by the CF-104, with warhead yields ranging from twenty kilotons to one megaton, a fact 
that did not become public until 1998.110 
 The first Canadair-built CF-104 rolled off the production line in May 1961, and No. 6 
(Strike and Reconnaissance) Operational Training Unit was established at Cold Lake to train 
pilots on the CF-104.111 The first CF-104 squadron was formed on 17 December 1962 with the 
last of the eight CF-104 squadrons being formed in March 1964, making a total of 160 CF-104 
aircraft in the division.112   Due to indecision in the Diefenbaker government about accepting the 
nuclear weapons needed to make the CF-104s effective weapons of war, the aircraft were sitting 
unarmed on their airfields in West Germany and France as rather expensive and useless pieces of 
flying equipment.113  With the election of the Kennedy administration that placed a renewed 
emphasis on conventional weapons, the utility of the strike-reconnaissance role was being 
questioned in Canadian defence policy discussions.  In 1962, even as the Air Division was re-
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equipping with the CF-104, defence commentator John Gellner noted that the “F-104 was 
strategically obsolete.”114 The Gellner article in Canadian Aviation evoked discussion at NDHQ 
with the Air Staff rebuking the contents of the article.115 The Liberal party had previously flip-
flopped on the issue of the acquisition of nuclear weapons for the Canadian Forces.  In 1959, 
Pearson suggested that tactical nuclear weapons should be treated as conventional weapons.116 
Later, in 1960 and 1961, the Liberal party opposed nuclear weapons and the strike-
reconnaissance role.117 For the NATO role, the Liberal Party was in favour of cancelling the CF-
104 strike programme and obtaining conventionally armed ground support aircraft that could 
directly support the Canadian brigade group in West Germany.118 
Air Transport Command Re-equipment 
 While the “sharp end” of the RCAF focused on the creation of a “nuclear air force,” Air 
Transport Command underwent a modernization programme that improved its effectiveness and 
versatility to support peacekeeping operations.119 In 1960, the RCAF received its first four 
Lockheed C-130B Hercules turboprop transports at a cost of $14 million with the ability to 
handle out-size cargo.120  The RCAF also received the first four of eight De Havilland Canada 
CC-108 Caribou tactical transports that year with the intention of deploying them with the 
United Nations in the Congo (UNOC).121 The Caribous were not used in the Congo, but they did 
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replace the Dakota transports serving with No. 115 Air Transport Unit in Egypt with UNEF.122 
In 1958, the RCAF did not originally want to procure the CC-108, and it was the Canadian Army 
that was willing to provide the funding for eleven aircraft to conduct trials using the Caribou, 
along with helicopters, for re-supply of units operating in forward areas, particularly on the 
nuclear battlefield.  Eventually, the Air Council agreed to cooperate with the Canadian Army on 
Caribou trials.123  To replace its Dakota wartime medium transports, No. 412 Squadron at 
Uplands was re-equipped in 1960 with the Canadair CC-109 Cosmopolitan, a turbo-prop engine 
version of the Convair 440 twin-engine airliner, at a cost of $23 million.   
In October 1961, No. 437 (Transport) Squadron was formed in Trenton equipped with the 
four-turboprop engine CC-106 Yukon long range transport that represented a quantum leap in 
capability compared to the North Star that it was replacing, but it still had its limitations, 
particularly as it was dependent on airfield handling equipment to load and unload cargo using 
its side doors.124  This was in contrast to the Hercules with its rear-loading ramp that facilitated 
ease in cargo handling.  Another criticism of the Yukon was the fact it was a turboprop airliner 
entering RCAF service at a time when jet transports were about to make their entry into the 
skies.  One RCAF air transport officer who later served as Commanding Officer of No. 437 
Squadron, subsequently wrote:  
The air staff view was that since we were already operating the Comet jet transport 
and Boeing and Douglas were about to launch the 707 and DC-8 respectively, the 
obvious course for a new logistics transport should be a fast, high capacity, jet-
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powered aircraft….A political decision had been made that another version of the 
Bristol Britannia…would be built at Canadair, thus solving the political and 
aerospace industries problem while relegating the military to making do with an 
aircraft that was destined to be obsolete before the first aircraft rolled off the 
production line.125 
 
It was not only a matter of falling behind the procurement of modern technology, but the type of 
aircraft being acquired.  For the same expenditure as the Cosmopolitan procurement, Air 
Transport Command could have added another six C-130 Hercules transports that would have 
provided more flexibility than the Cosmopolitan airliners.  Given the requirement to operate 
transports on rough field operations, pure airliner types such as the Cosmopolitan and Yukon 
were the wrong type of aircraft for Air Transport Command. 
The Carpenter Report versus the Nuclear Air Force 
In February 1961, the Air Council authorized the establishment of the Special Studies 
Group on Long Range Objectives for the RCAF with the aim of developing long-range strategic 
guidance for the RCAF beyond ten years in the future.126  This RCAF initiative was nothing 
novel as both the RCN and the Canadian Army had conducted similar studies, and with the 
introduction of new roles and equipment, it was appropriate to examine the future of air power in 
the next decade.127  In June 1961, Air Commodore Fred Carpenter was appointed Chief of 
Special Studies, reporting directly to the CAS, Air Marshal Campbell.128 
There were a number of inter-related developments coalescing to create the “perfect 
storm” for the air force in planning its future.  First, fiscal constraint and reductions in defence 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Lieutenant-General David R. Adamson (Retired), “The Yukon Saga,” Air Force Magazine, Vol. 33, No. 3, Fall 
2009, p. 30.  Adamson directed the same criticism regarding political and industrial decision-making towards the 
procurement of the Canadair Cosmopolitan airliner that replaced the Dakota transport in Air Transport Command. 
126 See Bertram Frandsen, “Air Vice Marshal Fred Carpenter and the RCAF Vision,” Unpublished paper presented 
at the 14th Annual Air Force Historical Workshop, 24-25 September 2008, Kanata, Ontario.  
127 See The Roundel, Vol. 13, No. 6, July-August 1961.  The entire issue of The Roundel was devoted to the ongoing 
changes in the RCAF over the past year 1960-61. 
128 Carpenter had completed five years as the AOC Air Transport Command that including extensive involvement in 
both the Suez and Congo operations. 
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spending had been the principal drivers in the defence programme since the Progressive 
Conservative government ascension to power in 1957. The Golden Age of the RCAF had ended, 
and the service was now receiving less funding in absolute terms and also in its share of the 
defence budget.  As well, much of the budget was allocated to personnel and operations costs, 
with a declining amount available for capital expenditures – this at a time of major re-equipment 
for the RCAF.  This had a tremendous impact on the “strategy without dollars” approach of the 
Progressive Conservative government.  There was the strategic dissonance regarding defence 
policy associated with the Diefenbaker government that was to worsen and eventually contribute 
to its defeat and the return of the Liberals in 1963.  This represented the “defence debacle” 
arising from confusion and obfuscation over the Avro Arrow cancellation, and acquisition of 
nuclear delivery systems in the form of the CF-104 for the Air Division and the Voodoo and 
BOMARC for Air Defence Command.  The bulk of RCAF capital expenditures were allocated 
for procurement of these nuclear delivery systems – but without their nuclear weapons!   Budget 
pressures were exacerbated by cost overruns on the Avro Arrow programme that resulted in 
reduced procurement for the Argus maritime patrol aircraft and Yukon transports. At the 1959 
AOC Conference, Air Vice Marshal Cornblat, the RCAF Comptroller, commented, “we have an 
estimated $315 million available to undertake an estimated $840 million of new programme.”129  
The Report of the Special Studies Group on Long Range Objectives for the RCAF was 
submitted to the CAS on 29 June 1962 where it was promptly filed away in a classified filing 
cabinet.130 Referred to as the “Carpenter Report,” this study proposed an alternative future for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 DHH 73/1223, Series 3, Subseries 14, Box 102, File 2002, Minutes of a Conference of Air Officers Commanding 
and Air Officers, 17-19 March 1959, Appendix F – Distribution of Resources 1959-64 AOC Conference – Address 
by Air Vice Marshal I.C. Cornblat, Comptroller, 18 March 1959, p. 2. 
130 DHH 73/1223, Series 3, Subseries 13, Box 90, File 1819, Royal Canadian Air Force Report of the Special 
Studies Group on Long Range Objectives for the RCAF, June 1962.  See also Colonel (Ret’d) Fred Carpenter, “The 
RCAF	  Report That Wasn’t,” Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 3, No. 2, Summer 2002, and Paul Hellyer, Damn the 
Torpedoes: My Fight to Unify Canada’s Armed Forces, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Inc, 1990, pp. 109-110. 
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RCAF in contrast to the actual approach being pursued in the early 1960s.  The Carpenter Report 
presented the RCAF with a Mitchell “anything that flies” approach to air power that contrasted 
with the prevailing RCAF focus on creating the “Douhet with nukes” air force.  The report 
identified the Soviet Union as the main military threat, but the danger of total war was deemed to 
be slight, and if it did occur, it would be the result of the escalation of a minor conflict.131 The 
new threat emanating from numerous so-called “brushfire” conflicts around the world required 
highly flexible and mobile conventional armed military forces, including air forces, capable of a 
full spectrum of operations ranging from providing technical advice, performing police actions, 
monitoring truce agreements, organizing and engaging in guerilla activity to fighting in limited 
wars.132 In order to meet the requirements for this type of conflict, the report proposed a revised 
RCAF force structure that featured multi-purpose combat aircraft and a tremendous increase in 
tactical and strategic transport capabilities.133  The proposed future RCAF force structure is 
summarized at Table 6-2 below. 
Table 6-2: Possible Composition of the RCAF – 1970s 
Ref: Report of the Special Studies Group on Long Range Objectives for the RCAF, June 
1962 
Tactical Air Command Strike, close support, recce 
and air defence 
12 sqns – STOL multi-
purpose combat aircraft 
Tactical transport 8 sqns – tactical transport. 4 
sqns – heavy helicopter 
Air Defence Command Air Defence 3 sqns - STOL multi-
purpose combat aircraft 
(additional sqns  to come 
from TAC) 
Air Defence 2 sqns - BOMARC 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 Report of the Special Studies Group on Long Range Objectives for the RCAF, p. 12. 
132 Ibid. p. 15.  See also Robert Saundby, “Air Power in Limited Wars,” The Royal United Services Institute Journal, 
Vol. CIII, No. 611, August 1958. 
133 Report of the Special Studies Group on Long Range Objectives for the RCAF, pp. 25-28. 
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Air Division (Resources 
assigned from TAC) 
Strike, close support, recce 
and air defence 
3 sqns - STOL multi-
purpose combat aircraft 
Tactical Transport 2 sqns – tactical transport 
1 sqn – heavy helicopter 
Air Transport Command Strategic transport  5 sqns – heavy transport 
Special transport 1 sqn – special transport 
Flight refuelling 1 sqn – jet refuelling 
Long range recce 1 sqn – long recce 
Maritime Air Command Maritime patrol 3 sqns – maritime patrol 
Training Command Training RCAF and foreign aid 
Air Materiel Command Support Task Force support 
 
In the case of the multi-purpose combat aircraft, it was to be available in two versions – air 
defence and tactical support, capable of using both conventional and nuclear armament.  It would 
be two-crew, two-engine, capable of Mach 2.35, and the tactical version would ideally have a 
Vertical Take-Off and Landing (VTOL) capability.  The estimated cost of the multi-purpose 
combat aircraft was $2.5 million.134 The report also included the required characteristics for the 
strategic and tactical transports.135 This report was not intended for implementation in isolation, 
as it noted that discussions were required with DND and the other services in order to proceed to 
the next level.  The Tactical Air Command was seen as the centerpiece of the new air force 
reflecting changes that had already occurred in the USAF and RAF.136 Some of the ideas 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 Ibid. p. 32. 
135 Ibid.  pp. 33-35.  See also R.G. Husch, “Future Long Range Air Transport in the RCAF,” Air Force College 
Journal, 1964.  In this article, Squadron Leader Husch discussed a replacement for the Yukon and Hercules 
transports, noting that the C-141 was unable to utilize semi-prepared runways.  Husch noted the growing importance 
of airlift in the military strategy for brushfire wars. 
136 In the case of the USAF, the Composite Air Strike Force was equipped with a variety of combat aircraft and 
transports to rapidly deploy overseas.  See Henry P. Viccellio, “Composite Air Strike Force,” Air University Review, 
Vol. IX, No. 1, Winter 1956-57, and Henry Viccellio, “The Composite Air Strike Force 1958,” Air University 
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contained in the report had been earlier raised by Carpenter during discussions at the annual 
AOC Conference which he attended in his capacity as AOC Air Transport Command.  For 
example, at the 1960 AOC Conference, Carpenter commented, “I would suggest two fairly 
extreme courses of action for the armed forces.  First – in the RCAF we should use what 
influence we have to achieve a single service.  Second, we should admit that we have no large 
offensive capability and we should, in fact, go along with what is likely to be the most probable 
policy of our government – that we should not have atomic weapons.”137  He recommended that 
the RCAF should obtain conventionally armed strike-reconnaissance aircraft.138  Carpenter also 
suggested decreases in the size of Air Defence Command and Maritime Air Command.139 At the 
1961 AOC Conference, Carpenter proposed an increase in the number of transport squadrons and 
questioned the utility of the strike-reconnaissance role for the CF-104.140 Looking ahead ten 
years to the future design of the forces, he suggested that the ability to fight a limited war needed 
consideration.141 Referring to his experiences in planning transport operations for Suez and the 
Congo, Carpenter suggested that the RCAF was reluctant to provide additional support to the 
UN.142  
In bureaucratic terms, the submission of the Carpenter Report on 29 June 1962 to the 
CAS, Air Marshal Campbell, could not have come at a worst time.  DND, including the RCAF, 
was subject to further reductions in expenditures for FY 1962/63.  Overall government spending 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Review, Vol. XI, No. 2, Summer 1959.  For the RAF, No. 38 Group was re-established within Transport Command 
on 1 Janauary1960 equipped with Hunter jet fighters, tactical transports and helicopters to provide close air support 
and tactical mobility to deployed troops in the Strategic Reserve.  See N. Cameron, “The 38 Group Concept,” The 
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138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid.  
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was to be reduced by $250 million, including $67 million for DND.  Of that amount, the RCAF 
share was $29 million representing a 4.1 per cent reduction.143 Campbell retired in September 
replaced as CAS by Air Marshal C.R. “Larry” Dunlap.  Dunlap had joined the RCAF in 1928, 
serving as the Director of Armament at AFHQ during the early part of the war 1939-42 and then 
overseas commanding a bomber wing and station until May 1945.  After the war, Dunlap 
returned to AFHQ as the Deputy Air Member for Air Staff and then Air Member Air Plans until 
1948.  He was then appointed the Air Officer Commanding North-West Air Command, 1949-
1951, Commandant National Defence College 1951-1954, Vice Chief of the Air Staff 1954-1958 
and afterwards DCOS Operations at SHAPE.144 The new CAS had to contend with the ongoing 
crises that by this time had engulfed the Canadian government and at the same time run an air 
force.  The October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the crisis in Diefenbaker’s government 
overshadowed any interest in alternative RCAF force structures.  However, many of Carpenter’s 
ideas and the proposals in the “Carpenter Report” would influence the defence policy of the 
subsequent Liberal government of Lester Pearson. 
In the 18 June 1962 Federal election, Diefenbaker’s Progressive Conservatives won with 
less than 20,000 votes over Pearson’s Liberals, and his enormous 1958 victory was reduced to a 
minority government.  Confusion over defence matters continued to plague the government, and 
this was readily apparent to most Canadians with the government’s inept response to the Cuban 
Missile Crisis in October 1962.  The imbroglio continued with the public announcements of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 DHH 73/1223, File 1863, Comptroller’s Briefing to Members of Air Council and Visiting AOCs on 1962-63 
Budget Reductions, 11 July 1962, p. 2. A casualty of this reduction was the disbandment of No. 426 Squadron 
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retiring SACEUR, General Norstad and the US government in January 1963 regarding nuclear 
weapons, along with the ongoing dissension within Cabinet.  In the meantime, the Liberal Party 
conducted a volte-face on its nuclear weapons policy with Pearson’s famous Scarborough speech 
of 12 January 1963. The Liberal party perspective on nuclear weapons could be characterized, to 
paraphrase the words of Mackenzie King (on another defence topic), “nuclear weapons if 
necessary, but not necessarily nuclear weapons.”145 
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Chapter 7 
Twilight for Canadian Air Power - The Liberals Return 1963-1968 
Introduction 
The Pearson years should have represented a period of renewal and reappraisal for the 
Big Air Force concept, but, ultimately, other factors intervened.  These included the confusion 
and chaos resulting from the integration/unification of the armed forces, and the continuing 
decline in defence expenditures exacerbated by the continuation of existing military 
commitments whilst introducing new military roles. The election of the Trudeau government in 
1968 brought a defence review that confirmed the decline and foreshadowed the demise of the 
Big Air Force concept.  Despite some small improvements in the air power equation (particularly 
in air transport), the overall result of the Liberal defence policies between 1963 and 1968 
qualifies this period as a continuation of the “defence debacle.”1 In terms of the three pillars of 
politics and economics, strategy and technology, the Liberal government proved to be more 
politically decisive than its predecessor.  However, it was also constrained by fiscal realities that 
considered with the existing strategic and technological factors, limited the Liberal government’s 
freedom of action in the undertaking of a new policy direction.  
The Liberal minority government elected in April 1963 fulfilled Pearson’s campaign 
promise by allowing the RCAF to equip its nuclear weapon delivery systems with their warheads 
in order to make them useful.  By this time the United States, under the Kennedy administration, 
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recognized the need for larger and better-equipped conventional armed forces to deal with  
"limited wars," an approach that resulted in a changed NATO doctrine of Flexible Response in 
1967.2 Flexible Response was based on the concept of maintaining sufficient conventional forces 
that would act as a tripwire in the event of Soviet aggression and only then would the use of 
nuclear weapons be considered. The Carpenter Report, as we have seen, had sketched out a non-
nuclear future for the RCAF, including strategic and tactical transport in support of such 
missions as United Nations peacekeeping.  Although these ideas had attracted little support in the 
Air Staff, they were in tune with approaches favoured by Paul Hellyer, the Liberal defence 
minister. His programme, however, was undercut by the declining defence budget.    
Shrinking budgets hit hardest at capital funding, and essential support to the Canadian 
aircraft industry whose diminished capacity weakened the sustainability of the Big Air Force 
concept.  This represented a great contrast to the heyday of the 1950s that had seen the Avro CF-
100 and CF-105, and the Canadair Sabre, North Star, Yukon and Argus.  During the period 1950-
1958, Canadian industry had produced 1,815 Sabre, 692 CF-100 and 656 T-33 jet aircraft, a total 
of 3,163 aircraft.  In comparison, during the period 1961-1974 production consisted of 340 CF-
104/F-104G, 240 CF-5 and 210 Tutor jet aircraft for a total of only 790 aircraft.  The production 
of military jet aircraft then ceased with the completion of Canadair CF-5 Freedom Fighter 
production in 1974.3  David Golden, President of the Air Industries Association of Canada, was 
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more prophetic than he realized when in 1964 he testified that the outlook for the industry was 
uncertain.4 
Defence Review 1963 
 Though defence issues had been in the public spotlight throughout 1962 and 1963, they 
were not at the top of the Pearson government’s agenda.5 Under the new Liberal administration 
the defence budget accounted for less than twenty five per cent of federal expenditures compared 
to fifty per cent during St. Laurent’s tenure.6  
Hellyer, the minister, was a wilful individual with strong ideas.  His appointment was to 
have dire consequences for the Big Air Force concept, though he is better remembered as the 
minister who instigated the unification of the armed forces.   Hellyer’s views on air power grew 
from his time at the Northrop Aeronautical Institute, his wartime RCAF service, his post-war 
experience as Associate MND and as the Official Opposition defence critic.7 Defence 
commentator John Gellner also influenced his views.8  Hellyer was opposed to the creation of a 
“nuclear-armed air force,” and as Official Opposition defence critic, Hellyer had been a 
vociferous opponent of the CF-104 and the strike-reconnaissance role for the Air Division.  He 
distrusted the senior Air Force leadership, a perspective that was to determine his approach to re-
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equipment of the RCAF.9  Rather than acquiescing to the RCAF leadership’s desire to acquire 
new and expensive multi-role combat aircraft, Hellyer preferred spending the limited DND 
capital resources on an increased number of transport aircraft and a more simple ground support 
aircraft suitable for operations in Third World conflicts but for not fighting in the NATO Central 
Region in Europe.10 
To present the new minority government in a positive light as a government that got 
things done, there were the “60 days of decision” after the Liberals assumed power in March 
1963, including addressing a number of outstanding defence issues.11 An early undertaking was 
the necessary negotiations with the US government for the acquisition of the nuclear warheads 
for the delivery systems already procured. The BOMARC was the first weapons system to 
receive its warhead by 31 December 1963, while the CF-104s in the Air Division and the Air 
Defence Command CF-101 interceptors received their nuclear weapons during 1964.12 
The new government also conducted an internal Defence Review under the leadership of 
Dr. R.J. Sutherland, Chief of Operational Research at the Defence Research Board.13 An early 
submission by Dr. Sutherland on 5 July 1963 reviewed the RCAF proposal recommending the 
procurement of sixty-six additional CF-104 aircraft at a cost of  $91 million to offset attrition 
losses and maintain the Air Division at an operational strength of eight squadrons with 144 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Hellyer, p. 34. 
10 Ibid. 
11 John English, The Worldly Years: The Life of Lester Pearson Volume II: 1949-1972, Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf 
Canada, 1992, pp. 270-271. 
12 Ibid.  Part of the Liberal Party platform had been to negotiate to obtain the nuclear weapons in order to meet 
Canadian commitments as implied by the acquisition of these various nuclear delivery weapons systems, but then to 
also negotiate Canada out of being nuclear-equipped.  In the case of the CF-104 and BOMARC, this was achieved in 
1972, but the Genie nuclear rockets carried by the CF-101 continued in service until retired in 1984.  
13 The other Ad Hoc Committee members consisted of A.C. Grant, DM’s staff, Captain V.J. Wilgress, RCN, 
Brigadier D.A.G. Waldock, Canadian Army, Group Captain J.K.F. MacDonald, RCAF and Group Captain C.H. 
Mussells, RCAF. 
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aircraft.14 The study noted that strike forces were limited by the vulnerability of their airfields to 
Soviet missile attacks and the vulnerability of low-flying aircraft to air defences.  No alternative 
equipment for the Air Division would be available before 1969, and it was thought that after this 
period, a replacement for the strike role would consist of MRBMs or V/STOL aircraft not 
dependent on airfields.  Airfield vulnerability was not a new issue as the Chairman, Chiefs of 
Staff Committee, General Foulkes, had raised it back in 1959 when the selection of the strike-
reconnaissance aircraft was under discussion.15 
 The Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Defence Policy, referred to as the Sutherland 
Report, was submitted to the government on 30 September 1963.16  The Report suggested that 
there was no logical rationale for the existing size of the defence budget, noting that it had 
peaked during the defence build-up of 1951-54 and had been in decline ever since.17 It was the 
Report’s view that Canadian strategy had been essentially based on alliance planning resulting in 
a force structure aimed at fulfilling alliance commitments.18  As well, the Report noted that the 
defence of Canada had to be considered within the context of the defence of North America, as 
there was no separate threat against Canada.19 Priority issues for the RCAF included replacement 
aircraft for the CF-101 and the Argus during the 1968-73 timeframe and for the CF-104 during 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 The CF-104 Follow-On Order, 5 July 1963. 
15 DHH 73/1223 Series 3, Subseries 14, Box 103, File 2008B, Record of Proceedings of the 1962 Conference of Air 
Officers Commanding and Air Officers, 27 February – 1 March 1962, Appendix A – VCAS Address to AOC 
Conference on Current Plans and Programmes of the RCAF, p. 3.  A year earlier at the annual AOC Conference in 
1962, the Vice-Chief of the Air Staff, Air Vice Marshal D.M. Smith had briefed on a requirement for additional 
ninety CF-104s consisting of sixty-six single and twenty-four dual aircraft to meet attrition requirements.  See also 
David Bashow – on CF-104 losses.  The RCAF lost a total of 110 CF-104s in “Category A” accidents between 1961 
and 1986 resulting in thirty-seven pilot fatalities, this represented 46% of the total of 238 CF-104 aircraft in RCAF 
service.  For the first five years after the Air Division was completely re-equipped with the CF-104 in 1964, the 
losses were fifty-five aircraft.  By 1973, ten years after the formation of the first CF-104 squadron, total losses were 
eighty-one aircraft. 
16 DHH 73/1223, Series 4, File 2099, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Defence Policy, 30 September 1963 (the 
“Sutherland Report”). 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
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the 1969-72 timeframe.20  Air defence system modernization was another issue that needed to be 
considered during the 1970s.21 
The Sutherland Report determined four options for a future Canadian NATO 
commitment to Europe – the status quo plus evolution in the Central Region, withdrawal from 
Europe, continued participation in European defence using Canadian based forces and, lastly, 
continuing to base forces in Europe, but assuming a Central Region reserve role or SACEUR 
mobile force role.22 In the first option, cost was a major concern with the need to re-equip both 
the army brigade and air division starting in the late 1960s.23 In the case of the air division, a 
strike reconnaissance replacement for the CF-104 could not be justified in terms of cost or 
effectiveness, so that the only remaining practical alternative was seen as the adoption of a 
tactical support role using the same aircraft that could be operated for air defence in Canada.24 
The second option, withdrawal from Europe, also considered a partial withdrawal, either of the 
air division or the brigade.  In the case of the air division, it was suggested that its impact would 
be lessened if withdrawn in 1972 at the end of the expected service life of the CF-104.25 The 
third and fourth options introduced the concept of a mobile force and its possible application. 
The mobile force concept had been the subject of discussion in the armed forces for several years 
based on the perception that future conflicts in the Third World might require some type of 
intervention force, along with allied developments and Canadian UN experience.26  In the case of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. p. 88. 
23 Until 1968, the army commitment consisted of one brigade based in Germany as part of the British Army of the 
Rhine, with two additional brigades in Canada earmarked to be deployed overseas to form a division. A fourth army 
brigade in Canada was for defence of Canada tasks and UN operations. 
24 Sutherland Report, p. 98, The Carpenter Report had made a similar recommendation. 
25 Ibid. p. 115. 
26 Sean M. Maloney, “ “Global Mobile”: Flexible Response, Peacekeeping and the Origins of Forces Mobile 
Command, 1958-1964, The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin, Vol. 3, No. 3, Fall 2000, pp. 22-26. 
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the third option, the merits of both a light and heavy mobile force based in Canada were 
considered.  A lightly armed mobile force, though it would be more easily air transported to 
Europe, would lack a medium armour capability, as tanks could not be airlifted, making such a 
contribution to the Central Region of limited military value.27 A heavily armed force, though 
militarily useful, would incur high costs in order to provide either the necessary sealift or 
equipment stockpiling.28 The magnitude of the airlift problems associated with the mobile force 
was a central issue; to move a division with only their personal weapons and equipment in thirty 
days would optimistically require a minimum of ten Yukon and thirty-eight Hercules transports.29  
The commitment of a Canadian-based brigade sized mobile force to reinforce the Northern Flank 
was also discussed, but was dismissed as being militarily high risk and politically unacceptable.30 
The report did not see a UN role for the mobile force, believing that the UN would not accept 
Canadian fighting troops, and any Canadian contribution to UN forces could be achieved from 
the existing force structure.31 The proposed RCAF component of the Canadian-based mobile 
force was based on a wing of three squadrons of F-4C Phantom fighter-bombers each of 
eighteen aircraft, a wing of three squadrons of Grumman Mohawk battlefield support/counter-
insurgency aircraft each of eighteen aircraft, and a wing of two C-130 Hercules transport 
squadrons each of twelve aircraft.32  The F-4C Phantom aircraft represented the high end of a 
possible tactical fighter contribution to a mobile force, an issue that was to become a critical one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Sutherland Report, p. 119. 
28 Ibid. pp. 129 and 139.  For a division, dedicated sealift costs were estimated at $300 million and $465 million to 
stockpile the equipment and supplies in Europe. 
29 Ibid. pp. 126-127.  At this time, the RCAF had only four Hercules aircraft; an additional thirty-four aircraft would 
cost an estimated $120 million. 
30 Ibid. pp. 136-137. However, Canada did adopt this role in 1968 with the CAST (Canadian Air-Sea Transportable) 
brigade role. 
31 Ibid. p. 89. This view was based on the Canadian experience in UNEF and UNOC that peacekeeping contributions 
would consist of logistics, communications and air transport units.  However, for Cyprus in 1964, this was the 
exception where Canada provided an infantry battalion, an armoured reconnaissance squadron and a brigade 
headquarters.  The Canadian Army maintained an UN Standby Force during this period based on an infantry 
battalion. 
32 Ibid. pp. 119-120. 
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for the RCAF.  In the fourth option, the notion of a light mobile land force based as a theatre 
reserve in the Central Region was not viewed as a viable military commitment.  Within this 
option, another alternative considered a contribution of European based Canadian land and 
tactical air forces to Allied Command Europe Mobile Force - Land, AMF (L) and Allied 
Command Europe Mobile Force – Air, AMF (A).  The AMF (L) and AMF (A) were intended to 
operate on the NATO Northern and Southern flanks to demonstrate Allied solidarity rather than 
as a fighting force; a purpose for which lightly equipped land forces were considered suitable.  
The contribution of a battalion or even a brigade was considered possible, but not a division, for 
political, military and logistics reasons.33  
The Report stated, 
The proposition that Canada can best contribute to the defence of the NATO area by 
participation in a strategically mobile force is an extremely attractive one.  This is the 
role which is most compatible with Canada’s position as a North American nation 
and with Canada’s other responsibilities for the Defence of Canada and support to 
the United Nations.  There is every reason to suppose that this should be Canada’s 
basic long-term objective and that no opportunity should be lost to move in this 
direction. 34 
The musings regarding the application of a Canadian mobile force in the Sutherland Report were 
based on an imprecise attempt to reconcile various aspects of Canadian defence – the desire to 
contain costs, dissatisfaction with the nuclear role, the notion that Canadian forces were overly 
specialized in their alliance commitments and lacked flexibility for other roles, a desire for 
compatibility between European and Canadian based land forces and a single multi-role fighter 
for both NATO and NORAD roles, the attraction for the peacekeeping role, and a desire to have 
more integrated links between air and land forces.  The mobile force concept was viewed as an 
attractive alternative, but the practical attainment of these objectives was not founded on a sound 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Ibid.  Section XI – Contribution to SACEUR’s Mobile Force. Ultimately, in 1964, Canada contributed two 
battalions to the AMF (L) from its home-based forces, this being reduced to one battalion in 1968. 
34 Ibid. p. 159. 
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strategic basis.35 Hellyer envisaged a mobile force of division size supported by its own air 
transport and tactical fighters.36  Hellyer’s vision of the mobile force was a flawed one that was 
never clearly articulated, as he called for both a mechanized heavy force and some airborne 
capability to undertake such disparate roles as a “mobile reserve of the Supreme Allied 
Commander in Europe or serve in a United Nations operation….”37 
 An all-party House of Commons Special Committee on Defence commenced its broad 
review of defence matters in June 1963 continuing until the end of 1964.38 In the case of the 
RCAF, one of the Committee’s recommendations was a review of the merits for a dual nuclear 
and conventional capability for the CF-104, a recommendation that was endorsed by the 
government’s Defence White Paper in 1964, but not implemented until 1972.   Other 
recommendations included a study to determine the most suitable role for the Air Division when 
the CF-104 became obsolete, including consideration of assigning the air transport role to the Air 
Division.39 In the case of Air Defence Command, the Committee recommended that, “as long as 
attack by enemy bombers remains a continuing threat, though of a diminishing nature, Canada 
must share in the defence against that threat.”40 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Sean M. Maloney, “ “Global Mobile II” The Development of Forces Mobile Command, 1965-1972, The Army 
Doctrine and Training Bulletin, Vol. 4, No. 2, Summer 2001, p. 17 “Foulkes was concerned about the direction 
Hellyer and Allard was going.  It was one thing to increase the mobility of the two Canada-based brigades so they 
could get over to Europe.  It was quite another to employ them in “this world-wide pacification role.” As Foulkes 
put it, “The question of this free-wheeling, globe-spanning, trouble shooting role bothers me a bit.” 
36 Maloney, “ “Global Mobile”: Flexible Response, Peacekeeping and the Origins of Forces Mobile Command, 
1958-1964, pp. 28-29.  A Mobile Force Committee to examine this concept operated August-November 1963, while 
a separate Joint Service Study Group operated concurrently to examine strategic airlift. 
37 Ibid. p. 28. 
38 The Special Committee on Defence has also been referred to as the Sauvé Committee after its first chairman, 
Maurice Sauvé, who was replaced by David Hahn in 1964. See also Andrew Brewin, Stand on Guard: The Search 
for a Canadian Defence Policy, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1965.  Brewin was the New Democratic 
Party member on the committee. 
39 Special Committee on Defence Interim Report, p. 19. 
40 Ibid. p. 21. 
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 Among the various expert witnesses to appear before the Special Committee were 
General (Retired) Charles Foulkes, former Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 
Lieutenant General Guy Simonds, former Chief of the General Staff, and Wing Commander 
(Retired) John Gellner.  These three witnesses advocated the adoption of an integrated mobile 
force for the armed forces with air power in a supporting role focused on air transport.41  
Simonds, in particular, apart from emphasizing air transport, supported some aircraft for the 
ground support and reconnaissance functions, but not for the strike or air defence roles.42  
Defence White Paper 1964 and Afterwards 
The Liberal government published its Defence White Paper in March 1964 that addressed 
a number of outstanding air power issues looking forward over the next ten years to 1974.43 The 
White Paper confirmed there would be no procurement of additional CF-104 aircraft to replace 
those lost through attrition, meaning there would be a reduction over time of the number of CF-
104s available for operations.44  The White Paper mentioned the acquisition of a “high 
performance aircraft” to conduct tasks ranging from “ground attack to air surveillance.” These 
aircraft would be capable of rapid deployment, allowing their stationing in either Canada or 
Europe. As well, there was a desire for the European based squadrons to be more directly 
involved in the support of Canadian ground troops.45  It was also anticipated that the Canadian 
based squadrons would be available for the air defence role, “thereby eliminating the necessity of 
acquiring special aircraft for this purpose.46  These proposals were similar to what been proposed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Special Committee on Defence, Lieutenant General Guy Simonds Testimony, 17 October 1963, General Charles 
Foulkes Testimony, 22 October 1963, and Mr John Gellner Testimony, 24 October 1963. 
42 Simonds Testimony, 17 October 1963. 
43 Paul Hellyer, White Paper on Defence, Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1964. 
44 Ibid. p. 22. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. p. 23. 
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in the 1962 Carpenter Report and Special Committee on Defence witness testimony.  In 
conjunction with air defence, it was suggested that there would be a declining allocation of 
resources to the anti-bomber role, but the three CF-101 squadrons would continue in their role 
for the life of the aircraft while the two BOMARC squadrons would be “operated as long as they 
form an integral and essential part of the NORAD system.47 
The centrepiece of the White Paper was the creation of a mobile force to include both 
land and tactical air forces.  The White Paper also announced the significant enhancement of air 
transport capabilities “in order to have the flexibility in circumstances where improved air strips 
are not available…a considerable augmentation of the “air truck” component of the air transport 
fleet is being undertaken.”48 The rationale for expanding air transport capabilities, apart from the 
lift required for the mobile force, had been a lesson learned from previous UN peacekeeping 
experience in Suez in 1956 and the Congo in 1960.  As the White Paper was released, the Yukon 
and Hercules aircraft of Air Transport Command enabled the rapid deployment of a Canadian 
contingent to the new UN force being established in Cyprus. 
The White Paper was vague regarding the future of the RCAF Maritime Air Command.  
In the area of anti-submarine maritime forces where the command was making a substantial 
contribution, the White Paper noted that continuing studies were determining the most effective 
force mixed systems, including maritime aircraft.49 Both the Argus and the Neptune maritime 
patrol aircraft were “nuclear capable” though no nuclear weapons were obtained for these 
aircraft.  However, there was the issue of a fundamental change in their anti-submarine role from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Ibid.  The number of CF-101 squadrons had been reduced from five to three with the disbandment of No. 410 
Squadron at Uplands and No. 414 Squadron at North Bay in 1964. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid.  At this time, Maritime Air Command was at its peak strength, consisting of thirty-three Argus and twenty-
five Neptune maritime patrol/anti-submarine aircraft, along with the RCN with its one aircraft carrier and a total of 
eighty-three Tracker shipboard anti-submarine aircraft. 
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hunting and destroying Soviet “wolf packs” of submarines to “offensive” operations against 
Soviet ballistic missile-launching submarines.  
Equally disappointing was the uncertain future facing the Air Reserves.  They were 
mentioned in less than a single sentence: “the Air Force Reserves have a role in support of 
ground forces in civil survival.”50  The number of Auxiliary squadrons was reduced once again 
from ten to six squadrons equipped with Otter light transports.51 The Auxiliary personnel 
strength was reduced from 2,260 to 860 personnel in April 1964.52 
The government had commissioned separate studies on the future of the Reserve 
components of the services, with the Draper Report examining the future of the RCAF 
Auxiliary.53 The Draper Report recommended that the Auxiliary have the specific role of army 
air support, though its current equipment limited its ability to perform this role. 54  The White 
Paper twisted the Draper Report recommendation by limiting the Auxiliary role to supporting the 
Army only for civil survival, a task of the Army Reserves.55 
Another false economy for the RCAF was the forced release of 500-trained aircrew in 
1964, as it was considered that the air force had a surplus in the aircrew occupations.  Shortly 
afterwards, the RCAF realized its miscalculations, and attempted to re-enlist those who had been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Ibid. 
51 No. 400 and 411 Squadrons at Downsview, No. 401 and No. 438 Squadrons in St Hubert, No. 402 Squadron at 
Winnipeg, and No. 418 Squadron at Edmonton.  Re-equipment changed the aircraft Unit Establishment from four 
Otter and four Expeditor aircraft per squadron to six Otters per squadron.  The RCAF footprint ceased in Calgary, 
Hamilton and Vancouver, with the disbandment of No. 403, 424, 442 and 443 Squadrons.  See F.J. Hatch, “Salute to 
the Auxiliary,” The Roundel, Vol. 16, No. 3, April 1964, p. 13. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Special Committee on Defence, Group Captain J.W.P. Draper Testimony, 13 August 1964. 
54 See Special Committee on Defence Report, 1964 Session.  In fairness, the Committee had noted the high cost of 
re-equipping the Auxiliary for airlift or tactical support would be very high, this at a time when cutting costs was a 
priority.   The Committee believed that the principal role of the Auxiliary should be to maintain the flying skills of 
ex-Regular Force pilots whose training had been obtained at great cost. 
55 The Suttie Commission had studied the role of the Canadian Army (Militia) resulting in the re-introduction of 
traditional combat arms units to replace the disastrous attempt to convert the organization into a rescue force to 
contend with the results of nuclear war. 
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released.  Some aircrew did return, but the majority had already sought other avenues of 
employment.   
Shortly after the release of the Defence White Paper, Air Vice Marshal Annis, the Vice 
Chief of the Air Staff, presented “The RCAF: 1964-1974” at the 1964 AOC Conference.56  
Annis’ presentation is revealing as it shows the RCAF senior leadership was still promoting the 
concept of a Big Air Force.  He noted that the declining number of CF-104s in the Air Division 
would result in a reduction to four squadrons by January 1967 but with sufficient reserves of 
aircraft to enable them to continue in operation until 31 December 1969.57  However, some fifty 
CF-101 Voodoo interceptors, which had a lower attrition rate than the CF-104, were expected to 
still be in service in 1970.  Annis expressed his uncertainty whether or not the proportion of the 
defence budget allocated to the maritime forces, including Maritime Air Command, would 
remain the same after the White Paper.  The Air Staff had now determined, however, that an 
Argus replacement would not be required to enter squadron service until 1979 thus providing 
some immediate relief to the RCAF capital budget.58 Air Transport Command anticipated the 
procurement of an additional two to four Yukon transports along with the acquisition of several 
jet transports.  Annis did note there was a concern that the procurement of the Yukons might 
hamper obtaining additional C-130s beyond the recently approved sixteen aircraft.59 The 
roadblock to moving ahead on these acquisitions was the lack of funding.  Overall, the RCAF 
was anticipating capital procurement of $1.294 billion over the next ten years, of which $712 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 DHH 73/1223, File 2009, 1964 AOC Conference, Air Vice Marshal C.L. Annis, “The RCAF: 1964-74,” undated, 
but suspected to be May 1964.  This presentation was rather prescient in its predictions. 
57 Ibid. p. 2.  The Air Division was reduced to six squadrons in 1966, being reformed as No. 1 Canadian Air Group 
with three squadrons in 1970. A total of forty-three surplus CF-104s were sold to Denmark and Norway. 
58 Ibid. p. 7.  The CP-140 Aurora arrived in 1980. 
59 Ibid. p. 8. No additional Yukons were procured, but eight additional C-130 aircraft were acquired to bring the fleet 
up to twenty-four aircraft. 
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million would be needed to acquire the F-4 Phantom aircraft that was the preference of the 
RCAF as its next fighter aircraft.60  
A Special Meeting of the Air Members held on 12 June 1964 considered the RCAF 
programme for 1965-66 and looked ahead over the next five years to FY1969-70.  Annual 
budget expenditures for the Air Division were expected to decrease from $84 million in 1964-65 
to $43 million in 1969-70.61 The allocation for Maritime Air Command SACLANT forces was 
expected to remain constant.  A significant increase was anticipated in Air Defence Command 
starting in 1966-67 and continuing onwards representing about 23 per cent increased 
expenditures in 1969-70 with most of the funds to be allocated to the procurement of the 108 “F-
4 type” aircraft that could be employed either for the air defence or tactical fighter roles.62  Air 
Transport Command was another growth area, where it was expected the budget would jump 
from $83 million in FY 1964-65 to $115 million in FY 1965-66, after which a gradual decline 
would result in an annual expenditure of $72 million in FY 1969-70.63  
The overall RCAF budget was expected to remain constant at approximately $662 million, 
but there were anticipated reductions in the personnel, operations and maintenance categories 
from $541 million to $498 million by FY 1969-70.64  These reductions were expected to allow 
some limited growth in the capital budget from $130 million to $167 million by FY 1969-70.  
Changing RCAF personnel strengths also indicated the trends in priorities.  A reduction of 4,000 
members from the 1964-65 RCAF Regular Force strength of 51,135 was anticipated to achieve 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Ibid. p. 8.  $288 million was spent to procure 115 CF-5 aircraft during this period. 
61 DHH 73/1223, File 1965, S000-115-65 (CAS), 1 June 1964, – RCAF Defence Programme 65-66, Special Meeting 
for Air Members, 12 June 1964. 
62 Ibid. pp. 22 and 30.  Note the reduction in the requirement for new fighters from 217 to 108 aircraft, though this 
most likely represented the initial buy rather than the total requirement. 
63 Ibid. p. 4. 
64 Ibid. p. 6. 
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47,135 by 1966-67, a number that was expected to remain stable thereafter.65  In the case of the 
Air Division, its strength of 5,111 personnel in FY 1964-65 was to decline to 3,711 personnel by 
FY 1967-68.66  For Maritime Air Command, its strength was to be reduced from 4,205 to 3,795 
by FY 1965-66.67  A small increase in Air Defence Command was anticipated, from 11,491 to 
11,951 personnel.68 In the event, RCAF personnel reductions were considerably greater than the 
Air Staff had anticipated, resulting in a personnel strength to 45,000 by 1966, 43,500 in January 
1968, and 42,700 in 1969 prior to the major military manpower cuts imposed by the Trudeau 
government.69 
The New Tactical Aircraft 
The announcement of the procurement of a new tactical aircraft proved to be the most 
contentious issue of the Defence White Paper.70  Previously, in April 1963, the Air Staff had 
recommended 288 McDonnell Douglas F-4C Phantom aircraft at a cost of $837 million.71 As 
noted, the acquisition of the F-4 remained an issue during 1964.  There was an unsolicited 
proposal from Canadair to license-build 108 Rolls-Royce Spey-powered F-4 Phantoms for the 
RCAF to replace the CF-104.72  The Spey-powered Phantom being built for the RAF and RN 
was an upgrade from the original USAF version, the F-4C Phantom, once considered as a 
contender for the strike-reconnaissance role in 1958, but eliminated due to its high cost and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Ibid. p. 7. 
66 Ibid. p. 9. 
67 Ibid. p. 17. 
68 Ibid. p. 21. 
69 See The Military Balance, Volumes 66, 68 and 69, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Taylor & Francis 
Strategic Defence and Security Studies Archive [accessed 21 February 2015]. 
70 DHH 73/1223, Series 1, File 214, Equipment RCAF – Tactical Aircraft, NSS 8885-12 S 1038-180 HQS 2100-15-
1 (OPRED/DGFD) 4 September 1964, Revised Tactical Air Staff Requirements. 
71 Air Staff/COR recommendation, RG 2 Volume 2749 (NAC), as quoted in Raymond Stouffer, “Cold War Air 
Power Choices for the RCAF: Paul Hellyer and the Selection of the CF-5 Freedom Fighter,” Canadian Military 
Journal, Vol. 7, No. 3, Autumn 2006, p. 66.  Note differences in both numbers of aircraft and their cost. 
72 Ibid. 
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developmental status at the time.  The Phantom continued to represent the benchmark for a 
desired RCAF aircraft as its characteristics mirrored the multi-purpose aircraft proposed in the 
Carpenter Report two years earlier. Speaking of the new tactical aircraft at the AOC Conference 
in May 1964, Annis commented that “As I imagine you already know our choice was the 
McDonnell F4.”73  
 RCAF support for the F4 Phantom was based on its capability, not only to provide close 
air support to ground troops, but for the air superiority and interception roles.  The RCAF 
planned force structure was to establish eight squadrons by 1972 with the procurement of 217 F-
4 Phantom aircraft, based on an allocation of either four squadrons for NATO and four 
squadrons for NORAD, or two squadrons for NATO and six squadrons for NORAD.74 In terms 
of its flexibility, the F-4 made imminent sense as it could be utilized in the strike-reconnaissance 
for the Air Division and for air defence with Air Defence Command at home.  In addition, it 
fulfilled the requirements for the new tactical aircraft to provide battlefield close air support and 
reconnaissance.  
The major drawback was its relatively high cost at $3 million per aircraft compared to $1 
million for the F-5 aircraft.  With $215 million allocated to the new tactical fighter programme, 
approximately sixty F-4 aircraft could be procured compared to 115 CF-5 aircraft.  The RCAF 
did not hide its preference for the F-4 to fulfill the tactical aircraft role, however, the 
government, and particularly Defence Minister Paul Hellyer had a different focus that 
emphasized an inexpensive approach.  At Hellyer’s direction, the F-4 was ruled out and the 
tactical aircraft competition was limited to four aircraft – the McDonnell Douglas A-4E Skyhawk, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 DHH 73/1223, File 2009, 1964 AOC Conference, Air Vice Marshal C.L. Annis, “The RCAF: 1964-74,” undated, 
but suspected to be May 1964.  
74 Stouffer, p. 6. 
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the Grumman A-6A Intruder, the Ling-Temco-Vought A-7A Corsair II and the Northrop F-5 
Freedom Fighter.75  The A-4 was a proven specialized attack aircraft in service with the US 
Navy (USN) and Marine Corps (USMC).  The A-6 was also in service with the USN and USMC.  
The A-7 was a new attack aircraft destined for both the USN and USAF.  The Northrop F-5 had 
been trialled by the USAF in Vietnam but not adopted by that service.76  In 1958, while still at 
the developmental stage, the F-5 had been proposed and rejected for the NATO strike role.  The 
F-5 was intended primarily to provide Third World air forces with a simple supersonic air 
superiority fighter with a limited air-to-ground capability. 
The staff recommendation submitted on 15 February 1965 rated the A-7A Corsair II as the 
best option, with the A-4E Skyhawk second. The A-6A Intruder was dropped from consideration 
because of its cost and complexity, while the F-5 was rated as not suitable.77 The Chief of the 
Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshal Miller noted that the CF-5 was ineffective for the air 
superiority role as it lacked radar, and it was equally unsuitable for the ground attack role as it 
lacked sufficient range when carrying a weapons load.78 Depending on the variant of F-5 to be 
selected, it was estimated that the number that could be purchased for the fixed cost of $215 
million varied between ninety and 126, the larger number being for variants of reduced 
capabilities.79 The $215 million budget for the CF-5 represented only the cost of the aircraft, not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 DHH 73/1223, Series 1, File 214, Equipment RCAF – Tactical Aircraft, Memorandum from MND to CDS, 7 
January 1965, Selection of a Tactical Aircraft.  In this memo, Hellyer ruled out acquisition of the F-4, the selection 
being limited to the A-4E, A-6A, A-7A and F-5. 
76 The USAF adopted the T-38 two-seat trainer version of the F-5 aircraft. 
77 DHH 73/1223, Series 1, File 214, Equipment RCAF – Tactical Aircraft, 8001-1500-(COPR) 15 February 1965, 
Selection of a Tactical Aircraft.  See 981-100 (D/COPR) 29 October 1964 Letter – comparison of A-4 and F-5, and 
DHH 73/1223, Series 1, File 215, Equipment RCAF – Tactical Aircraft, 8001-1500 (ASec (COPR)) 21 June 1965, 
Tactical Aircraft – comparison of A-7A and F-5. 
78 DHH 73/1223, Series 1, File 215, Equipment RCAF – Tactical Aircraft, 8001-1500 (CDS) 7 June 1965, Letter 
from CDS to the Minister, Tactical Aircraft. 
79 DHH 73/1223, Series 1, File 217, Equipment RCAF – Tactical Aircraft, Letter from DM of Defence Production to 
DM, DND, 13 April 1966. 
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the total programme cost that Miller identified prior to the submission to the Cabinet as requiring 
an additional $73 million for 125 aircraft, bringing the total programme cost of $288 million.80 
 It has been suggested that the procurement of the CF-5 was as much based on Hellyer’s 
vision of air power as the fiscal constraint of Finance Minister Walter Gordon.81 In the 
Memorandum to the Cabinet on the Selection of a Tactical Aircraft, Hellyer extolled the CF-5 on 
the basis of three considerations: 
(a) The F5 is the only one of the three under consideration which has two engines 
and hence a higher survivability factor; 
(b) The F5 is the only one of the three which is supersonic and consequentially, has 
the best air-to-air combat capability at high altitudes; 
(c) The F5 could be modified for use as a supersonic trainer for the Canadian Forces, 
if this should become a requirement.82 
Miller’s letter on 7 May 1965 to Hellyer in response to the minister’s intransigence on procuring 
the CF-5 rebutted the first two points.83 In the case of the third factor, there was no requirement 
for such a trainer.  Ultimately, the government announced on 15 July 1965 that up to 125 CF-5 
aircraft were to be license-built by Canadair.  With the selection of the CF-5, the concept of 
employment for the tactical aircraft had to be revised to correspond with the limited capabilities 
of the CF-5.84 
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1965, Tactical Aircraft – Selection (Aide-Memoire on the Implications of Tactical Aircraft Selection). 
81 See DHH 73/1223, Series V, Box 113, File 2501, “History of Procurement CF-5 Aircraft and Tactical Aircraft 
Programs,” Colonel W.H. Carsley, Project Manager for CF5/NF5, CF5 History of Events 1964-1971, 16 November 
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84 DHH 73/1223, Series 1, File 214, Equipment RCAF – Tactical Aircraft, 8001-1500 (DAFCD) 30 July 1965, 
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In the original concept of operations for the tactical aircraft, four CF-5 squadrons were to 
be established, three operational squadrons each with eighteen aircraft to support the three Army 
brigade groups, and the fourth squadron with twenty-four aircraft to act as the Operational 
Training Unit.85 The CF-5 programme had planned the following squadron re-equipment:  No. 
408 Squadron, the Operational Training Unit, would be formed mid 1968 at Cold Lake, followed 
by No. 444 Squadron, the first operational squadron, to be formed at Namao late 1968, No. No. 
434 Squadron was to be formed at Bagotville mid 1969, and the last squadron, No. 414 
Squadron, forming at North Bay by 1970.86 Hellyer approved this proposal “in principle,” with 
the caveat that he would make the final decision on the number of squadrons, along with the 
suggestion that there might be a better location in the Maritimes (i.e. Chatham) rather than North 
Bay.  In anticipation of its new tactical role operating the CF-5, No. 408 Squadron had been 
reformed in 1964 at Rivers as a tactical support and reconnaissance unit equipped with the T-33. 
By February 1968, it was decided that only two squadrons would be authorized, No. 434 
Squadron, was formed as the Operational Training Unit at Cold Lake on 15 January1968 (though 
it later gained an operational role) and No. 433 Squadron was formed as a tactical fighter 
squadron on 26 September 1969 at Bagotville.87 
  The acquisition of the CF-5 raised controversy similar to that over the CF-104 
procurement in 1959.  James Eayrs noted the exuberance of a contemporary recruiting 
advertisement,  
The Super F-5 is just one of the many new exciting things that’s happening…in the 
Canadian Forces.  Fast, versatile, and rugged, the Super F-5 is an ideal partner for 
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our ground forces.  Operating from sod fields, it’s deployed right up front where the 
action is, ready to step in and back up Canadian troops – with authority….”88 
Eayrs proceeded to comment that he had recently met a senior Northrop official who told 
him “that there was joy and amazement…in about equal proportions – joy that the 
Canadians had bought the F-5 in such large quantities, amazement that we would have any 
useful purpose for it.”89 At the time of the CF-5 selection in 1965, a newspaper article by 
reporter William Neville wrote that Hellyer and other senior defence officials were 
launching a public relations programme to sell the CF-5 to the Canadian Forces.  Neville 
reported, “The CF-5 supporters maintain the main criticism of the plane from a “handful of 
‘big war’ exponents” who are opposed to Canadian purchase of any aircraft that does not 
have a nuclear bombing capability.”90 Neville wrote that in the eyes of  CF-5 proponents 
such as Hellyer, the Vietnam War had proven that the selection of the aircraft had been the 
correct decision.91  The requirement for tactical support aircraft was justified on the 
grounds that the increased outbreak of Third World “brushfire wars” would necessitate 
more robust capabilities for UN air power beyond the traditional requirement for transport 
aircraft.  The UN operation in the Congo had seen the deployment of combat aircraft by 
member nations, and experience there seemed to substantiate a requirement for a simple 
light attack and reconnaissance capability for UN air power.92   
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Armed Forces Re-organization and the RCAF 
The Liberal government’s integration and then unification of the armed forces effectively 
broke up the air force and the other services as institutions, and thus greatly diminished the 
influence of advocacy for a Big Air Force within the defence establishment.93 This re-
organization did not take into account the real cultural differences that exist between the three 
armed services affecting tactical and environmental determinants in the conduct of military 
operations.94 The first change was Bill C-90 that restructured National Defence Headquarters 
creating the Chief of Defence Staff appointment as the government’s senior military advisor and 
doing away with the service Chiefs of Staff positions and the three service staffs.  These changes 
resulted in an integrated Canadian Forces Headquarters (CFHQ) consisting of a single staff with 
senior officers from each service placed into various functional positions.   Though there were 
RCAF officers who held various integrated appointments, there was no longer a professional 
head of the RCAF.  For example, in February 1966, Air Chief Marshal Frank Miller was the 
Chief of the Defence Staff, and as such responsible for the whole of the Canadian Armed Forces.  
RCAF senior appointments in the four integrated CFHQ staff branches included Air Marshal 
Annis as the Chief of Technical Services, Air Vice Marshal Ball as Deputy Chief Plans, Air Vice 
Marshal Reyno as Deputy Chief Personnel and Air Commodore Whitby as Deputy Chief 
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Construction Engineering.95 Within the new organization, the senior air force operations officer 
was now relegated to a Director General Air Forces, at the Air Commodore rank level.96 
 The introduction of an integrated command structure for the Canadian Armed Forces in 
1965 was another change that was to impact the RCAF in an institutional sense. The existing 
command structure of the three services based on a total of eleven functional and geographical 
commands was replaced with six integrated functional commands consisting of Mobile, 
Maritime, Air Defence, Air Transport, Training, and Materiel Command.  The Air Defence and 
Air Transport Commands were merely a continuation of the previous RCAF commands, while 
an integrated Maritime Command for the RCN and RCAF had been operational since 1959.  No. 
1 Air Division reported directly to CFHQ, rather than through a separate air force chain of 
command.  In the field commands, the greatest change occurred with the establishment of 
Mobile Command that consisted of mobile land and tactical air forces in Canada.97 The 
commander of the Mobile Command was an army officer, but there were two Deputy 
Commanders representing the army and RCAF, that reflected the initial importance assigned to 
tactical air support in the new Command.98 
In May 1967, Parliament passed Bill C-243, the Canadian Forces Reorganization Act 
that unified the three services into a single service, the Canadian Armed Forces.  This act went 
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into effect on 1 February 1968.  Though the act might not directly change the conduct of daily 
operations on the flight line or in the cockpit, there was a significant impact on the institutional 
air force that was downplayed or ignored.  The organizational restructuring at both the strategic 
headquarters level and in the field commands violated a basic tenet regarding the centralized 
control of air power.  The centralized control of air power ensured that a single air force 
commander would be provide the required “coherence, guidance and organization” in making 
the most effective use of air resources to accomplish objectives.99  This “penny packeting” of air 
force resources destroyed this tenet and the absence of single authority that could speak on 
behalf of Canadian air power resulted in the emergence of various “air force communities,” – 
fighters, transport, maritime, and tactical aviation – that represented a fragmented, wasteful and 
incoherent approach to air power. This was a further nail in the coffin of the Big Air Force 
concept, and the cessation of any notion of “independent air power” in the Canadian context. 
Within Mobile Command, a new formation, No. 10 Tactical Air Group (10 TAG), 
was established in September 1968 with the intention that it would consist of the four 
tactical fighter squadrons, Buffalo tactical transports, and light and heavy helicopters. In 
the interim, other 10 TAG units were formed commencing with No. 429 (Tactical 
Transport) Squadron established at St Hubert in August 1967 equipped with the Buffalo, 
with a detachment of four aircraft at Namao.100  On 29 March 1968, No. 450 Heavy 
Transport Helicopter Squadron, equipped with the CH-113A Voyageur transport helicopter, 
was formed at St Hubert while No. 403 Helicopter Operational Training Squadron 
equipped with the CUH-1H Iroquois utility tactical transport helicopter was also formed in 
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1968 at Petawawa.101 The Voyageur squadron had previously been the Canadian Army 
transport helicopter platoon, but the Iroquois acquisition was in anticipation of a planned 
tremendous increase in the size of the battlefield helicopter fleet as a result of the 1967 
Helicopter Study.102 This study had recommended that the Canadian Armed Forces acquire 
four types of helicopter to support land forces: a light observation helicopter (LOH), a 
utility tactical transport helicopter (UTTH), a medium transport helicopter (MTH) and 
attack helicopters (AH).  Subsequent assessments identified the following requirements: 
107 LOH, 100 UTTH, eighteen MTH and twenty-three AH.103 The eventual procurement 
fell far short because of budgetary constraints: only fifty Bell CH-135 Twin Huey UTTH, 
seventy-four Bell CH-136 Kiowa LOH and eight Boeing CH-147 Chinook MTH, and no 
attack helicopters. 
 In the case of Air Transport Command, the major re-equipment programme had been the 
replacement of the C-119 Flying Boxcar aircraft in No. 435 and No. 436 Squadrons with the C-
130E Hercules during 1965.  According to Hellyer, the RCAF senior leadership had been content 
to simply refurbish the C-119 aircraft, but upon seeing for himself the extensive corrosion of the 
aircraft while undergoing maintenance at the De Havilland Canada plant in Toronto, Hellyer 
decided that the aircraft required replacement.104 The C-130E Hercules acquisition provided a 
tremendous increase in RCAF air transport capability representing more than mere numbers of 
aircraft.  The twenty-four C-130E and the twelve CC-106 transports greatly expanded the airlift 
capacity of Air Transport Command, providing the RCAF with a long-range transport capability 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 “Military Affairs,” Flying Review International, Vol. 23, No. 5, May 1968, p. 242. 
102 DHH 73/1223 Box 11, File 187, File No. V 11520-1 (DLFORA) 18 May 1967, Helicopter Study.  See Randall 
Wakelam, “Creating an Air Arm for the Canadian Army,” The Canadian Army Journal, Vol. 15, No. 2, Autumn 
2013. 
103 DHH 73/1223, Series 2, Box 50, File 923, Annex A to Minutes of CDSAC 3/70, 28 January 1970, Deputy Chief 
of Force Development Presentation to CDS Advisory Committee 28 January 1970 on Helicopter Programs. 
104 Hellyer, Damn the Torpedoes, pp. 74-75.  
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that was otherwise limited to the USAF and RAF.  This new airlift capability enabled Air 
Transport Command to move an air transportable battalion group of 1,200 or more troops on 
light scales as part of the NATO ACE Mobile Force or a UN operation.  (However, it was still a 
far cry from the estimated fifty C-130 Hercules aircraft required to airlift a light brigade from 
Canada to Europe over a four week period.)105 Air Transport Command again demonstrated its 
new capabilities with the emergency withdrawal of the 800 strong Canadian contingent with 
UNEF I in May 1967.106  
As the current CC-106 Yukon aircraft would reach the limit of their operational life by 
1973, at the 16 May 1968 meeting of the DND Estimates Review Committee, Major General 
N.G. Wilson-Smith, the Deputy Chief Force Development, proposed that the Yukon be replaced 
with eleven Lockheed C-141 Starlifter jet transports during the period 1972-74 at a cost of $175 
million.107 However, it was a missed opportunity, as no orders had been placed in 1967 before 
the production line closed down.108 Apart from the obvious increase in airlift capabilities, the C-
141s would have been a capable refuelling aircraft as the “C-141 could refuel four CF-5A 
fighters on transatlantic ferry from wing tanks while hauling 30,000-lb flyaway kits and other 
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106 See W.A.B. Douglas, “Canada and the Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force,” Canadian Defence 
Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 3, Winter 1972-73. 
107 DHH 73/1223, Series 4, Box 105, File 2103, 174th Meeting of the DND Estimates Review Committee Defence 
Review, 16 May 1968. 
108 DHH 73/1223, Series V, Box 113, File 2500F, S1151-4110/D1 (DSecDD (MM) 4 August 1967, Defence Council 
Presentations.   At the 226th Defence Council meeting on 27 June 1967, approval had authorized for the purchase of 
four C-141 and one DC8 aircraft.  See also Flying Review International, Vol. 22, No. 15, November 1967, reporting 
the acquisition of four C-141 tanker-transports, while  
 “Aeronews and Military Report,” Air Progress, Vol. 21. No. 2, August 1967 reported the procurement of ten C-141 
jet transports.  
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gear to operate fighters from overseas bases.”109 The opportunity to obtain six additional C-130 
aircraft was also allowed to pass.110 
New Fighter Aircraft – Missed Opportunities? 
In the meantime, the air force officers at the new Canadian Forces Headquarters (CFHQ) 
had proposed a new fighter aircraft known as the Canadian Advanced Multi-Role Aircraft 
(CAMRA) as a possible replacement for the existing CF-101, CF-104 and CF-5 aircraft in the 
1973-83 timeframe.111 This programme had originated in 1966 under Air Commodore William 
Carr and Group Captain Hal Bridges.112 Initial planning was based on a procurement of 250 
aircraft to equip twelve operational squadrons.113 Interestingly, the CAMRA proposal referred to 
the CF-5 as  “an interim priority program not only to ensure close support…in the short term, but 
also to permit the Canadian Armed Forces to relearn and develop the skills and techniques of 
close air support.”114  In 1967, Northrop submitted a proposal for their P.530 Cobra lightweight 
multi-role fighter.115 Hellyer exerted pressure on the Chief of the Defence Staff, General Allard, 
urging that “the staff would be able to give this proposal to participate in Project 530 their early 
consideration….”116 There was pushback from the CDS, suggesting that procurement in 1973 
was most unlikely, with 1975 being a more realistic timeframe.  In the CDS’s words, “while their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Ibid. 
110 In 1970-71, five Boeing 707 aircraft were procured to replace the Yukon transport, of which two were modified in 
1972 as air-to-air refueling tankers.  Five additional C-130H aircraft were acquired in 1975. 
111 DHH 73/1223, Series 1, File 219, Equipment RCAF – Tactical Aircraft, Annex A to V3510-6 (DAFORCF) 28 
April 1968. 
112 Ron Pickler and Larry Milberry, Canadair: The First 50 Years, Toronto: CANAV Books, 1995, p. 258. 
113 DHH 73/1223, Series 1, File 219, Equipment RCAF – Tactical Aircraft, Annex A to V3510-6 (DAFORCF) 28 
April 1968. 
114 Ibid.  The notion that the CF-5 was an interim “aircraft” along with the suggestion of a twelve combat squadron 
structure appears to have originated with Hellyer in a letter to the Minister of Defence Production, C.M. Drury, 
dated 26 May 1966. 
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Canadian Advanced Multi-Role Aircraft (CAMRA) – NORTHROP P530 Proposal. 
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proposal makes a great deal of sense in relation to applicable Canadian requirements and 
possible consortium interest,” no firm commitment could be made until studies of other aircraft 
programs such as the Anglo-French Variable-Geometry (AFVG) aircraft, the USAF FX study 
and the NATO follow-on aircraft had been completed.117 The Cobra represented a significant 
advance over the CF-5 aircraft, but the lack of customers ended its development.118 In March 
1968, Defence Council put a hold on any future studies of the CAMRA project pending a review 
of the defence programme.119 At the same time, in May 1968 Canada became a member of a 
NATO working group consisting of the UK, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium 
examining a future fighter aircraft.120 These meetings resulted in Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) being signed by Germany, the UK, Netherlands and Italy on 17 July 1968 with the intent 
of studying the MRA-75 (Multi-Role Aircraft 1975) as a new fighter.  Aircraft designs were 
based on twin-engines using variable-geometry wings.121 Under the terms of this MOU, Canada 
was allowed to participate for a further two months after which it would be subject to the MOU 
terms.122 The tone of the deputy minister’s letter on the subject seemed to reject further Canadian 
participation with the European group in favour of future linkages with the US.123 Defence 
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Council requested an extension beyond the two-month limit without signing the MOU in order to 
allow for an assessment before deciding on future participation.124 However, this was a very 
short-lived involvement in the programme; Canada withdrew by October 1968.125  
The succession of Pierre Trudeau to the office of Prime Minister and his subsequent 
election in June 1968 was also to portend future changes to the role of air power in the new 
Canadian Armed Forces.  One of his first actions as Prime Minister was to direct a Defence 
Review.  In the case of the 1968 Defence Review, there were consistent themes affecting the 
future of Canadian air power.126 First, there was the requirement to replace the CF-101 and CF-
104 by 1974-75.  Associated with the CF-101 replacement, there was a requirement to 
modernize the air defence system. Second, there was the requirement to replace the Argus 
maritime patrol aircraft by 1973.  Third, there was a requirement to modernize and increase air 
transport capabilities.  However, these various programmes were to be delayed, similar to the 
case of the new fighter, for over a decade.  The election of Trudeau heralded the new generation 
assuming power from that older generation of political leaders, Diefenbaker and Pearson, who 
had held power during the “air wars” of the past decade.  Trudeau’s ascension to power also 
confirmed that the Big Air Force concept was finally put to rest. 
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Epilogue 
 
A new Defence White Paper in August 1971, Defence in the Seventies, reaffirmed the 
priorities set forth in the defence policy announcement of 3 April 1969.  
(a) The surveillance of our own territory and coastlines, i.e. the protection of our 
sovereignty; 
(b) The defence of North America in co-operation with US forces; 
(c) The fulfillment of such NATO commitments as may be agreed upon; and 
(d) The performance of such international peacekeeping roles as we may from time 
to time assume.1 
 
There was no pretence of maintaining the Big Air Force concept. Although the Canadian Forces 
still had a fleet of 1,080 aircraft, nearly sixty per cent were training and non-operational transport 
aircraft, many of them older types.2  In 1970, No. 1 Canadian Air Group, the successor to No. 1 
Air Division, consisted of two of nuclear-strike and one reconnaissance CF-104 squadrons with 
fifty-four operational aircraft.  As promised, the CF-104 nuclear strike role was relinquished in 
January 1972, and the aircraft in the three squadrons were reconfigured for the conventional 
attack role.  Compared to other conventional attack aircraft, however, the CF-104 had a number 
of inherent limitations, a principal one being its limited ordnance load of 4,000 pounds.  In Air 
Defence Command, the BOMARC nuclear-armed surface-to-air missiles were also withdrawn 
from service in 1972, leaving the CF-101 Voodoo interceptors as the sole remaining nuclear 
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armed weapon system (Genie rocket) until its phase-out in 1984.  The original surviving batch of 
Voodoos that had been obtained in 1961 was exchanged in 1971 for sixty-six upgraded aircraft.  
The assignment of No. 417 Squadron, the CF-104 operational training unit, to an air defence 
role, simply represented “window dressing” rather than an improvement to air defence in 
Western Canada, let alone an effective use of the CF-104 aircraft.  The CF-5 “tactical aircraft,” 
that had been a key element in the 1964 Defence White Paper, and originally viewed as 
representing the “New Look” of Canadian air power with four “global mobile” tactical fighter 
squadrons, was relegated to a minor role.   The two CF-5 squadrons that had been formed were 
assigned to NATO’s Allied Mobile Force (Air) on the Northern Flank in the tactical support role.  
They were also to provide “a quick-response photographic reconnaissance capability in Canada 
and over the waters off Canadian shores.”3 In 1970, trials were conducted to determine CF-5 
suitability for use in the NATO Central Region; however, the aircraft’s limitations confirmed 
that it could not be usefully employed in this theatre.  Maritime Command continued to operate a 
reduced number of Argus maritime patrol aircraft that in addition to their ASW role now 
included additional tasks such as Arctic sovereignty patrols and non-military commitments such 
as pollution detection.  The Tracker aircraft, previously operated from the aircraft carrier HMCS 
Bonaventure until its retirement in 1970, continued to operate from the naval aviation shore base, 
CFB Shearwater, in a short-range coastal patrol role.  Air Transport Command, a major 
beneficiary of the 1964 Defence White Paper, underwent a limited modernization with the 
replacement of its twelve Yukon turbo-prop transports with five CC-137 (Boeing 707) jet 
transports during 1970-71. Two CC-137s were adapted for air-to-air refuelling of the CF-5 
fighters for deployment to Norway.  The acquisition of the five CC-137s was a far cry from the 
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original plan to acquire eleven Lockheed C-141 Starlifter military jet transports (and possibly the 
giant Lockheed C-5 Galaxy transports) that had fallen through in 1967, an acquisition that would 
have provided considerable airlift and flexibility for the mobile force.  The CC-137 aircraft and 
the twenty-four CC-130E Hercules transports that had been acquired as a result of the 1964 
White Paper were to remain the bulk of the Canadian Forces long-range airlift until the mid 
1990s.4  However, the fifteen Buffalo tactical transports that had entered service in 1967 as a 
battlefield transport with Mobile Command had a very short period of service in this capacity 
with their transfer to Air Transport Command in 1970 for the Search and Rescue role and for 
transport duties with the United Nations.  Within 10 TAG of Mobile Command, the tactical 
aviation elements experienced a tremendous expansion by 1975, though considerably less, as we 
have seen, than projected in the original 1967 concept.  A total of seven squadrons were 
established with the procurement of 132 light observation, utility and medium transport 
helicopters; no attack helicopters had been acquired.5  The Canadian Forces Air Element had 
achieved some limited modernization by the early 1970s, but its size and importance were 
greatly diminished.  More significantly, there was no strategic rationale for the organization and 
function of the various air components of the unified Canadian Armed Forces.  The Air Element 
had no independent role, but rather supported the other commands or carried out alliance 
commitments.  The three-year defence budget freeze at a time of high inflation had a devastating 
effect on the Air Element in the early 1970s with greatly reduced flying hours and aircraft in 
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service.  For example, the number of operational Voodoo aircraft was cut from forty-four to 
thirty-six aircraft and the number of Argus aircraft from thirty-two to twenty-six.    
The more vitriolic critics tend to blame everything on Trudeau, but most difficulties with 
the Canadian Forces in the late 1960s, including those of the Air Element, originated in the 
decisions of previous governments.6  A basic difficulty was inadequate funding as a result of cuts 
in the defence budget since the mid-1950s.  Capital equipment expenditures in the defence 
budget had fallen to thirteen per cent in 1966, and with the 1969 three-year budget freeze, the 
equipment portion fell further to eight per cent by 1972.  The Trudeau government’s re-ordering 
of defence priorities only five years after they had been previously re-arranged greatly added to 
the confusion that continued from the upheavals during Hellyer’s tenure as Defence Minister.  
Moreover, within five years of the changes announced by Trudeau in April 1969, defence policy 
had come full circle with the re-emphasis on NATO in the mid-1970s onwards.7  In addition, the 
rather muted support for peacekeeping in 1969 was resurrected with new commitments by 1973.8  
The top priority, the protection of national sovereignty, remained a dubious one.9  Expensive 
equipment that had been procured for warfighting roles was utilized without the necessary 
modifications for surveillance purposes.  Indeed, senior military officials did not “buy” into the 
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sovereignty protection role as a legitimate military function.  The only nation in a position to 
challenge Canadian sovereignty was the United States – and therefore the use of military force 
remained a moot point. 
The Defence Structure Review in 1974, apart from bringing increases in defence 
spending also reversed some policies set forth in the 1971 White Paper.  A Request For 
Proposals (RFP) in 1973 brought four responses to replace the Argus with a modern Long Range 
Patrol Aircraft (LRPA).10 By December, the choice had been narrowed to a version of the 
Lockheed P-3C Orion or the Boeing 707.11  At this stage, the LRPA programme almost came 
apart as industrial offsets were assigned a higher priority than the provision of an aircraft that 
could meet the military requirements.12  A budget ceiling of $1 billion was established that 
would allow for the acquisition of twenty-three Lockheed CP-140 Aurora aircraft (the Canadian 
version of the P-3 Orion) or sixteen Boeing 707 LRPA.  A contract was finally signed in July 
1976 for the procurement of only eighteen Aurora aircraft at a cost of $1.061 billion.  Despite 
arguments that more modern aircraft have a higher availability rate, there is a quality associated 
with quantity as well.  The eighteen Aurora aircraft simply could not replace thirty-two Argus 
aircraft, let alone the fifty-eight maritime patrol aircraft operated by RCAF Maritime Air 
Command in 1962.13  
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received for the Boeing 707, Hawker Siddeley HS801 Nimrod, Lockheed P-3C Orion and the McDonnell Douglas 
DC-10. 
11 Ibid. 
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 The replacement of the existing fighter force had been an ongoing issue since the mid 
1960s.  In the early 1970s, there had been speculation that the CF-101 and CF-104 fighters 
would finally be replaced by the McDonnell Douglas F-4E Phantom, but lack of funds, the 
absence of political will, and the over-riding priority of USAF needs for F-4 production for the 
war in South-East Asia were all factors that precluded replacement at that time.14 Finally, the 
Canadian government announced the New Fighter Aircraft (NFA) programme in March 1977 
that was designed to replace the CF-101, CF-104 and CF-5 fighter aircraft.15  The Canadian 
Forces had procured a total of 419 of these three types, but under the NFA programme they 
would be replaced by a maximum of 150 new fighters within a budget limit of $2.34 billion in 
1977 dollars.16  Again, as with the LRPA programme, industrial offsets often trumped military 
requirements. Invitations went to six fighter aircraft manufacturers, and five responded.17  
McDonnell Douglas proposed their F-15 Eagle, the most expensive aircraft and the one preferred 
by Air Command.18  However, the NFA budget would have limited the acquisition of the F-15 to 
only ninety-seven aircraft, an extreme shortfall to meet Air Force commitments.  Another option 
suggested a two-aircraft purchase with the Grumman F-14 Tomcat for North American air 
defence, and the General Dynamics F-16 for NATO tasks.  This would have meant two separate 
logistics and training systems and perpetuated the problems of earlier procurements of 
specialized aircraft such as the CF-101 and CF-104 that could not be adapted to other roles.  In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Gordon A.A. Wilson, NORAD and the Soviet Nuclear Threat: Canada’s Secret Electronic Air War, Dundurn: 
Toronto, 2011, p. 167. 
15 Department of National Defence, Defence 1979, Ottawa: Information Canada, 1980, p. 98.  By this time, the 
number of operational aircraft consisted of fifty-four CF-104, thirty-six CF-101 and twenty-four CF-5 fighters for a 
total of 114 aircraft, not including those required for training, testing, maintenance spares or attrition. 
16 John Gellner, “The Fight for the Fighter,” Canadian Aviation, Vol. 50, No. 12, December 1977. 
17 “Six fighters in competition to replace CF-101s, CF-104s,” Canadian Aviation, Vol. 50, No. 5, May 1977. 
18 See W.K. Carr, “The New Fighter Aircraft: Operational Requirements and Desirable Characteristics,” Canadian 
Defence Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 4, Spring 1976, and Hugh Whittington, “Interview - Lieut.-Gen. William K. Carr 
discusses new fighters, the air reserves, search and rescue and the Canadian Forces Air Command today,” Canadian 
Aviation, Vol. 50, No. 1, January 1977, pp. 7-8. 
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addition, the F-14 was expensive, like the F-15.  The acquisition of the F-16 alone raised the 
difficulty that a single engine aircraft was not considered suitable for North American defence.  
However, the F-16 allowed for the acquisition of 147 aircraft within the NFA budget, the largest 
number among all the types considered.  Another advantage was its interoperability with other 
NATO nations that had adopted the F-16. 19 
The McDonnell Douglas F-18A was a naval development of the YF-17, a competitor for 
the US Air Force lightweight fighter competition, and itself a development of the Northrop P.530 
Cobra, a candidate for the CAMRA in the 1960s.20  The F-18 had the advantage of twin-engines 
for use in the Far North, but in Europe it would be an “orphan aircraft.”  There was also the 
Northrop F-18L that was a cheaper land-based version of the F-18A, with the same technical 
antecedents.  The European option was the Panavia Tornado, the result of the NATO tri-nation 
consortium that had developed the Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA), the programme from 
which Canada had withdrawn in 1968.21  The Tornado was also an expensive aircraft, with twin 
engines, that would have been suitable for the North American interceptor and European 
interdiction roles, but it was not really suitable for the close air support role.  The sixth possible 
candidate, the Dassault Mirage 4000, did not elicit a response from the manufacturer.   
In the end the competition came down to a choice of 138 CF-18 or 147 CF-16 aircraft 
with the industrial offset benefits being a key factor in selection.  However, the military 
advantage of twin-engines and a greater growth potential for the CF-18 that promised well for 
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20 DHH 73/1223, Series 1, File 219, Equipment RCAF – Tactical Aircraft, S 1151-4110 TD. 7157, 6 June 1967, 
Canadian Advanced Multi-Role Aircraft (CAMRA) – NORTHROP P.530 Proposal.  See also Bill Gunston, F/A-18 
Hornet, Shepperton: Ian Allan Ltd, 1985.   
21 Bill Gunston, Panavia Tornado, Shepperton: Ian Allan Ltd, 1980.	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flexibility were certainly important factors in its final selection.22 The government selected the 
CF-18 aircraft as the winner in the NFA competition in late 1978, but no contract was signed 
prior to the Liberal government defeat in 1979.  The minority Progressive Conservative 
government declined to sign a contract, so that the NFA contract was not signed until the 
election of a majority Liberal government in 1980, a delay of two years. The selection of the CF-
18 represented a good decision by the Air Force and the government, as the Air Force finally 
acquired the multi-role aircraft that it had been seeking since the early 1960s.23  Despite some 
trepidation about operating an “orphan” naval fighter as the first Air Force to select the F-18, the 
aircraft was eventually adopted by six other air forces.  A negative aspect of the NFA 
programme, however, was the failure to take up the option of twenty additional CF-18 aircraft to 
offset attrition losses.  The air force’s continuing “commitment-capability gap” demonstrated 
that 138 CF-18 aircraft could not replace the hundreds of fighters previously operated.24 
 A fundamental organizational change in 1975 was the establishment of Air Command, a 
move that re-established a “de facto” air force within the unified Armed Forces.  Within the new 
Air Command, functional groups re-created the pre-unification Air Force structure: Air Defence 
Group, Air Transport Group, Maritime Air Group, and No. 10 Tactical Air Group.25  The 
exception was No. 1 Canadian Air Group that remained assigned to Canadian Forces Europe.26  
However, this “back to the future” approach brought mixed views.  From Stephen James’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 See John Gellner, “Let’s get on with the job,” Canadian Aviation, Vol. 52, No. 2, February 1979, and Hugh 
Whittington, “F-16 Got Benefit of All Doubt but Still Couldn’t Match F-18A,” Canadian Aviation, Vol. 53, No. 7, 
July 1980. 
23 See P.D. Manson, “The CF-18 Hornet – Canada’s New Fighter Aircraft,” Canadian Defence Quarterly, Vol. 10. 
No. 1, Summer 1980. 
24 Eight small operational squadrons were established, along with the Operational Training Unit, reflecting the 
NORAD and NATO commitments.  However, without attrition aircraft, this force structure could not have been 
maintained. 
25 Air Reserve Group and No. 14 Training Group were additional formations added later, reinforcing the return to 
the RCAF “traditional” command structure. 
26 There were obviously still numerous linkages between Air Command and No. 1 CAG. 
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perspective, the creation of Air Command ensured the survival of the “air force” as a separate 
organization within the Canadian Armed Forces.27  Ken Pennie, later the Commander of Air 
Command, wrote that the creation of Air Command resolved the post-unification problem by 
recognizing the basic tenet of air power, that is centralized command and control, a principle that 
had been entrenched in the RCAF both in an institutional and operational context.28   
In contrast, John Gellner, viewed the set up of Air Command as a retrograde development 
impinging on the promotion of the unified force for what today would be referred to as joint 
operations.29  Sean Maloney adopts an extreme view, suggesting conspiratorial action on the part 
of what he referred to as the “virtual air force” that destroyed the original concept of both Mobile 
Command and unification.30  Though there was now a theoretical centralized command and 
control of Canadian air power, in reality, the years of diffuse air power as a result of the 1965 
integrated/unified command structure, along with the unification process itself, had taken its toll.  
Air Command was a fractured institution as the air components of Mobile and Maritime 
Commands remained under their operational control.  These factors hindered resurgence of the 
Air Force, and the concept of independent air power.  The resulting confusion was readily 
apparent at the 1984 Air Force Doctrine Symposium where the disparate air force functional 
communities each demonstrated its own interpretation of air force doctrine.31 Stephen James 
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28 See K.R. Pennie, “The Impact of Unification on the Air Force,” in William A. March and Robert H. Thompson, 
(eds.), Papers Presented at the 1st Air Force Historical Conference, 18-19 November 1994, Winnipeg: Air 
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29 John Gellner, “Air Command,” Canadian Aviation, Vol. 48, No. 4, April 1975.  See also “Editorial – What will 
Air Command command?” Canadian Aviation, Vol. 48, No. 4, April 1975. 
30 See Sean M. Maloney, “ “Global Mobile II” The Development of Forces Mobile Command, 1965-1972,” The 
Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin, Vol. 4, No. 2, Summer 2001, pp. 20-21. 
31 Department of National Defence.  Air Force Doctrine Symposium: Summary of Proceedings, CFB Trenton, 24 
January 1984.  See also Aerospace Doctrine Study – Final Report, Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 30 
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decried “a federated air force absent of a unifying purpose.”32  By contrast the Air Force of the 
1950s was a force that been created for “strategic effect.”33  These were not the circumstances 
with the re-created Air Force of the 1970s that instead represented a case of survival mode.   
The Air Force had successfully made the case for both the LRPA and the NFA 
programmes, but there was considerable opposition to Air Force re-equipment.34  First and 
foremost, there was no longer a Canadian prime contractor for these programmes, so the focus 
was on offsets for Canadian industry, a practice that over-rode  military requirements in the 
government’s approach to defence procurement.   
The LRPA and NFA programmes began to produce results in the early 1980s, when a 
renewed chill in the Cold War justified the decisions to modernize the Air Force.  Several reports 
produced by the Special Committee of the Senate on National Defence highlighted the shortfalls 
in Canadian air power.  In its January 1985 Report, the committee recommended the North 
American air defence modernization, including the acquisition of twenty attrition CF-18 aircraft, 
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33 See Paul Dickson, “Harry Crerar and an Army for Strategic Effect,” Canadian Military History, Vol. 17, No. 1, 
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but without result.35  The following year, the Special Committee issued its report on “Military 
Air Transport” that examined the airlift and air mobility situation in Air Transport Group and 
No. 10 Tactical Air Group.36 Among the short-term recommendations of this report were the 
acquisition of one additional CC-137 jet transport, and an increase in the Hercules fleet from 
twenty-six to thirty-three aircraft by 1988.37 In the case of No. 10 Tactical Air Group, the 
committee noted the shortage of both Twin Huey and Chinook helicopters to support the Army.  
To rectify the short-term problem, three additional Chinook helicopters were needed to bring the 
fleet up to ten aircraft.38  In the longer term to the 1990s, there was a requirement to acquire sixty 
LOH to replace the Kiowa and thirty-five UTTH to replace the Twin Huey.39 
By the time that the Mulroney Progressive Conservative government issued its June 1987 
Defence White Paper, geostrategic events were unfolding so rapidly that the document was out-
of-date by April 1989.40  In terms of the Air Force, the Defence White Paper did not promise 
much.  A major organizational change was the re-establishment of No. 1 Air Division in Europe 
as a result of consolidation of the two separate NATO fighter aircraft commitments - two 
squadrons allocated to the NATO Northern Flank and the three squadrons assigned to the Central 
Region AAFCE/4th ATAF.  Apart from re-establishing the Air Division Headquarters in 
Germany, the peacetime stationing of fighter aircraft remained limited to the three squadrons 
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now re-organized into No. 4 Wing at Baden-Soellingen.  In the event of an emergency or war, 
No. 3 Wing with its two squadrons would be deployed to Lahr, West Germany.  However, unlike 
the “glory days” for the Air Division during the 1950s, even with the deployment of the two 
wings in Germany, only seventy-eight CF-18 fighter aircraft would be available compared to the 
Big Air Force period of twelve Sabre squadrons with 300 jet fighters.  However, the White Paper 
did promise to correct long outstanding deficiencies by undertaking improvements for airfield 
defence and logistics support for the Air Division.41   
The other major promise for the Air Force in the 1987 White Paper was the acquisition of 
six additional Aurora Long-Range Patrol Aircraft, a recognition that too few aircraft had been 
procured under the original programme.42 A proposal to upgrade the Tracker coastal patrol 
aircraft with turboprop engines in lieu of the piston engines did not come to fruition and the 
aircraft was withdrawn from service in 1990.  There was no expansion or modernization of other 
elements of the Air Force prior to the end of the Cold War – air transport and tactical aviation 
remained essentially the same since the early 1970s.43  The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 
1989, culminating with the dissolution of the Soviet Union on 26 December 1991, marked the 
end of the Air Force involvement in the Cold War, the longest campaign in its history. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 The government invested in the $800 million Low Level Air Defence project consisting of antiaircraft guns, 
surface-to-air missiles and radar systems.  See W.H. Welsh, “The Canadian Forces and Airfield Defence,” Canadian 
Defence Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 4, Spring 1980, and Michael Slack and Martin Shadwick, “Low Level Air Defence: 
The Canadian Dimension,” Canadian Defence Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 1, Summer 1984.  To correct logistics 
deficiencies, the White Paper announced the Allied Command Europe Logistics and Medical Support (ALMS) 
project designed not only to improve the provision of logistics support, but also to ensure its survivability through 
the dispersal of logistics installations and lines of communication.  The author was involved in the ALMS project 
during Defence White Paper implementation 1987-89. 
42 In the end, only three CP-140A Arcturus aircraft were obtained (essentially the Aurora without the ASW 
equipment).    
43 See George E.C. Macdonald, “The Air Force Programme: Implementing the White Paper,” Canadian Defence 
Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 4, Spring 1988. Macdonald noted the intent to build up to a fleet of forty-five Hercules 
aircraft by 2000 and the build up of the Air Reserve from 950 to 8,000 personnel.  Neither of these objectives was 
attained. 
	  
	  
 299 
Conclusion  
Throughout the last quarter century of the Cold War, the government and the Air Force 
failed to achieve a balanced priority among the competing three pillars of politics and 
economics, strategy and technology for the development of the Big Air Force that existed in the 
early 1960s.  Ultimately, it was the political and associated fiscal dimension that was the 
deciding factor that overrode the strategic and technological issues. 
From 1948 to 1957, the RCAF had successfully grown into the leading Tier 1 air force 
amongst the middle powers.  Along with the build up of the RCAF, there had been the equally 
successful expansion of the Canadian aviation industry that was integral to the Big Air Force 
concept.  Senior leadership at all levels – government, the RCAF and industry – had effectively 
put Possony’s “elements of air power” into practice.  During the 1950s, “airmindedness” 
amongst the political leadership was a driving force that enabled both the RCAF and the aircraft 
industry to succeed.  The RCAF leadership, however, failed to appreciate the extent to which 
changing technology (especially the rise of nuclear weapons), evolving international relations, 
and new fiscal agendas in domestic politics eroded airmindedness. Thus the RCAF was not well-
positioned to meet future challenges such as the re-roling and re-equipment of No. 1 Air 
Division, the changing demands of North American air defence or the new requirements of 
peacekeeping and mobile expeditionary forces.  Eliot Cohen and John Gooch explained the need 
to appreciate the factors of learning, anticipation, and adaptation in order to understand why 
military organizations fail.44   
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In the case of the RCAF, it was a young service that had gained independence from the 
Army only in 1938 and thereafter experienced almost continuous expansion during the Second 
World War and then in the early Cold War.  Under these circumstances,  there was no previous 
model that could have been utilized as a guide for future air force development.  The RCAF 
could have been more pro-active in studying possible future developments, but, equipment rather 
than policy tended to define service roles, the prime example being the manner in which the 
service placed “all its eggs into a single basket” with the Avro Arrow programme.45 
Understandably, the failure to adapt has been viewed as a failure of command.46 This failure led 
to a RCAF that was hard pressed to defend its requirements against other more compelling new 
defence and non-defence needs. In their study, Why Air Forces Fail: The Anatomy of Defeat, 
authors Robin Higham and Stephen Harris postulate, “Service doctrine that is not in harmony 
with government policy is likely to produce circumstances in which air forces will fail; 
government policy made in isolation of service capabilities tends to do the same.” 47 In the case 
of the RCAF during the Cold War, this is the situation that developed by the end of the St. 
Laurent government.  During its expansion after the February 1951 defence announcement, the 
RCAF and the government had a synchronized policy that enabled the RCAF to emerge as the 
dominant service in Canada seemingly representative of this Golden Age. The Big Air Force 
enabled the government to make a critical and credible contribution to Western defence for a 
short period time, reflecting a continuation of the earlier approach of “limited liability” based on 
air power and industry by previous Liberal governments.  Compelled by alliance expectations to 
make Canadian Army contributions to the UN forces in Korea and to the Integrated Force in 
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NATO, the Big Air Force concept provided the government with a viable alternative when 
discussion arose regarding increased army contributions to NATO or the UN, with the attendant 
spectre of conscription. 
   National capabilities that made possible RCAF expansion during the St. Laurent years 
included a well-developed industrial and educational infrastructure that enabled the necessary 
equipment and personnel, the required logistics support, political endorsement, and technological 
development.48 These vital assets, however, were of limited value in the absence of coherent 
strategic vision.49  For political and economic reasons, the Big Air Force concept could not be 
continued on an indefinite basis.  Simply put, Canada could not afford the Big Air Force as 
envisioned by the RCAF leadership. The RCAF was cut down in size by the Liberal government 
under Lester Pearson.  During the Trudeau and Mulroney years, despite modernization during 
the 1980s, it was the “minimalist air force” rather than the Big Air Force concept that 
prevailed.50 
The demise of the Big Air Force was evident both in the quantity and quality of its aircraft 
holdings.  From a peak of 2,968 aircraft in 1956, the RCAF had declined to 1,300 aircraft by 
1963.51  Further decreases resulted in holdings of 1,080 aircraft by 1973, and by the end of the 
Cold War, these numbers had further decreased to 692 aircraft representing nineteen different 
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types, including 285 older jet trainers.52  In terms of quality, the Big Air Force in the 1950s had 
been equipped with top-of-the-line fighters such as the Sabre and the CF-100.  Their 
replacements in the 1960s, the CF-104 and the CF-101 were primarily selected on political and 
fiscal grounds rather than as the best available equipment for the RCAF.  The dubious 
acquisition of the CF-5 represented a clear case of the danger associated with political 
interference in RCAF aircraft procurement.  In the 1980s, the acquisition of the CF-18 and the 
CP-140 Aurora provided the air force with advanced modern equipment.  However, the 
procurement of 138 CF-18s to replace 419 CF-101, CF-104 and CF-5 aircraft, and eighteen CP-
140 to replace thirty-two CP-107 Argus aircraft in no way provided the same degree of 
capability.  Despite the acquisition of these more modern aircraft, a sufficient number of 
operational aircraft to offset attrition losses and aircraft undergoing maintenance has a quality of 
its own.                                                
 As early as 1952 the chiefs of staff of the armed forces acknowledged that the RCAF re-
armament programme was not sustainable, and this became more apparent as the decade 
progressed.53 For most Canadians – politicians, military officers, aircraft industry workers, and 
the general public – the unaffordability of the Big Air Force reached home with the cancellation 
of the Avro CF-105 Arrow programme in 1958-59.  If the project had adhered to its original 
parameters of solely developing the airframe, and utilizing off-the-shelf items for the other 
systems, then, it is conceivably possible that the aircraft would have been economically feasible.  
The continuing success of the RSAF and the Swedish aircraft industry in producing indigenous 
fighter aircraft demonstrated this possibility.  However, there were also many aircraft 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 See “World Air Forces,” Flight International, No. 4397, Vol. 144, 24-30 November 1993, p. 47.  These jet 
trainers included eighty-one CF-5, 114 CT-114 Tutor and sixty CT-133 Silver Star aircraft, many of them in storage. 
53 DHH 73/1223, Series 3, File 1307A, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Minutes of a Special Meeting, 15 January 1952.	  
 303 
development failures in such disparate nations as Switzerland, Italy, India, Egypt and 
Argentina.54 This would suggest that airmindedness required more than a willingness to expend 
funds from the national treasury on what might referred to as national “signature projects.”   In 
his study of the BOMARC missile programme, Robert Clark noted: 
Much of the success realized by the RCAF in their struggle with the Canadian Army 
in advocating their weapons programs is attributable to the structure of the Chiefs of 
Staff Committee.  Senior RCAF officers became adept at using the Committee 
system to stonewall undesirable rival programs.  Throughout the 1950s the RCAF 
developed into the most assertive and self-confident service in the Canadian Forces.55 
The perpetuation of Avro Arrow mythology continues to direct public animosity towards 
the Progressive Conservative government of John Diefenbaker.  Though the Diefenbaker 
government committed numerous mistakes in the management of defence policy, and 
particularly in the case of the RCAF, the government made the correct decision to cancel the 
Avro Arrow programme.  What is often forgotten is that this decision was based on the 
recommendation of the Air Staff and the Chiefs of Staff Committee.  The cancellation of the 
Avro Arrow, though it caused serious damage to the Big Air Force concept, did not result in its 
demise at that time.  Despite the change in the focus of air defence from “defending the nation” 
to that of “defending the deterrent,” the RCAF still realized its need to replace the CF-100 
interceptor for Air Defence Command.  Commenting on the Avro Arrow affair, James Eayrs 
wrote that, “the cancellation of this project seven years later, after the aircraft had reached the 
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55 Clark, pp. 24-25. 
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prototype stage of development…dealt to the prestige and morale of the Air Force a blow from 
which it never fully recovered.  Pride led to hubris, hubris to the CF-105.”56 
If “pride” and “hubris” led to the downfall of the Avro CF-105 Arrow programme, then the 
same could be applied to the adoption of the nuclear strike role and the selection of the CF-104 
Starfighter.  By 1958-59 when the strike role was under consideration by the RCAF, there was 
already significant evidence for the need to build up NATO conventional air forces and this was 
readily apparent by the time the Air Division had re-equipped in 1963.57  However, the adoption 
of the strike role meant the retention of an “independent” role for the RCAF; the service would 
not be relegated to supporting the Army.58 Its significant participation in the strike role enabled 
the RCAF to participate in the “big leagues” of operational planning and targeting in NATO 
circles. At one point, the RCAF provided 20 per cent of the 4ATAF day and night nuclear strike 
force.59 
Though the CF-104 was designated as a “fighter,” in the strike role the aircraft was 
developed as a tactical bomber.  The RCAF Ultimate War Plan of the early 1950s had envisaged 
the development of a bombing capability in the event of general war, then envisaged as a largely 
conventional and prolonged conflict that would allow time for the kind of mobilization that had 
taken place in the Second World War.60  However, the RCAF had then ruled out the bomber role 
after the failed attempt during the “Closing the Gap” deliberations in the lead up to the 1952 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, Volume 3 – Peacemaking and Deterrence, Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1972, p. 123. 
57 John Gellner, “Canada in NATO and NORAD,” Air University Review, Vol. XVIII, No. 3, March-April 1967, pp. 
25, 28-29. 
58 Raymond Stouffer, “Nuclear Virgin or Nuclear Strike?  John Diefenbaker and the Selection of the CF-104 
Starfighter,” in W.A. March, ed., Sic Atur Ad Astra, Canadian Aerospace Power Studies – Volume 3: Combat if 
Necessary, but Not Necessarily Combat, Department of National Defence: Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare 
Centre, Trenton, Ontario, 2011. 
59 Clearwater, pp. 110-111. 
60 DHH 73/1223, Series 3, Subseries 13, Minutes of the 155th Meeting of the Air Members, 21 May 1952, pp. 2-3. 
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Lisbon Conference for the creation of a second RCAF air division equipped with light 
bombers.61 Instead, the RCAF had emphasized the build up of an effective corps of air defence 
jet fighters both in Canada and Europe, until the nuclear interdiction mission opened a fresh 
opportunity. 
  Despite characterization of the strike role as defensive, a commentator in the open press 
noted a report that “the Defence Department has been somewhat astonished at the fact that so far 
there has been no criticism of the change in the 14-year old role of the RCAF as an instrument of 
strictly defensive character.”62 The CAS, Air Marshal Dunlap, described the RCAF as a deterrent 
force in his testimony to the Parliamentary Special Committee on Defence in 1963.63 
Although RCAF officers might regard nuclear warheads as just another weapon in the 
arsenal, it was much more difficult for Canadian political leaders to do so.  The decision by 
Lester Pearson in 1963 that Canada would honour its commitments to arm its nuclear weapons 
systems included the caveat for re-negotiation to extricate the country from these commitments 
as soon as possible.  The adoption of the CF-104 and the strike role provided life-support for the 
Big Air Force concept with the large procurement of 238 aircraft.  It was only a respite, however, 
for the new Liberal government soon ruled that there should be no follow-on CF-104 order and 
the force structure could not be sustained.64  Nevertheless, the CF-104 programme ultimately 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 The two Auxiliary light bomber squadrons equipped with the obsolete Mitchell until 1958 could not really be 
considered an effective bomber capability by any stretch of the imagination. 
62 “Role of the CF-104,” Aircraft, Vol. 22, No. 1, January 1960. 
63 Air Marshal C.R. Dunlap Testimony, Special Committee on Defence, 31 October 1963. 
64 Among the RCAF’s supersonic fighters, the CF-104 suffered from the highest accident rate, losing 110 out of 238 
aircraft during its twenty-five years of service. In comparison, the CF-101 Voodoo accident loss rate was ten out of 
sixty-six aircraft over ten years. 
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cost the RCAF and the taxpayer in excess of one billion dollars representing the most expensive 
defence programme of that period.65 
The CF-104 programme should be viewed as a failure on the part of the RCAF senior 
leadership for its inability to clearly enunciate to the government the strategic rationale for the 
strike role in terms of Canadian defence policy.66 This failure was compounded by the fact that 
the CF-104 was unsuitable for other roles.67 Commenting on “the Starfighter affair,” Gellner 
noted 
The hope is that the CF-104 case may have taught our decision-makers a few 
valuable lessons.  The three most important are: When buying a military aircraft, 
think of industrial benefits by all means, but do not put them before military 
considerations; do not expect an aircraft that was specifically designed to do job X, 
to do job Y efficiently, in other words, do not count on miracles; bear the need for 
standardization in mind, but not to the point of taking what others want us to have if 
it does not suit our own requirements.68 
The lack of another role for the CF-104 gave credence to those critics who argued that Canadian 
defence policy had been based purely on its alliance membership.69 The Liberal government’s 
attempt to continue existing alliance commitments while also introducing new roles and 
simultaneously trimming funding, contributed greatly to the increasingly Potemkin-village-like 
quality of the RCAF: the resources available were insufficient to sustain the alliance 
commitments let alone give substance to the new roles.   
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Rather paradoxically, in the wake of the failures associated with the Avro CF-105 Arrow 
and CF-104 programmes, failure was also the end result of the highly lauded tactical fighter 
programme announced in the 1964 Defence White Paper.  Partly from a determination not to 
accede to the demands of the air marshals for  “nothing but the best”  (the F-4 Phantom) but also 
recognizing that a less expensive close air support aircraft was more suitable for  “brushfire 
wars,” Hellyer instead ordered 115 inexpensive CF-5 aircraft that were unsuitable for the tactical 
fighter role.70 The CF-5 fiasco once again demonstrated that the RCAF had little interest in 
supporting the Army.  
By contrast, the modernization and expansion of Air Transport Command, particularly the 
acquisition of a relatively large number of Lockheed C-130 Hercules transports, represented a 
positive development in Canadian air power.   This provided the capability for rapid deployment 
of troops wherever the government decided they should be committed, including missions for the 
UN duties, and on the NATO flanks.  There was also the embryonic development of tactical 
aviation designed to support the Army that reached the apex of its development and expansion in 
the next decade.  In both instances, this was use of air power in a supporting role for the Army, 
not the “independent” application of air power as represented by strategic air defence or the 
strike-reconnaissance role.   
By the mid 1960s, the air force was caught in an unresolvable conflict between two 
concepts of air power, “Douhet with nukes,” and Mitchell’s “anything that flies.”  On the one 
hand, there was the institutional RCAF that had embraced the independent roles of the  “nuclear 
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air force” with its CF-104s, CF-101s and BOMARCs.  On the other hand, there was the actual 
development of a more balanced and flexible force designed to contend with the more likely 
forms of expected conflict.  The Carpenter Report stressed  “flexibility” in its proposed force 
structure.  In reality, the RCAF had to contend with the inflexibility of operating specialized 
aircraft designed for single roles that could not be utilized for other purposes.  With its insistence 
on the “nuclear air force,” the RCAF failed to provide flexible air power that would have 
provided the government with choices, hence the imposition of strong political direction in what 
should have been essentially military decisions. The Carpenter Report provided the RCAF with 
an alternative vision for the future that was completely ignored – at the air force’s peril.   
The lack of a coherent strategy, economic folly, political legerdemain, and military 
parochialism were all factors that lead to the demise of the Big Air Force Concept.  With 
Trudeau’s 3 April 1969 Defence Policy Statement, air power in the Canadian Forces was 
reduced to a hodge-podge collection of various types of aging military aircraft that now added a 
number of non-military tasks to their repertoire.  This was a far cry from the 1951 
pronouncement that “Canada will become the third ranking air power in the free world and 
probably the second ranking air training nation.”71 
  The expansion of the RCAF into one of the world’s leading air forces during the St. 
Laurent years represented a considerable achievement for a nation of 14 million people.    A 
dynamic political and military leadership acknowledged the need to allocate the required 
resources to counter the perceived threat.  The existence of a strong aviation industry ensured the 
development and production of aircraft to meet not only the operational needs of the RCAF, but 
also the requirements for the RCAF’s greatly expanded training system that supported NATO 
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needs, and the provision of aircraft to Allied air forces.  However, the RCAF’s weaknesses in 
long range planning for force development plagued the service and contributed to its eventual 
decline and demise. Colin Gibson’s vision of a balanced air force in 1946 that could support the 
Army in the field did not reflect what eventually emerged as the Canadian version of air power 
with the “nuclear air force” of the early 1960s.  The development and implementation of the Big 
Air Force occurred at a unique time in the nation’s history during the St. Laurent years: “In 1945, 
it had been expected that the central government’s preoccupation would be social security and 
domestic improvement.  Instead it was defence.”72 A significant portion of this preoccupation on 
defence was the attention devoted to air power.  By the late 1950s, the quest for improved social 
and economic development had re-emerged as the priority for both political leaders and the 
public, challenging the rationale for the Big Air Force concept.  The existence of unique 
circumstances enabled the RCAF to develop the Big Air Force to become Canada’s first line of 
defence and to represent the “Canadian way of war” during this vital period of the Cold War, 
circumstances that are not likely to be repeated.  
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